Almost Is Not Nothing: The All-Or-Nothing Error From Plato To "Almost Persuaded," And How Epicurus Answered It
This article was first published on EpicurusToday.com. Every citation below links to the passage itself in the texts on that site.
Even The Early Church Fathers Knew That “All Sins Are Equal” Was A Stoic Absurdity. Its Roots Go Back To Plato.
“Almost” Is But To Fail
In 1871 the American hymn writer Philip P. Bliss published a song that went on to appear in hundreds of hymnals. It was suggested by a sermon in which the preacher, a Mr. Brundage, declared that “he who is almost persuaded is almost saved, but to be almost saved is to be entirely lost.” Bliss took his title from the words of King Agrippa to Paul: “Almost thou persuadest me to be a Christian” (Acts 26:28, KJV). The last verse of the hymn states the lesson:
Quote“Almost persuaded,” harvest is past! “Almost persuaded” doom comes at last! “Almost” cannot avail; “Almost” is but to fail! Sad, sad, that bitter wail, “Almost,” but lost!
P. P. Bliss, “Almost Persuaded” (1871)
The hymn rests on a strand of theology that many readers will recognize. “For all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God” (Romans 3:23). “For whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all” (James 2:10). “Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect” (Matthew 5:48). From verses like these, much popular preaching draws the conclusion that God detests all sin equally, that the smallest fault separates a man from God as completely as the greatest crime, and that the only two conditions that finally matter are saved and lost.
This is not a uniquely Christian idea. It is one form of an error that is far older than the hymn, older than the New Testament, and older than Epicurus. It begins with Plato. The Stoics turned it into a system. The early Christian thinkers who inherited it knew where it came from, and some of them said so. The error has a single root, and once that root is brought to the front, we can see how it corrupts nearly every part of philosophy: what is good, what is happiness, what is knowledge, what is progress, what is justice, and what divinity would be. Most important of all, it corrupts what pleasure is. Carried into Epicurus’ own teaching, it turns his statement that the limit of pleasure is the removal of all pain into the false claim that pleasure has no real degrees, and that the only pleasure worth having is complete absence of pain.
The root error is this: setting a standard of perfection outside this world, against which every human distance becomes the same distance.
Where It Starts: Plato And The Test Of “More And Less”
In the Philebus, Plato divides things into those that have a limit and those that “admit of more and less,” and he asks where pleasure belongs. Philebus, the champion of pleasure in the dialogue, answers badly by asserting that pleasure can and should be infinite:
QuoteSOCRATES: Have pleasure and pain a limit, or do they belong to the class which admits of more and less?
PHILEBUS: They belong to the class which admits of more, Socrates; for pleasure would not be perfectly good if she were not infinite in quantity and degree.
SOCRATES: Nor would pain, Philebus, be perfectly evil. And therefore the infinite cannot be that element which imparts to pleasure some degree of good.
Plato, Philebus 27e-28a (tr. Jowett)
Socrates’ point is sound as far as it goes: something that can always be increased is never complete. But Plato then makes a second argument, and this is where the trouble starts. He places completeness outside the world we live in. In the Timaeus he divides “that which always is and has no becoming” from “that which is always becoming and never is” (Timaeus 27d-28a). The things we see and feel, the things of this world, belong to becoming. They never fully are what they are. True being belongs only to the eternal patterns, the Forms, which reason alone can grasp.
Plato applies this test directly to pleasure and finds it lacking. Later in the Philebus, Socrates praises the philosophers who taught “that pleasure was a generation only, and had no true being at all,” and concludes that “pleasure, being a generation, will be rightly placed in some other class than that of good” (Philebus 54). On this view nothing in human experience can ever be complete, because nothing in human experience is real in the full sense. Completeness, in pleasure or in anything else, does exist, but not in this world.
Once the standard is placed outside the world, a strange thing happens to every measurement inside it. If the target is infinitely far away, then every finite distance from it is the same. A man one step from the Form and a man a thousand steps from it are both infinitely short. Measured against something with no edge, all distances collapse into one.
