We are essentially going to have to fill out what is unstated at that Wikipedia page: What was Epicurus' position?
While I definitely don't think Epicurus agreed with Plato on this, I don't think he agreed with Aristotle either, and I think we're going to rotate back to that section on the origins of Epicurean empiricism from DeLacy:
I think also though that this is a different problem than the one he makes for pleasure.
Yes, this is a much deeper issue, and probably more closely involves the questions revolving around the canon of truth, which probably does precede our evaluation of pleasure.
I believe we are eventually going to have to wrestle with the line underlined in red:
I could tell you what my (half-formed) viewpoint is but that would spoil the fun 
What about the more general question of the "one and the many" issue? What is the general point he is making, not just about pleasure, but about anything, as to separating things into "one and many" categories?
Rather than divert this thread solely in one direction here is a thread to address one of the "big issues" we referenced today:
Sooner or later we need to give this tangled semantic web the Gordian treatment—to cut through words and logic and disputation, through dialectic and debate and Ciceronian puppet-strings, and to come down to something visceral and experiential.
No, I think that IS the answer!
We need to do that because in the end there is no other choice.
I will link to this thread in the show notes for Episode Ninety-Four, because I think we are going to find that the issue is very relevant. But I want to set it out as a separate thread. The basic question in the thread is "
"What In The Heck Is Socrates Even Talking About?" Can we help each other by explaining what we think this is about?
The heart of the question I think becomes most clear in this brief excerpt, which comes from the full Philebus:
SOCRATES: We say that the one and many become identified by thought, and that now, as in time past, they run about together, in and out of every word which is uttered, and that this union of them will never cease, and is not now beginning, but is, as I believe, an everlasting quality of thought itself, which never grows old. Any young man, when he first tastes these subtleties, is delighted, and fancies that he has found a treasure of wisdom; in the first enthusiasm of his joy he leaves no stone, or rather no thought unturned, now rolling up the many into the one, and kneading them together, now unfolding and dividing them; he puzzles himself first and above all, and then he proceeds to puzzle his neighbours, whether they are older or younger, or of his own age—that makes no difference; neither father nor mother does he spare; no human being who has ears is safe from him, hardly even his dog, and a barbarian would have no chance of escaping him, if an interpreter could only be found.
But in order to understand that you probably need to read this preliminary argument:
SOCRATES: The awe which I always feel, Protarchus, about the names of the gods is more than human—it exceeds all other fears. And now I would not sin against Aphrodite by naming her amiss; let her be called what she pleases. But Pleasure I know to be manifold, and with her, as I was just now saying, we must begin, and consider what her nature is. She has one name, and therefore you would imagine that she is one; and yet surely she takes the most varied and even unlike forms. For do we not say that the intemperate has pleasure, and that the temperate has pleasure in his very temperance,—that the fool is pleased when he is full of foolish fancies and hopes, and that the wise man has pleasure in his wisdom? and how foolish would any one be who affirmed that all these opposite pleasures are severally alike!
PROTARCHUS: Why, Socrates, they are opposed in so far as they spring from opposite sources, but they are not in themselves opposite. For must not pleasure be of all things most absolutely like pleasure,—that is, like itself?
SOCRATES: Yes, my good friend, just as colour is like colour;—in so far as colours are colours, there is no difference between them; and yet we all know that black is not only unlike, but even absolutely opposed to white: or again, as figure is like figure, for all figures are comprehended under one class; and yet particular figures may be absolutely opposed to one another, and there is an infinite diversity of them. And we might find similar examples in many other things; therefore do not rely upon this argument, which would go to prove the unity of the most extreme opposites. And I suspect that we shall find a similar opposition among pleasures.
PROTARCHUS: Very likely; but how will this invalidate the argument?
SOCRATES: Why, I shall reply, that dissimilar as they are, you apply to them a new predicate, for you say that all pleasant things are good; now although no one can argue that pleasure is not pleasure, he may argue, as we are doing, that pleasures are oftener bad than good; but you call them all good, and at the same time are compelled, if you are pressed, to acknowledge that they are unlike. And so you must tell us what is the identical quality existing alike in good and bad pleasures, which makes you designate all of them as good.
PROTARCHUS: What do you mean, Socrates? Do you think that any one who asserts pleasure to be the good, will tolerate the notion that some pleasures are good and others bad?
SOCRATES: And yet you will acknowledge that they are different from one another, and sometimes opposed?
PROTARCHUS: Not in so far as they are pleasures.
