Posts by Cassius

Ok so this is what Velleius says:

Quote

“These discoveries of Epicurus are so acute in themselves and so subtly expressed that not everyone would be capable of appreciating them. Still I may rely on your intelligence, and make my exposition briefer than the subject demands. Epicurus then, as he not merely discerns abstruse and recondite things with his mind's eye, but handles them as tangible realities, teaches that the substance and nature of the gods is such that, in the first place, it is perceived not by the senses but by the mind, and not materially or individually, like the solid objects which Epicurus in virtue of their substantiality entitles steremnia; but by our perceiving images owing to their similarity and succession, because an endless train of precisely similar images arises from the innumerable atoms and streams towards the gods, our mind with the keenest feelings of pleasure fixes its gaze on these images, and so attains an understanding of the nature of a being both blessed and eternal.

So this is indeed something i had missed previously -- i was thinking that it was just a stream of elemental particles that kept the gods alive in their quasi-bodies, but it appears that the word used is images, not particles, and I can't help but think that that makes a difference. What the difference might be, I don't really know, but there has to be some significance to the things streaming toward the gods being "images" (which I take to be particles organized in shape deriving from their source) rather than just random elemental particles.

To save time for anyone reading along, the heart of the sections in Philebus and Seneca I am referring to are:

SOCRATES: I omit ten thousand other things, such as beauty and health and strength, and the many beauties and high perfections of the soul: O my beautiful Philebus, the goddess, methinks, seeing the universal wantonness and wickedness of all things, and that there was in them no limit to pleasures and self-indulgence, devised the limit of law and order, whereby, as you say, Philebus, she torments, or as I maintain, delivers the soul. — What think you, Protarchus?

…

SOCRATES: Have pleasure and pain a limit, or do they belong to the class which admits of more and less?

PHILEBUS: They belong to the class which admits of more, Socrates; for pleasure would not be perfectly good if she were not infinite in quantity and degree.

SOCRATES: Nor would pain, Philebus, be perfectly evil. And therefore the infinite cannot be that element which imparts to pleasure some degree of good. But now — admitting, if you like, that pleasure is of the nature of the infinite — in which of the aforesaid classes, O Protarchus and Philebus, can we without irreverence place wisdom and knowledge and mind? And let us be careful, for I think that the danger will be very serious if we err on this point.

PHILEBUS: You magnify, Socrates, the importance of your favourite god.

SOCRATES: And you, my friend, are also magnifying your favourite goddess; but still I must beg you to answer the question.

…

SOCRATES: And whence comes that soul, my dear Protarchus, unless the body of the universe, which contains elements like those in our bodies but in every way fairer, had also a soul? Can there be another source?

PROTARCHUS: Clearly, Socrates, that is the only source.

SOCRATES: Why, yes, Protarchus; for surely we cannot imagine that of the four classes, the finite, the infinite, the composition of the two, and the cause, the fourth, which enters into all things, giving to our bodies souls, and the art of self-management, and of healing disease, and operating in other ways to heal and organize, having too all the attributes of wisdom; — we cannot, I say, imagine that whereas the self-same elements exist, both in the entire heaven and in great provinces of the heaven, only fairer and purer, this last should not also in that higher sphere have designed the noblest and fairest things?

PROTARCHUS: Such a supposition is quite unreasonable.

SOCRATES: Then if this be denied, should we not be wise in adopting the other view and maintaining that there is in the universe a mighty infinite and an adequate limit, of which we have often spoken, as well as a presiding cause of no mean power, which orders and arranges years and seasons and months, and may be justly called wisdom and mind?

PROTARCHUS: Most justly.

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We can find the same point made by Seneca in the following letters:

Quote Seneca’s Letters – Book I – Letter XVI: This also is a saying of Epicurus: “If you live according to nature, you will never be poor; if you live according to opinion, you will never be rich.” Nature’s wants are slight; the demands of opinion are boundless. Suppose that the property of many millionaires is heaped up in your possession. Assume that fortune carries you far beyond the limits of a private income, decks you with gold, clothes you in purple, and brings you to such a degree of luxury and wealth that you can bury the earth under your marble floors; that you may not only possess, but tread upon, riches. Add statues, paintings, and whatever any art has devised for the luxury; you will only learn from such things to crave still greater. Natural desires are limited; but those which spring from false opinion can have no stopping point. The false has no limits.

