One Wise Man Is Not Wiser Than Another: What Epicurus' Saying Tells Us About Pleasure, Happiness, And How We Know What Is Real
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November 19, 2026 at 9:18 AM -
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- The Question
- Where The Test Comes From: Plato's Philebus
- What Diogenes Laertius Records
- The Stoic Answer: All Or Nothing
- The Schools Close To The Stoics: Cynics, Ariston, Herillus
- The Schools That Allowed Degrees: Peripatetics And Platonists
- The Cyrenaics: Equal Pleasures, Unequal Lives
- The Skeptics: There Is No Good To Measure
- Epicurus' Answer: Pleasure As The Good Is Complete Because It Has A Limit
- What Epicurus Did Not Accept From The Stoics
- A Note On Yonge's Translation Of X.121
- Conclusion: Why This Issue Is Important
- Sources Of Further Information
This article was first published on EpicurusToday.com. Every citation below links to the passage itself in the texts on that site.
The Question
Among the sayings about the wise man that Diogenes Laertius collected from the Epicurean school is one short sentence:
QuoteOne wise man is not wiser than another.
Diogenes Laertius X.121 (tr. Bailey)
At first sight this looks like an odd thing to say. Men differ in learning, in experience, in temperament and in talent. Why would a school that trusted the evidence of the senses deny what everyone can see?
The answer is that the ancient question was never really about who knows more facts. It was a test question that Epicurus did not invent but saw needed answering. Where a school comes down on this issue shows what that school thinks the goal of life is, and whether that goal can be reached. Cicero states the connection clearly in the third book of On Ends. There, the Stoic Cato explains why his school says that no wise man is wiser than another, and he explains why the answer is significant:
QuoteSo it is consistent with the principles already stated that those who deem the End of Goods, that which we term the extreme or ultimate Good, to be capable of degree, are on their own theory also bound to hold that one man can be wiser than another, and similarly that one can commit a more sinful or more righteous action than another; which it is not open to us to say, who do not think that the End of Goods can vary in degree.
Cicero, On Ends III.48 (tr. Rackham)
That is the issue behind the question. Does the highest good come in degrees, so that there is always more of it to get? Or does it have a definite top, a limit? If it has no top, then every wise man can always become wiser, and no one is ever finished reaching wisdom. If it has a limit, then at the limit there is equality, however much men may differ in other ways.
The Stoics and Epicurus both said that one wise man is not wiser than another. However, they reached the same conclusion from opposite starting points, and the difference in their reasoning tells us a great deal about how each school views reality.
Where The Test Comes From: Plato's Philebus
Cato's rule did not begin with the Stoics. Plato had already made "more and less" a test of the good. In the Philebus, Socrates divides things into those that have a limit and those that "admit of more and less," and then asks where pleasure belongs:
QuoteSOCRATES: Have pleasure and pain a limit, or do they belong to the class which admits of more and less?
PHILEBUS: They belong to the class which admits of more, Socrates; for pleasure would not be perfectly good if she were not infinite in quantity and degree.
SOCRATES: Nor would pain, Philebus, be perfectly evil. And therefore the infinite cannot be that element which imparts to pleasure some degree of good.
Plato, Philebus 27e-28a (tr. Jowett)
Philebus, the champion of pleasure in the dialogue, concedes that pleasure has no limit, and, not realizing where his position will logically lead, he even boasts of it. Socrates turns the boast into an objection: what has no limit cannot be what makes a thing good. Later in the dialogue he restates the point in terms of purity. The pleasures "which are in excess have no measure," and belong "to the class of the infinite, and of the more and less" (52c). Then he asks what makes whiteness pure:
QuoteSOCRATES: How can there be purity in whiteness, and what purity? Is that purest which is greatest or most in quantity, or that which is most unadulterated and freest from any admixture of other colours?
PROTARCHUS: Clearly that which is most unadulterated.
SOCRATES: True, Protarchus; and so the purest white, and not the greatest or largest in quantity, is to be deemed truest and most beautiful?
Plato, Philebus 53a-b (tr. Jowett)
This is the foundation which explains where the argument is going. Plato asserts that the highest good must have a limit, because something that admits of more and less without end can never be complete. The Stoics accepted this logical test, and so, to a degree, did Epicurus. What they disagreed about is whether pleasure can pass this test. Plato and the Stoics said pleasure fails it, so they went looking for something else to meet this test of the good. Epicurus accepted the test but denied that pleasure fails it.
Plato's two classes are, in Greek, the things that have peras (a limit) and the things that are apeiron (unlimited). Epicurus used the same two words, as we will see below, when he explained why the universe has no limit and why pleasure does.