SOCRATES: That is a return to the old position, Protarchus, and so we are to say (are we?) that there is no difference in pleasures, but that they are all alike; and the examples which have just been cited do not pierce our dull minds, but we go on arguing all the same, like the weakest and most inexperienced reasoners? (Probably corrupt.)
PROTARCHUS: What do you mean?
SOCRATES: Why, I mean to say, that in self-defence I may, if I like, follow your example, and assert boldly that the two things most unlike are most absolutely alike; and the result will be that you and I will prove ourselves to be very tyros in the art of disputing; and the argument will be blown away and lost. Suppose that we put back, and return to the old position; then perhaps we may come to an understanding with one another.
PROTARCHUS: How do you mean?
SOCRATES: Shall I, Protarchus, have my own question asked of me by you?
PROTARCHUS: What question?
SOCRATES: Ask me whether wisdom and science and mind, and those other qualities which I, when asked by you at first what is the nature of the good, affirmed to be good, are not in the same case with the pleasures of which you spoke.
PROTARCHUS: What do you mean?
SOCRATES: The sciences are a numerous class, and will be found to present great differences. But even admitting that, like the pleasures, they are opposite as well as different, should I be worthy of the name of dialectician if, in order to avoid this difficulty, I were to say (as you are saying of pleasure) that there is no difference between one science and another;—would not the argument founder and disappear like an idle tale, although we might ourselves escape drowning by clinging to a fallacy?
PROTARCHUS: May none of this befal us, except the deliverance! Yet I like the even-handed justice which is applied to both our arguments. Let us assume, then, that there are many and diverse pleasures, and many and different sciences.
SOCRATES: And let us have no concealment, Protarchus, of the differences between my good and yours; but let us bring them to the light in the hope that, in the process of testing them, they may show whether pleasure is to be called the good, or wisdom, or some third quality; for surely we are not now simply contending in order that my view or that yours may prevail, but I presume that we ought both of us to be fighting for the truth.
PROTARCHUS: Certainly we ought.
SOCRATES: Then let us have a more definite understanding and establish the principle on which the argument rests.
PROTARCHUS: What principle?
SOCRATES: A principle about which all men are always in a difficulty, and some men sometimes against their will.
PROTARCHUS: Speak plainer.
SOCRATES: The principle which has just turned up, which is a marvel of nature; for that one should be many or many one, are wonderful propositions; and he who affirms either is very open to attack.
PROTARCHUS: Do you mean, when a person says that I, Protarchus, am by nature one and also many, dividing the single ‘me’ into many ‘me’s,’ and even opposing them as great and small, light and heavy, and in ten thousand other ways?
SOCRATES: Those, Protarchus, are the common and acknowledged paradoxes about the one and many, which I may say that everybody has by this time agreed to dismiss as childish and obvious and detrimental to the true course of thought; and no more favour is shown to that other puzzle, in which a person proves the members and parts of anything to be divided, and then confessing that they are all one, says laughingly in disproof of his own words: Why, here is a miracle, the one is many and infinite, and the many are only one.
PROTARCHUS: But what, Socrates, are those other marvels connected with this subject which, as you imply, have not yet become common and acknowledged?
SOCRATES: When, my boy, the one does not belong to the class of things that are born and perish, as in the instances which we were giving, for in those cases, and when unity is of this concrete nature, there is, as I was saying, a universal consent that no refutation is needed; but when the assertion is made that man is one, or ox is one, or beauty one, or the good one, then the interest which attaches to these and similar unities and the attempt which is made to divide them gives birth to a controversy.
PROTARCHUS: Of what nature?
SOCRATES: In the first place, as to whether these unities have a real existence; and then how each individual unity, being always the same, and incapable either of generation or of destruction, but retaining a permanent individuality, can be conceived either as dispersed and multiplied in the infinity of the world of generation, or as still entire and yet divided from itself, which latter would seem to be the greatest impossibility of all, for how can one and the same thing be at the same time in one and in many things? These, Protarchus, are the real difficulties, and this is the one and many to which they relate; they are the source of great perplexity if ill decided, and the right determination of them is very helpful.
PROTARCHUS: Then, Socrates, let us begin by clearing up these questions.
SOCRATES: That is what I should wish.
PROTARCHUS: And I am sure that all my other friends will be glad to hear them discussed; Philebus, fortunately for us, is not disposed to move, and we had better not stir him up with questions.
SOCRATES: Good; and where shall we begin this great and multifarious battle, in which such various points are at issue? Shall we begin thus?
PROTARCHUS: How?
