Posts by Cassius

Quote from Little Rocker

But then a complete perception of an object would involve a faculty of intellect, right, not only sensory organs?

From my point of view, a "complete perception" of an object would be more a function of repeated observations, from different perspectives, at different distances,using all of the faculties of perception, but there is where I would draw the line, and as far as the process of drawing those observations into an opinion that is right or wrong, that part i would classify as "intellectual" and therefore no longer "perception."

Quote from Little Rocker

So if there is a 'criterion' of horse, then it seems to me that it must depend on thought and memory. And I admit that I think that if Epicurus doesn't think that, then I'm not sure his view is plausible.

This is the point in the conversation where I go with DeWitt, who argues that in regard to concrete objects to which we are exposed over time we will indeed form a concept (mental picture) of a horse, and then use that concept in the future to apply the same "word" to new instances of four-legged animals when we see them, to form an opinion as to whether those animals or are or not horses. This is what Laertius hammers home, but in my view this is describing what is done *after* the five senses and feelings and anticipations have relayed their input to the mind. DeWitt's position seems to me to be that Laertius is confusing the process of "working with" proleptic input with the more important issue of "forming" proleptic input, and that the process of forming proleptic input to the mind is completely pre-rational, pre-conceptual, and actually is present as a faculty and in operation *before* we ever see our first horse, just as the eyes are operational and functional before we ever use them to see (and then in the mind) to classify anything at all.

Quote from Little Rocker

It seems to me that Epicurus thinks opinions can be true or false, and not all opinions are about sensations. Sensations don't have to confirm an opinion for the opinion to count as true.

As to "not all opinions are about sensations" I would agree with that. We can definitely have opinions about opinions (adding layers upon layers there). And I would say that there is prolectic involvement in the assembling of opinions about opinions. But that proleptic invoilvement would not involve telling us which opinions are true, but would function more on the order of recognizing in the first place that arithmetic has some relationship to calculus about which to take notice.

In discussing today the issue of what Lucretius means about the gods not having a pattern by which to create the universe, it seemed to me that Lucretius should not be interpreted so much as taking the position that gods cannot create planets and the like from existing materials (I would expect Epicurus to take the position that they can in fact do things that we will be capable of one day). Rather, it seems to me that the emphasis is on that no one, gods or human, can do anything without their minds having the disposition to assemble experiences into more complicated constructs (the anthropomorphizing Don mentioned earlier today being an example). I would therefore see the example as implying that both gods and men must rely on Nature to provide the disposition and ability for a mind to construct abstractions, but the faculty of prolepsis is not any single abstraction which is formed, but the *capability* to form abstractions in the first place.

I would say that the meaning is more likely to be that were it not for the faculty of anticipations, the raw data presented by (1) the five senses (2) the feelings of pain and pleasure, and (3) previous anticipations would never be assembled into any abstractions whatsoever. To me, that distinction keeps the focus on prolepsis being a pre-rational, pre-cognitive faculty, and yet still gives it an important place in the formation and use of concepts.

Quote from Don

They're both pre-rational and things upon which reason works, but they're not the same.

If they were exactly the same and did exactly the same thing, they wouldn't be separate things!

I would say our best lead on all this is from Velleius, and I do not see in these Latin words the necessity to conclude that nature has implanted any "ideas" of the gods at all. Seems to me this can be read with connotations of "notions" that are not ideas at all, and that people are forcing an "idea" or concept template onto this because of their own expectation to find it.

There's another excerpt below that one where the Latin needs to be parsed ...

Quote from Don

that you don't think "gods are blessed and incorruptible" cannot be the content (so to speak) of a "a pre-conceptual / pre-opinion faculty"

Right - I don't think that *any* "preconceptual - preopinion faculty" can have "content" of any kind -- the absence of "content" is exactly the point of it being pre-conceptual.

I think a lot of the problem we have is that centuries of conventional commentators have been trying to force Epicurus' statements into boxes that are not appropriate. And on the prolepsis, I think the main error is equating prolepsis with "concepts" in the first place. In fairness to them, I think what Diogenes Laertius is talking about is the conceptual reasoning process, that does in fact occur and is in fact very important, but that "prolepsis" is a process that precedes that stage.

By forcing the conversation to be about conceptual reasoning, which I would say is another process entirely, taking the input FROM the faculties and processing it, the commentators are going astray and not focusing on the "mechanism" of prolepsis, which should be treated just like eyes and ears and the rest.

