Posts by Cassius

Quote from Don

"Non-stimulating" and "not stimulated" sounds like there's no sensation at all.

I agree that that deduction would be something to be avoided.

Quote from Don

The pleasure of floating on a calm sea

But this would be only one such pleasure and we'd likely want to avoid "floating" metaphors as well, unless we are ships, because floating is what ships do. I would say "floating" is going to evoke "mindlessness" or "total inaction" unless we are careful to exclude that. And that's where the kinetic language gets blurry, if for example savoring memories is kinetic.

We're humans, and what we're looking for I think is something the conveys "doing anything and everything that humans do when they are not 'excited' but also not in pain." We're looking for a word that describes all normal activities of life where we aren't "excited" but we are still functioning normally. I would think this is what Torquatus is pointing out as the answer to Chrysippus' hand hypothetical. A hand is which not being stimulated or excited or massaged still falls under "a hand in pleasure" so long as the hand is not in some affirmative pain.

Quote from Don

I also think we need to acknowledge that there is a difference between pain and suffering

At the moment I would emphasize in order of importance:

(1) There are only two feelings, pleasure and pain, which means the presence of one is the absence of the other. Each and every feeling in life which is agreeable falls under pleasure, each and every feeling that is disagreeable falls under pain.

(2) Within "pleasure" and "pain" there are many different particular feelings which vary greatly from one another in terms of how we experience them. The pleasure of ice cream varies from the pleasure of listening to music. The pleasure of Beethoven differs from the pleasure of Wagner. This point two does not contradict point one, it's just a different perspective level.

(3) From a "whole person" perspective, the limit of the quantity of pleasure is the absence of pain. There is no way to improve the quantity of pleasure past 100%, and this understanding gives us the understanding that pleasure has a limit, and therefore it can't be made "better" by living forever. Living longer gives us more time experiencing pleasure, but no matter how long we live life never gets better than 100% pleasure.

Once propositions one and two are accepted then it's fair game to parse individual pleasures and pains any way one prefers to think about them and label them with whatever words seem useful in any language we'd like to use. But until it is accepted that pleasure includes both stimulating and non-stimulating pleasures, it's not possible to stand up against the argument of Cicero and others that Epicurus is using the term "pleasure" in a non-standard way.

Cicero's complaint is correct - Epicurus *is* using the word "pleasure" in a non-standard way, just like he uses "god" in a non-standard way. It seems clear that Epicurean terminology on pleasure differs from normal usage, and that "pleasure" includes two types of pleasures which we can understand in words that mean something to us ( 1 - exciting / stimulating pleasures vs 2 - pleasures of normal living in which we are not stimulated / excited).

The equation of "pleasure = absence of pain" is never going to make sense to a person who insists on sticking to standard terminology. Whatever explanations get us over that hurdle is desirable, and I am sure there are many ways to do it.

Here's a new one for me, from Chapter 6 of the Boeri /Aoiz book:

Quote from Theory and Practice In Epicurean Political Philosophy

Trebatius Testa was one of the most renowned jurists of his time. He began his career under the protection of Cicero, who recommended him to Caesar. Trebatius joined Caesar in Gaul in 54 BC. In a letter from February 53 Cicero tells Trebatius that he knows he has become an Epicurean, and reproaches him that being an Epicurean contradicts his status as a politician and jurist (Fam. 2.12 1).⁷⁰ We do not know how Trebatius replied, but several facts in his biography highlight the arguments by which an Epicurean could have responded to Cicero. Trebatius did not want to pursue a political career (in fact he refused the office of military tribune offered to him by Caesar in 54, which annoyed Cicero). However, he was able to make the most of his talent as a jurist and became Caesar’s adviser and familiaris. Trebatius, as Benferhat points out, got through the civil war without compromising himself or becoming a victim.⁷¹ He was also valued as a jurisconsult by Augustus. It could perhaps be said that Trebatius, without aspiring to power or office, enjoyed fame and prestige, which provided him with security until his death in his eighties. In the aforementioned letter of February 53, Cicero is particularly emphatic in questioning how an Epicurean could devote himself to law. It is one of Cicero’s anti-Epicurean arguments that most clearly reveals his omission of the central tenets of Epicureanism, for, as we have shown, the Epicureans developed a sophisticated defence of justice and law. One of the testimonies of Trebatius’ activity as a jurisconsult reflects just the kind of argument one would expect from an Epicurean jurist: the insistence on the utility of law. When Augustus consulted jurists on whether the use of codicils was in accordance with the ratio iuris, Trebatius convinced the emperor that it was by claiming that, in effect, the codicil was most useful and necessary for the citizens [utilissimum et necessarium hoc civibus esse].