The Stoics Make It A System
The Stoics took Plato’s test and drew the conclusion without flinching. They held that virtue is the only good and that it is all or nothing. Diogenes Laertius records:
QuoteFor the Stoics say, that as a stick must be either straight or crooked, so a man must be either just or unjust, and cannot be more just than just, or more unjust than unjust; and that the same rule applies to all cases.
Diogenes Laertius VII.127 (tr. Yonge)
And from that it follows that all faults are equal:
QuoteFor the man who is a hundred furlongs from Canopus, and the man who is only one, are both equally not in Canopus; and so too, he who commits a greater sin, and he who commits a less, are both equally not in the right path.
Diogenes Laertius VII.120 (tr. Yonge)
Cicero’s Cato draws the conclusion for human progress:
QuoteFor just as a drowning man is no more able to breathe if he be not far from the surface of the water, so that he might at any moment emerge, than if he were actually at the bottom already, and just as a puppy on the point of opening its eyes is no less blind than one just born, similarly a man that has made some progress towards the state of virtue is none the less in misery than he that has made no progress at all.
Cicero, On Ends III.48 (tr. Rackham)
Compare this to the words of the hymn. The man nearly at the surface drowns with the man at the bottom. The man almost persuaded is lost with the man who never listened. “‘Almost’ is but to fail.” The Stoic drowning man and the Christian hymn’s lost soul are the same figure.
The Early Christian Thinkers Knew Where It Came From
Our theme here is not a unique modern insight. Two of the most influential Latin Christian writers of the late fourth and early fifth centuries AD both identified the doctrine that all sins are equal as Stoic.
Around AD 393, Jerome wrote two books against a monk named Jovinian, who taught, among other things, that all sins are equal and that there is one grade of reward and punishment in the next life. Jerome mocked him for switching schools whenever it suited him:
QuoteIn sexual intercourse and full feeding he is an Epicurean; in the distribution of rewards and punishments he all at once becomes a Stoic, He exchanges Jerusalem for Citium, Judæa for Cyprus, Christ for Zeno. If we may not depart a hair’s breadth from virtue, and all sins are equal, and a man who in a fit of hunger steals a piece of bread is no less guilty than he who slays a man: you must, in your turn, be held guilty of the greatest crimes.
Jerome, Against Jovinianus II.21 (tr. Fremantle, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers)
Citium in Cyprus was the home of Zeno, the founder of Stoicism. At the end of the work Jerome says he has “pulverized Zeno’s old opinion” (II.35).
About twenty years later, Augustine wrote to Jerome asking how James 2:10 should be understood: “Whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all.” Augustine was troubled, because the verse seemed to teach the Stoic doctrine, and he said so plainly:
QuoteThe doctrine of the equality of sins, however, the Stoics alone dared to maintain in opposition to the unanimous sentiments of mankind: an absurd tenet, which in writing against Jovinianus (a Stoic in this opinion, but an Epicurean in following after and defending pleasure) you have most clearly refuted from the Holy Scriptures.
Augustine, Letter 167.4 (to Jerome, AD 415; tr. Cunningham, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers)
So the leading theologians of the Latin church rejected the equality of sins and traced the erroneous concept to Zeno. Later Catholic teaching kept a distinction between mortal and venial sins, and it could point to the New Testament itself: “All unrighteousness is sin: and there is a sin not unto death” (1 John 5:17), and Jesus’ words to Pilate, “he that delivered me unto thee hath the greater sin” (John 19:11).
Why, then, does the all-or-nothing idea keep coming back in hymns like “Almost Persuaded” and in preaching that God detests all sin equally? Because rejecting equal sins did not remove the root error. Jerome himself, summing up his argument, describes the final judgment as “the sheep and goats on the right hand and the left, the righteous and the wicked … distributed into two classes” (II.35). Augustine and Jerome allowed that one sin is worse than another, but the standard by which men are finally judged still stood outside this world, in the perfection of God, and the final verdict was still two-valued: saved or lost. Measured against that standard, “all have sinned, and come short.” Grading sins inside a system whose last word is all or nothing softens the system without changing it. The hymn simply says explicitly what the system implies at its end.
