Posts by Cassius

Quote from Don

... Yes, but some pleasures are not choiceworthy.

I would say yes, but that is a subsidiary point, and should never be used to dilute the effect of the prior more fundamental statement that "no pleasure is a bad thing in itself." Just as Epicurus did, you start with the basic that no pleasure is bad in itself, and then state that sometimes some pleasures bring more pain than pleasure, and that *for that reason alone* some pleasures are not choiceworthy. You lead with the theorem and then give an application of it, but to me it's essential to hammer home the theorem since that is what everyone wants to fight about, and it chokes in the mouth of the Platonists and Stoics.

Let's make them choke again: "Choiceworthiness" means ONLY that it brings more pain than pleasure.

As usual I think we are in agreement

Important caveat to post 59:

While I am comfortable dogmatically stating that the absence of pain is pleasure, and the total absence of pain is the greatest pleasure, and that there is nothing bad in any pleasure or virtue in itself except the *unlimited* pursuit of that activity, I would never walk up to the man on the street or stand on the street corner and shout that out like a street preacher.

To me it is necessary to always say - except when we are certain to be speaking to people who know what we mean - that "Yes I believe that pleasure is the absence of pain, and yes I believe that no pleasure is a bad thing in itself, but let me explain to you now *why* I believe that.

I think Epicurus gave his explanations in his other writings besides Menoeceus, and I think that Torquatus would have given a much longer explanation if Cicero had allowed him.

As someone totally ignorant of Greek I will just interject here that in my view, since no pleasure is bad in itself, the emphasis should always be on the "limitless" or "without limit" aspect in a discussion of why a particular pursuit at a particular time might be ill advised. I personally do not think the words fame, power, money, or any of the similar types of pleasures where it is tempting to pursue them as ends in themselves would ever be labeled as negative in and of themselves by Epicurus.

I would expect him *always* to say that the issue in any pursuit is whether that pleasure is pursued as an end in itself, without limit. The reason (and only reason) that the unlimited pursuit of an activity, even virtue, is the problem, is that when we do so we take our eye off of pleasure itself and therefore suffer pain or less pleasure than we would otherwise.

ANY activity in human life is to be praised if it indeed leads to more pleasure than pain. So I personally would judge my confidence in any translation as whether it reinforces that view, and if a translation tends to indicate that there is a "type" or category"of pleasure that is to be avoided in itself, I would say that is wrong. The issue seems to me to always be in the "unlimited" pursuit of that pleasure.

And I would say this with the same confidence (even dogmatism) as I would say "the absence of pain is pleasure" or "the total absence of pain is the greatest pleasure" without a thought as to the specific activities involved, because I know from the premises with which we started out that "true reason" compels this to be the case, and therefore I do not *need* to know the particular desires or circumstances involved. And yes I know that Cicero will say that, like Velleius, I sound like I just visited the intermundia.

Here is a version with some of the letter read in Greek.

I seem to remember that there might be a typo in one of these videos -- apologies for that, but I posted anyway because the audio is the important part.

I thought we had this posted somewhere but perhaps not, and I am thinking that some might find it interesting to hear the letter Menoeceus read by someone with a modern accent. Thanks to Elli for doing this several years ago. I think I have one of her reading the opening (at least) in Greek, so I will look for that too.

Right to all. I am using "logic" loosely for dialectic or just generally these elaborate and abstract constructions that we get into as we go back and forth dealing with the assorted traps and diversions that people like Plato or Paul or Plotinus create.

Quote from Godfrey

It might begin with a tightly focused exercise and advance from there. And such an exercise, or series of exercises, could be of interest to people who are looking for alternatives to the popular Stoic exercises.

I find this very interesting, and I agree that there is a significant segment to which this will appeal and we need to develop it.

