Posts by Cassius

Fascinating: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pando_(tree)

DAILY LUCRETIAN WEDNESDAY OCTOBER 16, 2019

And therefore a fourth nature must needs be added to these (and this indeed has no name at all) but nothing can be more apt to move, nothing more subtle than this, nor consist more of small smooth seeds; and this is what first raises a sensible motion through the body: this, as it is formed of the minutest particles, is first put into motion, then the heat, and the unseen vapor receive a motion from it, and then we are and so all the limbs are set a-going; then is the blood agitated, and all the bowels become sensible, and last of all, pleasure or pain is communicated to the bones and marrow. But no pain or any violent evil can pierce so far without disordering and setting the whole into confusion, so that there is no more place for life, and the parts of the soul fly away through the pores of the body. But this motion often stops upon the surface of the body, and then the soul remains whole, and the life is preserved.

Now, how these four principles are mixed, and in what matter they subsist, I am very desirous to explain, but the poorness of the Latin tongue prevents me, against my will; yet, as far as that permits, I will endeavor briefly to touch upon this subject.

The seeds then of these principles move so confusedly among themselves, that no one of them can be separated from another, nor is there any place severally allotted to each, where anyone can act by itself; but they are, as it were, many powers of the same body. As in a piece of any animal there is smell, and heat, and taste, and out of all these one perfect body is composed; so heat, air, and the invisible vapor, and that fourth active quality, (which is the principle of motion to the other three), and from which all sensible motion rises through the limbs) compose by their mixture one subtle substance, or one Nature.

This fourth something is deeply fixed in the inmost recesses of the body, nor is there anything in the whole body more secretly and inwardly placed; it is, as it were, the very soul of the soul itself: For as in the limbs, and through all the body, the united force and power of the mind and soul are hid and unseen, because they are formed of small and few seeds, so this something without a name, being composed of minute principals, lies deep and concealed; it is the very soul of the whole soul itself, and governs the whole body. By the same rule, it is necessary that the vapor, the air, and the heat be so properly mingled through the limbs, and be disposed either higher or lower than one another, that one certain nature may be formed from all; lest the power of the heat, the vapor, and the air, being divided and separately placed, might destroy the sense, and prevent its operation.

Heat prevails in the mind when the creature is enraged, grows hot, and fire sparkles from its glowing eyes. Much vapor is cold, and the companion of fear, it excites horror in the body, and shakes the limbs; but air is of a calm and mild quality, it resides in a quiet breast, and a serene countenance. But those have most heat whose hearts are fierce, and whose angry mind are soon inflamed into passion. of this sort, in the first place, is the distracted Fury of lions, who, roaring, often burst their very breast, and are unable to contain the torrent of Rage that swells within. The cold temperature of the deer has more of vapor, and sooner incites a chillness in the limbs, which causes a trembling motion through the whole body. But the nature of the ox consists more of soft air, nor does the smoky firebrand of anger (that spreads a shade of black darkness over the mind) too much inflame him, nor is he stupefied by the darts of chilling fear, but his nature is placed between both, between the fierce lion and the deer.

Quote from Godfrey

And the gods are definitely a juicy topic with which to deepen one's understanding!

Dare I suggest it, but being willing to give serious consideration to "the Epicurean gods" may be analogous to being willing to give serious consideration to about "pleasure" as the goal of life.

Are we brave enough to through off the chains of political and academic respectability, and explore whether Epicurus may have been onto something big, two thousand years ago, that we have fully and completely buried today, even in educated academic circles that are supposed to be Epicurean-friendly?

It's quite clear to me that significant numbers of people, even in the educated classes, are not willing, and will never be willing, to open their minds to that possibility. But it's the ones who are that I think are the key to revitalizing Epicurean philosophy. Which is not to say at all that we're going to agree on the same conclusions, but I do think we ought to be willing to give Epicurus the benefit of every doubt, and really consider his statements from every possible sympathetic angle before rejecting them.

So whenever it is suggested to me that we should top talking about "the gods" because it turns off people who might otherwise be interested in Epicurean philosophy, my response is to say that "Unless we DO talk about "the gods," and explain Epicurus' reasoning about them, then they will never understand the full depth of Epicurus' reasoning about proper reasoning (the canon) and humanity's place in the universe!

