Posts by Cassius

I think Don's post 15 is very close to where it needs to be, but I sense there is still equivocation on the issue that the single word that expresses the ultimate goal in most sweeping terms is not "Tranquility" or "Ataraxia" but "Pleasure."

(And this post is not by any means targeted at Don. We're all doing this at times, me included. Eoghan has asked for proposed responses to explanations to outsiders, and that's what we're working on improving.)

Pleasure is the global term; tranquility and ataraxia are fully contained within the word pleasure, but "pleasure" is not fully contained within tranquility or ataraxia. There are pleasures which do not involve tranqulity or calmness or any other similar term. Are those other pleasures less "worthy" than calmness?

When tranquility and ataraxia are used in a way that conveys that they, and not pleasure, are the goal, then the other pleasures are deprecated, and the issue of their status remains muddy. Epicurus was extending the definition of the word Pleasure so that it would include all agreeable feelings, including feelings such as Don is describing and that many people don't ordinarily think of as "Pleasure." If we fail to follow his lead and use the umbrella term, then we're throwing away the main tool that gets us to the point of clarifying what pursuing "pleasure" really means and how it fits into "the nature of things."

The reason this is a continuing question, and the reason that Eoghan is posing it again, is that the orthodox view is that it is wrong to say that "Pleasure" is the goal. The orthodox gatekeepers of acceptability say we should be saying "Tranquility" or "Ataraxia" or some other "acceptable" word instead. And in most cases they are not saying it because they really believe in calmness -- they're saying it because they have another agenda, and they don't want *you* to see pleasure as a legitimate goal.

I don't think these questions will ever begin to clarify in peoples' minds unless the focus remains first, last, and always on "Pleasure." We should say to heck with the nay-sayers who think that the medicine is too bitter to drink. This issue has become as muddy as it is precisely because of this equivocation that we all are tempted to make -- We all know that the Stoics and the Buddhists and the Humanists and the Virtue-crowd are the majority, and we hear in their tone of voice the same condescension and bitterness that we hear in Cicero's abhorrence at the very idea of saying that "Pleasure" is the goal of life.

We should make a clean break with that equivocation and never back down from saying clearly that "Pleasure" is the goal of life. After that, we can then explain all the many facets of what "Pleasure" means for as long and as far as we'd like to go. But the battle is going to be won or lost on keeping it clear that it is Pleasure which is the banner under which we're traveling, and the banner's not ataraxia or aponia or tranquility or any other word than "Pleasure."

When you enter a discussion looking like you're apologizing for the word Pleasure, then you look afraid and you lose the argument before it's even started.

We're "Living for Pleasure," and we're not "Living For Ataraxia" or "Living for Tranquility" or anything else - unless, that is, that we're ready to admit that joy and gladness and what everyone admits to be under the definition of Pleasure are not a legitimate part of the goal of life. Every time we indicate that Ataraxia or Tranquility is more important than Pleasure we are repudiating the definition of pleasure that Epicurus was promoting. An apt analogy is Peter swearing to Jesus that he is a disciple and then immediately turning around and denying him three times before the cock crowed.

If we don't insist on continuing to use the word "Pleasure" as the description of the goal, then we're admitting that the Ciceros of the world have won. No one really believes that there is some special transcendental state constituting "ataraxia" or "tranquilty" which is outside of pleasure and is the real goal of life. The issue is whether we are going to defend the word "Pleasure," or whether we retreat under pressure to what we think is a respectable euphemism, and admit that Cicero has won.

Torquatus didn't retreat and we shouldn't either.

Pacatus if that makes sense to you I say go for it.

I think I am content to say in plain English that because there are no gods and absolute rules and no heaven and hell to calculate for, I am left to look to nature for guidance, and nature gives me only pleasure and pain. I want as much pleasure and as little pain as possible. In evaluating what is pleasure I include everything that is agreeable to me, and I find agreeable both active stimulation from the outside as well as my own "quieter" internal appreciation of healthy normal mental and bodily life.