What Diogenes Laertius Records
Diogenes Laertius usually closes his account of a school with a summary of its doctrines, and the same standard questions come up again and again: what the end of life is, whether virtue is enough for happiness, whether virtue can be lost, whether all faults are equal, whether there is a middle state between virtue and vice, and what the wise man will and will not do. The question of equality among wise men sits inside this group. The table below gathers places in the Lives where a school takes a position on these issues or on the doctrines that decide them.
In what follows the passages from Books II through IX are quoted from the translation of C. D. Yonge, Lives of Eminent Philosophers. The passages from Book X are quoted from Cyril Bailey's translation. The section numbers in Books II through IX follow the standard divisions of the Greek text, as printed in R. D. Hicks' Loeb edition.
The Stoic Answer: All Or Nothing
The Stoics gave the most far-reaching and famous answer, against which the other schools frequently argued. For Zeno and Chrysippus virtue is the only good, and goodness does not come in degrees or amounts:
QuoteBut it seems that all goods are equal, and that every good is to be desired in the highest degree, and that it admits of no relaxation, and of no extension.
Cato says the same in Cicero: "Goodness is absolute, and is not a question of degree; ... the value in its case depends on kind and not on quantity" (On Ends III.34).
If the good cannot be more or less, then neither can its opposite. Every fault is equally a fault:
QuoteAnd they lay down the position that all offences are equal, as Chrysippus argues in the fourth book of his Ethic Questions, and so say Persæus and Zeno. For if one thing that is true is not more true than another thing that is true, neither is one thing that is false more false than another thing that is false; so too, one deceit is not greater than another, nor one sin than another. For the man who is a hundred furlongs from Canopus, and the man who is only one, are both equally not in Canopus; and so too, he who commits a greater sin, and he who commits a less, are both equally not in the right path.
There is therefore no middle ground between the wise man and the fool:
QuoteAnother doctrine of the Stoics is, that there is nothing intermediate between virtue and vice; while the Peripatetics assert that there is a stage between virtue and vice, being an improvement on vice which has not yet arrived at virtue. For the Stoics say, that as a stick must be either straight or crooked, so a man must be either just or unjust, and cannot be more just than just, or more unjust than unjust; and that the same rule applies to all cases.
The virtues come as a package: "they say that virtues reciprocally follow one another, and that he who has one has all" (VII.125). And the wise are "free from all error, in consequence of their not being prone to any wrong actions" (VII.122).
From these premises the equality of wise men follows at once. A stick that is straight cannot be straighter than another straight stick. Seneca states the Stoic form of Plato's test in so many words:
QuoteTherefore the power and the greatness of virtue cannot rise to greater heights, because increase is denied to that which is superlatively great. You will find nothing straighter than the straight, nothing truer than the truth, and nothing more temperate than that which is temperate. ... What can be added to that which is perfect? ... Do you think that propriety, justice, lawfulness, do not also belong to the same type, and that they are kept within fixed limits? The ability to increase is proof that a thing is still imperfect.
Seneca, Moral Letters 66.8-9 (tr. Gummere)
And he carries the point all the way up to the supreme god of the Stoic system:
QuoteIn what respect is Jupiter superior to our good man? His goodness lasts longer; but the wise man does not set a lower value upon himself, just because his virtues are limited by a briefer span. Or take two wise men; he who has died at a greater age is not happier than he whose virtue has been limited to fewer years: similarly, a god has no advantage over a wise man in point of happiness, even though he has such an advantage in point of years.
Seneca, Moral Letters 73.13 (tr. Gummere)
The price of this answer is that everyone who falls short of perfect wisdom is equally a failure. Cato draws the conclusion himself, with two images that Cicero later attacked:
QuoteFor just as a drowning man is no more able to breathe if he be not far from the surface of the water, so that he might at any moment emerge, than if he were actually at the bottom already, and just as a puppy on the point of opening its eyes is no less blind than one just born, similarly a man that has made some progress towards the state of virtue is none the less in misery than he that has made no progress at all.
Even inside the Stoic school this was too much for some. Diogenes Laertius records that "Heraclides of Tarsus, indeed, the friend of Antipater, of Tarsus, and Athenodorus, both assert that offences are not equal" (VII.121). Chrysippus and Cleanthes disagreed on whether the perfect state, once reached, could be lost: "Chrysippus is of opinion that virtue can be lost, but Cleanthes affirms that it cannot; the one saying that it can be lost by drunkenness or melancholy, the other maintaining that it cannot be lost on account of the firm perceptions which it implants in men" (VII.127). And the later Stoics Panaetius and Posidonius "do not admit that virtue has this sufficiency of itself, but say that there is also need of good health, and competency, and strength" (VII.128).