One Error, Many Corruptions
The same structure turns up wherever a standard of perfection is set outside the world and then used to measure the things inside it. Here are seven places where it does its damage. The last of them, pleasure, is the most important of all for anyone trying to understand Epicurus.
1. Goodness. If the good is perfection, every fault is the same failure. The Stoics said all sins are equal. James says that to offend in one point is to be guilty of all. The man who steals bread when he is starving and the man who commits murder fall into one class. Cicero answered the Stoic version with a musical analogy that drives home the right answer to the problem:
QuoteSuppose, says my opponent, of a number of lyres not one is so strung as to be in tune; then all are equally out of tune; similarly with transgressions, since all are departures from rule, all are equally departures from rule; therefore all are equal.— Here we are put off with an equivocation. All the lyres equally are out of tune; but it does not follow that all are equally out of tune.
Cicero, On Ends IV.75 (tr. Rackham)
That one sentence states the whole error. That all are short of the standard is true. That all are equally short does not follow.
2. Happiness. If happiness is perfection, no human being is ever happy. For the Stoics, only the sage is happy, and Cicero asked of the sage, “who ever was? or when, or where, or how?” (On Ends IV.65). For Plato, pleasure is only “a generation” and never complete. For the theology behind the hymn, true happiness waits in the next life, and this one is a trial. In every version the happy life is moved out of reach, and the actual pleasures and joys of men and women are counted as nothing.
3. Knowledge. If knowledge means certainty that can never be wrong, then nobody knows anything. The Stoics and the Academic skeptics agreed that nothing is more disgraceful for a wise man than to assent to something false. Cicero puts it this way: “there is nothing more incompatible with the idea which we have of the gravity of a wise man than error, levity, and temerity” (Academic Questions II.20). The Stoics claimed their sage could tell true from false without fail. The skeptics answered that no one can, and concluded that “the wise man will restrain all assent” (II.21). Both sides took infallibility as the standard. The only disagreement was whether anyone meets it. The skeptic is simply a man who has looked at an all-or-nothing standard of knowledge, seen that he cannot meet it, and chosen nothing.
4. Reality. If being means eternal sameness, the world we live in is not fully real. For Plato, the things of sense are “always in a process of becoming and perishing and never really” are. On this view the tree, the friend, and the meal are shadows of patterns that exist somewhere else. The world of the senses is demoted because it does not meet a standard of changeless perfection that nobody has ever seen.
5. Progress. If perfection is all that counts, progress counts for nothing. This is the most practical damage of all. The Stoic drowning man near the surface is no better off than the man at the bottom. The hymn’s soul who is almost persuaded is totally lost. On this view there is no reason to celebrate the student who has come most of the way, the man who has overcome most of his anger, or the friend who has become more honest. Cicero saw the harm and offered better analogies: “one man’s eyesight is dim, another’s general health is weak; apply remedies, and they get better day by day; every day the one is stronger and the other sees better; similarly with all who earnestly pursue virtue; they get better, their vices and errors are gradually reduced” (On Ends IV.65). In this, Cicero is much closer to the Epicurean attitude than to the Stoic.
6. Justice and divinity. If the lawgiver’s standard is perfection, every offense is an offense against an infinite majesty, and every offense deserves the same final sentence. Jerome’s hungry thief and his murderer stand in one class. And the god who stands behind such a standard is a god who is offended, who detests, and who judges. The idea that a perfect being is perpetually angry at imperfection is itself a product of the same root.
7. Pleasure. This is where the error does the most harm to Epicurean philosophy, because it turns Epicurus’ own doctrine against him. Epicurus said that the limit of pleasure is the removal of all pain. Read through all-or-nothing eyes, that sentence seems to say two things he never said. The first is that pleasure has no real degrees: a pleasure is either complete, with no pain anywhere, or it does not count. The second is that the only pleasure worth having is complete absence of pain, so that the whole of Epicurean ethics reduces to escaping pain, and the pleasures of an ordinary life, mixed as they always are with some pain somewhere, are counted as failures.