Quote Seneca’s Letters – To Lucilius – 66.45: “What can be added to that which is perfect? Nothing otherwise that was not perfect to which something has been added. Nor can anything be added to virtue, either, for if anything can be added thereto, it must have contained a defect. Honour, also, permits of no addition; for it is honourable because of the very qualities which I have mentioned.[5] What then? Do you think that propriety, justice, lawfulness, do not also belong to the same type, and that they are kept within fixed limits? The ability to increase is proof that a thing is still imperfect.”“

To state one more way, this is the "Philebus" issue. People who have fallen into the trap of the Academy or the Stoa or even the Peripatetics cannot escape the trap laid by Socrates in Philebus because they are in thrall to "logic." As such, they cannot think their way out of the implications of Socrates' questions, which boil down to the requirement that the greatest good must be describable in absolute terms as having a "limit.". They presume that more pleasure is always better, so they are forced to admit that pleasure has no limit, and thereby (according to the premises they have accepted) cannot be the greatest good.

Describing the limit of pleasure as the absence of pain has little if any "practical" appeal (real people always want to know which pleasures and which pains) but it is the precise answer to the logic trap which Philebus could not escape.

I think stating the issue this way is reasonably clear, but I do not think it is possible to appreciate the significance of this without reading Philebus for oneself and seeing the trap that was laid, and how Epicurus offers the way out.

Back in Athens most people would know the story of Philebus. Today very few do, so pushing this argument forward is going to require laying the foundation through Philebus. The same argument appears in Seneca so the Epicurean remedy can also be illustrated there, but of course Seneca long post dated Epicurus, so the real key is Philebus, which is focused on the issue of Pleasure.

To expand now I am home, yes - I think this perspective is essential to understanding what appear otherwise to be ambiguities or inconsistencies in the philosophy. Epicurus is all about practicality, and yet he is frequently referring to "pleasure" which is about as broad a word as can possibly be.

I think the reason is that what we have preserved in the letters is the highest-level summary of the philosophy, which as such is necessarily stated in highly abstract terms. That leads to what I think is the key error of the "absence of pain" approach. Those people are attempting to take a highest-level summary and trying to convert it directly into a "what should I eat at noon today" level of detail. Talking about "Pleasure" was never meant to be that kind of immediately practical advice --- or better stated, the immediate practical use of the abstraction "pleasure" is to respond to the false assertion that it is not feeling, but Virtue or Reason or Piety that should be the goal of life.

I think if we had the reams of other material we would see the practical translation of this term into the details we are looking do, but that instead all we have is the highest level outline rather than the details we are expecting to find (having been conditioned by stoicism and religion to detailed do's and don't).

This is not shortsightedness or an error on Epicurus' part but an error on our part in thinking that what amounts to a high-level spec sheet can be used as an operating manual.

To some extent definitely, but I think the distinction that I am making is that philosophy can be, from some perspectives, a word game which is a trap for the unwary. I do not believe Epicurus said simply 'don't play that game.". I think Epicurus realized that many people are already trapped by that word game, and he formulated the way out using the rules of his opponents ' games, as a means of liberating those who fell into the trap before the were exposed to Epicurus.

For such people, teaching a way out of the word game is an essential and valid approach. And I think that approach is at least as valuable today as it was then, because virtually everyone is captured by some variation of the virtue / rationalism game.

Also in regard to this episode, it has me wanting to go back and review Velleius as to the images going TOWARDS the gods. I have always thought of that just in terms of atoms flowing toward them and their bodies being assembled from atoms like a waterfall. But images are "organized" and not the same as random atoms flowing toward them. Is there an implication if Velleius is talking about images rather than simple particles?

Welcome to Episode Sixty-Eight of Lucretius Today.

I am your host Cassius, and together with my panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the six books of Lucretius' poem, and discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book, "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.

For anyone who is not familiar with our podcast, please check back to Episode One for a discussion of our goals and our ground rules. If you have any question about that, please be sure to contact us at EpicureanFriends.com for more information.