I am reviewing the Boeri / Aioz book (Theory and Practice in Epicurean Political Philosophy) and came across this passage relevant to our discussion of memory, from their Chapter 5:

In sum, friendship is an indispensable condition for happiness and, like justice, is a powerful means for achieving imperturbability. But friendship is also thought of as a sort of kinetic pleasure: the memory of a dead friend appears to Epicurus ‘sweet’ (Plutarch, Pleasant Life 1105E; Us. 213); it produces joy and ends by being a relief capable of counteracting the body’s pains.

Thanks for those calculations Pacatus!

Quote from Pacatus

Question: Can B1 and B2 also have katastematic qualities? For example, chronic physical pain or clinical depression?

You're pursuing this out of interest and you enjoy it (I feel sure), but to me i would think a newer person would find this to be hazardous if they pursue it before more basic issues are resolved. I don't have a cite ready at hand to back this up, but I am pretty sure that the authorities don't consider "duration" (implied in the word chronic) as "the" key defining aspect of katastematic pleasure, but rather "changeability," which is related but I would say is not the same. Don's concern was (I think rightly) "since memories can be a kinetic pleasure." It's pretty clear that some 'actions' like memories can come and go last longer than others, so it isn't the time element alone or maybe even primarily that distinguishes the two. If someone asserts that it is, where is the dividing line between a long-lasting kinetic pleasure and a katastematic one? A minute? An hour? A day? At what point in time is the dividing line crossed and kinetic become katastematic?

In fact, that's the underlying problem of talking about K/K. It isn't really clear what distinguishes one from the other. Does katastematic really equate to "rest?" How is sustained smooth motion over a long period of time different than "rest?" What is "rest" in the first place in a universe with no "bottom" and composed of never-ceasing-to-move atoms flying through space? I know that some people assert answers to these questions, but authoritative cites explaining these things are not easy to find, and certainly not clear explanations in Epicurean texts. By the time a newer person tries long enough to get to the bottom of it i would wager most of them have created for themselves more intellectual pain than pleasure and gone a long way toward thinking that trying to decode Epicurus is fruitless.

Quote from Cassius

While we know that the position that there are only two feelings and we are experiencing either one or the other is the Epicurean position, for persuasiveness purposes we will still need to hammer the point that Kalosyni is wanting to raise: Can we experience something without an associated feeling?

It's clear we need to go back over this point. WHY is this position seemingly of such importance to Epicurus. I think there are probably several answers but we need to make them clear.

Quote from Joshua

if 6 held that "Any non-painful feeling is a pleasure" it would be a deductive conclusion of 1 and 2.

Good point. Will change most every word "experience" to "feeling." That also will address the points in the remainder of your post I think.....

While I think in normal discussion the word "experience" equates to "feeling," there is no reason to introduce that ambiguity in this list of points. All that was previously stated as "experience" will now be changed to "feeling."

While we know that the position that there are only two feelings and we are experiencing either one or the other is the Epicurean position, for persuasiveness purposes we will still need to hammer the point that Kalosyni is wanting to raise: Can we experience something without an associated feeling?

Cicero says we can, Torquatus/Epicurus says we cannot. As far as I can tell, every single reference to the question in the core texts backs up Torquatus/Epicurus that this is the Epicurean position.

Now as to WHY that is the Epicurean position, that's a separate but highly important question. I would say it is because of Epicurus' philosophic conclusions about life (life is desirable, so life in the absence of pain is pleasurable) but there are probably other ways of reaching the same conclusion. It is a plus (but not determinative of the question) that modern clinical researchers seem to take the same position (a point which Don and Godfrey are all over.) See posts in this subforum and many others which are not linked there as of yet.

One additional point on this from the letter to Menoeceus: "And therefore a right understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable, not because it adds to it an infinite span of time, but because it takes away the craving for immortality."

