Posts by Don

I'm not sure if this has been cited, but here's Epicurus's entry in the the Suda:

https://www.cs.uky.edu/~raphael/sol/sol-entries/epsilon/2404

The most pertinent section for the purposes of the timeline include:

His school continued until the first Caesar, for 227 years. In these [years] there were 14 successors.

Now, we now the Epicurean school lasted longer than "the first Caesar" because Popillius Theotimus was in charge of the Garden in 121 CE when Trajan was emperor.

But it appears the Suda is saying there were 14 "successors" to Epicurus between Epicurus's death and "the first Caesar." It looks like we still have the names of 10 of them.

The Suda was composed/compiled in the 900s CE.

Of interest, too, in the online Suda is : Translated by: Marcelo Boeri on 22 October 2003@15:29:13.

Early AD 121 – Plotina writes to Hadrian on behalf of the Epicurean school in Athens (#Hadrian1900) FOLLOWING HADRIAN

In the early year of AD 121, Pompeia Plotina, the greatly respected widow of the emperor Trajan, sent Hadrian a letter asking him to help the Epicurean school…

followinghadrian.com

Popillius Theotimus

Wasn't there a scholarch with a Roman name? Source amnesia on that one.

Quote from Joshua

https://wiki.epicurism.info/Epicurean_Scholarchs/

I see also this list, which cites a scholar named T. Dorandi as having developed the authoritative list.

That list appears to be the most comprehensive.

I found Dorandi's book on Google Books, and p.75 has the scholarchs... but that page isn't part of the preview! Table of contents: "4. Successione degli scolarchi"

Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, BOOK X, EPICURUS (341-271 B.C.)

Next came Polyaenus,37 son of Athenodorus, a citizen of Lampsacus, a just and kindly man, as Philodemus and his pupils affirm. Next came Epicurus's successor Hermarchus, son of Agemortus, a citizen of Mitylene, the son of a poor man and at the outset a student of rhetoric.

All these were distinguished, and with them

Polystratus, the successor of Hermarchus

he was succeeded by Dionysius

he by Basilides.

Apollodorus, known as the tyrant of the garden, who wrote over four hundred books, is also famous ;

(and the two Ptolemaei of Alexandria, the one black and the other white ; I'm assuming these were no scholarchs!)

and Zeno39 of Sidon, the pupil of Apollodorus, a voluminous author ; [26] and Demetrius,40 who was called the Laconian ; and Diogenes of Tarsus, who compiled the select lectures ; and Orion, and others whom the genuine Epicureans call Sophists.

Quote from Cassius

Actually, regardless of whether he's right or wrong to pull back from it, I think it's a point worth discussiing. Does (or can) imagining "hypothetical what-might-have-beens" lead to healing?

You raise some interesting points. To add a little more context, I was specifically referring to thinking things like "If only X were alive, they would be graduating from high school and going off to college. X wanted to be a doctor when they were [pick an age when few people really know what they'll do]. I know they would have been a great doctor...etc." That kind of thinking is a rabbit hole of despair. *Maybe* something more healthy would be "X always loved to pretend they were a doctor. I remember them hitting my knee with their little plastic hammer and listening to my heart with the toy stethoscope...etc." Remembering things that actually happened rather than torturng oneself with regrets and prognostications that can never be. If those regrets and prognostications bring pain to the one doing the regretting and making up "little X would be doing ABC IF they were alive...", those things are "bad" by virtue of the pain they bring. If, on the other hand, the living person uses X's possible path to medicine to create a foundation to send other children to medical school and takes pleasure in that endeavor, it could be positive to imagine "what might have been." It all comes round to context.

Quote from Godfrey

They no longer exist and so aren't missing out on any hypothetical pleasures. The pains that they may suffer before dying are a different discussion, and those pains may be heartbreaking

Well said.

Quote from Godfrey

The only sense in which the child being dead is bad is in the pain it brings to those still living.