In this Episode 68 we will continue with a passage we originally planned for last week, start at approximately Latin line 195 of Book 5, with Martin reading today's text. Now let's join the discussion:

Munro Notes

195-234: nay, if I did not know the first-beginnings of things, the imperfection of this world would prove to me the gods did not make it for man's use: see after all how small a part of the whole earth he can bring under tillage, and that with the sweat of his brow; and then his labour is often thrown away: look at all the miseries he suffers, dangers by sea and land, diseases, untimely death; compare the helpless baby with the young of other animals.

Browne 1743

For were I wholly ignorant of the origin of things, yet I could prove this truth from the heavens, and by many other reasons, that the frame of the world was by no means raised by the gods for the use of man, so faulty it is, and contrived so ill. And first, the Earth, covered over by the violent whirl of the heavens, huge mountains and woods, the harbor of wild beasts, and rocks and vast lakes, and the sea, which widely separates the distant shores, take up a great part of it; and then the torrid heat, and continual cold, rob mankind almost of two parts, and make them uninhabitable. The fruitful fields that remain, nature of herself would spread over with thorns if the labor of man did not prevent it; if he did not, to preserve life, force the earth by constant toil with strong tools, and cut it through with the plough; if we did not turn up the fruitful clods with the crooked share, and compel the soil to exert its strength, of its own accord it would produce nothing. And yet, when the fruits are raised with great labor, when they look green upon the ground, and all things flourish; either the sun's rays burn everything up with their fierce heat, or sudden showers, or piercing frosts, destroy our hopes; or the blasts of wind, with terrible hurricanes, blow them away. And then, why does Nature nourish and increase the dreadful race of wild beasts, by sea and land, the professed enemies to humankind? Why do the seasons of the year bring disease with them? Why does untimely death wander every way abroad?

Besides, a child, like a shipwrecked mariner on shore by the cruel tide, lies naked upon the ground; a wretched infant, destitute of every help of life, as soon as Nature, by the mother's pangs, has thrown him from the womb into light; and then he fills the air with mournful cries, as he has reason to do, since in the course of life he has such a series of evils to pass through. But cattle of every kind, and herds, and wild beasts, grow up with ease. They have no need of rattles to divert them; they have no occasion for the kind nurse, by her fond and broken words, to keep them in humor; they require no difference of dress for the several seasons of the year; they have no need of arms, nor high walls, to secure their property; for the Earth, with curious contrivance, of herself produces everything in abundance for the whole variety of creatures to feed and support them.

Munro 1886

But if I did not know what first-beginnings of things are, yet this judging by the very arrangements of heaven I would venture to affirm, and led by many other facts to maintain, that the nature of things has by no means been made for us by divine power: so great are the defects with which it is encumbered. In the first place of all, the space which the vast reach of heaven covers, a portion greedy mountains and forests of wild beasts have occupied, rocks and wasteful pools take up and the sea which holds wide apart the coasts of different lands. Next, of nearly two thirds burning heat and the constant fall of frost rob mortals. What is left for tillage, even that nature by its power would overrun with thorns, unless the force of man made head against it, accustomed for the sake of a livelihood to groan beneath the strong hoe and to cut through the earth by pressing down the plow. Unless by turning up the fruitful clods with the share and laboring the soil of the earth we stimulate things to rise, they could not spontaneously come up into the clear air; and even then sometimes when things earned with great toil now put forth their leaves over the lands and are all in blossom, either the ethereal sun bums them up with excessive heats or sudden rains and cold frosts cut them off, and the blasts of the winds waste them by a furious hurricane. Again, why does nature give food and increase to the frightful race of wild beasts dangerous to mankind both by sea and land? Why do the seasons of the year bring diseases in their train? Why stalks abroad untimely death?

Then, too the baby, like to a sailor cast away by the cruel waves, lies naked on the ground, speechless, wanting every furtherance of life, soon as nature by the throes of birth has shed him forth from his mother’s womb into the borders of light: he fills the room with a rueful wading, as well he may whose destiny it is to go through in life so many ills. But the different flocks herds and wild beasts grow up; they want no rattles; to none of them need be addressed the fond broken accents of the fostering nurse; they ask not different dresses according to the season; no nor do they want arms or lofty walls, whereby to protect their own, the earth itself and nature manifold in her works producing in plenty all things for all.