I have not previously interpreted it this way, but that underlined portion may be exactly the point: it is the right understanding that death is nothing to us that makes a mortal life enjoyable. It is thinking through these issues philosophically that makes us realize that even when we are not being stimulated, the simple and normal act of living is understood to be pleasurable. If we don't understand this, then we wander in indifference and doubt and question the value of life and we flirt with Stoicism or Nihilism or worse. If we do understand it, then the wise man can experience a constant predominance of pleasure over pain.

I wrote my post #3 in the middle of the night, and when I read Don's post #4 I was half asleep. I failed to really be clear about this part which I would steer away from:

Quote from Don

A = pleasure (pleasurable sensation/positive affect)

B = pain (painful sensation/negative affect)

A1 = "Any experience of agreeable "stimulation"" (ie, kinetic pleasure)

A2 = "normal and healthy experience of life" (ie, katastematic pleasure)

I think the designation of A1 as kinetic and A2 as katastematic would not be helpful. Regardless of different readings of the texts, as I understand the situation the k/k terminology is not nearly as well establishable in the core Epicurus and Lucretius texts as is the discussion of the difference between "stimulation" vs "absence of pain / normal experience of life." The problems that result from this k/k classification include for example exactly the one Don mentions in his post, that the "kinetic/katastematic" distinction does not map directly onto the distinction between stimulation vs normal painfree life.

The summoning up and savoring of memories is mental, and though we don't think of that usually as an "action" experience, it does fall under the category of an action as I understand the authorities. Action is not merely physical change but also includes mental change, and so (again as I understand the authorities) stopping and starting to think about distinct memories is considered kinetic, as is any process that involves "change of state" rather than "static state." Diving into whether the pleasure involved is "changeable" or "static" introduces complexities that are not needed for the overall analysis of whether pleasure predominates over pain.

The big hurdle to get over and the reason for discussion is to understand what "absence of pain" means. Resolving the issue that we should seek the predominance of all types of pleasures over all types of pain resolves the biggest issues in controversy as to what the goal of life is. As I see it, the prime objective should be first is to identify and have confidence on the desired goal. Once we do that, then the question can turn to which individual pleasures to pursue under a particular circumstance. And that's going to be more of a practical fact-specific question than a theoretical issue.

Yes I would agree that this takes us to exactly the same place, if we insist on the accustomed viewpoint of looking at feelings of body and mind separately. That's why I included my note in number one that most people are going to look at them separately, but the issue of whether their activity is pleasure or pain is the same. When you separate those out and refer to them as AI/A2 and B1/B2 you're right we arrive at the same place:

Quote from Don

HP = (A1 + A2) height/fullness of pleasure is just 100% pleasure

HP = C - (B1 + B2) height/fullness of pleasure is the totality of life without any pain of body or mind

And i agree that this is an added complexity that would arise due to ambiguities between the kinetic and katastematic terms:

Quote from Don

But pain in the body B1 is the absence of pleasure in the body but neither A1 nor A2 map neatly onto mind and body since memories can be a kinetic pleasure.

.... problems which i would put aside by considering those questions to be of secondary down-the-road importance, if that. I would leave those problems to those who really want to pursue whether Epicurus himself was concerned with this distinction at all, and I would go with Lucretius' approach and leave that for another book.

The real fundamental help that going through these steps provides under either scenario is that it explains how the term "absence of pain" can be used in a completely clear way. Seen this way, "absence of pain" is tied tightly to pleasure and describes both the ultimate goal of life as well as the sweeping nature of everything that is considered pleasure. No "woo" or mystery or implication of asceticism or devaluing of life, but rather a clear reference that brings within it any experience in life which is not painful.

Please check my math and let me know if you see an error:

Pleasure Arithmetic and "Absence of Pain"

==================================

1. There are only two feelings of body or mind: those which are agreeable (pleasure) and those which are disagreeable (pain). Let's call pleasure "A" and pain "B." (It should not be necessary to say that we are including both "body' and "mind," since we are a single organism, but since many people seem to insist on thinking in those two terms, let's be clear that everything said here refers to both.)

2. If a person is alive and feeling anything, what he is feeling is either "A" pleasure or "B" pain.

3. "All" the feelings of life = "A" + "B." Let's call all the feelings of life "C." A + B = C

4. "All" the feelings of life means 100% of them. There is no logical way to increase "C" past the total of "A" + "B."