But in the end I don't see Lucretius or Diogenes of Oinoanda or whoever the original source of Torquatus' words was showing evidence that they themselves were primarily pursuing that kind of approach. I see where Cassius Longinus wrote that the philosophy of virtue is hard to understand, while the philosophy of pleasure is not, and that might be a hint of such an approach. And I definitely think that once you grasp the issues viscerally you see the big picture in emotional or even sensual terms every bit as strongly as Cicero would assert the glories of virtue. I guess where I end up is "different strokes for different folks" and that it looks to me that both Epicurus and the later Epicureans thought both approaches were important.

And if we were to use Lucretius as a pattern, we should start always with the senses and observe that it is pleasure that drives the ships and the birds and the bees and everything else. But after we make that first observation we then appropriately spend six books and tens of thousands of words tracing down the logical path that follows from the first premise: that while pleasure rules life, the next step is not just to stand silent and observe, but then to use our minds and bodies to follow the observation that nothing comes from nothing, and then mentally and physically trace literally everything else out from there so that we too can successfully follow pleasure, just like the birds and the bees do without worrying about why. Our ships require both approaches to continue sailing, or else we are in danger of lbeing seduced to leave them in port with sails furled and oars out of the water, which is not what ships are for.

Quote from Godfrey

he best way to discuss pleasure, pain and neutral is by leading with the sensations and feelings, not by leading with logic.

Godfrey I agree that is the *best* way, and I think that is what Torquatus is reporting was insisted on by Epicurus himself in stating that no more proof is necessary or appropriate than pointing to animals and pleasure and snow and the like.

But it's not the **only** and as Torquatus said it appears the later Epicureans (and I think Epicurus himself too) decided that for multiple reasons we cannot abandon the field of logic and philosophy itself to the pin-head Platonists. So if we are going to argue for pleasure on philosophic grounds, we have to have rigorous and bullet-proof logical statement of how all this fits together.

Were Emily Austin to say "I think Epicurus was right -- look at what babies do! - I rest my case" and close her book and sit down for the rest of the semester, she would likely be in very hot water, and probably not satisfied with herself either.

So I don't think there is really an tension here -- for those who will accept the direct physical example that you mentioned, that is all that is needed.

But are those people really going to be secure in their confidence that they are correct if they pick up literally ANY book or article written by anyone whose last name is not DeWitt or Austin and read what they have to say about Epicurus?

Unfortunately I am afraid the answer is clear and we have to BOTH attack on common-sense observation, and on on logical philosophic grounds, just like the ancient epicureans did.

I was thinking just a minute ago something related to this; In Philebus, Plato has Philebus stab his argument in the heart by admiring that pleasure has no limit. In On Ends, Cicero cannot bring himself (probably on pain of an Epicurean uprising) to put words in Torquatus' mouth that undermine his own case. Torquatus never deviates from the Epicurean formula, and all of his statements are textbook Epicurean correctness. But what Cicero does NOT do is allow Torquatus to give a full explanation of Epicurus' reasoning that goes into detail about how Epicurus reached these conclusions.

We can do that today, by mining Lucretius and the rest of the texts and interpolating between the lines what was really going on in Epicurus' argument.

Martin:

Can you help me figure out if there is a more "symbolic" way (algebra or whatever, with symbols) to express the following:

Let the universe be A and B and nothing else.

Let A be defined as the opposite of / negation of B with no ability to combine the two.

(1) Therefore absence of A = B

(2) Therefore absence of B = A

For any universe composed of only A and B and nothing else:

(1)The maximum A is the absence of B.

(2) The maximum B is the absence of A.

(3) In the absence of A and B there is nothing.

Obviously I would eventually substitute pleasure and pain for A and B, but it seems to me that the "dogmatism" of Torquatus in taking the firm positions that he does is best expressed by identifying that he is treating the issue as a logical construct such as this, which derives itself from the basic conclusion that pain and pleasure are the only feelings, as stated (if I recall) in the letter to Herodotus and amplified in PD3.

