Even though the anticipation or recollection of eating are "inner" pleasures, they are very kinetic.
How?
And I realize typing that as a one word question *looks* combative or defensive. It's not meant to be. I'm just curious to hear your thinking behind how you'd characterize the anticipation or recollection as kinetic.
I'm getting my train of thought from Farrington's The Faith of Epicurus:
Kalosyni Thanks for the thoughts.
From my perspective:
The pleasure derived from the activity of eating is always kinetic.
The pleasure derived from the anticipation of eating or the recollection of eating is always katastematic.
The issue I have is with the modern implications of "tranquility" as being "at rest" or "inactive" or similar words circling the drain of "nothingness.
Agreed.
I maintain (and I think we agree) that activity can be undertaken with a calm, tranquil mind.
For example, if I ever found myself in a foxhole, I would want a commanding officer who approached the mission with a clear eye and calm mind rather than some screaming, yelling lieutenant.
ADMIN NOTE: This thread was originally a part of a discussion of the translation of the Letter to Menoeceus by Peter St. Andre started here. This first post below was near the start of the tangent that led to the split-off, but you may need to read several posts before you get an idea of how the new thread title applies. -- Cassius
Hello Don,
What about taking the second τὰς back to τὰς ἡδονὰς?
Granted, I'm just eyeballing it, so I should take some time to give it closer attention, but I'm reading the second τὰς as a reference back to τὰς ἡδονὰς, with the ἡδονὰς understood, so taken together 'the pleasures of profligates or the [pleasures] lying in consumption.'
I address that elsewhere in my translation commentary, but, briefly, even if that's the course taken, I would still stand by something like "those (pleasures) stuck in the enjoyment of (only) those things from outside ourselves."
My take is that this is a direct swipe at the Cyrenaics.
Okay, here is a sneak preview of my Menoikeus update. I still have a lot to do before posting the revision, but I thought this would stir up some controversy so here it is 
I am now of the opinion that τὰς ἐν ἀπολαύσει κειμένας should be interpreted as "those who are stuck in enjoying (only) those things which provide enjoyment from outside themselves." To me, this is a direct reference to the "incorrect" beliefs of the Cyrenaics and others in relation to pleasure. And, yes, the reader is correct that I'm referring to the kinetic and katastematic pleasures that Epicurus mentions. I realize this is considered controversial by some, but I believe this best explains Epicurus's being able to use ἀπολαύσει in both positive and negative senses.
Epicurus is on record for including both kinetic and katastematic pleasures within his definition of "pleasure." I have come to understand kinetic pleasures as those arising from factors and circumstances outside of ourselves; katastematic pleasures are those arising from within ourselves (such as tranquility, pleasurable memories, etc.). While Epicurus conveys (along with Metrodorus and Philodemus) that we can be more confident in katastematic pleasures, he clearly says that we should continue to "delight" in kinetic pleasures when they are available. It is the exclusivity of "getting stuck in" only seeing kinetic pleasures as pleasure that Epicurus is objecting to here with τὰς ἐν ἀπολαύσει κειμένας.
PS. I am MORE than happy to entertain other ideas. This one is the one (so far) that makes the most sense to me.
Pleasure is cultivating the virtues so as to be serene and live a pleasant life.
By Zeus! They're trying to make Epicurus a Stoic!
Here are some notes of mine I had on VS9
This is a clever bit of writing from Epicurus. The original Greek reads "κακὸν ἀνάγκη, ἀλλʼ οὐδεμία ἀνάγκη ζῆν μετὰ ἀνάγκης." Note those three occurrences of ἀνάγκη/ἀνάγκης. The word itself means force, constraint, or necessity; so a literal translation would be something like "An evil, necessity (is); but (there is) no necessity to live in the midst of necessity." This retains the clever wordplay but is honestly a little clunky in English. To get the import of the statement, a paraphrase may be better. Consider what he is saying. Being constrained in your choices is an evil. If you have only one choice - or feel you only have one choice - that is an evil. However, we have free will, so we are not required to live having our choices curtailed and constrained. Even if we make choices we don't want to make, we are exercising our free will. "I don't want to go to work today, but I have to." No, you don't. You could quit. But are you ready to face the consequences of quitting your job? You can consciously decide today is not the day I quit. I make the decision to get up and do the work. Likewise, maybe getting a new job is the right decision. Weigh your options. Exercise your faculty of choice and rejection. You are not forced to be forced to do something. Make your choices and rejections. Practice well!
FYI I'm in the process of creating a revised edition of my Menoikeus translation & commentary... More hopefully soon.... Of course, I have additional thoughts on απολαυσεις etc in 131 & 132. Stay tuned...
Like this?
And scanning exercise into the details!
So the second of those two videos is using the double slashes to indicate separations while the first video does not seem to use such separations when reading(?) Is one more clearly correct than the other?