And that bothers me. But of course it doesn't really bother those whose interest in Epicurus starts and stops with Epicurus was a hedonist, but a funny kind, because he held that the greatest pleasure is the absence of pain, and all we really need is bread and water and tranquillity. (my summary, not a quote )

It is a wonder that I have any teeth left, since I have to "grit" them so often!

(Added note:

In fact, even if Epicurus had never said the first word about pleasure, pain, and happiness, I think I would have found Epicurus to be one of the most fascinating figures in world history, just for his views on physics and the universe and this "divinity" issue.)

In fact, Godfrey, your discussion is really advancing my thought on this. Hopefully we will one day develop some kind of "course" or discussion on Epicurean "theology" and I just realized that the opening section of that should probably not be devoted to the statements of Epicurus on the gods or to the Epicurean section from on "On the Nature of the Gods" but probably to this On Methods of Inference. If we don't first fix people's minds on the issue that Epicurus was dealing with the issue of how to think about something on which there is not a lot of "direct evidence" -- on the issue of how to deal with things that we cannot ourselves see -- then we may never be able to break through the conventional religious perspective to entertain that Epicurus had good reasons for what he was saying.

Much like the "size of the sun" issue -- it is ridiculous ever to simply say "Epicurus was wrong about the size of the sun" without explaining in the same conversation what the issues were that he confronted from competing positions, what evidence he enlisted in support of his conclusion, how he also maintained that alternative explanations which are possible should not be eliminated, and how he got right the issue that was probably more important - that the Earth is not the center of the universe. And in my reading of the details of what is left on that controversy, it is not even clear to me that Epicurus took a firm position on the measurement of the sun - the record I have seen is that Epicurus said that the sun was something like "more or less what it appears to be" and that in itself can be interpreted in varying ways. The bottom like is that it always irks me when people who are supposedly giving a neutral or even sympathetic portrayal of Epicurus cannot point out that the arguments against him may not be all that they appear to be.

Quote from Godfrey

, apologize if I've offended anyone,

You certainly have not! You're going to have to try pretty hard to be "offensive" with this group, as we should always take things in good humor whenever possible!

Quote from Godfrey

it's challenging to adopt a belief in gods.

You don't need me to say this, but of course this isn't a belief in "gods" in the standard sense of that term at all - as you know.

As I see it even if you apply everything that Epicurus said literally, you are still talking about nothing more than the kind of reasonable speculations about alien life that you would find in most any Star Trek episode. It might even be better to talk about "divinity" as the subject matter rather than gods, because as I gather the drift, it really amounts to a discussion of "what would perfection look like in the real universe that we live in?" - Then applying those thoughts to the examples of life that we've come into contact with here on Earth to come up with reasonable speculation about how life forms that have mastered deathlessness would act anywhere in the universe.

Which I admit kind of frustrates me in some cases, as it appears that it can be difficult for some people to take the Epicureans at their word, and strip away all the omnipotence, omniscience, and universe-creating supernatural nonsense that religion insists on adding. Some people INSIST on using the standard definitions of gods, and so they insist that Epicurean explanation of "the gods" makes no sense and is unconvincing -- which indeed it WOULD be if you insist on clinging to the standard definitions of gods!

Godfrey I don't know how much additional reading you plan to do, but your discussion here has reminded me of what I think is an important supplement: Philodemus' "On Methods of Inference" is devoted to the topic of how to make inferences when the data is not as clear as we would like, and when we should treat those inferences as valid or insufficient.

If you get interested in that part I highly recommend this version at Archive.org by De Lacy. I do not recall that the part that survives addresses the gods at all, but it is some very interesting material about logic and the differences between Epicurus' approach and the Stoics and others. I do recall that it does have some specific examples of how we should reason about the way things are in countries that we have never visited, which is pretty obviously analogous to places in the universe that we have never visited. I have learned a lot by reading the Appendix in which De Lacy explains the context of all this, especially as to how even Aristotle had not broken entirely free of Platonism, so even if you don't get a chance to read the main text, I think you would find the Appendix is very worthwhile - especially parts 4-6.

in fact our discussion about this reminds me of the more general point that the reason I like to talk about this subject of the gods is not so much due to "the gods" at all -- but that this is, I think, an excellent test of whether someone sees how dramatically Epicurus departed from the Greek norm in developing his standard of truth. He tears away from faith in Logic and invests it in deductive reasoning based firmly in the senses, and that's the way of course he "proves" the existence of atoms. It seems to me that his position on "the gods" is just a small extension (maybe not an extension at all) of his method of reasoning about the atoms, applied to the stars and man's place in the universe.

