By my count we had eight people - meaning three visitors in addition to our regulars. We spent most of the first half hour just introducing outselves (which should not take so long in the future) and then we spent the rest of the hour discussing principle doctrine one from Nate's compilation.
We need to set up threads for each meeting to be sure we cover any topics that people want to ask about. What else do we need to do to enhance the experience?
Feedback on session one? I thought it was VERY successful - a great start!
Not disruptive at all please join when you can!
Kalosyni thank you for posting that update and especially the link to Nate's list of alternate translations. Have those in front of us when we discuss each one is a very good idea.
thank you isychos - hope to see you
Which is exactly what I was trying to provide in my letter to Menoikeus
Yes exactly. This has to be a team effort and not everyone will be able or inclined to do everything and they shouldn't try.
It will always be beyond the capability or inclination or some to translate the original Greek -- or grow an original Greek philosopher's beard! 
No doubt there is going to be a "shakedown" period where we figure out what works best, but Kalosyni and Scott and Joshua and Martin have been very good about all sorts of suggestions and I think we have a good core to launch this as a new initiative. I hope those who have not attended in the past will consider attending and adding it to their routine. No preparation necessary, no video necessary, no recording -- no pressure of any kind - just an opportunity to "socialize."
Yes the full article speculates that the "missionary" viewpoint expanded over time during the Roman period, and I think correctly. We never will likely want to be shouting at passersby from the street corner, but the world increasingly offers lots of opportunities for us to claim a space in the "marketplace of ideas."
Catherine Wilson is an interesting case as she seems a little more willing to break away from the orthodoxy on Epicurus.
However I don't get the feeling that she is as much an Academic as she is a writer for more general audiences, so maybe she has more flexibility to follow her intuitions.
My take is that she thinks she can push the envelope on Epicurean philosophy toward more popular success (at least in publishing) if she combines it with a good sprinkling of politics to make it sound more relevant to modern audiences. She might be right about that to some extent, but I doubt it will win her much endorsement in Academia. If someone wants to justify their politics through philosophy, most of the Academics realize that it's more efficient to focus on the mainline Platonic-Aristotelian position, where they can rest their desired uniformity of position on "forms" or "ideas" or "essences."
It's really hard to claim eternal significance for a particular set of political ideas when the only things that are eternally the same are things like the size, shape, and weight of the atoms. 
its much easier to claim that one's own views equal "virtue" and that your opponents views are "evil" and the anti-Epicurean philosophies are the home of that approach.
Yes I think Don's explanation is the right one. Even today Epicureanism is not reputable among the academics. A few of them may argue differently (the O'Keefe's etc, who argue the "tranquility" position) but the majority of Academia knows better.
The majority of Academia rightly sees Epicureanism as an individualistic rejection of Platonist uniformity, and they aren't going to finance and support and promote tenure for people to focus on the deeper aspects of what Epicurus taught.
It would be interesting to try to learn more about Macgilivray personally to see what he really thinks himself, but I bet Don's right - if you want a career in Academia you're going to toe the line and not spend too much time on Epicurus.
And if you choose to go down the "tranquility" road then you'll eventually end up in Stoicism, because they have the market on anesthesia and emotional suppression cornered.
He also seems to have gone down an Epictetus/Stoic track after the initial interest in Epicureanism
That is so sad! Both his analysis and his notes seem to me to be of very high quality. This doesn't read like a "student" paper at all, but someone of advanced thinking and capacity who is widely read in the ancient materials.
At some point this paper probably needs to be compared to Nate's list of ancient Epicureans to be sure the list contains the ones MacGilivray references.
Thanks no I did not! I am impressed with his style and cites so will look at that.
Also he says in the first paper that he wrote, but did not publish, a section more directly on Philodemus.
I have not heard of McGil. Otherwise so he might be interesting to look up his other activities.