We can embellish all that with lots of additional words but I see no reason to be concerned that the ancient Epicureans saw things in a much more complicated way than that. The commentators can fight over the details as long as they like but I won't let them worry me that I missing anything more sophisticated than what I just described, because at the end of my life I am unlikely to be any better off than Epicurus himself, offsetting pleasure against pain as best I can.

Pacatus I gather you are referring to those first two and yes!

Do I detect that that Lucretius looks a little like Nate?

In our meeting tonight Pacatus mentioned that the Greek might be chronos which might indicate a longer length of time than a moment? That's my paraphrase and I may have it wrong.

Tonight at 8pm, we will cover Vatican Saying 44 and 45.

Please join us. (Post here in this thread if you have never attended one of these sessions as we do have a vetting process for new participants.)

VS44. The wise man, when he has accommodated himself to straits, knows better how to give than to receive, so great is the treasure of self-sufficiency which he has discovered.

VS45. The study of nature does not make men productive of boasting or bragging, nor apt to display that culture which is the object of rivalry with the many, but high-spirited and self-sufficient, taking pride in the good things of their own minds and not of their circumstances.

So you're saying that the literal version is:

The time of the beginning of the greatest good [pleasure] and the time of its release are one. (?)

If one and the same thing is being referred to as to having the beginning and the end, then that begins to bend back around toward "the time of the beginning and the end of the greatest good is one" and you could could conceivably begin to see "the time" as a reference to a length of time.

And if you see "the time" as a length of time which demarcates the beginning and end of the greatest good / pleasure (when viewing pleasure as both stimulating and normal activities of life)? You'd potentially be back at Dewitt's suggestion that the focus of the statement is a reference to life - - as starting with birth and ending with death --- being the start and end of pleasure (the greatest good).

But to get there you'd have to see "time" as not "a moment in time" but a "length of time."

In English the wording could go either way. Can it go either way in Greek?

I see that the Epicurus.info version in its main page is different from its wiki version:

42) The time of the beginning of the greatest good [pleasure] and the time of its enjoyment are one.

Quote from Don

Problem is there's no "from evil" in the manuscript.

Don what did you conclude "should" be there at the end?

Edit: This is Don's post from earlier this month:

Post

RE: VS42 - Versions of Vatican Saying 42

I happened to tackle this exact saying here: RE: If Death Is Nothing To Us, Then Life Is Everything to Us

First, we return to the manuscript:

epicureanfriends.com/wcf/attachment/4260/

https://digi.vatlib.it/view/MSS_Vat.gr.1950.pt.2/0255

Here's what I see in the manuscript itself:

Ὁ αὐτὸς χρόνος καὶ γενέσεως τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἀπολύσεως.

The pivotal last word is:

epicureanfriends.com/wcf/attachment/4261/

From what I see it's α'π^ολύσε(ως).

That last swoopy letter is a ligature substantiated in…

Don

November 8, 2023 at 10:49 PM

I don't see a translation in the article but there's a good photo of the wording. Something about who made it?

Edit:

Two mosaic inscriptions were also unearthed in the building as a result of salvage excavations. A mosaic with Latin script was located at the base of a rectangular building, while another mosaic with Greek script was found on the floor of another partially preserved walled building.

The Latin mosaic reads: “On the occasion of its 30th anniversary and with our prayers for it to reach its 40th anniversary. This building [Fabrica] was built under the leadership of his friend [Comes] Hyacinthos. You, O building, have now reached the most magnificent level.”

The Greek mosaic reads: “Enter in a healthy way” or “Enter if you are healthy.”

Raphael I saw your email to me asking about registration. Did you successfully get signed on? You should be able to post here now.

Great -- that "still at it" refers to the link being as recent as November 3, 2023!

Quote from Bryan

Metrodorus is quoted by Plutarch as "Τhis very thing is the good: Escaping from the bad -- because It is not possible for the Good to be placed anywhere, when neither What is painful nor What is distressing is any longer making way for it.

Wow that's another one that if I've read it before I don't recall it --- but isn't that making exactly the same point in another way!

I don't want to press to hard since we're not talking about the Greek wording exactly, but do I read that correctly to say that we should understand that "removing pain" is the same thing as pleasure because pleasure cannot exist where pain resides?