Agreed, however, I'd rephrase that to say:

The only sense in which the child's current nonexistence is bad is in the pain that thinking what could possibly have been brings to those still living. Actual memories that can be remembered with joy are good. Imagining hypothetical what might have beens, while probably a natural outgrowth of grief, does not lead to healing.

I want to add that I have no clue as to how I would react in this scenario, nor do I even really want to entertain the notion. It brings pain. But Epicurus did encourage his students to meditate on death, to dig into it, to internalize the fact that "death is nothing." We all have wrestle with our own mortality as well as every person's we know and love. This is tough stuff everybody, but necessary.

For ease of reference:

https://www.epicureanfriends.com/wcf/user/311-don/#wall/comment425

Quote from Blank_Emu43

I can't wait to read your reply! I've read a lot of your posts and I always learn something new.

That is very kind of you to say. The others jumped right into the deep end of this discussion, so I'll try to add some complementary thoughts to theirs.

Admittedly with brief moments of backsliding due to my religious acculturation (I'm working on it), I believe Epicurus was absolutely correct to hammer on the fact that death is truly non-existence for the one that dies. After a person dies, they do not exist. It's even hard to say the sentence "they do not exist" is factual because it implies the subject "they" experiences some kind of action of the predicate "do not exist." We definitely cannot say "So-and-so is dead"! There is no "state of being dead" unless we acknowledge that it is simply a metaphorical way of saying not existing. Death is the end of consciousness, sensation, cognition, and everything. "Death is no thing to us" conveys A LOT in a short sentence.

But I'm dodging the question, aren't I?

Quote from : original question

If a child dies young, would you pity him/her (or at least feel remorseful that the child couldn't live longer)?

The question presupposes a particular life the child would have led. Had they lived, what if the child had a terrible accident and fell into an irreversible coma if they lived a year after they died? What if five years after they died, they were visiting the Grand Canyon and had an accident and fell to their death? You get the idea. The question presupposes a good long life where the child experienced all the good things life has to offer, and none of us are guaranteed that. Some of our life is by chance. Epicurus was also not a fan of predicting the future, so prognosticating what the non-existent potential life not lived is not a fruitful pursuit. Would I share this line of thought with grieving parents or family? No, I probably would not. This may be how I would process the tragedy.

Which moves into how one may try to process this. Epicureanism acknowledges that the death of a friend or loved one or family member is going to "bite." There is nothing wrong with feeling grief, unlike the Stoics who teach that losing a child should no more affect one than breaking a tea cup. There is nothing wrong with deeply feeling the loss and sadness. But... Epicureans should not let grief overwhelm them. That isn't healthy. We need to turn to the memories that bring us both joy for the experience and sadness that the person is gone.

Philodemus's On Death appears to have discussed this general topic in the lost and fragmentary early portion of his book, but here is a taste of that:

It talks about the teenage Pythocles, but the hammers home the idea that one is never too young to learn to live well.

So, to paraphrase Epicurus, I've prattled on long enough. Suffice to say that I don't think one should pity the potential life that isn't going to exist. There's no way to prognosticate what good or bad might have been. But feel the sting of grief and loss *for the living* and cherish memories.

That's my belated off the cuff remarks. As Cassius says, I reserve the right to revise or extend my remarks later.

Fabulous episode everyone! Very much enjoyed listening to this one.

I wanted to share something I've noted before, but it's appropriate to revisit here.

Various English words are used to describe the person in the texts referenced in this episode: profligate and prodigal and sybarite.

• Ex: Cicero: VIII. What propriety then is there in saying: I should find nothing to blame, if they kept their passions within bounds ? This is as much as to say: I should not blame profligates, if they were not profligates. (Reid)
• Ex. Epicurus: Therefore, whenever we say repeatedly that "pleasure is the goal," we do not say the pleasure of those who are prodigal and those stuck in delighting in pleasures arising from circumstances outside of ourselves like those who are ignorant, those who don't agree with us, or those who believe wrongly; but we mean that which neither pains the body nor troubles the mind. (My translation)

But...What's the Latin and Greek word used for profligate?