SOCRATES: We say that the one and many become identified by thought, and that now, as in time past, they run about together, in and out of every word which is uttered, and that this union of them will never cease, and is not now beginning, but is, as I believe, an everlasting quality of thought itself, which never grows old. Any young man, when he first tastes these subtleties, is delighted, and fancies that he has found a treasure of wisdom; in the first enthusiasm of his joy he leaves no stone, or rather no thought unturned, now rolling up the many into the one, and kneading them together, now unfolding and dividing them; he puzzles himself first and above all, and then he proceeds to puzzle his neighbours, whether they are older or younger, or of his own age—that makes no difference; neither father nor mother does he spare; no human being who has ears is safe from him, hardly even his dog, and a barbarian would have no chance of escaping him, if an interpreter could only be found.
PROTARCHUS: Considering, Socrates, how many we are, and that all of us are young men, is there not a danger that we and Philebus may all set upon you, if you abuse us? We understand what you mean; but is there no charm by which we may dispel all this confusion, no more excellent way of arriving at the truth? If there is, we hope that you will guide us into that way, and we will do our best to follow, for the enquiry in which we are engaged, Socrates, is not unimportant.
SOCRATES: The reverse of unimportant, my boys, as Philebus calls you, and there neither is nor ever will be a better than my own favourite way, which has nevertheless already often deserted me and left me helpless in the hour of need.
PROTARCHUS: Tell us what that is.
SOCRATES: One which may be easily pointed out, but is by no means easy of application; it is the parent of all the discoveries in the arts.
PROTARCHUS: Tell us what it is.
SOCRATES: A gift of heaven, which, as I conceive, the gods tossed among men by the hands of a new Prometheus, and therewith a blaze of light; and the ancients, who were our betters and nearer the gods than we are, handed down the tradition, that whatever things are said to be are composed of one and many, and have the finite and infinite implanted in them: seeing, then, that such is the order of the world, we too ought in every enquiry to begin by laying down one idea of that which is the subject of enquiry; this unity we shall find in everything. Having found it, we may next proceed to look for two, if there be two, or, if not, then for three or some other number, subdividing each of these units, until at last the unity with which we began is seen not only to be one and many and infinite, but also a definite number; the infinite must not be suffered to approach the many until the entire number of the species intermediate between unity and infinity has been discovered,—then, and not till then, we may rest from division, and without further troubling ourselves about the endless individuals may allow them to drop into infinity. This, as I was saying, is the way of considering and learning and teaching one another, which the gods have handed down to us. But the wise men of our time are either too quick or too slow in conceiving plurality in unity. Having no method, they make their one and many anyhow, and from unity pass at once to infinity; the intermediate steps never occur to them. And this, I repeat, is what makes the difference between the mere art of disputation and true dialectic.
PROTARCHUS: I think that I partly understand you Socrates, but I should like to have a clearer notion of what you are saying.
SOCRATES: I may illustrate my meaning by the letters of the alphabet, Protarchus, which you were made to learn as a child.
PROTARCHUS: How do they afford an illustration?
SOCRATES: The sound which passes through the lips whether of an individual or of all men is one and yet infinite.
PROTARCHUS: Very true.
SOCRATES: And yet not by knowing either that sound is one or that sound is infinite are we perfect in the art of speech, but the knowledge of the number and nature of sounds is what makes a man a grammarian.
PROTARCHUS: Very true.
SOCRATES: And the knowledge which makes a man a musician is of the same kind.
PROTARCHUS: How so?
SOCRATES: Sound is one in music as well as in grammar?
PROTARCHUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And there is a higher note and a lower note, and a note of equal pitch:—may we affirm so much?
PROTARCHUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: But you would not be a real musician if this was all that you knew; though if you did not know this you would know almost nothing of music.
PROTARCHUS: Nothing.
SOCRATES: But when you have learned what sounds are high and what low, and the number and nature of the intervals and their limits or proportions, and the systems compounded out of them, which our fathers discovered, and have handed down to us who are their descendants under the name of harmonies; and the affections corresponding to them in the movements of the human body, which when measured by numbers ought, as they say, to be called rhythms and measures; and they tell us that the same principle should be applied to every one and many;—when, I say, you have learned all this, then, my dear friend, you are perfect; and you may be said to understand any other subject, when you have a similar grasp of it. But the infinity of kinds and the infinity of individuals which there is in each of them, when not classified, creates in every one of us a state of infinite ignorance; and he who never looks for number in anything, will not himself be looked for in the number of famous men.
a pretty good first step in exploring the path of the Garden.
That would be a very interesting discussion for a separate thread -- "first steps" in exploring the path of the garden!"
I am pretty sure I understand your position, Godfrey and Don, and I think there is a possibility that you are right in this case. K. Has to be the ultimate judge of that.