Dactylic hexameter - Wikipedia
That double bar is a caesura. It's there whether it's marked or not. Luke Ranieri just didn't mark the scansion. Ranieri's is more fluid, but the the second is just emphasizing or demonstrating the meter far more. They're both "correct." :
"Almost every hexameter has a word break, known as a caesura /sɪˈzjʊərə/, in the middle of the 3rd foot, sometimes (but not always) coinciding with a break in sense. In most cases (85% of lines in Virgil) this comes after the first syllable of the 3rd foot, as in ca/no in the above example. This is known as a strong or masculine caesura."
See also:
Scansion | Dickinson College Commentaries
If you're interested at all in Latin and Ancient Greek, I **highly** recommend Ranieri's YouTube channels Scorpio Martianus and PolyMathy (and now there's a PolyMathy+).
PS. I also just realized that the first, Ranieri's, is using the Classical pronunciation while the second is using the Ecclesiastical pronunciation. Note the difference in those as you're listening. Personally, I prefer the Restored Classical pronunciation.
Nicely done, Bryan! You've inspired me to think again about going back and trying to record the Philodemus epigram of the invitation to Piso to join in the 20th!
You might be interested in these, too:
Thought this may be of interest, too:
LOL! He uses an image of Seneca to illustrate Lucretius.
The medieval Christians were "properly" curious.
To use the Barron's words: "C'mon, give me a break!"
Thanks for sharing, Joshua!
btw, just because I think he defined what the summum bonum is accurately doesn't imply I agree with anything else he says! A broken clock is right twice a day.
PS.:
Sorry, can't let this go. I also freely admit that it's been quite awhile since I read Greenblatt's book, so this is more a response to Barron then a defense of Greenblatt's work.
Barron brings up Bocaccio's Decameron. This is from Bocaccio's Wikipedia article: "he challenged the arguments of clerical intellectuals who wanted to limit access to classical sources to prevent any moral harm to Christian readers. The revival of classical antiquity became a foundation of the Renaissance, and his defense of the importance of ancient literature was an essential requirement for its development."
"Chaucer's attitudes toward the Church should not be confused with his attitudes toward Christianity. He seems to have respected and admired Christians and to have been one himself, though he also recognised that many people in the church were venal and corrupt." (Wikipedia)
If Barron is dismissive of Greenblatt's thesis, Barron seems a little free and easy with his interpretation of medieval Catholicism, too.
I think Epicurus scored the winning goal on that playing field.
Yes I think you are right but this is our task - to explain the reasoning to the "hearts in darkness."
Tell them to turn on the light!
All the to'ing and fro'ing befuddles me to no end.
What do you do with that priest in the video when he reaches the "uncaused cause" part of his chain of reasoning, and suggests to you that that is "God?"
I suspect that you have a good answer to that, but I also expect that 95% of the world does not.
Oh, that? I think he's deluded and indoctrinated and unwilling to honestly assess his preconceived notions. There's no need for an "uncaused cause." As Joshua pointed out in an historical antidote in the last episode of the podcast, there's no need for that notion in physics.
My point is that if you're trying to counter the unmoved mover claim, you've already ceded the argument to them.
I do not believe answering the summum bonum question in any way cedes the field to anyone. I think Epicurus scored the winning goal on that playing field.
We have to be alive - we have to exist! - to feel pleasure or pain.
And that's exactly why I would say that it makes sense to emphasize the "life" aspect as part of the equation, so that no one gets the idea that pleasure or pain are themselves disembodied forces or god or of nature or ideals that exist apart from the living being.
None of this has any meaning for things that don't exist! Pleasure and pain are feelings *of living beings.*
I truly and sincerely don't understand the knots into which we tie ourselves in these discussions about the "greatest good," the summum bonum, the telos, etc. To me it's simple and clear as day:
All those terms simply mean "What motivates your actions when you keep asking why you do what you do?" Epicurus answered, correctly in my opinion, pleasure. Pleasure, both in the short term and the long term, motivates all our actions. Full stop. Stoics answered virtue. Epicurus could come back with, why do you act virtuously... Because it brings you pleasure!
All the to'ing and fro'ing befuddles me to no end.
I doubt there is a way to be sure of this question but for example sitting at dinner for thanksgiving and looking forward to the meal might be something I would consider to be a type of hunger that is pleasure.
I'd say the anticipation of tucking into the feast is the pleasure, not the feeling of hunger itself.
I think DeWitt is asking, however, whether that was not the direction that Epicurus was going, and once one "thinks like an Epicurean" in equating life in the absence of pain to be pleasure, then equating "being alive" with "pleasurable experience" is a natural association, and a good way to think.
I think DeWitt is just mistaken, especially in light of his "Latin doesn't have a definite article" hobbyhorse in his summum bonum paper. I do not think this was the direction Epicurus was going. It's not "life in the absence of pain = pleasure", it is simply "the absence of the feeling of pain = pleasure" and conversely "the absence of the feeling of pleasure = pain." Adding "life" to the equation doesn't add anything. We have to be alive - we have to exist! - to feel pleasure or pain.