Thank you for joining us, and we look forward to hearing more from you!

Quote from Godfrey

So some version of gods are possible given these conditions, even probable, but are not required.

Lots of these words have multiple meanings but to focus on "required" -- required for what?

Epicurus and Lucretius are very specific as to the need to avoid "thinking unworthily of the gods" as a means to the most happy life - for example here in Book 6:

Unless you purge your mind of such conceits, and banish them your breast, and forebear to think unworthily of the gods, by charging them with things that break their peace, those sacred deities you will believe are always angry and offended with you; not that the supreme power of the gods can be so ruffled as to be eager to punish severely in their resentments, but because you fancy those beings, who enjoy a perfect peace in themselves, are subject to anger and the extravagances of revenge: and therefore you will no more approach their shrines with an easy mind, no more in tranquility and peace will you be able to receive the images, the representations of their divine forms, that form from their pure bodies and strike powerfully upon the minds of men: From hence you may collect what a wretched life you are to lead.

And if "which version to accept" is the issue, then that is a matter of adhering to clear Epicurean texts, or going one's own way on them, since no one has formed a "club" with a "membership requirement list" requiring that any particular version of divinity be believed.

My personal bright line is mainly to rule out of court any version of the position that "Epicurus said things things because he was a hypocrite, just to save himself from the fate of Socrates." Because at some point if someone doesn't respect that the Epicureans were attempting to be honest on something as basic as this, on which they made repeated clear statements, then that person really has no sincere interest in being part of a group that respects Epicurean philosophy.

Yes those are huge points Godfrey. That essay is one of my favorites for making what I think are some excellent arguments about things that seemed easy to understand on the surface, but on further reflection needed deeper thought. "Necessity" and "chance" need to be closely considered.

With this HUGE Takeaway:

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This explains why we have free will while the universe is not in total chaos.

Sometimes I get the impression that people who throw the "Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle" around in beginner philosophy classes need to think about that too!

My commentary on how the canon would apply would include this:

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24. If you reject absolutely any single sensation without stopping to distinguish between opinion about things awaiting confirmation and that which is already confirmed to be present, whether in sensation or in feelings or in any application of intellect to the presentations, you will confuse the rest of your sensations by your groundless opinion and so you will reject every standard of truth. If in your ideas based upon opinion you hastily affirm as true all that awaits confirmation as well as that which does not, you will not avoid error, as you will be maintaining the entire basis for doubt in every judgment between correct and incorrect opinion.

At the very "worst" I would say that the Epicurean theory of the existence of extraterrestrial gods "awaits" confirmation. But as far as I can tell the Epicureans stated their observational arguments on which they expected eventual confirmation, (boundless eternal universe, isonomia, nature never creates a single thing of a kind, anticipations) so my personal view is that it is clear error under the Epicurean canon to rule out the theory, since the argument against it (based on my understanding of what Hiram and some others argue) seems to be based solely on "we haven't seen any yet."

We didn't see atoms for thousands of years either, but it was the wrong bet to dismiss the theory of atomism, and the smart bet to accept the existence of atoms, even before a single man ever "saw" one through advanced technology.

In fact, much of the first book and other parts of Lucretius are devoted to arguing exactly that - the reasonableness of accepting an argument as to the existence of something for which there is no visible evidence, and no way of proof other than deduction.

BINGO THANK YOU JOSHUA!!!

Cassius started a new event:

Event

October 15 Birthday of Virgil, Date of Death of Lucretius, and Birthday of Friedrich Nietzsche

This needs documentation....

Tue, Oct 15th 2019, 11:00 am – 12:59 pm

Cassius

October 15, 2019 at 9:33 AM

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This needs documentation....

These two posts crossed my desk today, indicating that both Virgil and Lucretius were born on October 15th. The poster (Trimontium Trust) is a reputable British museum. Anyone know a source for documenting that this either Lucretius or Virgil's birthday? If so then October 15 deserves a special place on the Epicurean calendar.