Notes on this chapter - definition of PEDANT
ped·ant | \ ˈpe-dᵊnt
\
1a: one who is unimaginative or who unduly emphasizes minutiae in the presentation or use of knowledge
b: one who makes a show of knowledge
c: a formalist or precisionist in teaching
2obsolete : a male schoolteacher
Here's a part of the Conclusion, that will hopefully encourage more of us to read the bulk of it:
The Epicureans were then no isolationist community living within a garden compound, or a scholastic group content to merely recite philosophical truisms amongst themselves. Rather this was a community that was structured from the
beginning, and with the ideological supports, to have an active concern to include outsiders, and to extend their philosophy beyond their immediate associates. Yet despite such characteristics, the Epicureans were not a community of evangelists or missionaries. The realization that the Epicureans had a strong aversion to the open propagation of philosophy also needs to be informing and pulling upon our understanding. This concern is probably best demonstrated by Epicurus’ frequent refrains on the crowd’s inability to respond correctly to philosophical truths, and his belief on the futility of trying to structure a message to appeal to a mass audience. The following passage probably best expresses this attitude:
[I would rather] reveal the things which are expedient to all mankind, even if no one is going to understand me, than assent to the received opinions and reap the adulation lavishly bestowed by the multitude.
So although the school could show an effort and concern not witnessed in its main rivals to embrace and expedite the development of outsiders/beginners, and it could even on occasion be found pursuing specific individuals to persuade, there was little conception or drive to actively evangelize, or attempt to spike the interest the otherwise uninterested masses with the potency and legitimacy of their message. As with other contemporary philosophical schools it was assumed that if you were to be responsive to the philosophy that you would seek it out50* just as a patient would seek out a doctor, and not the other way around. 51 This explains why the epitomes, which some scholars have designated as also functioning as propaganda material, despite the long preface we are given on their designed use and varied intended audiences, make no hint at their possible use for convincing or introducing the philosophy to those with no prior interest.
Yet the picture is further complicated for scholars wanting a straightforward account of the Epicurean engagement with mission, for as we plotted the Epicurean movement across the generations of the school, and as philosophy moved westwards onto Roman soil, this open*closed dynamic came under pressure. Subsequent generations of Epicureans do not seem to have been merely content with the School’s inclusion/amenability to outsiders; but rather they sought to actively proselytize their message to the commonality of society. The tension that Epicurus was aware of above between holding a message that was expedient for all mankind, but not fashioning it in a way to appeal to the majority of humankind was for some Epicureans strained to breaking point. Though it is hard to exactly judge the motives and circumstances that
prompted the Epicurean popularisers, and further research will be needed to understand and place them within the larger context of the Second Sophistic age; we can though note that given that the abstinence from propagation seems to have been more of a shared cultural agreement amongst the schools, rather than a dogmatically informed opposition in Epicureanism, that we should not be particularly surprised that given appropriate circumstances that this aversion would be liable to degrade. The reasons motivating this change would also probably be reliant upon broad Epicurean cosmopolitanism, and their fundamental concern to include a cross*spectrum of society within their ranks to gain the therapy that their philosophy provided.52 The successful implementation of this desire could, I proposed, be uniquely achieved in Epicureanism because of their philosophy’s focus on dyadic teaching, rather than a more politically focused philosophy, and through the School’s sanctioning and practice of producing epitomes of their philosophy for beginners. However others such as the Epicurean scholar Philodemus demonstrated the continuing observance of the open*closed dynamic in the school, 53 and he frequently critiqued the populists’ efforts to simplify the philosophy into epitomes, and bemoaned their attacks on the value of serious philosophical texts.
Yet the change in Epicureanism to fashion texts that would draw people to their message was not just done through the utilization of brevity. Lucretius’ great didactic poem the De Rerum Natura was explicitly crafted to lure educated Latin speakers through its finessed prose to consider the (at first usually distasteful), message of Epicureanism. Although some scholars have opined that his poem was an anomalousflash of interaction of between Epicureanism and educated Roman society, we found that we could establish a surprisingly large list of Epicurean adherents from the top of Roman society. Epicureanism was part of the general intellectual discourse of the time, and not restricted to a isolated, or peripheral philosophical community. Cicero’s frequent comments on the numeracy of his Epicurean peers, and his numerous recollections at finding them present in friend’s houses, at drinking parties, and hosting philosophical lectures, all testify to the vitality of Epicureanism and its success in positioning itself as a respected intellectual position in elite Rome society at Rome. But more this, the popularity and adherence to Epicureanism amongst the politically and business active Roman elite reveals the ability of Epicureanism to extend its membership beyond operating merely in specifically designed Epicurean communities and to include, as I have argued they had always done, well*disposed and interested members into their midst.