Is the implication that like two atoms, where only one atom can be in a place at a time, you have to move pain out of the way for pleasure to occupy the same spot?

Now in this case we'd also want to refer back to where Torquatus said that we don't admit that when one pleasure leaves that pain *necessarily* fills its space, because the norm would be that one pleasure can take the place of another ("variety").

So there's not necessarily going to be a pain at a particular location if we've ordered our lives successfully, but as to adding *more* pleasure to the total we're experiencing, we can't add any more pleasure once all pain is ejected.

Are you reading it that way Bryan?

I'll restate the same point Don made --- Joshua made some outstanding points in this episode that simply would not be possible to make without having dived into a lot of background reading. Joshua always brings an encyclopedic knowledge of general literature to the table, but in this case the cross-referencing of Books One and Two, and the reading far enough to find Aulus Gellius, are just things that aren't going to happen for the general reader no matter how well intentioned.

To repeat my "joke" I will say that this is why we pay Joshua so well for his input --- In this case I hope the payment in satisfaction from knowing how much his work is appreciated is good enough!

Quote from Eoghan Gardiner

Experientially I have discovered this to be true but I don't think I could explain it in a good way.

Interestingly I am not sure that I would agree that "absence of pain = pleasure" can be "discovered to be true experientally" -- at least not fully.

Everything we are doing here in this discussion is defining terms and attempting to attach words to feelings. The only way to be confident that "Absence of pain" equals "pleasure" is to assign in your mind the meanings of these terms and then hold them firmly. Cicero's objection that "absence of pain is not equal to pleasure" is a perfectly reasonable assertion to many people, and it isn't met fully by saying "your definition is erroneous." Who gets to set what the "right" definition is?

That's why I think this statement is hugely important: "The fact that the name of pleasure was not customarily applied to the normal or static state did not alter the fact that the name ought to be applied to it; nor that reason justified the application; nor that human beings would be the happier for so reasoning and believing."

The "ought" in that sentence then has to be explained, and it's going to ultimately be a matter of your ultimate views of the universe. If life is a privilege and a short-term gift to be treasured, then we will see it as a pleasure. If life is a prison and a burden and a torture by the gods, then we'll see life as a pain.

I suppose yes you can introspect and learn to see that life IS really a pleasure, but in the end I think you end up needing to add the philosophical viewpoint to reach the ultimate understanding. As Lucretius says (paraphrasing) it's not the light of day that opens our eyes to these things, but a scheme of philosophic contemplation.

Also:

PD12. A man cannot dispel his fear about the most important matters if he does not know what is the nature of the universe, but suspects the truth of some mythical story. So that, without natural science, it is not possible to attain our pleasures unalloyed.

PD19. Infinite time contains no greater pleasure than limited time, if one measures, by reason, the limits of pleasure.

PD20. The flesh perceives the limits of pleasure as unlimited, and unlimited time is required to supply it. But the mind, having attained a reasoned understanding of the ultimate good of the flesh and its limits, and having dissipated the fears concerning the time to come, supplies us with the complete life, and we have no further need of infinite time; but neither does the mind shun pleasure, nor, when circumstances begin to bring about the departure from life, does it approach its end as though it fell short, in any way, of the best life.

PD21. He who has learned the limits of life knows that that which removes the pain due to want, and makes the whole of life complete, is easy to obtain, so that there is no need of actions which involve competition.

Here's a start. I will expand on this but I want to go ahead and add an explanation that Joshua just found in the Aulus Gellius material:

It is a perfectly acceptable construction in grammar, used by numerous people but no less than Virgil and Homer, to express one of a pair of opposite terms by stating its negation. For example, when Homer wanted to describe a virtuous person, he would call him "without fault." When Virgil was describing a horrible person, he described him as "without praiseworthiness." We could go on and on to expand this list, but these are among the examples that Aulus Gellius cites as perfectly acceptable and clear language, and we are all familiar with similar usages.

Aulus Gellius then goes on to include Epicurus' use of "absence of pain" as an example of the same kind of grammatical construction. This shows that Epicurus' usage is not intended to be mysterious, but to be a normal construction when discussing opposites.