But this I also believe to be true:
That every aspect of our current American society is so thoroughly anti-epicurean in nature that we must expect that anyone who has not already thoroughly examined these issues has been "programmed" with very damaging assertions about the biggest issues of life.
The issue of the role of pleasure may be simple enough for any kitten or puppy or baby to understand it, but no human of average social exposure in 2021 has escaped the preventing influence of modern culture, and simply identifying happiness or even pleasure as the goal of life is akin to the biblical assertion to the effect that "not all who call out the name of Jesus will be saved."
Certainly if K or anyone else were to choose not to pursue certain aspects of the philosophy that would be their choice and something to be respected,.
However the underlying issue that Epicurus was facing is in my view the same that we face to day - that of identifying a consistent system of thought that we can embrace confidently as that which is most consistent with our ultimate natures and which is the "best" use of our short lives.
Unless we understand the system we cannot apply it consistently in our own circumstances. We can't understand the system unless we understand the steps by which Epicurus got from "nothing comes from or goes to nothing" to his "canon of truth". And without that understanding we can't ultimately be confident in processing the "word games" that confront every one of us who were not born on and are not living on a desert island.
But in this and every case K it any other person involved has to proceed at her own speed and as she is so inclined.
But it is clear to me that the "trick" involves the allegation that it is necessary to slice and dice any subject up into components, which then implies that the various components must be ranked, which then leads inevitably to the conclusion that the "art of ranking" is more important than any instance of the thing you are examining. So once you admit the necessity to slice and dice ( I.e. in this case that some pleasures are better than others) you inevitably have lost the argument that pleasure is the highest good.
But it's a word game where you predetermine the result according to your definitions!
The challenge for us is to be able to explain the issue - in terms even more clear than we need to bring to bear on the related issue of "formal logic" we discussed with Martin
The issues at state are very similar and many indeed by close to identical, and it has something to do with what happens when you forget the limitations that you originally knew existed when you started the word game in th first place.
(Which is why K., If you are reading this, one of the most enjoyable and satisfying stories of Lucian is "Hermotimus")
At this moment all I can think about is that meme from one of the early Star Wars movies where the rebel general exclaims "It's a trick!"
My paraphrases based on quotes from Philebus!
I left out the "purity" argument which is also in Philebus.
I got started on my attempt to chart all the arguments in the dialog but it is a bigger job than I expected. I need to basically paste the full dialog into an outlining program so I can slice and dice it by section - just like the cooks that Plato so fancied!
And one of these days I am going to finally get a grip on " the one and the many" argument -. Although I expect I am going to have to have your help to ever emerge on the other side of that one.
As I sit here in late October 2021 after years of reading it I still don't grasp all the implications of it.there are presumptions buried in it that may in the end be no deeper than the "cook" analogy, but I am convinced it is ultimately a word game intended to provide produce exactly the kind of perplexity I feel every time I read it.
Kalosyn I I believe it would be interesting to consider you as being in the role of Philebus, and picture Socrates (really Plato) responding to your comment instead of one of us:
Socrates: So K, if you believe that pleasure is governed by wisdom and reason, then you believe that wisdom and reason are superior to, and more important to have, than pleasure?
K - Well.... ?
Socrates:L If so, K, then you really maintain that the ultimate most important thing for you to have is wisdom and reason, because they are the elements of life that tell you how and when to pursue pleasure and everything else.
K - ??
Socrates: On the other hand, if what you are saying is that you need both pleasure and wisdom, then you are something of a "cook" putting together the ingredients of the best life. And if you are a cook, then the art of cookery, which is the wisdom as to how to combine and process your ingredients, is really the most important thing for you to have. Right?
K - ????
Socrates: Likewise, if you are saying that you need both pleasure and wisdom, then you are saying the pleasure alone cannot be "the good" to pursue above all else. That is because if pleasure can be made better through the addition of wisdom, then pleasure alone would be definition be insufficient to be "the good." And I say that because one of the characteristics of being THE good (being "the best" or being "the highest good") is that such an ultimate objective is complete and sufficient in itself, The "highest" good can never or allow anything else to be added to it which would make it even better - or else it would not be the highest!
K - ????
So if our modern Socrates were to say those things to you, how do you think you might respond? 
I think an epicurean would not die for something abstract like love, a country or honour. The greatest good is life.
Now that causes me to think of changing not only the noun but the verb -- " I will live for pleasure." might be one way of contrasting it ironically -- too bad we don't have any big smiling faces of Epicurus!