Some of you will appreciate that i was particularly impressed by THIS analysis:
Where did Lucretius get this obstinate desire that he describes above to fashion his didactic poem in Latin? The answer, I believe, is to be found by noting Lucretius’ strong belief that it was the format of his work that contained its effectual power and presumably its construction in Latin was also a carefully chosen part of this allure. If Epicureanism wished, it seems Lucretius had judged, to truly integrate itself into Roman society it must be expressed in Latin. If, as he says, he wanted to put Epicureanism before his reader’s mind, he did so with the recognition that, though capable in Greek, they thought in Latin. If Epicureanism was to become a Roman, as well as Greek, philosophy (and we have seen his belief on the transcended reach of philosophy demonstrated above), then it would need to be translated into the language of the state. We should remember that Cicero provides similar reason as motivating his efforts to manufacture philosophy away from their traditional Greek language, and into his native Latin.
Also:
J. D. Minyard (1985) 46,87 also concluded that: ‘Had his purpose been purely explanatory, didactic, and descriptive, purely philosophical, this is what he should have done. Greek was well*known to his oligarchic audience and the De Rerum Natura is nothing if not an oligarchic poem...[rather] he wants his poem to revaluatethe literary heritage and rearrange Roman culture, to reform the language itself and the society based on it....This cannot be accomplished by ignoring the language that reflects and embeds the inherited social form of thought and motivates a pattern of life it fossilizes and inspires...He clearly believed that if Epicureanism was to take root in society at large, specifically in Roman society, it must reach out to the wider audience in the form and on the terms to which that audience was used.
So we have to do both: study the details of the Greek and be sure we get the most accurate understanding of it, and then re-express the same thoughts in understandable English.
Yes, as you read through the rest of the article he expands on this point with lots of details. To be clear, McGilivray does NOT believe that Epicureans were essentially Hermits who put up walls around themselves and lived isolated from the rest of the world.
The trust of the article is to the opposite point: That while Epicurus was very clear that not every person or group or people will become our friends, those who are "well-disposed" towards us should be invited to at least some of our gatherings (the 20th is explicitly mentioned) and that we engage in discussion and question and answer with them, even with those who we are sure will never want to spend the time to read all the 37 books and pursue all the details.
That's one of the the really interesting parts of the essay -- the use of outlines like the letters to Herodotus and Pythocles and the 40 doctrines: are they summaries for use of new people? are they abbreviations for use in memorization by the inner circle? are they in any sense "dumbing down" the doctrines to make it easier to spread the word?
So a lot of the essay is directed toward the question of how dedicated Epicureans should act towards those who are not (yet) dedicated Epicureans, and that touches on a lot of what we do with EpicureanFriends.com and our other initiatives.
McGilivrary makes the kind of comments we are now accustomed to (calling DeWitt out when he goes too far with his Christianity analogies) while at the same time affirming DeWitt's basic point -- that the Epicureans were not at all hermits, and that it was an important part of the Epicurean model to work to expand the philosophy to others.
Welcome to Episode One Hundred Twenty One of Lucretius Today.
This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.
I am your host Cassius, and together with our panelists from the EpicureanFriends.com forum, we'll walk you through the ancient Epicurean texts, and we'll discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. We encourage you to study Epicurus for yourself, and we suggest the best place to start is the book "Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Canadian professor Norman DeWitt.
If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.
Today we continue our review of Epicurus' letter to Herodotus, and we move further into fundamental physics and discuss issues related to the question of whether matter can be infinitely divided.
Now let's join Martin reading today's text:
Bailey
[60] Furthermore, in the infinite we must not speak of “up” or “down,” as though with reference to an absolute highest or lowest — and indeed we must say that, though it is possible to proceed to infinity in the direction above our heads from wherever we take our stand, the absolute highest point will never appear to us — nor yet can that which passes beneath the point thought of to infinity be at the same time both up and down in reference to the same thing: for it is impossible to think this. So that it is possible to consider as one single motion that which is thought of as the upward motion to infinity and as another the downward motion, even though that which passes from us into the regions above our heads arrives countless times at the feet of beings above and that which passes downwards from us at the head of beings below; for none the less the whole motions are thought of as opposed, the one to the other, to infinity.