The Schools Close To The Stoics: Cynics, Ariston, Herillus
The Cynics held a simpler form of the same view. Antisthenes taught "that virtue was of itself sufficient for happiness, and was in need of nothing, except the strength of Socrates" (VI.11), and among his sayings is "Virtue is a weapon of which a man cannot be deprived" (VI.12). Diogenes Laertius sums up the school:
QuoteAnother of their doctrines is, that virtue is a thing which may be taught, as Antisthenes affirms in his Heraclides; and that when it has once been attained it can never be lost. They also say that the wise man deserves to be loved, and cannot commit error, and is a friend to every one who resembles him, and that he leaves nothing to fortune.
Ariston of Chios pushed indifference further than Zeno. He taught that the chief good was "to live in perfect indifference to all those things which are of an intermediate character between virtue and vice; making not the slightest difference between them, but regarding them all on a footing of equality. For that the wise man resembles a good actor; who, whether he is filling the part of Agamemnon or Thersites, will perform them both equally well" (VII.160). Herillus made knowledge the end and drew a hard line between two classes of men: "those who were not wise aimed at the latter [a subordinate end]; but that only the wise man directed his views to the former" (VII.165). The Megarian Euclides had already taught "that the chief good is unity; but that it is known by several names; for at one time people call it prudence; at another time God; at another time intellect" (II.106). A good that is one single thing leaves no room for more and less.
The Schools That Allowed Degrees: Peripatetics And Platonists
Aristotle's school answered the other way. Between vice and virtue it placed "a stage between virtue and vice, being an improvement on vice which has not yet arrived at virtue" (VII.127). Aristotle denied that virtue alone is enough:
QuoteAnd he taught that virtue was not sufficient of itself to confer happiness; for that it had need besides of the goods of the body, and of the external goods, for that a wise man would be miserable if he were surrounded by distress, and poverty, and circumstances of that kind. ... He also asserted that the virtues did not reciprocally follow one another, for that it was possible for a prudent, and just, and impartial man, to be incontinent and intemperate; and he said, that the wise man was not destitute of passions, but endowed with moderate passions.
On this view one wise man may well be better off than another. His happiness depends in part on health, wealth and fortune, and a man may have some virtues without the rest. Plato, in Diogenes Laertius' summary, stands between the two camps: "virtue was sufficient of herself for happiness, but nevertheless required the advantages of the body as instruments to work with ... Still that the wise man would be not the less happy, even if destitute of these auxiliary circumstances" (III.78).
In Cicero, Cicero himself argues the Peripatetic side against Cato. He rejects the drowning man and the puppies as false analogies and offers his own: "one man's eyesight is dim, another's general health is weak; apply remedies, and they get better day by day ... similarly with all who earnestly pursue virtue; they get better, their vices and errors are gradually reduced." Then he adds the remark that shows the weakness of the Stoic position: "But still the elder Gracchus was not a Wise Man; who ever was? or when, or where, or how?" (On Ends IV.65). A standard that no one has ever met cannot guide anyone's life.
The Cyrenaics: Equal Pleasures, Unequal Lives
The Cyrenaics, the other ancient school of pleasure, are important here because they show that making pleasure the goal does not by itself settle the question. They held "that no one pleasure was different from or more pleasant than another" (II.87). Yet because they placed the good in each particular pleasure and treated happiness as a sum of particular pleasures that is hard to collect, they could not promise the wise man a pleasant life:
QuoteBut they admit that every wise man does not live pleasantly, and that every bad man does not live unpleasantly, but that it is only a general rule admitting of some exceptions. And they think it sufficient if a person enjoys a happy time in consequence of one pleasure which befalls him. ... and that some of the virtues may exist even in the foolish.
They also allowed degrees in learning and in suffering: "They admit, too, that there is such a thing as improvement in philosophy, and in other good studies. And they say that one man feels grief more than another" (II.93). Their followers split. Hegesias concluded "that complete happiness cannot possibly exist" (II.94). Anniceris held the opposite, that "even if the wise man should meet with some annoyance, he would be no less happy -- even though he should have but few actual pleasures" (II.96).
The Skeptics: There Is No Good To Measure
The Pyrrhonists removed the question altogether. If nothing is good by nature, there is no standard against which one wise man could be measured against another: "Another of their doctrines is, that there is no such thing as any natural good, or natural evil" (IX.101).
Epicurus' Answer: Pleasure As The Good Is Complete Because It Has A Limit
Epicurus agreed with the Stoics that one wise man is not wiser than another, but he forcefully rejected their framework for getting there. For Epicurus the good is pleasure, not virtue, and the decisive fact about pleasure that makes this possible is that pleasure has a natural limit:
QuoteThe limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once.
