Posts by Cassius

OK I am trying to keep not only the big picture but also just the thread title in focus as we go forward. The issue under discussion is broadly speaking (I think) whether "concepts" as that word is commonly used are a part of the Epicurean canon of truth.

Some translators seem to take that position (that "concepts" are part of the canon of truth), but I think it is fair to say the majority (and those I personally find most persuasive) do not take that position. They think Epicurus was referring to something pre-rational, potentially "intuitive," that functions in parallel (and analogously, I think it is fair to say, as pre-rational) with the five senses and with the pleasure/pain mechanism.

So I think I am reading the Feldman-Barrett comments to say that she also agrees that there is a pre-rational mechanism going on that pre-exists in the sequence of things before the arisal of what we might call "the concept of fear."

If I am reading that correctly that that makes FB a useful data point in supporting Epicurus' contentions and explaining them as part of Epicurean philosophy.

(?)

Well if she is saying that "fear" is a word and that the definition of a word is contextual (with different words in different languages) then I have no problem with that.

If she is saying that the emotion that we call fear in English but which all animals and all humans appear to share - because we feel it prerationally -does not exist until a word is put to it after thinking about it, then that would be something else entirely.

Quote from Godfrey

Without a concept for “Fear,” you cannot experience fear.”

This quote seems particularly stark to me in making clear that it is important to define what is meant by this word "concept" because the view expressed here is almost certainly not the view that is implicit in the ancient debates, where by my reading a concept is something formed after thought based on experience.

Now fear is an emotion / feeling and a human would most certainly experience fear as a natural feeling before ever thinking and describing the experience in words, which seems to be a central part of concepts.

Use of Feldman Barrett or anyone else to describe the processes actually involved will be helpful, but I also think to keep the conversation on course we have to focus on the debate in traditional terms, and there it seems to me that the word concept is closely related to "ideas" and "forms" and the ultimate questions of whether there are external locations (realm of ideas, religion/gods, formal logic /virtue) to which we must conform our thoughts and actions.

On the other hand focusing on what is actually going on is obviously good, so there's a balance involved!

Quote from Godfrey

But he's obviously not a Skeptic: the verification comes from direct experience.

Indeed, THAT is the function of the canon of truth!

And Nate thank you again for having a better memory than I do, because this is another thread where we need to suit up Don on one side vs Norman DeWitt on the other (and apparently Archontia Liontaki too) as to whether to read sovereignty / kingship into Epicurus' writings on self-protection.

(But we were talking earlier about PD14 there. RE: PD14 - Alternate Translations Nevertheless a related issue?)

Elli has been away for a while but I hope this will encourage her to drop by again soon!

Thanks to Nate's summary I can paste here the ones that seem to me to be of the same mind that we are NOT talking "full-blown concepts" --

Hicks 1910 : or in feeling or in any mental apprehension

Hicks 1925 : or in feelings or in any presentative perception of the mind

Bailey: or feeling, or each intuitive apprehension of the mind

Long: through feelings, and through every focusing of thought into an impression

O'Connor: or in feelings or in any immediate perception of the mind,

Inwood and Gerson: the feelings, and every application of the intellect to presentations,

Anderson: every intuitive faculty of mind,

Makridis: the passions, or some other imaginary twist of mind

St Andre: your feelings, and all the layers of imagination involved in your thoughts

Strodach: or in the feelings or some percept of the mind itself

Mensch: feeling, or perception

Wow we'll have to see what Don thinks of that!

Quote from Don

This seems to be the sticking point. This goes against the "withhold judgement" ideas of Epicurus's philosophy.

That's referring to "beyond any need for seconds further data or reflection."

So I don't think that goes far enough. I don't think we can deal entirely within the Epicurean viewpoint here (unless you want to specify an Epicurean definition of "concept") because "concept" has a pretty clear and definite meaning among most of us today, and we're not going to be able to have public conversations about "concepts" unless we are clear on the terms.

And "concepts" are pretty darn close, if not identical, to "Platonic forms" and/or "universals." Certainly we can agree that concepts can be changed, but at any particular moment a "concept" i think is generally understood to be "a general notion or idea; conception" which at the time it is being discussed is considered to be something special.

Yikes who is Odysseus Makridis and should we consider him a good source?

Odysseus Makridis | Fairleigh Dickinson University

www.fdu.edu

Yes Joshua that is what I am thinking too - but I definitely still want your "why" as that will help flesh out the question.

I suspect Don might say that "Christianity" is pretty much on order with the "non-aggression principle' as a "platonic universal." And yes, that analysis is probably correct, and leads to the conclusion I think that is likely, which is that this formulation doesn't work, because a "mental examination of a confirmed concept" or at least a "confirmed concept" IS a Platonic universal. Is that correct / do we agree on that?