This is powerful stuff, and it demands a clear answer:

Quote from Cicero To Torquatus, in Book 2 of On Ends

But Epicurus, as I imagine, is both willing, if it is in his power, to speak intelligibly, and is also speaking, not of an obscure subject like the natural philosophers, nor of one depending on precise rules, as the mathematicians are, but he is discussing a plain and simple matter, which is a subject of common conversation among the common people. Although you do not deny that we understand the usual meaning of the word voluptas, but only what he means by it: from which it follows, not that we do not understand what is the meaning of that word, but that he follows his own fashion, and neglects our usual one; for if he means the same thing that Hieronymus does, who thinks that the chief good is to live without any annoyance, why does he prefer using the term “pleasure” rather than freedom from pain, as Hieronymus does, who is quite aware of the force of the words which he employs? But, if he thinks that he ought to add, that pleasure which consists in [pg 132] motion, (for this is the distinction he draws, that this agreeable pleasure is pleasure in motion, but the pleasure of him who is free from pain is a state of pleasure,) then why does he appear to aim at what is impossible, namely, to make any one who knows himself—that is to say, who has any proper comprehension of his own nature and sensations—think freedom from pain, and pleasure, the same thing?

This, O Torquatus, is doing violence to one's senses; it is wresting out of our minds the understanding of words with which we are imbued; for who can avoid seeing that these three states exist in the nature of things: first, the state of being in pleasure; secondly, that of being in pain; thirdly, that of being in such a condition as we are at this moment, and you too, I imagine, that is to say, neither in pleasure nor in pain; in such pleasure, I mean, as a man who is at a banquet, or in such pain as a man who is being tortured. What! do you not see a vast multitude of men who are neither rejoicing nor suffering, but in an intermediate state between these two conditions? No, indeed, said he; I say that all men who are free from pain are in pleasure, and in the greatest pleasure too. Do you, then, say that the man who, not being thirsty himself, mingles some wine for another, and the thirsty man who drinks it when mixed, are both enjoying the same pleasure?

But when I go through the letter the Menoeceus, and the positive sections of Torquatus in Book One and Two of On Ends, the statements I am listing below are the only "explanations" that i find. These are not really explanations at all, but a series of "assertions" that are united only by the connection that we have defined there to be only two feelings, pleasure and pain, with no middle ground. So what is the total effect when we string these together: (my comments after number 14):