Principal Doctrine 3 (tr. Bailey)
QuoteThe pleasure in the flesh is not increased when once the pain due to want is removed, but is only varied: and the limit as regards pleasure in the mind is begotten by the reasoned understanding of these very pleasures, and of the emotions akin to them, which used to cause the greatest fear to the mind.
Principal Doctrine 18 (tr. Bailey)
Torquatus states the same doctrine in Cicero: "complete absence of pain Epicurus considers to be the limit and highest point of pleasure; beyond this point pleasure may vary in kind, but it cannot vary in intensity or degree" (On Ends I.38).
Even Seneca, arguing for the Stoics, admits that Epicurus' good passes the test he had set for virtue:
Quote... we find mentioned in the works of Epicurus two goods, of which his Supreme Good, or blessedness, is composed, namely, a body free from pain and a soul free from disturbance. These goods, if they are complete, do not increase; for how can that which is complete increase? ... Just as fair weather, purified into the purest brilliancy, does not admit of a still greater degree of clearness; so, when a man takes care of his body and of his soul, weaving the texture of his good from both, his condition is perfect, and he has found the consummation of his prayers, if there is no commotion in his soul or pain in his body. Whatever delights fall to his lot over and above these two things do not increase his Supreme Good; they merely season it, so to speak, and add spice to it.
Seneca, Moral Letters 66.45-46 (tr. Gummere)
Seneca's "two goods" is a Stoic summary, and his word "season" makes the variety of pleasures sound trivial, which Epicurus never thought. But the point that matters here comes through. By Seneca's own rule, "the ability to increase is proof that a thing is still imperfect," and Epicurus' good, at its limit, does not increase. Plato's whiteness makes the same point from the other side. The purest white is not the greatest quantity of white but white without admixture of other colours. Epicurus' limit of pleasure is not the greatest quantity of pleasure either. It is pleasure without admixture of pain.
This is the key to Epicurus' position. He neither treats the good as all or nothing, as the Stoics did, nor as a scale which has no top. Pleasure, and the happy life made of it, has a definite limit: the removal of all pain. Below that limit there is more and less: more pain or less, more pleasure or less. Epicurus is telling us that absence of pain is the limit of pleasure not because "absence of pain" is something better than or different from pleasure itself, but simply because at the limit ("absence of pain") nothing more can be added.
What It Means To Have A Limit
To say that the limit of pleasure is "the removal of all that is painful" can sound strange. Read carelessly, it makes Epicurus sound like a mystic, waiting for some state of perfect stillness, or like an ascetic, cutting his desires down to nothing so that nothing can hurt him. He was neither, and this misconception could not be further from the truth. The phrase makes sense only when we see what Epicurus meant by a limit. For the essential background on this, we look to Epicurean physics, where we see in the case of the universe the implication of having no limit:
QuoteMoreover, the universe is boundless. For that which is bounded has an extreme point: and the extreme point is seen against something else. So that as it has no extreme point, it has no limit; and as it has no limit, it must be boundless and not bounded.
Diogenes Laertius X.41 (tr. Bailey)
Lucretius gives the same argument and illustrates it with evidence anyone can see:
QuoteLastly, before our eyes one thing is seen to bound another; air is as a wall between the hills, and mountains between tracts of air, land bounds the sea, and again sea bounds all lands; yet the universe in truth there is nothing to limit outside.
Lucretius, On the Nature of Things I.998-1001 (tr. Bailey)
A limit, in this argument, is not a definition set in stone by a god or given in advance. A limit is an edge, and an edge is seen against something on the other side of it. We see where the sea ends because we see the land beyond it. We see where a mountain ends because we see the sky above it. The universe has nothing outside it, so there is nothing for its edge to be seen against, and so it has no edge and no limit. Lucretius presses the point with a thought experiment. Wherever someone sets the furthest edge of the universe, let a man stand there and throw a dart. Either something stops the dart, or it flies on, and in both cases that was not the end (I.968-983).
Epicurus uses the same terminology in discussing the universe and pleasure. In X.41 the universe has no peras (limit) and is apeiron (unlimited). Principal Doctrines 19 and 20 speak of the perata (limits) of pleasure, and Principal Doctrine 20 says that "the flesh perceives the limits of pleasure as unlimited." Principal Doctrine 3 begins with horos (boundary marker), the stone set up to mark where one field ends and another begins. Lucretius uses the same image when he praises Epicurus for reporting "in what way each thing has its power limited, and its deepset boundary-stone" (I.75-77). These are also the words of the Philebus, where Philebus boasted that pleasure belongs among the unlimited things. Epicurus turned Plato's arrangement around. The universe as a whole is truly without a limit. Pleasure is not.