[61] Moreover, the atoms must move with equal speed, when they are borne onwards through the void, nothing colliding with them. For neither will the heavy move more quickly than the small and light, when, that is, nothing meets them: nor again the small more quickly than the great, having their whole course uniform, when nothing collides with them either: nor is the motion upwards or sideways owing to blows quicker, nor again that downwards owing to their own weight. For as long as either of the two motions prevails, so long will it have a course as quick as thought, until something checks it either from outside or from its own weight counteracting the force of that which dealt the blow. Moreover, their passage through the void, when it takes place without meeting any bodies which might collide, accomplishes every comprehensible distance in an inconceivably short time. For it is collision and its absence which take the outward appearance of slowness and quickness.
[62] Moreover, it will be said that in compound bodies too one atom is faster than another, though as a matter of fact all are equal in speed: this will be said because even in the least period of continuous time all the atoms in aggregate bodies move towards one place, even though in moments of time perceptible only by thought they do not move towards one place but are constantly jostling one against another, until the continuity of their movement comes under the ken of sensation. For the addition of opinion with regard to the unseen, that the moments perceptible only by thought will also contain continuity of motion, is not true in such cases; for we must remember that it is what we observe with the senses or grasp with the mind by an apprehension that is true. Nor must it either be supposed that in moments perceptible only by thought the moving body too passes to the several places to which its component atoms move (for this too is unthinkable, and in that case, when it arrives all together in a sensible period of time from any point that may be in the infinite void, it would not be taking its departure from the place from which we apprehend its motion); for the motion of the whole body will be the outward expression of its internal collisions, even though up to the limits of perception we suppose the speed of its motion not to be retarded by collision. It is of advantage to grasp this first principle as well.
[63] Next, referring always to the sensations and the feelings, for in this way you will obtain the most trustworthy ground of belief, you must consider that the soul is a body of fine particles distributed throughout the whole structure, and most resembling wind with a certain admixture of heat, and in some respects like to one of these and in some to the other. There is also the part which is many degrees more advanced even than these in fineness of composition, and for this reason is more capable of feeling in harmony with the rest of the structure as well. Now all this is made manifest by the activities of the soul and the feelings and the readiness of its movements and its processes of thought and by what we lose at the moment of death.
[64] Further, you must grasp that the soul possesses the chief cause of sensation: yet it could not have acquired sensation, unless it were in some way enclosed by the rest of the structure. And this in its turn having afforded the soul this cause of sensation acquires itself too a share in this contingent capacity from the soul. Yet it does not acquire all the capacities which the soul possesses: and therefore when the soul is released from the body, the body no longer has sensation. For it never possessed this power in itself, but used to afford opportunity for it to another existence, brought into being at the same time with itself: and this existence, owing to the power now consummated within itself as a result of motion, used spontaneously to produce for itself the capacity of sensation and then to communicate it to the body as well, in virtue of its contact and correspondence of movement, as I have already said.
[65] Therefore, so long as the soul remains in the body, even though some other part of the body be lost, it will never lose sensation; nay more, whatever portions of the soul may perish too, when that which enclosed it is removed either in whole or in part, if the soul continues to exist at all, it will retain sensation. On the other hand the rest of the structure, though it continues to exist either as a whole or in part, does not retain sensation, if it has once lost that sum of atoms, however small it be, which together goes to produce the nature of the soul. Moreover, if the whole structure is dissolved, the soul is dispersed and no longer has the same powers nor performs its movements, so that it does not possess sensation either.
[66] For it is impossible to imagine it with sensation, if it is not in this organism and cannot effect these movements, when what encloses and surrounds it is no longer the same as the surroundings in which it now exists and performs these movements.