The Greek in the letter to and PD10 is ἄσωτος (asotos) and Cicero's Latin uses asotus (basically just the Latin spelling for the Greek ἄσωτος). Interestingly, this is the same word (used as an adverb) used to describe the "prodigal son" in the New Testament:

Luke 15:13: “And not many days after, the younger son gathered all together, journeyed to a far country, and there wasted his possessions with prodigal living. (ζῶν ἀσώτως = living prodigally, living riotously)"

It's the same sort of mode of living that Cicero rails against, over and over and over, ad nauseum, to use a Latin phrase.

However, I find the meaning of ἄσωτος interesting.

ἄσωτος = "having no hope of safety, in desperate case; in moral sense, abandoned; and so spendthrift, profligate"

It's literally ἄ + σωτος = ἄ "no, not, un-" + σωτος "save, rescue, keep safe, heal"

So, ἄσωτος literally means "un-saved, un-healed, un-rescued"

Being that it's the same word that's used in Luke 15:13, it seems to carry the potential of redemption or the ability to be saved from yourself so to speak. Someone un-healed can be healed, someone un-saved can be saved. So, they may be unwisely following pleasures that lead to more pain, but they can be saved from their "profligate" ways and shown a wiser path.

Cassius also mentioned in passing whether it was the drinking parties that were strung together or all the list of activities listed in the letter to Menoikeus. It appears that it's specifically the drinking bouts and festivals. Here's an excerpt from my translation:

Pertinent line: 132 - οὐ [γὰρ] πότοι καὶ κῶμοι συνείροντες

• πότοι is plural of πότος "drinking-bout, carousal" (from πίνω "I drink")
• I find it interesting that Epicurus uses the word πότος (potos) and not συμπόσιον (symposion) "symposium, drinking-party." He wrote a book or dialogue entitled Symposium in which he wrote "Even when drunk, the wise one will not talk nonsense or act silly." So, Epicurus didn't seem to oppose drinking wine or attending drinking-parties. There seems to be a distinction between πότος and συμπόσιον, possibly with the difference being one of emphasis on drinking versus conviviality.
• κῶμοι (kōmoi) plural of κῶμος "a village festival: a revel, carousal, merry-making, Latin: comissatio." They seem to have involved crowned revelers parading the streets, bearing torches, singing, dancing, and "playing frolics."
• οὐ συνείροντες (ou syneirontes) literally "not stringing together" (as beads on a string)
• "not an endless string of drinking parties and festivals…"
• Note that he doesn't say you can't attend drinking parties or take part in village festivals! He's saying life shouldn't be an "endless string" of them. That's going to lead to more pain than pleasure in the end.

This episode is another good place to advocate for Dr. Pamela Gordon's The Invention and Gendering of Epicurus! She does an exquisite job showing how Epicureans came to be associated with gluttony and food and such. Well worth reading!!

I also enjoyed hearing Kalosyni say, "I'm beginning to dislike Cicero more and more." I couldn't agree more!

Welcome aboard! What a great introductory post. I wanted to respond to a couple of your points.

Personally, I think Emily Austin's book is the best introduction to Epicurus's philosophy available right now. I hope you enjoy the podcast episodes. She was great fun to talk to! While Emily's book is a little light on the physics and epistemology of the philosophy, she does include enough, and she provides a solid, balanced approach and backs it all up with a conversational and approachable style. I also highly recommend her article:

Are the Modern Stoics Really Epicureans?

Are the Modern Stoics Really Epicureans? | History News Network

Quote from Novem

I also like how very close Epicureanism's scientific theories and conjectures are to modern atomic physics and evolutionary theory, and its overall materialism.

That was one of the facets that attracted me as well.

Quote from Novem

the gods are real (made of matter) and are the embodiments of Epicurean ideals who live far away from the conglomerations of matter, not hurt or pleased from human vice or virtue, and religion makes us think otherwise.