Now apply the rule to pleasure. Pleasure has something on the other side of it: pain. Torquatus explains that Epicurus allowed no neutral feeling between them: "A man who is conscious of his condition at all must necessarily feel either pleasure or pain" (On Ends I.38). Like land and sea, pleasure and pain meet each other, and nothing lies between. That is why Epicurus states the limit of pleasure in terms of pain. "The removal of all that is painful" does not describe a special state reached by meditation or self-denial. It marks the edge where pleasure is seen against pain: in any experience, pleasure reaches as far as pain does not. Torquatus gives the everyday case: "when hunger and thirst are banished by food and drink, the mere fact of getting rid of uneasiness brings a resultant pleasure in its train. So generally, the removal of pain causes pleasure to take its place" (I.37).
Here we can compare the dart argument. In the universe the dart always finds more room. In feeling it does not. Once no pain remains in an experience, there is nowhere further for its pleasure to grow. Pleasure can then be varied in endless ways, but "is not increased" (Principal Doctrine 18). The flesh behaves like the man with the dart: it "perceives the limits of pleasure as unlimited, and unlimited time is required to supply it." The mind, "having attained a reasoned understanding of the ultimate good of the flesh and its limits ... supplies us with the complete life" (Principal Doctrine 20). The life is complete because the good has an edge. Something without an edge, like the universe, can never be complete in that sense.
Lucretius applies the same thinking to everything the senses report. If there were no limit to the shapes of atoms, he says, the best colours, tastes, smells and sounds would always be overtaken:
Quote... for something more excellent than all else would ever be arising. Likewise, all things would sink back on the worse side, just as we have told that they would rise towards the better. For, on the other hand, something would be more loathly too than all else to nostrils and ears and eyes, and the taste of the mouth. And since these things are not so, but a fixed limit to things marks the extreme on either side, you must needs confess that the first-matter too has a limited difference in shapes. Again from fire right on to the icy frost of winter is but a limited way, and in like manner is the way measured back again. For all heat and cold and tepid warmths in the middle lie between the two, filling up the sum in due order. And so they are brought to being differing with limited degrees, since they are marked off at either end by the twin points, beset on this side by flames, on that by stiffening frosts.
Lucretius, On the Nature of Things II.507-521 (tr. Bailey)
Lucretius is speaking here of the qualities of things, not of the limit in Principal Doctrine 3. But the principle is the same. Nature gives the range of what we feel fixed end-points. Nothing lies beyond the end of the range, just as nothing is colder than the coldest frost. Philebus' boast, that something better is always coming, is the picture Lucretius rejects.
This is also how Epicurus held that we come to know anything at all. Meaning comes from examples, not from definitions. Cicero complained that Epicurus "does not hold with giving a definition of the thing in question" (On Ends II.4), and when Cicero asked for a definition of pleasure, Torquatus answered, "who is there who does not know what pleasure is? Who needs a definition to assist him to understand it?" (II.5-6). Epicurus told his students to hold to "the first mental image associated with each word," so that "there should be no need of explanation" (X.38). The Epicurean summary says that "all thoughts have their origin in sensations by means of coincidence and analogy and similarity and combination, reasoning too contributing something" (X.32). Its example is a figure seen in the distance: "Is that standing yonder a horse or a cow?" We can ask the question only because we already know "the shape of horse and of cow" (X.33). We know each from examples: we have met many horses and many cows, and set them against each other, and seen how they differ. In the same way we know heat from examples of heat set against examples of cold, light against dark, and pleasure against pain. Torquatus says that pleasure and pain need no proof, because they are perceived by the senses "as that fire is hot, snow white, honey sweet" (I.30). The examples come to us through the senses, the anticipations and the feelings. Contrasting one example against another marks off one real thing from another, and the mind builds these examples up into a coherent picture of the world. That is where meaning comes from: from examples perceived and contrasted, not from definitions.
Plato took the opposite road. In the Timaeus he divides "that which always is and has no becoming" from "that which is always becoming and never is." What is "apprehended by intelligence and reason is always in the same state," while what is "conceived by opinion with the help of sensation" is "always in a process of becoming and perishing and never really is" (Timaeus 27d-28a). On that view the true limit of anything is a pattern outside this world, grasped by reason alone, and the things we see and feel never fully are what they are. The Stoics, for their part, held that wisdom and the good are all or nothing: a stick is straight or it is crooked, and a man is wise or he is a fool. Epicurus rejected both. He set up no standard outside the world, no Form, and no geometer's line to measure pleasure against. The limit of pleasure is like the edge of the sea. It is real, it is seen, and it is known by what lies on the other side of it.
The shore is a good picture of the whole idea. Anyone can tell sea from land, and the line where they meet is real. But no grain of sand or drop of water marks the exact spot, and the tide moves it constantly.