HICKS
[60] Further, we must not assert 'up' or 'down' of that which is unlimited, as if there were a zenith or nadir. As to the space overhead, however, if it be possible to draw a line to infinity from the point where we stand, we know that never will this space – or, for that matter, the space below the supposed standpoint if produced to infinity – appear to us to be at the same time 'up' and 'down' with reference to the same point; for this is inconceivable. Hence it is possible to assume one direction of motion, which we conceive as extending upwards ad infinitum, and another downwards, even if it should happen ten thousand times that what moves from us to the spaces above our heads reaches the feet of those above us, or that which moves downwards from us the heads of those below us. None the less is it true that the whole of the motion in the respective cases is conceived as extending in opposite directions ad infinitum.
[61] When they are travelling through the void and meet with no resistance, the atoms must move with equal speed. Neither will heavy atoms travel more quickly than small and light ones, so long as nothing meets them, nor will small atoms travel more quickly than large ones, provided they always find a passage suitable to their size, and provided also that they meet with no obstruction. Nor will their upward or their lateral motion, which is due to collisions, nor again their downward motion, due to weight, affect their velocity. As long as either motion obtains, it must continue, quick as the speed of thought, provided there is no obstruction, whether due to external collision or to the atoms' own weight counteracting the force of the blow.
[62] Moreover, when we come to deal with composite bodies, one of them will travel faster than another, although their atoms have equal speed. This is because the atoms in the aggregates are traveling in one direction during the shortest continuous time, albeit they move in different directions in times so short as to be appreciable only by the reason, but frequently collide until the continuity of their motion is appreciated by sense. For the assumption that beyond the range of direct observation even the minute times conceivable by reason will present continuity of motion is not true in the case before us. Our canon is that direct observation by sense and direct apprehension by the mind are alone invariably true.
[63] Next, keeping in view our perceptions and feelings (for so shall we have the surest grounds for belief), we must recognize generally that the soul is a corporeal thing, composed of fine particles, dispersed all over the frame, most nearly resembling wind with an admixture of heat, in some respects like wind, in others like heat. But, again, there is the third part which exceeds the other two in the fineness of its particles and thereby keeps in closer touch with the rest of the frame. And this is shown by the mental faculties and feelings, by the ease with which the mind moves, and by thoughts, and by all those things the loss of which causes death.
[64] Further, we must keep in mind that soul has the greatest share in causing sensation. Still, it would not have had sensation, had it not been somehow confined within the rest of the frame. But the rest of the frame, though it provides this indispensable condition for the soul, itself also has a share, derived from the soul, of the said quality; and yet does not possess all the qualities of soul. Hence on the departure of the soul it loses sentience. For it had not this power in itself; but something else, congenital with the body, supplied it to body: which other thing, through the potentiality actualized in it by means of motion, at once acquired for itself a quality of sentience, and, in virtue of the neighborhood and interconnection between them, imparted it (as I said) to the body also.
[65] Hence, so long as the soul is in the body, it never loses sentience through the removal of some other part. The containing sheath may be dislocated in whole or in part, and portions of the soul may thereby be lost; yet in spite of this the soul, if it manage to survive, will have sentience. But the rest of the frame, whether the whole of it survives or only a part, no longer has sensation, when once those atoms have departed, which, however few in number, are required to constitute the nature of soul. Moreover, when the whole frame is broken up, the soul is scattered and has no longer the same powers as before, nor the same motions; hence it does not possess sentience either.
[66] For we cannot think of it as sentient, except it be in this composite whole and moving with these movements; nor can we so think of it when the sheaths which enclose and surround it are not the same as those in which the soul is now located and in which it performs these movements.
[He says elsewhere that the soul is composed of the smoothest and roundest of atoms, far superior in both respects to those of fire; that part of it is irrational, this being scattered over the rest of the frame, while the rational part resides in the chest, as is manifest from our fears and our joy; that sleep occurs when the parts of the soul which have been scattered all over the composite organism are held fast in it or dispersed, and afterwards collide with one another by their impacts. The semen is derived from the whole of the body.]
YONGE
[60] Further, we must not assert 'up' or 'down' of that which is unlimited, as if there were a zenith or nadir. As to the space overhead, however, if it be possible to draw a line to infinity from the point where we stand, we know that never will this space - or, for that matter, the space below the supposed standpoint if produced to infinity - appear to us to be at the same time 'up' and 'down' with reference to the same point; for this is inconceivable. Hence it is possible to assume one direction of motion, which we conceive as extending upwards ad infinitum, and another downwards, even if it should happen ten thousand times that what moves from us to the spaces above our heads reaches the feet of those above us, or that which moves downwards from us the heads of those below us. None the less is it true that the whole of the motion in the respective cases is conceived as extending in opposite directions ad infinitum.