If you stick around (and I hope you will) you'll find I'm one of the one's who take a more metaphorical approach to the gods (like that espoused by Dr. David Sedley and others), not necessarily the majority view but I think there are texts to back it up. LOL! But that's probably a little far into the weeds for an introductory post.

So, feel free to ask questions, post your thoughts, and engage with the others on this path through the Garden.

Good call, burninglights

Just to confirm your suspicion, the letter begins:

Τὴν μακαρίαν... ἡμέραν

The blessed day ..

That μακαρίαν is the same word used in PD1 to describe the blessed state of the gods.

And, since we've noted pleasures of mind and body don't map directly into katastematic and kinetic; Diogenes Laertius states that, too:

Quote from Don

Epicurus admits both (pleasure which is a state of rest andconsists in motion).; ALSO pleasure of mind as well as of body,

Quote from Cassius

So BOTH the single word and the four lines appear on fragment 117?

No. Column 5. Lines 8-13.

Just go to the page and do a Ctrl+F and paste in

τετρα

Quote from Cassius

And that labeling would be important to emphasize IF we saw that Epicurus himself in his letters, or Lucretius in his poem, or Diogenes of Oinoanda on his wall were insisting on that labeling as a clear point. Nikolsky and Gosling and Taylor says we don't see that, and that Lucretius and Epicurus and Diogenes of Oinoanda are all using the word "pleasure" as the best term to describe tightly integrated word referring to all possible types of pleasure.

As I see it the best argument that Epicurus did insist on that labeling is the list of articles that Diogenes Laertius cites. However contrary to that argument is Nikolsky's observation that Diogenes Laertius was writing as a cataloger who (just like we may be doing today) was looking at Epicurus with the expectation to apply these labels to Epicurus' framework - a framework that does not necessarily turn on "motion" at all.

Diogenes Laertius is *citing* Epicurus himself when the term katastematic is quoted! (With editing added)

[136] Διαφέρεται δὲ πρὸς τοὺς Κυρηναϊκοὺς περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς: οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὴν καταστηματικὴν οὐκ ἐγκρίνουσι, μόνην δὲ τὴν ἐν κινήσει: ὁ δὲ ἀμφοτέραν : : ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, ὥς φησιν ἐν τῷ Περὶ αἱρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς καὶ ἐν τῷ Περὶ τέλους καὶ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ βίων καὶ ἐν τῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Μυτιλήνῃ φιλοσόφους ἐπιστολῇ. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Διογένης ἐν τῇ ἑπτακαιδεκάτῃ τῶν Ἐπιλέκτων καὶ Μητρόδωρος ἐν τῷ Τιμοκράτει λέγουσιν οὕτω: νοουμένης δὲ ἡδονῆς τῆς τε κατὰ κίνησιν καὶ τῆς καταστηματικῆς. ὁ δ᾽ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ Περὶ αἱρέσεων οὕτω λέγει: "ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀταραξία καὶ ἀπονία καταστηματικαί εἰσιν ἡδοναί: ἡ δὲ χαρὰ καὶ ἡ εὐφροσύνη κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργείᾳ βλέπονται."

[136] [Epicurus] differs from the Cyrenaics with regard to pleasure. They do not include under the term the pleasure which is a state of rest (καταστηματικὴν katastematiken), but only that which consists in motion (ἐν κινήσει en kinesei). Epicurus admits both ; also pleasure of mind as well as of body (ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος), as [Epicurus] states:

• in [Epicurus'] work On Choice and Avoidance
• and in [Epicurus'] On the Ethical End,
• and in [Epicurus'] first book of his work On Human Life
• and in [Epicurus'] epistle to his philosopher friends in Mytilene.
• So also Diogenes in the seventeenth book of his Epilecta,
• and Metrodorus in his Timocrates, whose actual words are : "Thus pleasure being conceived both as that species which consists in motion and that which is a state of rest."
• The words of Epicurus in his work On Choice [and Avoidance] are : "Peace of mind and freedom from pain are pleasures which imply a state of rest ; joy and delight are seen to consist in motion and activity."