These limits provide concepts for discussion, not moments we can see or touch or feel, and in that respect the concepts of happiness, pleasure, and wisdom are like heaps. No one can point to the grain of sand that turns a pile into a heap, and yet heaps are real, and anyone can tell a heap from a few scattered grains. In the same way no moment of human life comes marked as "wisdom" or "pure pleasure" or "total absence of pain," and none needs to. Epicurus posited no ideal Form or essence of painlessness, and no arrangement of atoms that bears that name. What is true and real for us is what the senses, the anticipations and the feelings report, and they report more pain and less, more pleasure and less, and the direction in which a life is moving. The limit is drawn from that experience, not through mathematics. Limits are no less real than heaps, and they tell us what the goal is and which way to go in working toward it.
Principal Doctrine 3 not only does not contradict this analysis, it supports it. "Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind" speaks of particular experiences, the separate segments of a life, not of a life taken as a whole. Each experience is pleasant or painful, and no single experience is both. But a man lives through many experiences, in body and in mind, at the same time and one after another. That no single experience can be both pleasure and pain does not mean that a whole life cannot hold both. Where there is land there is no sea, and yet a country can have both a coast and fields. Epicurus' own last day held both: the pain of his disease and the joy of remembering his conversations with his friends.
The Limit And The Wise Man
This analysis allows us to understand Cato's assertion in On Ends III.48. A school whose highest good "can vary in degree" without end must say that one man can always be wiser than another. Epicurus' highest good has a limit beyond which it cannot be increased, so by Cato's rule Epicurus is entitled to say, as he does, that one wise man is not wiser than another. The reason is not that wisdom is all or nothing.
"Wise man," like "heap," names something real that nevertheless has no exact boundary. No single lesson turns a student into a wise man, yet wise men can exist, because the goal the wise man pursues has a limit. There is no higher level of the goal for a "wiser" man to aim at, so one wise man, considered as wise, does not stand above another. The men themselves—though all are wise—still differ in learning, talent and temperament, as Epicurus' own ranking of his students shows.
Epicurus applies the same reasoning to time, and the parallel with Seneca's two wise men is close:
QuoteInfinite time contains no greater pleasure than limited time, if one measures, by reason, the limits of pleasure.
Principal Doctrine 19 (tr. Bailey)
The mind that understands the limits of pleasure "supplies us with the complete life, and we have no further need of infinite time ... nor, when circumstances begin to bring about the departure from life, does it approach its end as though it fell short, in any way, of the best life" (Principal Doctrine 20). Like the Stoic, the Epicurean considers it valid to measure himself against a divine standard of completeness. But where Seneca says the wise man equals Jupiter because virtue is all or nothing, Epicurus says a man may "rival even Zeus in happiness" if his body is secure from hunger, thirst and cold and he expects it to stay so (Vatican Saying 33), and that the man who lives by these teachings "shall live like a god among men" (Letter to Menoeceus 135). The difference between the Epicurean and Stoic wise man is clear. The Stoic is either perfect or miserable, and Cicero was right to reject this by asking who ever was perfect. The Epicurean does not need to stand at the limit to be happy. He needs to organize his life so that pleasure predominates, and a man who does that can rival Zeus, as Epicurus himself did on the last day of his life.
Epicurus knew that men are not gods, and Diogenes Laertius tells us that he drew exactly that distinction:
QuoteThey say also that there are two ideas of happiness, complete happiness, such as belongs to a god, which admits of no increase, and the happiness which is concerned with the addition and subtraction of pleasures.
Diogenes Laertius X.122 (tr. Bailey)
Complete happiness, the concept taken to its limit, is what Epicurus pictures in a god, and it "admits of no increase." There the equality is complete: nothing can be added to it.
Human happiness is different. It "is concerned with the addition and subtraction of pleasures." In human life some pain always remains somewhere. Illness, injury and loss come to everyone, and the body that feels pleasure also feels pain. One man's life holds more pleasure than another's, and the same man's life holds more at one time than at another. Among men, happiness and pleasure are always a matter of more or less, and they are known as more or less by being seen against their counterparts, unhappiness and pain. The experiences themselves also differ. No two experiences of pleasure are the same, and some are more desirable than others. One wise man may be enjoying a quiet evening with friends while another is climbing a mountain, sailing a rough sea, or building a business, and their lives will not hold the same pleasures in the same order.
But through all of this the goal, as a concept, stays the same for every man: pleasure, with its limit in the removal of all pain. That real human beings experience more and less pleasure and pain does not contradict the view that happiness and pleasure have limits. We can and do conceive of them as pure and unmixed with their opposites, and it is by contrast with those opposites, unhappiness and pain, that we recognize them in the first place.