[61] "When they are travelling through the void and meet with no resistance, the atoms must move with equal speed. Neither will heavy atoms travel more quickly than small and light ones, so long as nothing meets them, nor will small atoms travel more quickly than large ones, provided they always find a passage suitable to their size, and provided also that they meet with no obstruction. Nor will their upward or their lateral motion, which is due to collisions, nor again their downward motion, due to weight, affect their velocity. As long as either motion obtains, it must continue, quick as the speed of thought, provided there is no obstruction, whether due to external collision or to the atoms' own weight counteracting the force of the blow.
[62] "Moreover, when we come to deal with composite bodies, one of them will travel faster than another, although their atoms have equal speed. This is because the atoms in the aggregates are travelling in one direction during the shortest continuous time, albeit they move in different directions in times so short as to be appreciable only by the reason, but frequently collide until the continuity of their motion is appreciated by sense. For the assumption that beyond the range of direct observation even the minute times conceivable by reason will present continuity of motion is not true in the case before us. Our canon is that direct observation by sense and direct apprehension by the mind are alone invariably true.
[63] "Next, keeping in view our perceptions and feelings (for so shall we have the surest grounds for belief), we must recognize generally that the soul is a corporeal thing, composed of fine particles, dispersed all over the frame, most nearly resembling wind with an admixture of heat, in some respects like wind, in others like heat. But, again, there is the third part which exceeds the other two in the fineness of its particles and thereby keeps in closer touch with the rest of the frame. And this is shown by the mental faculties and feelings, by the ease with which the mind moves, and by thoughts, and by all those things the loss of which causes death.
[64] Further, we must keep in mind that soul has the greatest share in causing sensation. Still, it would not have had sensation, had it not been somehow confined within the rest of the frame. But the rest of the frame, though it provides this indispensable condition for the soul, itself also has a share, derived from the soul, of the said quality; and yet does not possess all the qualities of soul. Hence on the departure of the soul it loses sentience. For it had not this power in itself; but something else, congenital with the body, supplied it to body: which other thing, through the potentiality actualized in it by means of motion, at once acquired for itself a quality of sentience, and, in virtue of the neighbourhood and interconnexion between them, imparted it (as I said) to the body also.
[65] "Hence, so long as the soul is in the body, it never loses sentience through the removal of some other part. The containing sheath may be dislocated in whole or in part, and portions of the soul may thereby be lost; yet in spite of this the soul, if it manage to survive, will have sentience. But the rest of the frame, whether the whole of it survives or only a part, no longer has sensation, when once those atoms have departed, which, however few in number, are required to constitute the nature of soul. Moreover, when the whole frame is broken up, the soul is scattered and has no longer the same powers as before, nor the same motions; hence it does not possess sentience either.
[66] "For we cannot think of it as sentient, except it be in this composite whole and moving with these movements; nor can we so think of it when the sheaths which enclose and surround it are not the same as those in which the soul is now located and in which it performs these movements. [He says elsewhere that the soul is composed of the smoothest and roundest of atoms, far superior in both respects to those of fire; that part of it is irrational, this being scattered over the rest of the frame, while the rational part resides in the chest, as is manifest from our fears and our joy; that sleep occurs when the parts of the soul which have been scattered all over the composite organism are held fast in it or dispersed, and afterwards collide with one another by their impacts. The semen is derived from the whole of the body.]
Lots of anecdotes and references I have never seen before, such as:
Epicureanism then, even for a critic like Cicero, had integrated itself into the vibrant exchange of ideas, and was a topic for intellectual sparring with friends.33 Cicero’s association with this group probably also provided him with the amusing anecdote that after a lecture in Campania on Epicureanism had ceased, the unnamed Epicurean lecturer gave time for questions to be asked by the audience; to which Paetus responded not by voicing an intellectual question as the lecturer had intended, but by asking who was to take the scholar to dinner? 34
34 Fam. 9.25.2