Bailey 1921

But even if I knew not what are the first-beginnings of things, yet this I would dare to affirm from the very workings of heaven, and to prove from many other things as well, that by no means has the nature of things been fashioned for us by divine grace: so great are the flaws with which it stands beset. First, of all that the huge expanse of heaven covers, half thereof mountains and forests of wild beasts have greedily seized; rocks possess it, and waste pools and the sea, which holds far apart the shores of the lands. Besides, two-thirds almost burning heat and the ceaseless fall of frost steal from mortals. Of all the field-land that remains, yet nature would by her force cover it up with thorns, were it not that the force of man resisted her, ever wont for his livelihood to groan over the strong mattock and to furrow the earth with the deep-pressed plow. But that by turning the fertile clods with the share, and subduing the soil of the earth we summon them to birth, of their own accord the crops could not spring up into the liquid air; and even now sometimes, when won by great toil things grow leafy throughout the land, and are all in flower, either the sun in heaven burns them with too much heat, or sudden rains destroy them and chill frosts, and the blasts of the winds harry them with headstrong hurricane. Moreover, why does nature foster and increase the awesome tribe of wild beasts to do harm to the race of man by land and sea? Why do the seasons of the year bring maladies? Why does death stalk abroad before her time?

Then again, the child, like a sailor tossed ashore by the cruel waves, lies naked on the ground, dumb, lacking all help for life, when first nature has cast him forth by travail from his mother’s womb into the coasts of light, and he fills the place with woful wailing, as is but right for one for whom it remains in life to pass through so much trouble. But the diverse flocks and herds grow up and the wild beasts, nor have they need of rattles, nor must there be spoken to any of them the fond and broken prattle of the fostering nurse, nor do they seek diverse garments to suit the season of heaven, nay, and they have no need of weapons or lofty walls, whereby to protect their own, since for all of them the earth itself brings forth all things bounteously, and nature, the quaint artificer of things.

Episode 67 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. In today's episode, we continue into book five and discuss the question of whether the gods woke up one day and decided to create the universe. As always let us know if you have any questions or comments

I am editing this podcast now and want to note that when it is released around the 30 minute mark we start talking about the issue of the gods needing a model. We made the point that this is a very deep subject and I think one thing we probably did not cover adequately is the possibility that this "model" language might have been a direct reference to Plato's ideal forms, and perhaps he's just referring to models as a way of putting the Platonists into an illogical regression of asking "which came first, the gods or the models"?

Probably that's not a good way of expressing the issue, but listen for this part of the podcast and see what you think about how the model discussion may relate to Plato's forms.

After thinking about the question this way I wonder if the entire basis of the passage in Lucretius was to attack the logic behind Plato's forms.

Quote from Don

I was just thinking that we need to be clear that saying the "goal is pleasure" doesn't mean we don't voluntarily choose pain if it means attaining the "goal of living pleasurably." And that's not Stoic, that's Epicurus.

Right, but it's possible to use the same construction and say that you voluntarily choose pain in order to achieve pleasure if you define the pleasure you're talking about as "the greatest net" pleasure or "ultimate pleasure." The wording is clearly tricky and I keep coming back in my mind that the use of the construction "pleasure" makes sense mainly as a reply, and in the context of choosing between, "virtue" or "piety" or "wisdom" or some other very high level abstraction.

I was looking over the William Short 1818 letter this morning and a couple of questions came to mind (focusing here only on the ethics part):

(1) I wonder what Jefferson was following in composing this outline? Was he working from the letter the Menoeceus, or from Diogenes Laertius' entire biography, or perhaps even from Cicero's 'On Ends" -- or all of the above plus Lucretius?

(2) I didn't clip this part, but it's interested that he included a section on physics and ethics, but nothing on canonics. For someone as interested in "Reason" as Jefferson appears to have been, that's curious.

(3) "Virtue the foundation of happiness" and "utility the test of virtue" sounds almost like "On Ends." That precise point is not a focus of the letters, and I am not sure it stands out in Diogenes Laertius, does it? Does that then point to Cicero? I seem to remember a commentator pointing out that the list of virtues mirrors the listing in Torquatus.

(4) "Pleasure active and indolent" and the "agreeable motion" -- That's not in the letters, is it, but might be drawn from Diogenes Laertius but also from Cicero, correct?

(5) It's interesting that he would choose to use the word in-dolent, which I've never seen anyone else use for the resting / static / katastematic category referenced in DL and Cicero. I wonder why he chose that word, and chose to write it with the dash, almost as if he were emphasizing the "in-" part?