Plato prepared the way for this reading. In the Philebus he treats pleasures mixed with pain as false and admits only “pure” pleasures into the good life, and he says that pleasure in general is “a generation only,” never a complete thing. Once that frame is accepted, Epicurus’ limit is heard as one more pure Form to be reached or missed, and everything below it is only “becoming.” The result is the picture of Epicurus found in so many modern summaries: a man who taught that the goal of life is tranquility or absence of pain, who wanted us to cut our desires down until nothing could hurt us, and who had nothing to say for the vivid, varied, and exuberant pleasures of a life well lived. The all-or-nothing reading makes him a mystic waiting for perfect stillness, or an ascetic who prefers having nothing to the risk of wanting something.
This is the reverse of what Epicurus taught. “Every pleasure then because of its natural kinship to us is good” (Letter to Menoeceus 129). We judge “every good” by the feeling of pleasure, and we choose among pleasures “by a scale of comparison and by the consideration of advantages and disadvantages” (130). A scale of comparison is a scale of degrees. If there were no degrees of pleasure below the limit, there would be nothing to compare, and the whole Epicurean method of choice and avoidance would have nothing to work on. And Torquatus does not say that the wise man is happy because he feels no pain. He says that pains, if any befall him, never prevent the wise man “from finding more reasons for joy than for vexation” (On Ends I.62, tr. Reid). How a limit can be real without making everything below it worthless is the question we address below in the section “Why The Limit Does Not Make Lesser Degrees Worthless.”
The Common Thread
Every one of these corruptions works the same way. First, a standard is placed outside the world we can see, touch, and feel: the Form of the Good, the perfect sage, the perfect knowledge of the infallible wise man, the glory of God, the pure pleasure with no trace of pain anywhere in a life. Second, that standard is treated as having no edge that we can see, nothing in our experience on the other side of it to mark where it ends. Third, every human condition is measured against it, and since every human condition falls infinitely short of something infinitely distant, every human condition falls short by the same amount. The result is a world with only two classes in it: perfect and not perfect, wise and foolish, saved and lost, and, when the same reasoning is turned on Epicurus, complete absence of pain on one side and every other pleasure, counted as failure, on the other.
That result contradicts what everyone actually experiences. We know that a man one furlong from Canopus is nearly there. We know that the student who has learned most of the lesson is better off than the one who has not opened the book. We know that stealing bread is not murder. And we know that an evening of good food and conversation with friends, or the rush of reaching a summit, is a real pleasure, even on a day that also held some pain. The all-or-nothing thinker does not deny that we know these things. He says that what we know does not matter, because what matters is measured somewhere else.
Epicurus’ Answer
Epicurus accepted part of Plato’s test and rejected the rest. He agreed that the highest good must have a limit, and he agreed that something which can always be increased is never complete. But he denied that the limit lies outside the world, and he denied that a limit makes everything below it worthless. Above all, he denied that the limit of pleasure makes lesser pleasures worthless.
A Limit Is Seen Against What Lies Beyond It
Epicurus’ physics explains what a limit is:
QuoteMoreover, the universe is boundless. For that which is bounded has an extreme point: and the extreme point is seen against something else. So that as it has no extreme point, it has no limit; and as it has no limit, it must be boundless and not bounded.
Diogenes Laertius X.41 (tr. Bailey)
Lucretius gives the evidence anyone can see: “before our eyes one thing is seen to bound another; air is as a wall between the hills, and mountains between tracts of air, land bounds the sea, and again sea bounds all lands; yet the universe in truth there is nothing to limit outside” (Lucretius I.998-1001, tr. Bailey).
A limit, then, is not a pattern in another realm. It is an edge, and an edge is seen against what lies on the other side of it, the way the shore is seen against the sea. The only thing that has no limit is the universe as a whole, because nothing lies outside it. Plato’s arrangement is the reverse of the truth. The truth is that the things that have real limits are the things in this world, and their limits are known by contrast with other things in this world.
Pleasure has such a limit, because pleasure has something on its other side: pain. “The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful” (Principal Doctrine 3, tr. Bailey). Once pain is removed, pleasure “is not increased … but is only varied” (Principal Doctrine 18). The good has a top, and so it can be complete. But the top is not in another world. The top is known the way we know the edge of the sea: by what lies beyond it.