1. For it is to obtain this end that we always act, namely, to avoid pain and fear. (Menoeceus)
2. For it is then that we have need of pleasure, when we feel pain owing to the absence of pleasure; (but when we do not feel pain), we no longer need pleasure. (Menoeceus)
3. "When, therefore, we maintain that pleasure is the end, we do not mean the pleasures of profligates and those that consist in sensuality, as is supposed by some who are either ignorant or disagree with us or do not understand, but freedom from pain in the body and from trouble in the mind." (Menoeceus)
4. For the pleasure which we pursue is not that alone which excites the natural constitution itself by a kind of sweetness, and of which the sensual enjoyment is attended by a kind of agreeableness, but we look upon the greatest pleasure as that which is enjoyed when all pain is removed. (Menoeceus)
5. Now inasmuch as whenever we are released from pain, we rejoice in the mere emancipation and freedom from all annoyance, and everything whereat we rejoice is equivalent to pleasure, just as everything whereat we are troubled is equivalent to pain, therefore the complete release from pain is rightly termed pleasure. For just as the mere removal of annoyance brings with it the realization of pleasure, whenever hunger and thirst have been banished by food and drink, so pain is removed. For just as the mere removal of annoyance brings with it the realization of pleasure, whenever hunger and thirst have been banished by food and drink, so in every case the banishment of pain ensures its replacement by pleasure. (Torquatus Book One)
6. [38] Therefore Epicurus refused to allow that there is any middle term between pain and pleasure; what was thought by some to be a middle term, the absence of all pain, was not only itself pleasure, but the highest pleasure possible. Surely any one who is conscious of his own condition must needs be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain. Epicurus thinks that the highest degree of pleasure is defined by the removal of all pain, so that pleasure may afterwards exhibit diversities and differences but is incapable of increase or extension. (Torquatus Book One)
7. [39] But actually at Athens, as my father used to tell me, when he wittily and humorously ridiculed the Stoics, there is in the Ceramicus a statue of Chrysippus, sitting with his hand extended, which hand indicates that he was fond of the following little argument: Does your hand, being in its present condition, feel the lack of anything at all? Certainly of nothing. But if pleasure were the supreme good, it would feel a lack. I agree. Pleasure then is not the supreme good. My father used to say that even a statue would not talk in that way, if it had power of speech. The inference is shrewd enough as against the Cyrenaics, but does not touch Epicurus. For if the only pleasure were that which, as it were, tickles the senses, if I may say so, and attended by sweetness overows them and insinuates itself into them, neither the hand nor any other member would be able to rest satised with the absence of pain apart from a joyous activity of pleasure. But if it is the highest pleasure, as Epicurus believes, to be in no pain, then the rst admission, that the hand in its then existing condition felt no lack, was properly made to you, Chrysippus, but the second improperly, I mean that it would have felt a lack had pleasure been the supreme good. It would certainly feel no lack, and on this ground, that anything which is cut off from the state of pain is in the state of pleasure. (Torquatus Book One)
8. Well, then, said I, you are aware of what Hieronymus25 of Rhodes says is the chief good, to which he thinks that everything ought to be referred? I know, said he, that he thinks that the great end is freedom from pain. Well, what are his sentiments respecting pleasure? He affirms, he replied, that it is not to be sought for its own sake; for he thinks that rejoicing is one thing, and being free from pain another. And indeed, continued he, he is in this point greatly mistaken, for, as I proved a little while ago, the end of increasing pleasure is the removal of all pain. (Torquatus responding to Cicero in On Ends Book Two)
9. We will examine, said I, presently, what the meaning of the expression, freedom from pain, is; but unless you are very obstinate, you must admit that pleasure is a perfectly distinct thing from mere freedom from pain. You will, however, said he, find that I am obstinate in this; for nothing can be more real than the identity between the two. (Torquatus responding to Cicero in On Ends Book Two)
10. Is it, asked I, the same pleasure that he feels after his thirst is extinguished? It is, replied he, another kind of pleasure; for the state of extinguished thirst has in it a certain stability of pleasure, but the pleasure of extinguishing it is pleasure in motion. (Torquatus responding to Cicero in On Ends Book Two)
11. Why, then, said I, do you call things so unlike one another by the same name? Do not [pg 129] you recollect, he rejoined, what I said just now,—that when all pain is banished, pleasure is varied, not extinguished? (Torquatus responding to Cicero in On Ends Book Two)
12. Now, if that is the variety you mean, I should understand you, as, in fact, I do understand you, without your saying so: but still, I do not see clearly what that variety is, because you say, that when we are free from pain we are then in the enjoyment of the greatest pleasure; but when we are eating those things which cause a pleasing motion to the senses, then there is a pleasure in the emotion which causes a variety in the pleasure; but still, that that pleasure which arises from the freedom from pain is not increased;—and why you call that pleasure I do not know. (Cicero restating Torquatus in On Ends Book Two)
13. IV. Is it possible, said he, for anything to be more delightful than freedom from pain? Well, said I, but grant that nothing is preferable to that, (for that is not the point which I am inquiring about at present,) does it follow on that account, that pleasure is identical with what I may call painlessness? Undoubtedly it is identical with it, said he; and that painlessness is the greatest of pleasures which no other can possibly exceed. (Torquatus responding to Cicero in On Ends Book Two)
14. They are also two distinct things, that you may not think that the difference consists only in words and names. One is to be without pain, the other to be with pleasure. But your school not only attempt to make one name for these two things which are so exceedingly unlike, (for I would not mind that so much,) but you endeavour also to make one thing out of the two, which is utterly impossible. But Epicurus, who admits both things, ought to use both expressions, and in fact he does divide them in reality, but still he does not distinguish between them in words. For though he in many places praises that very pleasure which we all call by the same name, he ventures to say that he does not even suspect that there is any good whatever unconnected with that kind of pleasure which Aristippus means; and he makes this statement in the very place where his whole discourse is about the chief good. But in another book, in which he utters opinions of the greatest weight in a concise form of words, and in which he is said to have delivered oracles of wisdom, he writes in those words which you are well acquainted with, O Torquatus. For who is there of you who has not learnt the κύριαι δόξαι of Epicurus, that is to say, his fundamental maxims? because they are sentiments of the greatest gravity intended to guide men to a happy life, and enunciated with suitable brevity. Consider, therefore, whether I am not translating this maxim of his correctly. “If those things which are the efficient causes of pleasures to luxurious men were to release them from all fear of the gods, and of death, and of pain, and to show them what are the proper limits to their desires, we should have nothing to find fault with; as men would then be filled with pleasures from all quarters, and have on no side anything painful or melancholy, for all such things are evil.” (Cicero, summarizing his complaint to Torquatus in Book 2)