Another comment from a listener:
Cassius, on the last sentence of the Rerum Natura. I find a Dutch article in which is written that there could be a copying error in the Latin text. Instead of putting the torches under the pyre it could read:
"And rather than leave the corpses, They often chose scuffle and manslaughter, Until they tied the stranglehold around their own throat."
It is an article by Deleersnyder, with mostly references to French and German research.
Note: We may be dealing with Google Translate there, but it's still a good lead.
I have to say - the picture choices are just perfect. Except maybe for the American -- the weird expression on his face fits with the humor of the whole meme, but I don't even know who that is (?)
Creativity Request: I saw the top part of this meme below today, and although I feel like it is a little unfair to the Russians, even more, I feel like it cries out for extension to "Epicurean" and "Stoic" panels. What do you think would be good? It would be very easy to just say "I will die for a friend" or I will die for pleasure" and "I will die for virtue," but I bet we have people who are far more creative and funny, especially combined with the right image. So if you have a chance, please let us know your suggestion, preferably with an image!
(PS I suspect we will all immediately think - this is perfect for Eikadistes - but I bet - at least over time - others would have good ideas too!)
But I'll control myself until Kalosyni has a chance to consider our back and forth and respond.
Yes I was not intending to take us back to the "desire" vs "pleasure" or "feeling" question. When I wrote desirable there I was just looking for another synonym of pleasurable - I could just as well have said "feels good" rather than "desirable."
The issue of desire and will and issues like that I consider to be matters of psychology or even some other aspect, and not really the same issue we are talking about here at all.
What I think we are talking about here is a big-picture philosophical question of "What is the ultimate goal / guide of life?"
And the warring contenders for the crown, each of which have a war-party of its own - the warring camps aligned which contain a mixture of troops within themselves, but which are broadly aligned against each other, are:
(1) religion/holiness/divinity/divine revelation, etc (the Religion Camp)
(2) "logic"/"rationality"/"wisdom"/"transcendence/virtue, etc. (the Academic Camp)
(3) feeling/pleasure-pain/Nature's faculties, etc (the Epicurean camp)
Before Don and I go too far in debating what "others" may be doing, we really need to hear back from Kalosyni to hear more explanation from her on what she means in saying:
Multiple components comprise the Epicurean life. There is more to laud in the "sweetest life" than just pleasure.
I think we are seeing another exhibition of the slightly different approaches that Don and I are taking.
I agree with what Don has written, BUT:
We first have to have an understanding of the precise wording of what we are quoting from Kaolosyni, and in my view why she is struggling with it.
"Multiple components comprise the Epicurean life. There is more to laud in the "sweetest life" than just pleasure."
As I read the sentence, she is implicitly questioning the decision to define the goal of life (or the things in life to laud) as "pleasure."
We can take Don's answer that her question is easily resolvable by pointing out the myriad numerous experiences which compose the sweetest life, that's definitely fine to do, because it explains that pleasure is composed of many different individual experiences.
But I think what Kaolsyni, and a lot of people, struggle with is that they don't like Epicurus' definition of "pleasure" as including every desirable experience in life. And I do think that is what he is doing - he has by definition postulated that everything that affects us do so either as pleasure or pain. I can't stress that enough - he's doing that BY DEFINITION. He knows just as well as you and I do that there are multiple different kinds of pleasures, but for purposes of philosophical debate - for understanding the issue - he is defining every desirable experience in life as pleasure - because we feel it to be desirable.
Until we come to an agreement on that point with people everyone who fails to accept that this is what he is doing, those people who fail to accept that are going to squirm and struggle and kick back and they are going to insist that "there is more to life than just pleasure."
And the key to understanding why he defining the word pleasure in this way is not that he is perverse or unrealistic or that he is "academic" himself. He's defining the word in this way specifically for the purpose of pointing out the flaws in the dialectical argument that his opponents are using against the idea that pleasure is the ultimate guide.
I suspect the SPA philosophers would agree with Don that life is to be lived. They would beg to differ on the issue of what it means to live - what it is that we should "to keep our eye on ... to guide us in the right direction."
Rather than "pleasure as the north star" as Don suggests, they assert either "divine revelation" (if they are Socrates talking about his demon telling him things) or "logic" (or whatever word you want to use to describe the art of word-gaming that implies that the ultimate truth of the universe is in "ideas").
So agree fully with Don and I think most of us who are attracted to Epicurus grasp that intuitively - that is largely why we are here.
What's more of a challenge is to understand the depth of the error or the lie that SPA were asserting. That's because the SPA way has been completely victorious in world history. Essentially all of us have been taught their way all our lives, and we don't want to believe that everything important we have been taught about the nature of the universe (by philosophers other than those in the Epicurean line) is essentially a lie.