(6) The "it is not happiness, but the means to produce it." Is "it" referring to pleasure in general, or to his observation about active / agreeable motion?

(7) Does the "summum bonum" sound like a direct reference to Cicero's formulations in "on ends'?

(8) It is interesting that he chooses to say "utility" is the test of virtue rather than "produces pleasure" if he was following "On Ends." Maybe that is a reflection of the Utilitarianism movement (?)

These are just some of the questions that arise but I think it's interesting to consider what this outline indicates about which Epicurean sources Jefferson was reading. I note that he says in this 1819 letter that he wrote the outline some twenty years beforehand, which I gather would have been a very busy period for Jefferson.

sounds like an example where a set of standard connotations would be called into question by what we know of the broader context of what is being discussed. Of course we could question Lucretius' choice of words too. Probably that passage about pleasure being akin to our nature and pain being destructive would be relevant here too.

VS37. Nature is weak toward evil, not toward good: because it is saved by pleasures, but destroyed by pains.

Yes we did discuss it! We covered only half of the material I originally intended because there was so much in it. i will get it posted as soon as I can but may take a couple of days.

I have tremendous respect for MFS' work and I think he probably deserves the title "greatest living expert on Lucretius" and certainly on Diogenes of Oinoanda, but I am afraid I observe the same kind of tendency toward asceticism in MFS that I see in other modern commentators. It's way off topic to go down this rabbit hole, but I actually find David Sedley to have less of that tendency than does MFS. All of which just leads me to conclude that in every question of Lucretius it's best to look at all four (Daniel Brown, Munro, Bailey AND MFS) to compare the word choices. I also sometimes like what I see in Stallings and especially in Rolfe Humphries - who we rarely talk about but who is the basis for my favorite professional reading of Lucretius - but anytime someone is aiming to preserve the "poetry' aspect I have the concern that they are likely making concessions in accuracy in order to achieve the flair of poetry.

I am sorry to say I see MFS as a regression too (seductive being ambiguously negative)

"Again, how could it have harmed us never to have been created? Are we to believe that our life lay groveling in murk and misery until the first day of creation dawned for us? All people, once born, must certainly wish to remain in life, so long as seductive pleasure detains them; but if one has never tasted the love of life or been numbered [180] among the living, how does it harm one not to have been created?"

Godfrey according to MFS its somewhere around 170 - 180

You're quite possibly right in this instance, but I am afraid I have a significant sequence of Bailey choices that have convinced me to be suspicious

But rather than be negative let me focus on the positive: I continue to be fascinated that the older, unknown Daniel Browne translator frequently strikes me as best. And he's not that far in time from the Creech translation that I find to be almost unusable. So there's something fascinating to me about that 1743 version.

Lucretius Book Five:

Brown 1743: "Indeed, when we are once born, we should strive (whoever he be) to preserve our life, so long as we find an engaging pleasure in our being...."

Munro 1886: "Whoever has been born must want to continue in life, so long as fond pleasure shall keep him...."

Bailey 1921: "For whosoever has been born must needs wish to abide in life, so long as enticing pleasure shall hold him."

My comment:

Once again I find the 1743 edition more in tune with what I think the meaning should be if viewed in accord with the sweep of the philosophy ("engaging" is a positive word).

Munro's "keep" probably will strike some as odd language but it's probably accurate if we look back to older usages of keep (I remember the hymn phrase "The Lord bless you and keep you...." which does not seem to have a negative connotation).

But Bailey's "hold" has almost a Buddhist sound to it and I would accordingly reject that implication as negative. I would probably add this to my personal list of examples from Bailey where his choice of words reflects poorly on his assessment of Epicurean philosophy.

Does pleasure "hold" us, or does it provide the very goal and reason for living? If Bailey agreed personally with the latter option I don't think he would have used the word "hold" - if he didn't like "engage" and wanted to follow Munro's direction then "keep" or even "sustain" would have been a better choice.

Yeah I thought about not using the "rabble" word but I couldn't remember the "hoi polloi"! Actually neither term fits my target, because I don't mean to say anything demeaning about those who innocently misconstrue. My focus is on the strictly philosophical debate i referenced earlier, in with "pleasure" is the more technical term and "living pleasurably" is the more colloquial description. (I was thinking there was a passage about "the crowd" but couldn't put my finger on it.)

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