5. Any feeling of agreeable "stimulation" is a pleasure. Everyone admits this. Let's call this type of pleasure "A1".

6. Any non-painful feeling is a pleasure. Not everyone admits this, but this is the logical deduction of points 1 and 2. Let's call this type of pleasure "A2". This does not refer to "stimulation," but instead refers to the normal and healthy feeling of life when no pain or disease is present. Neither A1 nor A2 are intrinsically "better" than the other for all people at all times. Both are part of life and both require prudence and activity to sustain.

7. The most pleasure possible in life is when 100% of life ("C") is composed totally of pleasure, which means 100% A (pleasure, either A1 or A2 or both) and 0% B (pain). We can call this type of life "HP" (the "height of pleasure" or "the highest pleasure" or the "limit of pleasure").

8. If C = A + B (all feelings of life = the pleasurable feelings + the painful feelings) then A = C - B. This is another way of saying that the quantity of pleasurable feelings in life is the same as the quantity of feelings in life in which pain is absent. Any feeling of pleasure can therefore be referred to as a feeling of "absence of pain," and any feeling of pain can be referred to as a feeling of "absence of pleasure." This is not a complete description of a particular feeling, any more than the word "pleasure" is a complete description of ice cream or sex. From this perspective, "absence of pain" provides us a single term that describes any and all types of desirable experience, since "absence of pain" includes both A1 (any agreeable stimulation of body or mind + A2 (any non-painful normal experience of body or mind).

9. The most desirable life (which we called "HP" above) is completely pleasure (A1 + A2 with no amount of B), which means a life in which pain is absent. From this perspective, "absence of pain" provides us a single term that describes our goal for life.

10. "Absence of pain" can be used to refer to either "the goal of life" or "any and all types of desirable feelings." Just like the word "Pleasure," which can refer either to "the goal of life" or "any and all types of desirable feeling," the term "absence of pain" has two meanings, depending on which perspective is being discussed.

11. "Absence of pain" does not mean or imply "absence of feeling" or "absence of pleasure." Instead, "absence of pain" refers to any number of pleasurable feelings from a discrete single experience of pleasure all the way up to a total life which is full of pleasures unaccompanied by pains. Therefore when we say that the goal of life is absence of pain, we are not following the gross error of Hieronymous of Rhodes and others who say that the goal of life has nothing to do with pleasure, we are following Epicurus and saying that the goal of life has everything to do with pleasure.

EDIT NOTE: The first version of this post had "experience" in the place of what is now listed as "feeling." This change was made to tighten up the wording - see posts 8 and 9 in this thread below.

Ok - In listening again to Episode 195, I think we had a great conversation. However I think there is a lot more to say, so as we start 196 i expect to take us back over some of the same points, especially:

When we consider the Letter to Menoeceus TOGETHER with PDO3, I would say that we have to be firm both on both the overall organism level and as to individual feelings. We're not talking ONLY about the limit of quantity of pleasure being the absence of pain, but we are talking about any individual desirable feeling as being called by either of the names "pleasure" OR "absence of pain - in other words that the terms are interchangeable.

This latter point is more clear from the letter to Menoeceus: "By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul.". This is not directed toward the limit of the quantity of pleasure, as in the first sentence of PD03, but to what is said in the second sentence.

Torquatus is hammering this point over and over, but we can't leave it ambiguous:

1 - The theoretical goal is 100% pleasure / 0% pain, because it's obvious nothing can be more complete than 100%. When looking at your whole life "in sum," the logical goal for your life as a whole is 100% pleasure / 0% pain. Of course we know it is canonical Epicurus that we sometimes choose pain when that leads to more pleasure or less overall pain, so the 100% / 0% goal is a "whole organism" perspective, and not an inflexible rule that says at every moment that your "prime directive" is to make sure you never experience a moment of pain. You look to all the consequences and you act accordingly.

AND -

2 - Every step along the way, in any discrete moment / part / feeling / experience of your life, what you are feeling / experiencing is registered as either pleasure or pain, and that there is no "neutral" or third or fourth or any other kind of experience that does not fall under pleasure or pain. If you are not feeling pain, what you are feeling is pleasure, full stop, end of need to look for any other high-level label. Any feeling that we find to be desirable is equally describing as "pleasure" or "absence of pain" at this high level of analysis.