To me, this is in fact, as Cicero is labeling it, a war of a non-standard definition of pleasure against the "standard" definition of pleasure, just like goes on in regard to Gods. In fact I think Cicero could make the exact same argument as to Epicurean gods as to Epicurean pleasure -- Why does Epicurus insist on labeling as "gods" beings who appear to exist without all the attributes that every other Greek and Roman think that they have?

No doubt there was and is an answer to this, and Cicero strategically decided to omit it from On Ends, even though it almost certainly would have been explained at length in other Epicurean writing.

So it seems to me that just as with "the gods," Epicurus has reached a conclusion based on his observations of nature (1-that there are no supernatural realms or beings, and 2- that there is no guidance on how to live other than pleasure and pain) and he is taking those as givens and rewriting his vocabulary accordingly. Neither he nor Torquatus make any effort whatsoever to describe what specific positive actions the gods are taking, or what specific pleasures or pains we are experiencing - they are both reducing the question to one of math-like logic, from which they will derive all their specifics as if from a theorem. They aren't saying much of anything specific about gods except that they exist confidently in perfect bliss, and they aren't saying much of anything about what a person is or should do at a particular moment other than that we should seek pleasure and avoid pain, with the logical extreme being that we should seek 100% pleasure and 0% pain, with the result that the primary only logical point is that the absence of pain is pleasure, and the total absence of pain is total (the limit) of pleasure.

Epicurus didn't need modern science to confirm his opinions about atoms or gods or pleasure -- he was reasoning absolutely logically based on observation of things around him, and he was denying the truth of supernatural worlds or supernatural ideas or ideal forms or essences or anything which cannot logically be validated by the senses.

I am not sure exactly what these observations I am making leads to, but I would say that part of the conclusion is that adding modern scientific observations to the mix adds to our level of satisfaction with the conclusion, but whether we have one researcher or 100 researchers on indivisibility or gods or pleasure, Epicurus would not say that the strength of his argument is really improved. That's because the argument really rests on commitment to having confidence in what we can learn through the senses when we apply our minds in a rigorously reasonable manner.

I also think it means that it is an error to look at "pleasure is the absence of pain" as if we were doctors cataloging types of pleasures or types of pains or trying to doctor around with them or diagnose some as "better" or "worse." The point is that just as with the gods, where correct definitions lead to deeper understanding of how divinity is not to be feared but to be admired, with "pleasure," when considering its role in human life, a correct definition of pleasure as all of the many experiences of life which we experience as not involving pain leads us to realize that life itself (especially in comparison to the nothingness of death) is pleasurable and to be savored.

I am seeing a clear parallel between this sparring over three states or two with the similar definition issue of the nature of the Gods.

I share Epicurus' view of the true nature of both, but I also accept the fact of life that Cicero is right that the vast majority of normal people do not speak that way, either as to pleasure or as to gods.

And I have to admit that in Book 2 Cicero states a powerful case that it is Epicurus who is doing violence to normal terminology.