It cannot be repeated enough that Epicurus did not claim total freedom from pain for himself. On the day he died he wrote to his friend Idomeneus:
QuoteOn this truly happy day of my life, as I am at the point of death, I write this to you. The disease in my bladder and stomach are pursuing their course, lacking nothing of their natural severity: but against all this is the joy in my heart at the recollection of my conversations with you.
Diogenes Laertius X.22 (tr. Bailey)
He called the day "truly happy" while his disease was "lacking nothing of its natural severity." A man does not need total absence of pain to be happy. What he needs is pleasure enough to outweigh the pain, and Diogenes Laertius reports that Epicurus held the same of the wise man: "even if the wise man be put on the rack, he is happy" (X.118). Total absence of pain marks the limit of the concept. It is not a state that a man must enter, even for a moment, in order to be happy. A man chooses and arranges his life so that pleasure predominates, and when it predominates far enough he can, in Epicurus' words, "rival even Zeus in happiness," though some pain remains.
So the Epicurean position is not that all wise men are equally happy at every moment. Complete equality belongs only to the limit itself, the extreme point that Epicurus pictures in a god. One wise man is not wiser than another because they all pursue the same goal with the same limit, and none of them can go beyond it. Diogenes Laertius reports that Epicurus held that once a man has attained wisdom he does not fall back from it (X.117). But how near each one comes to it, and how often, is going to depend on his body, his circumstances and his fortune, and in that respect their lives will differ.
What Epicurus Did Not Accept From The Stoics
Because Epicurus reached his conclusions by a much different road than did the Stoics, he did not have to accept the Stoic consequences. Diogenes Laertius' summary rejects several of them explicitly.
Faults are not equal. "They hold that faults are not all of equal gravity" (X.122). The man one furlong from Canopus is closer than the man a hundred furlongs away.
Men differ in nature, and the wise remain different men. "A man cannot become wise with every kind of physical constitution, nor in every nation" (X.117). The wise man "will be more deeply moved by feelings, but this will not prove an obstacle to wisdom" (X.117). Lucretius explains that training never wipes out a man's native temperament, and then says why that does not matter:
QuoteSo is it with the race of men. However much training gives some of them an equal culture, yet it leaves those first traces of the nature of the mind of each. Nor must we think that such maladies can be plucked out by the roots, but that one man will more swiftly fall into bitter anger, another be a little sooner assailed by fear, while a third will take some things more gently than is right. ... One thing herein I see that I can affirm, that so small are the traces of these natures left, which reason could not dispel for us, that nothing hinders us from living a life worthy of the gods.
Lucretius, De Rerum Natura III.307-322 (tr. Bailey)
That is the Epicurean answer in brief: men are not made equal, but men who are not equal can know the same goal and live happily by it.
There are grades of students, and progress is real. Seneca reports that Epicurus himself ranked learners by how they reached the truth:
QuoteEpicurus remarks that certain men have worked their way to the truth without any one's assistance, carving out their own passage. And he gives special praise to these, for their impulse has come from within, and they have forged to the front by themselves. Again, he says, there are others who need outside help, who will not proceed unless someone leads the way, but who will follow faithfully. Of these, he says, Metrodorus was one; this type of man is also excellent, but belongs to the second grade.
Seneca, Moral Letters 52.3 (tr. Gummere)
A third class, of whom Hermarchus was an example, "can be forced and driven into righteousness"; and of the last two classes Epicurus "is more ready to congratulate the one, but he feels more respect for the other; for although both reached the same goal, it is a greater credit to have brought about the same result with the more difficult material upon which to work" (52.4). The phrase "both reached the same goal" is the Epicurean position exactly. Epicurus did not pretend that Metrodorus and Hermarchus were alike in talent, and he did not treat the man still on the way as no better off than the man who had not started. What he denied was that, once they arrived, one of them stood higher than the other.
Once wise, a man does not fall back. "When once a man has attained wisdom, he no longer has any tendency contrary to it or willingly pretends that he has" (X.117). On this point the Epicureans stood with Cleanthes and the Cynics against Chrysippus. But they did not claim that the wise man never errs. The Stoics and the Cynics did claim that (VII.122; VI.105). The Epicurean wise man forms opinions, tests them against the evidence, and corrects them. What does not leave him is his understanding of what the goal is and how it is reached.