We then to hammer home that analysis and then go back over why the example of Hieronymous of Rhodes illustastes this equivalence through the different positions that the two philosophers are taking.

If anyone has suggestions on ways to illustrate these points we will be glad to incorporate them into the upcoming podcast.

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I think your comment is on target - and I think that Frances Wright agreed with you and devoted a significant amount of her fictional reply of Epicurus to Zeno on the same point:

Quote from A Few Days In Athens Chapter 7

But, perhaps, though Zeno should allow this last effect of my philosophy to be probable, he will not approve it: his severe eye looks with scorn, not pity, on the follies and vices of the world. He would annihilate them, change them to their opposite virtues, or he would leave them to their full and natural sweep. ‘Be perfect, or be as you are. I allow of no degrees of virtue, so care not for the degrees of vice. Your ruin, if it must be, let it be in all its horrors, in all its vileness; let it attract no pity, no sympathy; let it be seen in all its naked deformity, and excite the full measure of its merited abhorrence and disgust.’ Thus says the sublime Zeno, who sees only man as he should be.

Thus says the mild Epicurus, who sees man as he is: — With all his weakness, all his errors, all his sins, still owning fellowship with him, still rejoicing in his welfare, and sighing over his misfortunes; I call from my gardens to the thoughtless, the headstrong, and the idle — ‘Where do ye wander, and what do ye seek? Is it pleasure? Behold it here. Is it ease? Enter and repose.’ Thus do I court them from the table of drunkenness and the bed of licentiousness: I gently awaken their sleeping faculties, and draw the veil from their understandings: — ‘My sons! do you seek pleasure? I seek her also. Let us make the search together. You have tried wine, you have tried love; you have sought amusement in reveling, and forgetfulness in indolence. You tell me you are disappointed: that your passions grew, even while you gratified them; your weariness increased even while you slept. Let us try again. Let us quiet our passions, not by gratifying, but subduing them; let us conquer our weariness, not by rest, but by exertion.’ Thus do I win their ears and their confidence. Step by step I lead them on. I lay open the mysteries of science; I expose the beauties of art; I call the graces and the muses to my aid; the song, the lyre, and the dance. Temperance presides at the repast; innocence at the festival; disgust is changed to satisfaction; listlessness to curiosity; brutality to elegance; lust gives place to love; Bacchanalian hilarity to friendship. Tell me not, Zeno, that the teacher is vicious who washes depravity from the youthful heart; who lays the storm of its passions, and turns all its sensibilities to good. I grant that I do not look to make men great, but to make men happy. To teach them, that in the discharge of their duties as sons, as husbands, as fathers, as citizens, lies their pleasure and their interest; — and when the sublime motives of Zeno shall cease to affect an enervated generation, the gentle persuasions of Epicurus shall still be heard and obeyed.

To sort of recap for a moment let me say this:

My major issue with the "absence of pain" analysis I see discussed by many modern commentators is that they either state or imply that there is some kind of "true pleasure" or "higher pleasure" that is the ultimate goal of life which is only experienced when every last drop of pain is eliminated. As a result they imply that the ordinary experience of pleasure in normal life as you get your life under control and gradually increase the predominance of pleasure in your experience from 50% to 75% to 90% to 99% ultimately is worthless, and that nothing is worth achieving until you cross that 100% pleasure / 0% pain threshold.

To coin a new term that no one has ever used before - that interpretation would make "the perfect the enemy of the good."

As I would say it now, PDO3 is making clear BOTH:

1 - That the theoretical goal is 100% pleasure / 0% pain, because it's obvious nothing can be more complete than 100%. When looking at your whole life "in sum," the logical goal for your life as a whole is 100% pleasure / 0% pain. Of course we know it is canonical Epicurus that we sometimes choose pain when that leads to more pleasure or less overall pain, so the 100% / 0% goal is a "whole organism" perspective, and not an inflexible rule that says at every moment that your "prime directive" is to make sure you never experience a moment of pain. You look to all the consequences and you act accordingly.