Epicurus can describe pleasure as "absence of pain" because he holds that pleasure is the opposite of pain, and that all feelings resolve into one of the two, so that if you are feeling anything at all you are feeling either pleasure or pain but not both at one part of your body or mind, and not "neither" -- there is no neutral state. The universe is made up of atoms and void and nothing else, and all feelings are either pleasure or pain and nothing else. So "absence of pain = pleasure" and "absence of pleasure = pain."

Expressing feelings by using negations emphasizes that the worst pain is the total absence of pleasure, and the best pleasure is the total absence of pain. Further, use of the negation helps emphasize that we are not concerned with describing an exact experience of pleasure or an exact experience of pain. We aren't concerned about doing that because it can't be done, because there is nothing common between all pleasures expect that we feel them to be agreeable, and there is nothing in common between all pains except that they feel disagreeable.

Expressing pleasure in such sweeping terms was important to Epicurus because he wanted to emphasize that "pleasure" is not limited to "stimulative" experiences, but that pleasure also includes all normal and healthy mental and bodily experiences of life. There's no way to express those in greater detail without providing an innumerable list of experiences, or without simply calling them experiences in which pain is absent, or "absence of pain."

And using DeWitt's words, this extension of the name of pleasure to the normal state of life is the key insight:

“The extension of the name of pleasure to this normal state of being was the major innovation of the new hedonism. It was in the negative form, freedom from pain of body and distress of mind, that it drew the most persistent and vigorous condemnation from adversaries. The contention was that the application of the name of pleasure to this state was unjustified on the ground that two different things were thereby being denominated by one name. Cicero made a great to-do over this argument, but it is really superficial and captious. The fact that the name of pleasure was not customarily applied to the normal or static state did not alter the fact that the name ought to be applied to it; nor that reason justified the application; nor that human beings would be the happier for so reasoning and believing."

The only way that Epicurean philosophy makes sense is to see "Absence of Pain" as synonymous with "pleasure," and "Absence of pleasure" as synonymous with "pain." If you try to divorce the two and make absence of pain something different from, and higher than, pleasure, then you tear the heart out of the insight that pleasure includes both pleasures that are stimulating and pleasures that are part of normal daily healthy life, and you lose the trail to see that "pleasure" is the term to use to describe the alpha and omega of life.

For those who are into the details, I would say that this is why examining closely Torquatus' response to the Chrysippus' hand argument is so important. The normal hand in a normal state without pain IS in a state of pleasure, and if you state that anything is "without pain" then you are stating that it's at 100% pleasure. This is also the way to understand why the pain-free host pouring wine for the thirsty but otherwise pain-free guest are both experiencing the same level of pleasure - "pain-free" is "pain-free." And it's why Torquatus is so adamant in insisting to Cicero that "pleasure" and "absence of pain" are the same.

Quote

Cicero: "...[B]ut unless you are extraordinarily obstinate you are bound to admit that 'freedom from pain' does not mean the same thing as 'pleasure.'" Torquatus: "Well but on this point you will find me obstinate, for it is as true as any proposition can be." ... Cicero: Still, granting that there is nothing better (that point I waive for the moment), surely it does not therefore follow that what I may call the negation of pain is the same thing as pleasure?" Torquatus: "Absolutely the same, indeed the negation of pain is a very intense pleasure, the most intense pleasure possible." CIcero - "On Ends" Book 2:iii:9 and 2:iii:11 (Rackham)

I can't pass over this line from Gellius either:

Quote

In bringing this charge against Epicurus Plutarch is "word-chasing" with excessive minuteness and almost with frigidity; for far from hunting up such verbal meticulousness and such refinements of diction, Epicurus hunts them down.

I am not sure that the word play between "hunting up" and "hunting down" is totally obvious to us, but this seems to be a witticism that amounts to a strong endorsement of Epicurus.

Does anyone have a different interpretation other than it means something like: "Epicurus is not only not guilty of playing games with words himself, he is hunting down and exposing those who do!"

If that's the meaning then this Latin sentence might deserve a special place along with Lucian's "strike a blow for Epicurus" and Cicero's "master-builder of human happiness" and Laertius' "take for our end that which is the beginning of wisdom" in introducing the Principal Doctrines, and similar praises.