DAILY LUCRETIAN TUESDAY OCTOBER 15, 2019

Besides, you see the Mind suffers with the body, and bears a share with it and all it endures; if the violent force of a dart pierces the body, and shatters the bones and nerves, though death does not instantly follow, yet a faintness succeeds, and a sort of pleasing desire of sinking into the ground, a passionate resolution to die, and then again the will fluctuates and wishes to live: the Mind therefore must needs be of a corporeal nature, because It suffers pain by the stroke of darts, which we know are bodies.

I shall now go on to explain clearly of what sort of body this mind consists, and of what principles it is formed. And first I say that the mind is composed of very subtle and minute seeds; that it is so, attend closely, and you will find that nothing is accomplished with so much speed as what the mind attempts, and proposes to execute. The Mind therefore is swifter in its motion than anything in nature we can see or conceive. But that which is so exceedingly quick to move must consist of the roundest and most minute seeds, that may be set a-going by the lightest impulse. So water is moved and disposed to flow by ever so little force, because it is composed of small and slippery seeds; but the nature of Honey is more tenacious, its moisture is more unactive, and its motion slower; its principles stick closer among themselves; and for this reason, because it consists of seeds not so smooth, so subtle, and so round. And thus a large heap of poppy seeds is blown away by the gentlest breath of wind, and scattered abroad; but no blast can shake a heap of stones or darts. Therefore the smoother and smaller the principles of bodies are, the more easily they are disposed to motion, and the heavier and rougher the seeds are, the more fixed and stable they remain.

Since therefore the nature of the mind is so exceedingly apt to move, it must needs consist of small, smooth, and round seeds; and your knowing this, my sweet youth, will be found of great use, and very seasonable for your future inquiries. This will discover clearly to you its nature, of what tenuous parts it is formed, and how small a space it might be contained, if it could be squeezed together. For when the calm of death has possession of a man, and the mind and soul are retired, you will find nothing taken away from the body as to its bulk; nothing as to its weight. Death leaves everything complete, except the vital sense and the warm breath; the whole soul therefore must needs be formed a very small seed, as it lies diffused through the veins, the bowels, and the nerves; because when it has wholly left every part of the body, the outward shape of the limbs remains entire, and they want not a hair of their weight. And this is the nature of wine, when the flavor of it is gone, and of ointments, when their sweet odors are evaporated into air. And thus it is, when any moisture perspires through the pores of the body, the bulk does not appear less to the eye, upon that account, nor is there anything taken off from the weight; for many and small are the seeds that compose the moisture and the smell in the contexture of all bodies. And therefore we may well assured that the nature of the mind and soul is formed of exceeding little principles, because when it leaves the body, it detracts nothing from the weight.

Yet we are not to suppose this nature of the mind to be simple and unmixed; for a thin breath mingled with a warm vapor, forsakes the bodies of dying men; and this vapor draws the air along with it, for there can be no heat without air intermixed, and heat being in its nature rare, must needs have some seeds of air united with it. We find then the mind consists of three principles: of vapor, air, and heat; yet all these are not sufficient to produce sense: For we cannot conceive that either of these, or all of them united, can be the cause of sensible motions that may produce reason and thought.

As to the natural laws possibly they do arise from the qualities too, but to the extent that the qualities are the things observed by us, which are transient, I think we are primarily talking about arising from the properties of the atoms.

As to the number of mortals vs immortals, we don't have much in the texts to go on, do we? I was presuming that Dewitt is inferring from the texts that they would be approximately equal, but on the other hand he does stress "equitable" doesn't he, and it is hard to know what "equitable" would mean here. But I guess it is somewhat clear from what we observe here on earth that we don't have the same numbers of all types of animals. So there may be some kind of parallel there -- we have a few more ants than people, if that tells us anything.

Quote from Godfrey

then the probability of any given thing existing in the universe would be 100% and if I'm not mistaken this doesn't seem to be the case in EP.

Yes Godfrey you are right in seeing an issue here. As I read Lucretius, he is very firm that although there may be a numberless but not infinite number of shapes, and an infinite number of atoms of those different shapes, the possible combinations are NOT unlimited, as you will recall that Lucretius points out that certain things like Centaurs cannot exist. Also even at the very beginning of Lucretius, Epicurus is pointing out "whence he returns a conqueror to tell us what can, what cannot come into being.