Quote from Cassius

Quote from Don

My perspective is that Epicurus, to the extent that he may be doing it, "prioritizes" katastematic pleasure because of the confidence that we can have it accessing it. It's not dependent on energeia.

But in Epicurus' own example at the end of his life, it's the kinetic pleasure of the memory of his associations to which he refers as overriding the pain, correct?

Just had to see how it was worded...

"On this blissful day, which is also the last of my life, I write this to you. My continual sufferings from strangury and dysentery are so great that nothing could augment them ; but over against them all I set gladness of mind at the remembrance of our past conversations. But I would have you, as becomes your life-long attitude to me and to philosophy, watch over the children of Metrodorus."

"Τὴν μακαρίαν ἄγοντες καὶ ἅμα τελευταίαν ἡμέραν τοῦ βίου ἐγράφομεν ὑμῖν ταυτί. στραγγουρία τε παρηκολουθήκει καὶ δυσεντερικὰ πάθη ὑπερβολὴν οὐκ ἀπολείποντα τοῦ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς μεγέθους. ἀντιπαρετάττετο δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν χαῖρον ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν γεγονότων ἡμῖν διαλογισμῶν μνήμῃ. σὺ δ᾽ ἀξίως τῆς ἐκ μειρακίου παραστάσεως πρὸς ἐμὲ καὶ φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιμελοῦ τῶν παίδων Μητροδώρου."

***

gladness of mind

τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν χαῖρον (to kata psykhe khairon), lit. "the rejoicing throughout (my) mind"

χαῖρον is indeed related to the "kinesis/energeia" pleasure χαρα "joy"

To enjoy [+dative = something] = μνήμῃ (dative) "remembrance, memory"

So, τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν χαῖρον ἐπὶ τῇ ... μνήμῃ "the enjoying throughout (my) mind... of the memory"

Philodemus, PHerc 1005, column 5:8-9: Pros tous [ ... ]

DCLP/Trismegistos 62437 = LDAB 3610

...παρει̣ρ[η-]

μένο̣[ν] ἡ τετραφάρ[μα-] (tetrapharma-

κος (-kos)· 'ἄφοβον ὁ θεός, ἀν[ύ-]

10ποπτον ὁ θάνατος καὶ

τἀγαθὸν μὲν εὔκτητ̣ο̣ν̣,

τὸ δὲ δεινὸν εὐεκκα[ρ-]

τέρητον.' ...

Quote from burninglights

128: The right understanding of these facts enables us to refer all choice and avoidance to the health of the body and the soul’s freedom of disturbances, since this is the aim of the life of blessedness.

Keywords

the health of the body

τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὑγίειαν (tēn tou somatos hygieian)

the soul’s freedom of disturbances

τὴν <τῆς ψυχῆς> ἀταραξίαν (tēn (tēs psykhēs) ataraxian)

Quote from burninglights

131: When, therefore, we maintain that pleasure is the end, we do not mean the pleasures of profilgates [...] but freedom from pain in the body and from trouble in the mind.

but neither to be pained throughout the body

ἀλλὰ τὸ μήτε ἀλγεῖν κατὰ σῶμα (alla to mēte algein kata sōma)

nor to be troubled throughout the mind.

μήτε ταράττεσθαι κατὰ ψυχήν·

(mēte tarattesthai kata psykhēn)

Quote from Cassius

Quote from Don

My perspective is that Epicurus, to the extent that he may be doing it, "prioritizes" katastematic pleasure because of the confidence that we can have it accessing it. It's not dependent on energeia.

But in Epicurus' own example at the end of his life, it's the kinetic pleasure of the memory of his associations to which he refers as overriding the pain, correct?

Touché!

Back to the drawing board!

burninglights is onto something again and I think I like where he's going!

My perspective is that Epicurus, to the extent that he may be doing it, "prioritizes" katastematic pleasure because of the confidence that we can have it accessing it. It's not dependent on energeia.