The Standard Is In This World
Because the limit is seen against its opposite, Epicurus did not need a standard outside the world to measure anything by. He held that we come to know what things are through examples, not definitions. We know horse and cow because we have met many of each and seen how they differ (X.33). We know heat against cold, light against dark, and pleasure against pain. Torquatus refused to give Cicero a definition of pleasure: “who is there who does not know what pleasure is? Who needs a definition to assist him to understand it?” (On Ends II.6). The sensations, the anticipations, and the feelings supply the examples, and setting one example against another marks off one real thing from another. That is the whole standard. Nothing in it is hidden in another realm, and nothing in it requires perfection to be seen.
This is why the Epicurean standard does not collapse distances. When the target is an edge in this world, the distance to it can be measured, and one distance is shorter than another. The man one furlong from Canopus can see the city.
Below The Limit, More And Less Are Real
Epicurus’ school rejected the Stoic conclusion in so many words: “They hold that faults are not all of equal gravity” (Diogenes Laertius X.122, tr. Bailey). The same passage records the distinction that the all-or-nothing thinkers missed: “there are two ideas of happiness, complete happiness, such as belongs to a god, which admits of no increase, and the happiness which is concerned with the addition and subtraction of pleasures.” Complete happiness is the limit, the concept taken to its end. Human happiness is a matter of more and less. Both are real. The existence of the first does not cancel the second.
Among men, happiness and pleasure are always more or less, seen against unhappiness and pain. Some experiences of pleasure are more desirable than others, while the goal as a concept stays the same. This does not contradict the view that happiness and pleasure have limits. We can and do conceive of them as pure and unmixed with their opposites, and it is by contrast with those opposites that we recognize them in the first place.
The limit is a concept, real in the way a heap is real. No one can name the grain of sand that turns a pile into a heap, nor does that grain bear a “mark,” and yet anyone can tell a heap from a few scattered grains. The concepts of wisdom, happiness, and pleasure work the same way. They name real things that have no boundary that can be completely captured in words divorced from experience, and the absence of a purely definitional boundary does not turn everything into one class. In the real world, we describe boundaries by how we experience them. We do not experience them by how they are described.
Why The Limit Does Not Make Lesser Degrees Worthless
Given how much we are indoctrinated into Platonism and Stoicism today, here is a question about which many are confused: If pleasure has a limit, and the limit is the best, why should anyone be satisfied with less? Isn’t the limit what we really want, and isn’t everything short of it a kind of failure after all? If Epicurus cannot answer this, he has only moved the all-or-nothing standard from virtue to pleasure.
He can answer it, and the answer has several parts that work together.
First, the limit is a limit of the same thing. This is the decisive difference between Epicurus and the Stoics. For the Stoics, everything short of virtue is vice, the opposite of the good. The man near the surface is drowning, not partly breathing. For Epicurus, everything short of the limit of pleasure is still pleasure, the good itself in a lesser quantity. “Every pleasure … is good” (Letter to Menoeceus 129). A cup that is three-quarters full holds real water, not “not-water.” That is why Cicero’s lyres are the right picture: every lyre may be out of tune, but some are nearly in tune, and the music they make is real music.
Second, the feeling is the standard, not the concept. We use “the feeling as the standard by which we judge every good” (129). The feeling of pleasure is felt as good at every degree. A man enjoying a meal with friends, or the view from a summit after a hard climb, does not feel his pleasure as a failure because some ache remains in his knee. The concept of the limit does not overrule what the feelings report. It supplements what they report by allowing us to measure degrees of progress toward the goal.
Third, the measure of a life is predominance, not perfection. Torquatus first describes the limit, a man “living in the continuous enjoyment of numerous and vivid pleasures alike of body and of mind, undisturbed either by the presence or by the prospect of pain” (On Ends I.40). Notice that even the limit, pictured this way, is not empty stillness. It is full of “numerous and vivid pleasures.” But when Torquatus describes the actual wise man, the standard is different: “there is no moment when the pleasures he experiences do not outbalance the pains” (I.62). And he states the point directly:
QuoteAnd pains, if any befall him, have never power enough to prevent the wise man from finding more reasons for joy than for vexation.
