Posts by Cassius

Quote from Onenski

I mean, possibly there's not a specific and universal activity or object to pursue that brings pleasure in general, but there's a way to do it or to get it: the virtuous one.

I think most all of us will agree on that. Even eating ice cream is not guaranteed pleasureable, if you have just eaten a gallon and are stuffed.

Quote from Onenski

I really hope this answer have some sense, because I'm not sure if I understood completely the question in dispute.

I think the question is more addressed to this: "Are all pleasures really interchangeable to a person, or or some pleasures more to be chosen than others?" Maybe the answer is obviously "Yes, some are to be chosen before others," but what is the best way to explain that to yourself, or to (for example) your child.

Cicero and others seem to infer that all true Epicureans will choose to spend their lives laying on the beach without a thought to (for example) a life as an artist or a scientist or a policeman or fireman.

Is Cicero correct? If not, why not, and how do you explain the Epicurean analysis of choosing some pleasures over others in Epicurean terms without reference to nobility or other outside standards? Is the only thing that can be said is "choose the most pleasant?"

Episode 190 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available!

Quote from Onenski

For Mill there are special pleasures, like reading philosophy, listening to music, contemplate art, etc., that are superior to other pleasures (accesible only for animals). I understand his idea, but I reject it for similar reasons why I reject stoicism: I don't think there are intrinsically nobler people, nobler activities or nobler ways to live (or intrinsically pleasurable).

I think most Epicureans would probably agree that there are no "nobler" people, activities, or ways to live, if "nobler" implies an absolute ranking of value. But would Epicureans agree that there are no "preferable" people, activities, or ways to live, that we we ourselves can decide to be preferable? The word "special" in Mill's wording is a little ambiguous reading it from your excerpt, but once we read out the "absolute for everyone standard," can we not - and should we not - establish for ourselves which are better and pursue those?

Is the entire question one of absolute vs subjective definition of the scale?

Quote from Plantpierogi

If I wanted to be a lay in the grass in the summertime for a week, I would simply wait 9 months. Besides, a shepherd's life never appealed to me, anyway.

Great thoughts in that post Plantpierogi and good to see back you on the forum again!

It should not have! does it appear to you that it did?

Quote from Don

See my addendum edit to post 35. I'm not convinced PD09 says pleasures are the same.

Right - I intended my comment to mean that I was agreeing with you, and I was just looking for more support against the opposite position. It doesn't make sense to me that someone would hold different types of pleasures (taste, smell) to be the same except from certain limited perspectives. One might say that they "are all the same in that they feel pleasurable" but that approaches being very high level wordplay that is of limited usefulness. One could also talk about the "quantity" (I think) in terms of coming up with a general measurement of "intensity" or "amount of attention you pay to that feeling" but the benefit of that too would be pretty limited.

So I agree with you that PD09 doesn't imply that all pleasures are the same except (at most) from some very high level perspective. Pleasures can differ very significantly from one another, and the question that each of us faces is WHICH pleasure to pursue at a particular moment.

Other than PD09 does Epicurus say anything anywhere that might support the idea that pleasures are "the same"? I am not thinking that he does and so I wonder if that is not also intended to reference "Quantity" as in PD03.

Other than in quantity I cannot see much similarity in pleasures as a whole other than that the feeling of pleasure tells us it is pleasurable, which is more of a generalization than a statement of a specific feeling.

Times like this I doubt that Epicurus put together this list and ordering himself.

Quote from Don

The feeling of pleasure is personal and subjective.

So "the height of pleasure" or "the highest pleasure" or "the greatest pleasure" or similar terms can never be measured on an absolute scale or even compared from person to person based on any outside authority or measurement, but are terms that are always relative to the person under discussion at a particular moment?

Does that apply too to "the limit of quantity of pleasure" as referenced in PD03? If so, the PD03 is intended to mean the "limit of quantity of pleasure for YOU" or "for a particular person" is the absence of pain, rather than referring to a particular activity? And that therefore different people are going to be doing different things when they are at this limit referenced in PD03?

If these are correct, then the shepherd out with the flock might be at his or her height of pleasure while Epicurus with his school could be at his height of pleasure and be doing absolutely different things, and therefore:

- It makes no sense to try to define any particular activity or state as the "height of pleasure" for people in general?

- The choice to live as a shepherd for your final week or Epicurus at the end for your final week says everything about your personal preference but nothing that can be generally praised or condemned by any general rule ... purely a personal preference?

{ I am not asking these totally rhetorically and if Don or anyone else disagrees with the perspective please say so! }

Quote from Don

PS. (Edit) Everything is contextual! The same pleasure in different contexts coming from different desires may lead to completely different decisions on whether one selects or flees from that pleasure.

So "pleasure" is itself contextual and there is absolutely no Platonic ideal or Aristotelian essence of "Pleasure"?

Quote from Don

That sounds horrific, but I'm also not an ancient Roman general commanding a legion. The fruits of his decision were strict discipline under his command. Was it worth it? Did it provide well-being? You'd have to ask Titus Manlius Imperiosus Torquatus

The presumption there seems to be that the choice of greatest pleasure is entirely personal. For the present rather than agree or disagree I would just say that --- if true --- that too (in addition to "sharing" and "length of time") would be major factors to consider in this hypothetical.