2 - That every step along the way, in any discrete moment / part / feeling / experience of your life, what you are feeling / experiencing is registered as either pleasure or pain, and that there is no "neutral" or third or fourth or any other kind of experience that does not fall under pleasure or pain. If you are not feeling pain, what you are feeling is pleasure, full stop, end of need to look for any other high-level label. Any feeling that we find to be desirable is equally describing as "pleasure" or "absence of pain" at this high level of analysis.

If those two points are accepted as clear, I think you eliminate most of the ill effects of all the "woo" that surrounds absence of pain, and you end up with a very practical and common sense framework that refutes all the ascetic or esoteric assertions that people who are averse to the word "pleasure" want to push. Accepting these two points as core Epicurus fleshes out what Epicurus is talking about in the letter to Menoeceus and makes clear he is not pointing in an ascetic direction, and that he has no intention of "writing out" the pleasures of "stimulation" from within the proper and full definition of pleasure, which includes both stimulation and all other activities of normal life which are not painful.

There's a lot further we can go in terms of practical advise and additional details, such as linking statements to the effect that life is desirable and that is a small man indeed who has many reasons for ending his life. We can then develop a similarly clear statement on the issue of being satisfied with what you have while at the same time wanting to continue living so long as you can expect a predominance of pleasure over pain.

But if points 1 and 2 above are not clear, I don't think it's productive to move further until we have confidence in those two.

Any thoughts?

Typo here Godfrey, or am I misreading the "desire, not desire"?

Quote from Godfrey

Another thought is that desire, not desire, is the reason to get out of bed. The desire to relieve a full bladder, to drink a cup of coffee, to accomplish such-and-such.

We are planning to interview Dr. Boeri in the next ten days for a special edition of the Lucretius Today podcast, and interview hopefully Dr. Aoiz in the Spring. If you have any comments or questions you would like us to incorporate in the interview, please comment in this thread. Here are our current thoughts for what the interview is going to cover:

How Apolitical Were The Epicureans?   | Academia Page | List of his articles | ORCID | Best Bio Information at Guggenheim

Academia Entry for the book.

Contents of the book: Theory and Practice In Epicurean Political Philosophy - Security, Justice, and Tranquility - Javier Aoiz and Marcelo Boeri

• Introduction
• 1 The Genealogy of Justice and Laws in Epicureanism
• 2 The City, the Natural Good and the Epicurean Promise of Security
• 3 Preconception, Justice and Usefulness in the Epicurean Contractual Political Model
• 4 Cicero, Plutarch and Lactantius as Readers of Epicureanism
• 5 The Epicurean Sage, the Issue of Justice and the Laws
• 6 The Greek Poleis, Rome and Its Illustrious Epicurean Citizens
• 7 Conclusions. Friendship, Law and Justice: The Epicureans and their Interest in Interpersonal Relations

Introduction

Today we welcome to our podcast Dr. Marcelo Boeri, who is a Professor of Ancient Philosophy at the Institute of Philosophy at the University of the Andes in Santiago, Chile. Born in Buenos Aires, he received a B.A. degree from the University of Buenos Aires. After receiving his Ph.D. from the University of Salvador in Argentina in 1995, he was appointed an Associate and, later, an Independent Researcher (1996-2003) at CONICET. He was also for a time an Associate Professor of Ancient Philosophy at the University of Comahue (1997-98) and a Lecturer in Greek Philosophy (2000-01) at the University of Litoral (2000-01) before joining the faculty of the University of the Andes in 2003.

In addition to his teaching responsibilities, Mr. Boeri has conducted extensive research on ancient philosophies and philosophers both at his home institutions and as a visiting researcher at Georgetown University (1994-95) and at Brown University (2007), as well as a Junior Fellow at Harvard’s Center for Hellenic Studies (1999-2000) and as a visiting researcher at that institution (2004).

His publication of more than fifty-five papers and critical reviews on Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, as well as his co-editorship of the philosophical journal Méthexis (since 2001) and of the International Plato Studies series (since 2007) have firmly established him as one of the world’s leading authorities on ancient philosophy. This reputation has garnered him invitations to lecturer from the University of Navarra, Spain (1999); Boston College (2003); the Pontifical Catholic University of Valparaíso, Chile (2005, 2007); Trinity College, Dublin (2007); and the University of Rome Tor Vergata (2007); among others.