Cicero, On Ends I.62 (tr. Reid)
Rackham’s translation gives the same sentence as “any pains that the Wise Man may encounter are never so severe but that he has more cause for gladness than for sorrow.” This is the Epicurean answer to the all-or-nothing standard in a single sentence. The wise man is not happy because he has reached a state with no pain in it. He is happy because, whatever pains befall him, he has more reasons for joy than for vexation. The limit describes the goal as a concept. Predominance describes the life a man can actually live, and that is the life Epicurus calls happy.
Fourth, we are human beings, and reaching our goals takes effort. We live in bodies made of atoms, with needs that return every day, in a world where chance and other men can help or hurt us. Getting the pleasures we want often means accepting pains along the way: “we think many pains better than pleasures, since a greater pleasure comes to us when we have endured pains for a long time” (129). The man who trains for a race, builds a business, or crosses an ocean chooses discomfort for the sake of a greater pleasure. How near any of us comes to the limit, and how often, depends on circumstances: our bodies, our times, our fortune. Epicurus said a man may rival Zeus in happiness if his body is secure from hunger, thirst, and cold and he expects it to stay so (Vatican Saying 33), and that “a man cannot become wise with every kind of physical constitution, nor in every nation” (X.117). Norman DeWitt argued that on Epicurus’ principles even the beings Epicurus calls gods must work to keep their happiness, since they are made of atoms like everything else:
Quote… the corporeal cannot be immune from the hazard of destruction; the gods are consequently not deathless, only incorruptible; this incorruptibility, not being inherent, demands some sort of conservation, which can only be ascribed to the foresight and effort of the gods themselves. This, then, is their virtue, to preserve their own happiness and incorruptibility.
Norman W. DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy (1954), “Incorruptibility and Virtue”
If even the happiest beings in nature must act to keep what they have, no man should expect to sit at the limit without effort, and none should count himself a failure because he has to keep working.
Fifth, the limit gives direction, and that is why the mind must grasp it. Does the goal set a target that we would not know to pursue unless the mind identified it? In part, yes. Epicurus says that “the limit as regards pleasure in the mind is begotten by the reasoned understanding” of pleasure and pain (Principal Doctrine 18), and that it is “the mind, having attained a reasoned understanding of the ultimate good of the flesh and its limits,” that “supplies us with the complete life” (Principal Doctrine 20). The flesh, left to itself, “perceives the limits of pleasure as unlimited” and always wants more. The mind, setting experiences of pleasure against experiences of pain, forms the concept of the limit, and the concept does two jobs.
It tells us which way to go: toward more pleasure and less pain, in body and in mind. And it tells us that the goal is not infinitely far away. “He who has learned the limits of life knows that that which removes the pain due to want and makes the whole of life complete is easy to obtain, so that there is no need of actions which involve competition” (Principal Doctrine 21). This is the opposite of the all-or-nothing standard. Plato’s Forms, the Stoic sage, and the glory of God are infinitely distant, and so every human distance from them is the same. Epicurus’ limit is close and finite, so every step toward it is a real step, and a man can see himself getting nearer. Knowing that the goal has a limit is exactly what frees a man from the treadmill of always needing more, and lets him take full pleasure in where he already stands.
So the limit does not make lesser degrees worthless. It makes them intelligible. Without the concept of a limit we would not know which way “better” lies or that the good is within reach. Without the degrees below it, the limit would be an empty ideal like Plato’s Forms. Epicurus held both: a goal clear enough to aim at, and a life in which every gain toward it is a real gain of the good itself.
Happy Though Not Perfect
Epicurus did not claim total freedom from pain for himself, and he did not think a man must be perfect to be happy. On the day he died he wrote:
QuoteOn this truly happy day of my life, as I am at the point of death, I write this to you. The disease in my bladder and stomach are pursuing their course, lacking nothing of their natural severity: but against all this is the joy in my heart at the recollection of my conversations with you.