So I don't think the Epicureans thought that the probability of any given thing existing in the universe would be 100% We probably need to be very careful with this wording though - i guess the point would be that it is possible for us to "imagine" things that are physically impossible.

Quote from Godfrey

chance is involved in the combinations of atoms.

I consider this to be a very difficult subject too, and not really possible to grapple with without getting to a definition of what "chance" really means. My go-to academic piece on this is the AA Long "Chance and Natural Law in Epicureanism" and I super-highly recommend that on this point. With the basic point being that "the swerve" is not as sweeping a force as it may seem. Certainly in some areas it is of supreme importance, but it does not seem to carry through everywhere or even in "most" day to day situations not involving higher animals -- but I need to let long explain his argument.... A short summary is "Why would ANYTHING be predictable if atoms were constantly swerving in an uncontrolled way? But we see that most things ARE predictable, so there has to be an explanation for when the swerve is controlling and when it is not. Long, I think, puts his finger on the answer very well.

Quote from Godfrey

And how can "equitable apportionment" occur in a chance system?

Ah, THERE it is! Good question, and I think Long's essay answers it. The key is in the definition of "chance." The system is not at all "chance" in the sense of chaotic, but is governed by what amounts to "natural law" that arises from the properties of the atoms and the qualities of the bodies that they form. While we talk about the importance of the swerve in "free will" and in the original formation of the universe, it appears that Epicurus contemplated that the swerve really has very little day-to-day impact on the mechanisms of non-animate life. But again, Long has this much better than I do.

But Long's killer argument (for me) is this: If the swerve were such an important part of Epicurus' system that, in the end, nothing is really predictable, then Cicero (and others) would have MERCILESSLY attacked the inconsistency of such a system. How could Epicurus have thought that atomism explained ANYTHING if in fact the atoms were so haphazard? Answer: he didn't think they were haphazard. He doesn't even mention the swerve in his own summary letters. The swerve is important, but not like we (who drink of the Heisenberg theory) seem to think it is.

Quote from Godfrey

Is the reason for more gods than mortals because the forces of preservation must exceed the forces of destruction in an everlasting universe?

1 - I would say that that is definitely NOT the reason for that - gods have nothing to do with controlling forces of preservation . But 2 Did Dewitt say that there are MORE immortals than mortals?\

Quote from Godfrey

I'm completely on board with his third premise of preservation exceeding destruction. My understanding, however, is that that would apply only to the atoms. All else is compounds and is subject to dissolution.

Well, isn't dewitt saying that the forces of preservation exceed the forces of destruction only on a "universe-wide" scale? Such that as you say all things that come together eventually come apart, but at the same time, elsewhere, new things are coming together? I gather that what he is really saying is that despite the constant change, the "forces of preservation" are sufficient to keep at least SOME things together all the time, so that the universe is not just a field of floating atoms that have no contact with each other. No doubt my wording there could be improved, because you are right in my view to observe that regardless of anything else, everything that comes together is thought to eventually come apart, with the exception of the bodies of the gods themselves, but in their case, only because they have perfected the science of somehow keeping their atoms together indefinitely.

Godfrey:

Elayne and I were discussing anticipations in regard to justice and I think this part of that applies here:

Of course there is a long section of DeWitt talking about anticipations of the gods, but I was focusing here solely on "justice", and to continue:

Sometimes to me it seems that DeWitt shifts into talking as if we have an innate "idea" which I think goes to far. It seems to me his best argument is in the sentence highlighted. We have at birth no names for colors, no "concepts" of colors, but we are born with eyes that have the innate ability to perceive different colors differently. The eyes don't tell us whether those colors are pleasing or not, but the sense of pleasure does. In justice, the innate ability to distinguish something as "relating to justice" does not necessarily tell us whether what we are observing is pleasant or painful, but the sense of pleasure, operating at the same time, will weigh in too. With the point being that if we did not have some kind of innate ability to distinguish situations that fall into a category as concerning "justice" then we would never recognize the relationship in the first place, and never process it any further, any more than a lower animal would.