His impressive publication list includes “The Stoics on Bodies and Incorporeals” (Review of Metaphysics, 54 [2001], 723-52) and “Socrates, Aristotle, and the Stoics on the apparent and real good” (Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, vol. XX, ed. J. J. Cleary and G. Gurtler [Leiden: Brill, 2004]); he provided the introduction, analysis, and translation from Latin and Greek for Los estoicos antiguos. Sobre la virtud y la felicidad (Ed. U. de Chile, 2004); he contributed the article “The Presence of Socrates and Aristotle in the Stoic Account of akrasia” in Metaphysics, Soul and Ethics. Themes from the Work of Richard Sorabji (Oxford UP, 2005), which Ricardo Salles edited; and he wrote Apariencia y realidad en el pensamiento griego. Investigaciones sobre aspectos epistemológicos, éticos y de teoría de la acción de algunas teorís morales de la antigüedad (Buenos Aires: Ed. Colihue, 2007).

Questions

1. Please tell us about your academic background or anything else about yourself that you think is relevant to an interest in Epicurus.
2. How did you first become interested in Epicurean philosophy?
3. What made you decide to take your interest in Epicurus' attitude toward engagement with society and politics to the level of writing a book about it?
4. You open your book with the statement: "At first glance, their programme seems to suggest – or, more precisely, to call for – a move away from society and politics, as suggested by the two famous Epicurean slogans ‘live unnoticed’ [λάθε βιώσας] and ‘do not participate in politics’ [μὴ πολιτεύσεσθαι]. This is how the adversaries of the Epicureans (mainly Cicero and Plutarch) presented their views in antiquity. But to distance oneself from contingent politics and society does not necessarily mean a solitary way of life or a lack of interest in society, the existence of which it certainly presupposes (or so we shall argue)." Can you summarize for us your conclusions about what Epicurus expected would in fact bet the proper way to approach these questions?
5. Let's first take "live unnoticed"....
6. And then take "do not participate in politics"
7. Epicurus complained in his own lifetime that his teachings were misunderstood and misrepresented. You have mentioned in your work that there is little contextual information about how the cliches about "living unknown" and "avoid politics" developed other than their use by opponents of Epicurus to criticize him. Can you tell us more about how we can use this same approach - that of examining the context in which misconceptions like this have arisen - to get a better understanding of Epicurean philosophy in general.
8. Another big problem you mention is that people like Cicero have "cherry-picked" the Epicurean materials and left out from the discussion major aspects of Epicurus' positions. For example you talk about how many of the Doctrines and sayings of Epicurus are devoted to discussing "security," and yet Cicero talks if those never existed. Do you have any thoughts or advice for how to use the information buried in the material left by anti-Epicureans such as Cicero or Plutarch to learn more about what Epicurus was really saying?
9. Often we run into people who have focused on reading Diogenes Laertius, Lucretius, and to some extent Cicero for their information about Epicurus, and many of those people are not familiar with the material in Plutarch. Could you give us your view of Plutarch and how best to approach his writings on Epicurus?
10. How do you see these issues as related to Epicurus' views on friendship, which Epicurus clearly stressed?
11. As we close can you let us know the best place for our listeners to find your book and to follow you and your work.

Among other things we want to talk about will be:

1. Upcoming Interview with Marcelo Boeri -- let us know if you have questions for him: Book: "Theory and Practice in Epicurean Political Philosophy" by Javier Aoiz & Marcelo Boeri
2. Continuing Podcast Attention to Cicero's Book Two of On Ends - again let us know if you have comments or questions re current or upcoming texts we are covering.
3. Upcoming Twentieth.
4. Current Forum Threads of Particular Interest.
5. Normal Catching Up With Friends.

Tonight!

Tonight at 8pm, we will cover Vatican Saying 34 & 35. Please join us. (Post here in this thread if you have never attended one of these sessions as we do have a vetting process for new participants.)

VS34. It is not so much our friends' help that helps us, as it is the confidence of their help.

VS35. We must not spoil the enjoyment of the blessings we have by pining for those we have not, but rather reflect that these too are among the things desirable. ^[13]

Isn't Marcion the one who thought ONLY Paul was worth reading, or so I have that reversed and he was against Paul and preferred the others?