A Note On Yonge's Translation Of X.121
Yonge's translation goes against the consensus of scholars and should be rejected: "It is possible for one wise man to be wiser than another" (Yonge, Lives, Book X). In Miroslav Marcovich's critical edition of Diogenes Laertius (Teubner, 1999), the two principal manuscripts, B and P, both carry a negative. P reads οὐ κινεῖται ("does not move"). Marcovich prints οὐκ εἶναί τε ἕτερον ἑτέρου σοφώτερον, "and that one is not wiser than another," a reading proposed by the early editors Sambucus and Aldobrandini, and he lists the sentence as Usener's fragment 561. R. D. Hicks, in the Loeb edition (1925), follows the reading of P, οὐ κινεῖσθαί τε ἕτερον ἑτέρου σοφώτερον, and translates "One wise man does not move more wisely than another," that is, he acts no more wisely than another. Bailey has "One wise man is not wiser than another," and the Usener collection has "It is not possible for one Sage to be wiser than another" (Usener 561). The readings differ only over whether the sentence speaks of being wise or of acting wisely. All of them deny that one wise man ranks above another. Yonge's positive version should not be relied on for this sentence.
Conclusion: Why This Issue Is Important
The question whether all wise men are equally wise is really a question about the shape of the goal of life. The ancient schools gave three kinds of answer.
- The goal is all or nothing. This is the Stoic and Cynic answer. The wise are equal because perfection cannot be more perfect. Everyone else is equally a failure: the man nearly at the surface drowns with the man at the bottom, and the one-furlong sinner is as far from Canopus as the hundred-furlong sinner. Cicero's question points out the problem: "who ever was?"
- The goal has no top. This was Philebus' boast in Plato's dialogue: pleasure "would not be perfectly good if she were not infinite in quantity and degree." It is also the answer of those for whom happiness keeps growing with more goods and better fortune, and in another way of the Cyrenaics, for whom happiness is a sum of particular pleasures that is never safely complete. On this answer one wise man can always be wiser and happier than another. Hegesias drew the bleak conclusion that complete happiness cannot exist at all. For Epicurus only the universe as a whole is without a limit, because nothing lies outside it to mark its edge.
- The goal has a limit. This is Epicurus' answer. Pleasure has a natural limit, the removal of all pain, and beyond that it is varied, not increased. At the limit, the extreme that Epicurus pictures in the happiness of a god, nothing more can be added and the equality is complete. The limit is real in the way a heap is real, though no moment of human life is marked off as pure pleasure. No man is free of all pain, as Epicurus' own last day shows, and no man needs to be in order to be happy. Human happiness rises and falls with the addition and subtraction of pleasures, so among men happiness and pleasure are always more or less, seen against unhappiness and pain, and some experiences of pleasure are more desirable than others, while the goal as a concept stays the same. This does not contradict the view that happiness and pleasure have limits. We can and do conceive of them as pure and unmixed with their opposites, and it is by contrast with those opposites, unhappiness and pain, that we recognize them in the first place. What wise men have in common is the goal they pursue, which has the same limit for all of them. Real differences of talent, temperament, learning and circumstance remain, faults remain unequal, and progress toward the goal is real progress.
The Epicurean denies the Stoic claim that anything short of perfection is worthless. It also denies the modern assumption that there is always more to get and that no one is ever finished. Epicurus held that the best life has a definite shape, that a man can know what it is and how to live it, and that he does not need to be the most gifted man in the world, or free of every pain, to live happily.
Sources Of Further Information
- Miroslav Marcovich, ed., Diogenis Laertii Vitae Philosophorum, vol. I (Stuttgart and Leipzig: Teubner, 1999), p. 790: the Greek text of X.121 with the manuscript readings described above.
- R. D. Hicks, tr., Diogenes Laertius: Lives of Eminent Philosophers (Loeb Classical Library, 2 vols., 1925), vol. II, pp. 646-647: Greek text and translation of X.120-121.
- Tiziano Dorandi, ed., Diogenes Laertius: Lives of Eminent Philosophers (Cambridge University Press, 2013): the most recent critical edition of the Greek text.
- Hermann Usener, Epicurea (1887), fr. 561 (Usener collection).
- Wim Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (Philosophia Antiqua 168; Leiden: Brill, 2023): the first book-length study of the Epicurean wise man, with chapters on the sage's fallibility, his friendships with other sages, and his livelihood, drawing on the Herculaneum papyri of Philodemus.
- René Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (Cambridge University Press, 2014): reconstructs the Stoic definitions of wisdom and argues that for the early Stoics the change from fool to sage was sudden and complete, and could pass unnoticed by the sage himself.
- Geert Roskam, On the Path to Virtue: The Stoic Doctrine of Moral Progress and its Reception in (Middle-)Platonism (Leuven University Press, 2005): the Stoic doctrine of moral progress toward wisdom, which had to be squared with the claim that all who fall short of wisdom are equally vicious, and its reception among the Middle Platonists, Plutarch among them.
- Ákos Brunner, Cicero's Presentation of Stoic Ethics in De Finibus Book III (doctoral dissertation, Central European University, 2011), PDF: a study of Cato's account of Stoic ethics in the book that contains the argument of III.48, with a section on the problems in that account.