As for what Epicurean style gods are, I think we are in the same multiple explanations boat we are in in regard to the stars and other phenomena that are too far away to be certain about. I don't gather that Epicurus obsessed about getting more detail about stars after he developed his non-supernatural explanations of them, and I doubt he obsessed about the details of the gods either.

I don' think we are too far apart at all. If on anything, only possibly in the question of how firmly we should expect to find very smart beings in other parts of the universe. I see that as so firm as to a virtual certainty, only waiting on confirmation through space travel and more advanced technology.

At the moment I would tend to think the way Godfrey is going is most likely. It seems likely that prolepsis is, like the eyes or other senses, a pre-conceptual / pre-opinion faculty that is neither right nor wrong. In contrast, even the assertions that "gods are blessed" or "gods are incorruptible" are chock full of conceptual right/wrong content.

So at this point it seems to me that those statements, which are "right" from Epicurus' point of view as stated by Epicurus to Menoeceus and by Velleius to Cicero, are better thought as "based in part on proleptic input" (which probably goes for all 'statements' of any kind that are recognizable to us) rather than "are prolepsis" or "being proleptic" themselves.

More likely than saying that our brains are stamped at birth "gods exist and are incorruptible and blessed," he's saying that our brains are stamped at birth with an operating system that, when exposed to certain experiences, are disposed to "anthropomorphize and to engage in teleological thinking." The results of that process are deemable to be true and consistent with all evidence only when we conclude that gods are blessed and imperishable, which means that they don't have anything to do with us or earth (that would indicate weakness). To reason otherwise contradicts our physics and all other repeatable and verifiable sensory observations.

However in my view there is no conflict at all with concluding that the evidence we do have (including infinite and eternal universe, isonomia, nature never makes only a single thing of a kind) we should expect to exist beings which do have physical reality and are totally happy and deathless. Reasoning in that way provides at least one plausible "explanation" of the phenomena that allows us to dismiss fears of supernatural causation.

Reasoning in that way I see no reason to be concerned that such theories as Don mentions above would "violate Epicurean othodoxy." The only way they would do so would be if "orthodoxy" required us to jump directly from "human ideas of divinity stem from mental phenomena" to "no superior forms of life exist elsewhere in the universe."

To me such a conclusion is a total non sequitur and goes against all scientific observations about life being natural and not supernatural. To reason that way seems to me to be a very basic error that Epicurus would and did reject. The fact that a huge number of people otherwise favorable to Epicurus seem inclined to reason in exactly that way (and conclude that Epicurean style gods do not in fact exist) is to me a defect in the reasoning of those making that assertion, not in the reasoning of Epicurus.

Here is something we've been needing for a while:

A Complete Episode Guide To the Lucretius Today Podcast

Over time I hope to get this expanded to include more detailed notes on each episode, but in the meantime we now have a single page listing of each episode (linked to where it can be found), date of release, and title.

Just for future planning purposes, after a while here in "General Discussion" we'll move this thread to the Philodemus section. I'll probably also link it or create a version of it for the "Justice" section as well, probably to point up the "Typology Chart" that Bryan linked above, so we can have a "forms of government" discussion. Such discussion is fully appropriate given its discussion in the texts, and it won't violate the "no politics" rule so long as we stay clear of discussion modern historical particulars that still evoke lots of emotion.

Given commonalities with parts of Aristotle at some future point it's probably worth citing to the section of Aristotle where the typology is explained, and then we can compare the full discussion there to the surviving Epicurean material and look for parallels / contrasts.

There are a lot of interesting statements in this Rhetoric that should be explored but it all seems kind of disjointed due to the fragmentation so we'll have to pull it out carefully.

Note - We'll want to correlate that with the Boeri book: Interview With Dr. Marcelo Boeri: Theory and Practice In Epicurean Political Philosophy

The "number of shapes" question and the others questioned should now be updated. Thanks all and please continue to report questions.

It would be good to collect references like this and compare them with for example Aristotle. Didn't he have some kind of listing of types of government according to how large was the ruling class, and he also had a classification of good and bad forms of each (?).

But the main thing is that it would be helpful to collect the sources, including the reference to Philodemus being sympathetic to Caesar.

I have these two links:

v.23 (1919-1920) - Transactions of the Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences - Biodiversity Heritage Library

Philodemi Rhetorica (trans. Hubbell) OPTIMIZED : Hubbell : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

Philodemus - On Rhetoric - Translated by Hubbell BEST COPY

archive.org

Here's the "worst form of government" --- https://www.biodiversitylibrary.org/item/32303#page/385/mode/1up

Martin: Think there is a better way to word that? Simply change it to "Why do atoms move?" I need to look back at the way it is worded in Lucretius and the letter to Herodotus.