And Godfrey this is the part that relates to this discussion:

In this "innate capacity to recognize an issue" issue, I think this is where DeWitt is going with Epicurus' view of divinity. The anticipation of divinity is a disposition to recognize that something is going on in the relationship between, let's say, where the living thing "is at the moment" and where it "might be" if it developed its capacities to "perfection." As a poor example, sort of like where a person might fit on a spectrum from an Olympic gold medal winner (at the top) to throwing plastic darts in the back yard (at the bottom). The Olympic gold medal winner is a "god among athletes" just like we might aspire to be "gods among men." Either that term "gods among men" was a pure joke, which I doubt, or else it had some relationship/aspirational meaning like this.

So an anticipation of divinity might have a purely earth-bound interpretation, which is separately applied to the issues of isonomy and the infinite / eternal universe to speculate as to the versions that live in the intermundia. But the two aspects of the issue would nevertheless fit together, I think.

So I would expand on the sentence in the DeWitt quote that I underlined in red above by adding the underlined part to speculate this:

"The innate capacity to distinguish colors is an anticipation of experience no less than the innate capacity to distinguish between justice and injustice [or to distinguish life forms that are "godlike / divine" from those that are not].

DAILY LUCRETIAN MONDAY OCTOBER 14, 2019

But since the nature of the mind and soul is discovered to be a part of the man, give these fiddler's their favorite word, Harmony, again, take from the music of the harp, or whencesoever they borrow the name, and applied it to the soul, which then - forsooth! - had no proper name of its own; however it be, let them take it again, and do you attend what follows.

I say then that the mind and soul are united together, and so joined make up one single nature; but what we call the mind is, as it were, the head, and conducts and governs the whole body, and keeps its fixed residence in the middle region of the heart. Hear our passions live, our dread and fear beat here, here are joys make everything serene; here therefore must be the seat of the Mind. The other part, the soul, spread through the whole body, obeys this mind, and is moved by the nod and impulse of it.

This mind can think of itself alone, and of itself rejoice, when the soul and body are no ways affected; as when the head or the eye is hurt by sensible pain, we are not tormented over all the body, so the mind is sometimes grieved or cheered with joy, when the other part, the soul, diffused through the limbs, is agitated with no new motion at all. But when the mind is shaking with violent fear, we see the soul through all the limbs partakes of the same disorder. Cold sweats and paleness spread all of the body over, the tongue falters, the speech fails, the eyes grow dim, the ears tingle, and the limbs quake. In short, we often see men fall down from a terror of the mind, from whence we may easily conclude that the soul is united with the mind, and when she is pressed forcibly with its impulse, then she drives on the body, and puts it in motion.

By this rule therefore we find that the nature of the mind and soul is corporeal semicolon for we see it shakes the limbs, rouses the body from sleep, changes the countenance, and directs and governs the whole man. (Nothing of which can be done without touch, and there can be no Touch without body.) Should we not then allow that the mind and soul are corporeal in their nature?

Ah you are right to focus on what is important!

Yes it is lots to digest and I hope you will continue the discussion. This reminds me of the current thread on "justice" that we are talking. We have strong preconceived notions of what we "should" be talking about in terms of both "justice" and "divinity." But at this point in studying Epicurus we ought to be cautioned that we need to re-examine virtually everything we have been told about Epicurus, and try to approach him from as unbiased view as possible, always starting back at the fundamental observations about the atomistic/eternal/boundless nature of the universe, and how mankind (all life, really) fits into it.

And without going too far off beam i think a related question arises from "pleasure." What IS pleasure and where did it "come from?"

My own admittedly radical answer to such questions is that we have to consider the possibility that Epicurus was going in the direction of concluding that "life" (not individual lives, but 'life' as a natural development of nature) is just as "eternal" as any other aspect of nature. In fact I am pretty sure that that is demanded by the physics -- so that while it might be correct to entertain that "life" developed on Earth at a particular moment from non-life, we would expect that that process had happened over an over an infinite number of times for an eternity up to this point.

While I would not think that planet-to-planet or "cosmos-to-cosmos" movement of life is a necessary conclusion, it is probably at least a "possible" conclusion that Epicurus would have entertained in the same way he entertained numbers of alternative theories that could not be proven to be uniquely correct, but which do not necessarily conflict with what we do observe.

Remember one of Lucian's satires involved alien life forms and interplanetary travel too. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_True_Story

But to repeat I am not advocating any of this as required either by scientific evidence today, or by the surviving Epicurean texts. But I think we have to open up just about any possible theory that we do not *know* to be impossible, if not as something that we think ourselves, but at least as something that the Epicureans might have entertained.