Joshua from your references on Gellius in Attic Nights, here is something else I think is highly useful: Gellius is showing us a list of examples where highly reputable Greek writers were using the negation of a term as the extreme point of its opposite, and he includes within the list Epicurus' use of "absence of pain."

I see this has helping a lot with the argument we are always facing: Why wasn't Epicurus more clear about the meaning of "Absence of pain?" Did he mean some fancy type of experience that isn't related to what we think of as "pleasure" at all? Or did he mean simply "100% pleasure" when he talked about "absence of pain?"

Seems to me this clearly shows that Gellius fully understood that it was totally proper for Epicurus to use "absence of pain" interchangeably and as a synonym for "pleasure." He cites in support of this two of the most renowned figures in all literature: not only Virgil (as to the unflattering meaning of the word "unpraised") but also Homer ("Homer usually bestows high praise, not by enumerating virtues, but by denying faults")!

Here's the quote:

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Quote

9 But concerning inlaudatus it seems possible to give two answers. One is of this kind: There is absolutely no one who is of so perverted a character as not sometimes to do or say something that can be commended (laudari). And therefore this very ancient line has become a familiar proverb:

Oft-times even a fool expresses himself to the purpose.

10 But one who, on the contrary, in his every act and at all times, deserves no praise (laude) at all is inlaudatus, and such a man is the very worst and most despicable of all mortals, just as freedom from all reproach makes one inculpatus (blameless). Now inculpatus is the synonym for perfect goodness; therefore conversely inlaudatus represents the limit of extreme wickedness.

11 It is for that reason that Homer usually bestows high praise, not by enumerating virtues, but by denying faults; for example:

"And not unwillingly they charged,"

and again:15

Not then would you divine Atrides see

Confused, inactive, nor yet loath to fight.

12 Epicurus too in a similar way defined the greatest pleasure as the removal and absence of all pain, in these words:16 "The utmost height of pleasure is the removal of all that pains." 13 Again Virgil on the same principle called the Stygian pool "unlovely."17 14 For just as he expressed abhorrence of the "unpraised" man by the denial of praise, 15 so he abhorred the "unlovable" by the denial of love. 16 Another defence of inlaudatus is this: laudare in early Latin means "to name" and "cite." Thus in civil actions they use laudare of an authority, when he is cited. 17 Conversely, the inlaudatus is the same as p141 the inlaudabilis, namely, one who is worthy neither of mention nor remembrance, and is never to be named; 18 as, for example, in days gone by the common council of Asia decreed that no one should ever mention the name of the man who had burned the temple of Diana at Ephesus.18

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So we have here direct testimony from the ancient world that there is no need to look for any kind of hidden meaning in the use of these terms other than that when you have two of a pair, the presence of one is the absence of the other: "pleasure" is "the absence of pain" and "pain" is "the absence of pleasure" --- and that's what you point out in this episode Cicero was specifically denying that Epicurus had done!

Here is where Cicero alleges at Book 2, ix that Epicurus does NOT in referring to "freedom from pain" call it "pleasure" ;

I see this as another example of why Cicero cannot be acquitted of the charge of intentional misrepresentation. Cicero certainly knows that Epicurus is equating absence of pain as another description of pleasure, and yet rather than admit Epicurus' usage and simply disagree with the conclusion, he keeps harping on what is essentially "Why don't you use the same term every time you refer to pleasure?"

So I think we see in Homer and VIrgil a part of the answer: it is entirely legitimate to emphasize the meaning of a term by contrasting it with the total absence of its opposite.

Gellius has pointed out for us that two of the greatest poets of Greece and Rome did exactly that, and he is including Epicurus' use of "absence of pain" as another illustration of the same thing.

I'm not sure that this is not one of the most clear and authoritative supportive statements from the ancient world as to how we should interpret Epicurus' use of the term "absence of pain" -- and I am embarrassed to say I am pretty sure I had never heard of it at all before you brought it up in the podcast!

Even worse, I think i had heard of the title "Attic Nights" - but I thought it was some kind of love poem!

Thank you so much for these links!

Episode 201 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is Now Available!