So as an advocate for Epicurus I am continuing to look for a way to address this terminology issue in a way that seems persuasive. I am convinced he and we are right, but being right on who had the green light still can leave you quite dead and on the losing end of a personal injury lawsuit

So I don't see this primarily as a question of fact either as to gods or as to two states, but as a question of how to deal, when we are in a small minority, that it is we who are saying that the "standard definition" is wrong.

Dewitt addresses this when he says that the human race would be better off for adopting Epicurus' definitions, but I am not sure we yet have articulated a path from where we are to where we want to be.

So I think that direction - finding new was to explain both the facts and the terminology very clearly and persuasively with wit and wisdom - is the way forward.

I am not sure how far we will get in this next episode and whether we will start or finish the "relationship of pleasure to virtue'' section. However I want to note that yesterday I spent some quality time reviewing Book Two of On Ends, which contains Cicero's full frontal attack on Epicurus and the notion that pleasure should be seen as the highest good. Reading that part again in the context of our current discussions meant much more to me than it sometimes has in the past.

When I first started writing on the internet about Epicurus I was more focused on the clash between virtue and pleasure through the sparring that took place with the Stoic school. This attack in Book 2 by Cicero (who goes on in the following sections to thrash the Stoics almost as much as he does Epicurus) is a reminder that we should not really concerned as much about sniping over logic as we should be about the ultimate issue: and that is, what it is deep down that the advocates of "virtue" and of "pleasure" are really saying about the source of their commitment to their respective positions?

When reading Cicero it is easy to see that it is not "logic" that motivates Cicero's adherence to "virtue" as much as it is what I might call an "emotional attachment." Although Cicero will not admit it, it gives Cicero much "pleasure" to advocate for virtue, and that is an issue that must be addressed and answered in equally forceful terms. It seems to me that the best way to really persuade in response to a passionate advocacy of a noble lie is the passionate advocacy of "the truth," and Cicero does not provide what the Epicureans much surely have been thinking when they read his final version of "On Ends." Cicero's statement of this position is as forceful and important than anything the Stoics had to say about virtue, and it is neatly packaged here for us to review in full. Given its forcefulness, this is a much more important issue to address than even concerns about whether discussion of "absence of pain" and "tranquility' can be twisted into indolence and passivity. Some people, yes, are tempted to interpret Epicureanism as a form of Buddhism, but the far greater challenge that has in fact been the one that has kept Epicurus at bay for 2000 years is that he was a moral invalid and that a life of pleasure is hardly worthy of a cow, much less of a human being.

Here at EpicureanFriends we tend to accentuate the positive, and to the extent we talk about Torquatus we focus only on his positive argument, but what we find in Book Two is that Cicero muzzles Torquatus and brings an array of arguments that he doesn't allow Torquatus to answer -- Cicero lamely ends he chapter with Torquatus saying that Philodemus and Siro would be better equipped to respond on Epicurus' behalf.

I think we can learn a lot from going through Cicero's arguments and responding to them ourselves, and in the coming weeks I will look for ways for us to address those issues and muster a public response to them,

Welcome to Episode 177 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics. We are now in the process of a series of podcasts intended to provide a general overview of Epicurean philosophy based on the organizational structure employed by Norman DeWitt in his book "Epicurus and His Philosophy." This week we continue our discussion of Chapter 12, entitled "The New Hedonism."

This week:

Continuous Pain Impossible

The Relation of Pleasure To Virtue

Episode 176 of the podcast is now available!

Thanks Don. As i said i left some of the discussion in the podcast, and it will be interesting to hear what other people think.

At the moment I am thinking that since the theme of the section revolves around the possibility of continuous pleasure / happiness, and that Epicurus' opponents would have wanted to argue that happiness is not possible while being tortured, and that the imagery is intended to stress that point - that continuous happiness is NOT possible in life due to events such as torture (and no doubt other much lesser pains). Thus to the effect that 'happiness" cannot accompany the victim as he walks up the scaffold to the torture/execution. That somewhere along the way happiness leaves the victim while he is still alive, and thus they seek to prove their argument that happiness/pleasure cannot be continuously present in life.