Quote from Don

whether or not I'm imbued with the knowledge of Epicurus or surrounded by his friends, doesn't sound "fruitful" to me, to riff on καρπίζεται. One, by definition of the hypothetical, couldn't "come back" and share that knowledge.

Quote from Don

What good would it serve to know everything and not be able to share it?

Yes we are making progress!

So if I read you correctly, from your perspective, the "ability to share" seems to be perhaps the paramount consideration in fruitfulness and enjoyability.

As you indicate (..."for me! someone else's mileage may vary"...) that may be a personal choice, but it's clearly understandable, and definitely advances the conversation to suggest something as a criteria.

One would then have to contemplate "sharing" as a companion to "length of time" in consideration of pleasure.

(we crossposted and I had not seen post 24 before writing that)

Is not judging pleasure by length of time specifically denied to be a good idea by Epicurus?

Letter to Menoeceus:

"And just as with food he does not seek simply the larger share and nothing else, but rather the most pleasant, so he seeks to enjoy not the longest period of time, but the most pleasant.".

As for the hypo I will specify for the Facebook version that "for a week" means that you only have one week to live in either scenario at the end of which your life is over. That makes it easier to see that the choice involves "how does one spend the time that one has."

The alternative of "for a week" meaning the equivalent of a trip to the beach after which you return to your present self might also be useful as a warmup to consider first, but would not frame the question so starkly.

And of course in life we have a lot more choices than these two to choose from, just as we have many pleasures to choose from, but the point of a hypothetical is to focus on a key issue for purposes of understanding a deeper lesson.

In this case: Are all pleasures equally to be chosen? If so, how do we choose among them? If not, why not?

Simply saying "Choose pleasure and avoid pain, while sometimee choosing pain to avoid a worse pain or get greater pleasure" answers that question generally, but is that all there is to be said about the nature of the choice of pleasure to seek? If that is all that can be said philosophically then that itself is important to know. If we think Epicurus said more, what else as a key philosophical rule that would apply here?

Another warmup question might be: "A former Torquatus put his son to death for violating a military rule, and our Torquatus justified that as a decision consistent in nature with an Epicurean perspective. This despite the other Epicurean rule that we sometimes die for a friend. Does that tell us anything about the Epicurean position for choosing among pleasures and pains?"

Quote from Don

I can come up with all kinds of complications!

I knew the Don we all know and love as to hypotheticals would not be long in coming!

An interesting aspect of Don's question is that it points out to me that it is more important to know "the truth" of what Epicurus was talking about than to think that I already know what the "most pleasant" of those alternative weeks would be.

I do not think that I (speaking only for me) have an adequate grasp of what Epicurus was really advising to presume that 'it would be more fun to be with Epicurus in the good times' is the right answer.

It might be more "fun" or even 'pleasant" to be with him in some of the earlier times, but i would want to know his mature thoughts or else i would not be so sure I had made the correct choice.

For me that one is easier I think - I would want to be able to question Epicurus in his most mature and advanced stage of life, so I would say "being with Epicurus during the last week of his life" to ask him where he eventually came down on many of these same issues we are discussing.

And i would probably include the exact question we are discussing from post one of this thread.

Agreed Nate.

So how would a non-idealist non-essentialist person like Epicurus view discussions where "Pleasure" is compared from one person to another or at different times and places?

Is there a standard of "pleasure" that exists for everyone that allows an explicit one-to-one comparison?

We have heard many times that accepting "Pleasure" as a standard turns us into cows (or worse)?

If that is not the case, why is it not the case?

Or are we in fact aiming at exactly the same pleasure of a cow grazing in the grass?

Is one person's "height of pleasure" the same as another person's?

And on the topic of being a student of Epicurus for any time period, here is something I think is related that any student of Epicurus should consider:

Q: "What is your understanding of Platonic Idealism and Aristotelian Essentialism and how they may or may not relate to Epicurus' view of Pleasure? Does considering that relationship (if any) indicate anything as to how you would answer the question being posed?"

An issue with any hypothetical is trying to exclude all the issues that people with think to add in that are outside the hypothetical. In this case the fact that Epicurus died after his last week needs to be excluded from the terms so that we can focus on the issue of their relative pains and pleasures while alive.

But also as with any hypothetical, explaining the caveats also helps with the main purpose, which is to get people thinking about the overall question.

Yes actually I do not see the "death at the end of the week" as being a major factor in making the hypothetical work.

The intent is generally that of:

1 - Being Epicurus for a week (with all that that implies) but in pain from kidneystones; vs

2 - Being a random shepherd for a week who is experiencing no specific pain but knows nothing about philosophy and doing nothing in particular but minding his own business living the live of a shepherd in the mountains .

Before posting to Facebook I will probably use these descriptions.

Thanks to all who have answered so far! This is going to provide some great food for thought over at Facebook too. I'll probably wait til the weekend to post it to give more time for consideration.