To be fair to Geer and test his wording I am looking to see whether there is any way in which a confirmed Epicurean might consider a "mental examination of a confirmed concept" to be a standard of truth(?)

OK I don't think that answer really gets to where we need to go so maybe I should drop back even further to the issue of:

What is a "mental examination of a confirmed concept" if one were to accept that version of the doctrine?

In asking about a "non-aggression principle" maybe that is too complex an example. If the suggested translation were to be accepted as accurate, what would be an example of a "mental examination of a confirmed concept" that would then be considered a canonical standard of truth?

Again, I am not convinced this translation is a good one, but in order to examine it let's presume that it is and look for an example of how to apply it on its own terms. Can this construction be applied consistently with what we know about the rest of Epicurean philosophy?

No one has responded yet to my question in this post:. RE: PD14 - Alternate Translations

Anyone? I Want to check my thinking in this issue.

Wow great research JJ thank you! That helps put things in perspective against today, where I gather such things are "somewhat" less prevalent

Quote from Godfrey

Does anybody have any information on Strodach? I like some of his translations but find his commentary disturbing. All I can find with a Google search is that he was born in 1905.

Do you have a copy of his book? I do but it doesn't seem to contain much bio information other than that he seems to have been a professor perhaps at Northwestern which published his book?

To All Who Care To Comment:

Suppose I decide that I am absolutely completely convinced by all my faculties and life-long experiences that "ALL KILLING IS WRONG" which I identify in my mind as a concept I entitle the "Non-Aggression Principle."

I am persuaded of the truth of the non-aggression principle beyond any need for seconds further data or reflection.

Has "the non-aggression principle" now entered into what I should understand from Epicurus that my canon of truth should be?

Argh now I am going to have to go through and move some of this to the sections for particular doctrines (such as 24) but I think it's probably best to let the thread develop first.

Note how Sedley and Long treat 24 (thanks Nate):

24. “(1) If you are going to reject any sensation absolutely, and not distinguish opinions reliant on evidence yet awaited from what is already present through sensation, through feelings, and through every focusing of thought into an impression, you will confound all your other sensations with empty opinion and consequently reject the criterion in its entirety. (2) And if you are going to treat as established both all the evidence yet awaited in your conjectural conceptions, and that which has failed to <earn> attestation, you will not exclude falsehood, so that you will have removed all debate and all discrimination between correct and incorrect.” (87)

I think they are properly too conservative to use "concepts" there, although it looks to me like they would be happy to do so.

Now if Epicurus were wanting to be a total subjectivist and say "things are to be judged as true in part according to the concepts I have formed of them" he might win an award for self-assertiveness or for starting a semi-modern school of subjectivity, but I don't think that was his intention at all.

I think he was setting up a standard of truth for the very exact purpose of always having a method to go back to, based on data provided through natural senses, by which to check the continued validity of concepts previously or currently formed.

If he had said " I include in my list of the standards of truth the opinions I have already formed," then he'd be doing exactly what he warned against (confounding your other opinions with empty opinion."

Of course I realize that a premise of my argument is that a concept is always an opinion, and that there is no way to objectively define any concept as "true for all times, places, people, etc." That's probably the direction this debate has to go to be decided. Is there any way to validate a concept as something that we should consider to be a criterion of truth for all people, all times, all places? Yes we take the position that some "facts" are established (such as no supernatural gods, no life after death, etc.) Do THOSE concepts we accept as "universally true" become part of the "criterion of truth"?

I can see someone arguing that position, but I am not at all sure that Epicurus was going in that direction. If he WAS going in that direction, then IMHO he was strictly limiting the number of positions that are "absolutely true" to those forcefully supported by his philosophy. And I don't think you can get from "one of three natural faculties" to "a list of the core positions of Epicurean Philosophy."

THANK YOU AGAIN NATE -- that deserves an all caps thank you!

A couple more comments on those of Geer that strike me as unusual. 39 and 40 strike me as questionable too, but the one I object to the most is 24:

I kind of like "the boundary of pleasure...." but he's removing "the limit of quantity" which is probably more exact.

Pretty good.

Pretty good

Pretty good on a hard one, I think. BUT here is 24:

I have to object to this one because he is assuming the controversial conclusion that the anticipations part is well translated as "the mental examinations of confirmed concepts." That is a dramatic raising of the flag in support of the position that "concepts" are part of the canon of truth. As I've said ad nauseam, as far as I am concerned that is the end of the game when you adopt that, because you have then adopted your own opinion as part of the standard of truth. Got to hand it to Greer, though - he makes his position on anticipations absolutely clear.