That interpretation would seem consistent with the importance that these guys attached to Epicurus contention (and to their intense desire to refute it) that continuous pleasure is possible.

But i will be very interested to hear what others think.

Closing in (hopefully) in completing editing of this episode, I am going to cut out a lengthy tangent in which we tried (pretty unsuccessfully) to decode Cicero's statement in Tusculun Disputations 5.9.24-25 (attributed to Theophrastus, I think?) to the effect that:

"the happy life cannot mount the scaffold to the wheel"

Rather than delete it entirely, however, I want to preserve it here, because DeWitt mentions it in this section and it would probably be a good idea to get a grip on the meaning.

EDIT - I am going to leave some of it in. I think Joshua comes up with the right interpretation, that the issue is that of mounting the steps to one's execution, to which we can attach the first part -- that Theophrastus may be alleging that the "happy man" cannot continue to be happy when he is undergoing execution. Perhaps.

Santa Claus would be proud!

I think the line from Torquatus referenced above deserves emphasis for a while, and I've added it to a rotation for the top of the front page. Here is the Latin of Torquatus' response to Cicero:

"Non prorsus," inquit, "omnesque qui sine dolore sint in voluptate, et ea quidem summa, esse dico."

Pretty clear and direct and without much effort to massage into good English:

All who are without pain are in pleasure, and in that which [is] highest!

Omnes qui sine dolore sint in voluptate, et ea quidem summa.

I may never be able to remember the Greek version, but that Latin I think i can remember

Added May 31, 2023:

Cicero: Who can fail to see that there are in the nature of things these three states: one when we are in pleasure, another when we are in pain, the the third, the state in which I am now, and I suppose you too, when we are neither in pain nor in pleasure? ... Do you not see that between these extremes lies a great crowd of men who feel neither delight nor sorrow?" Torquatus: "Not at all, and I affirm that all who are without pain are in pleasure, and in that the fullest possible!" - Cicero;'s On Ends, Book 2 (V)16

Not having read this thread in a while, doing so now is a good refresher.

This thread is still in "General Discussion" but we'll probably move it to a Canonics section to help reduce the nature of the disagreement to a form that is graspable. Possibly we need a full thread on Neoplatonism, if we don't have one already. And part of that would be to have an understanding of why it us referred to "Neo" as opposed to simply Platonism - seems for our Epicurean purposes they are hard to distinguish.

Plotinus's Relation to Plato[edit]

See also: Allegorical interpretations of Plato

For several centuries after the Protestant Reformation, neoplatonism was condemned as a decadent and 'oriental' distortion of Platonism. In a 1929 essay, E. R. Dodds showed that key conceptions of neoplatonism could be traced from their origin in Plato's dialogues, through his immediate followers (e.g., Speusippus) and the neopythagoreans, to Plotinus and the neoplatonists. Thus Plotinus' philosophy was, he argued, 'not the starting-point of neoplatonism but its intellectual culmination.'^[30] Further research reinforced this view and by 1954 Merlan could say 'The present tendency is toward bridging rather than widening the gap separating Platonism from neoplatonism.'^[31]

Since the 1950s, the Tübingen School of Plato interpretation has argued that the so-called 'unwritten doctrines' of Plato debated by Aristotle and the Old Academy strongly resemble Plotinus's metaphysics. In this case, the neoplatonic reading of Plato would be, at least in this central area, historically justified. This implies that neoplatonism is less of an innovation than it appears without the recognition of Plato's unwritten doctrines. Advocates of the Tübingen School emphasize this advantage of their interpretation. They see Plotinus as advancing a tradition of thought begun by Plato himself. Plotinus's metaphysics, at least in broad outline, was therefore already familiar to the first generation of Plato's students. This confirms Plotinus' own view, for he considered himself not the inventor of a system but the faithful interpreter of Plato's doctrines.^[32]

Plotinus - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org