Diogenes Laertius X.22 (tr. Bailey)
By the all-or-nothing standard this day was a failure, since pain was present. Epicurus called it “truly happy.” His own last day is the clearest example of Torquatus’ rule: the pains were severe, but they did not prevent him “from finding more reasons for joy than for vexation.” What a man needs is not perfection but a life in which pleasure predominates over pain. A man who arranges his life that way, with good friends and conversation, but also with travel, hard climbs, rough seas, ventures, and contests he has a chance to win, can “rival even Zeus in happiness” (Vatican Saying 33), though some pain remains.
Progress Counts, At Every Age
Because nearness to the goal counts, Epicurus urged men to pursue it whatever their starting point:
QuoteLet no one when young delay to study philosophy, nor when he is old grow weary of his study. For no one can come too early or too late to secure the health of his soul.
Letter to Menoeceus 122 (tr. Bailey)
He ranked his own students by how they reached the truth. Some found it unaided, Metrodorus needed a guide, and Hermarchus had to be driven. Yet of the last two he said that “both reached the same goal” (Seneca, Moral Letters 52.3-4). This is the opposite of the drowning man. On the Epicurean view the student who is almost there is almost there, and the teacher has every reason to say so and to help him the rest of the way.
That is also why “one wise man is not wiser than another” (X.121) does not mean what the Stoics meant by it. For the Stoics the wise are equal because perfection cannot be more perfect, and everyone else is equally a failure. For Epicurus the wise are equal because the goal they pursue has the same limit for all of them, while the men themselves still differ, faults remain unequal, and progress toward the goal is real progress.
Knowledge Without Infallibility
The same answer applies to knowledge. The Epicurean wise man does not wait for infallibility before he speaks: “he will give definite teaching and not profess doubt” (X.121). He forms opinions, tests them against the sensations, anticipations, and feelings, holds the ones that are confirmed, rejects the ones that are contradicted, and corrects his errors when he finds them. He does not need to be incapable of error to know a great deal, any more than a man needs to be free of all pain to be happy. The Stoic who claims never to err and the skeptic who refuses to assent to anything have made the same mistake: they have taken perfection to be the price of admission rather than the goal we aim toward.
A Divinity Without Anger
Finally, Epicurus removed the angry judge who stands behind the all-or-nothing verdict:
QuoteThe blessed and immortal nature knows no trouble itself nor causes trouble to any other, so that it is never constrained by anger or favour. For all such things exist only in the weak.
Principal Doctrine 1 (tr. Bailey)
A being that is truly blessed is not offended by human imperfection, does not detest, and does not sort men into the saved and the lost. Anger and favor “exist only in the weak.” The picture of a perfect being perpetually outraged at every shortfall is not a picture of perfection at all. It is a picture of weakness, projected onto the sky.
Conclusion: Almost Is Not Nothing
The hymn says that “‘Almost’ is but to fail.” The Stoic says that the man near the surface drowns with the man at the bottom. The skeptic says that if you cannot be certain, you must assent to nothing. Plato says that nothing in this world fully is, and that pleasure is only a generation, never complete. And the all-or-nothing reader of Epicurus says that the only pleasure worth having is complete absence of pain. These are not five separate mistakes. They are one mistake, made in five places: a standard of perfection is set outside the world, and every human distance is measured against it until all distances look the same.
Epicurus answered the error at its root. A limit is real, but it is an edge in this world, seen against what lies beyond it. Pleasure has such a limit, and so the good can be complete. Below the limit, more and less are real: every degree of pleasure is a real degree of the good itself, faults are unequal, progress is real, happiness is possible while some pain remains, and knowledge is possible without infallibility. The standard by which we judge is the evidence nature gives us through the sensations, anticipations, and feelings, not a pattern in another realm or the verdict of an offended judge.
On the Epicurean view, almost is not nothing. The man one furlong from Canopus is nearly home. The student who is almost persuaded by the truth has come most of the way and should be helped the rest of it. And the man who has arranged his life so that pleasure predominates has not failed because he is not a god. Whatever pains befall him, he has “more reasons for joy than for vexation,” and with them he can rival a god in happiness.