Yes indeed. I am thinking also that with Youtube processing it speech-to-text, that text will generate a lot more hits than previously.

Over the last ten days with help from Remus and others, we've added a significant number of new quiz questions to the quiz section. There are three new basic sets of questions on Epicurean Canonics, Physics, and Ethics, and the "Norman DeWitt's Epicurus and His Philosophy" quiz is also new. I think most of the questions are pretty good, and I am confident that the answers are pretty close to correct, but before we let these get too far out into the wild it would be helpful if our regulars go through these and see if they disagree with any of the question/answer combinations.

I am learning that developing multiple-choice questions is something of an art, and we'll continue to appreciate volunteer assistance for developing new ones.

For the moment, please help us check out the latest quizzes here:

Welcome To the EpicureanFriends Quiz Page! - Epicureanfriends.com

www.epicureanfriends.com

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One more cite - this is the Lucretius1743 edition, in the 100's

Nor are you to believe that the sacred mansions of the gods are placed in any parts of this world of ours, for the nature of the gods is so subtle, and at so remote a distance from our senses, that it can scarce be apprehended by the mind. Since therefore it cannot be touched or felt by our hands, it can touch nothing that it is the object of our senses, for nothing has a power to touch that is incapable of being touched itself. For this reason the abodes of the gods must be far different from ours; they must be subtle, and answerable to their own nature. But the truth of this I shall more fully prove in another place.

Issues I want to be sure to include in this episode:

1. Is "pattern" correct usage in the context of prolepsis? Is the Latin "exemplum" (see Lucretius below)? Is "example" or "notion" a better term? Does "pattern" imply intelligent designer?
2. Is "recognition" correct usage?
3. Are any "patterns" innate at birth? (beavers and dams?)
4. Relationship of "patterns" and "images"
5. Does the mind itself create patterns?
6. Lucretius 5:181, see post 40 above: [181-Bailey] Further, how was there first implanted in the gods a pattern for the begetting of things, yea, and the concept of man, so that they might know and see in their mind what they wished to do, or in what way was the power of the first-beginnings ever learnt, or what they could do when they shifted their order one with the other, if nature did not herself give a model of creation? For so many first-beginnings of things in many ways, driven on by blows from time everlasting until now, and moved by their own weight, have been wont to be borne on, and to unite in every way, and essay everything that they might create, meeting one with another, that it is no wonder if they have fallen also into such arrangements, and have passed into such movements, as those whereby this present sum of things is carried on, ever and again replenished.
   1. Martin Ferguson Smith - Furthermore, how was a model for the creation of things implanted in the gods? How did they obtain the conception of human beings, so that they might know and perceive in their minds what they wished to produce? And how did they ever recognize the capacity of the primary particles and the potential effect of their different arrangements, if nature herself did not furnish them with a pattern for creation? The fact is that from time everlasting countless elements, impelled by blows and by their 190 own weight, have never ceased to move in manifold ways, making all kinds of unions and experimenting with everything they could combine to create. 17 It is not surprising therefore that they have at last fallen into such arrangements, and acquired such movements, as those whereby this aggregate of things is maintained and constantly renewed.
   2. MFS Note 16 - 16. 181-186: The same argument is used in 1046 1049, where Lucr. is maintaining that language cannot have been an artificial invention. The point is that neither the gods nor the inventors of language can have had a conception of what they wanted to create, if nature had not already created a world or language that they could use as a model. The argument depends on an important principle of Epicurean epistemology, which is that repeated reception of sense impressions creates in the mind a general conception of each class of things, and that without these conceptions, to which further sense impressions arc referred, scientific knowledge would be impossible. On (pre)conceptions as a criterion of truth, see p. xxv.
   3. MFS Note page xxv - "Sensation by itself is irrational and incapable of memory, but the repeated reception of sense impressions creates in the mind general
      conceptions or all classes or things. Both in Greek and in Latin these general conceptions arc often (though not by Lucretius) called "preconceptions," because, once created in the mind, they remain there, and further sense impressions are referred to them for testing and identification. However, it is imp0l1ant to understand that the (pre)eonceptions are not innate, but derived from sensation. Indeed it is because they are derived from sensation that they arc valid. Without them, memory, thought, and knowledge would be impossible, and they are the second criterion of truth.
7. 

Welcome to Episode 235 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com.

For our new listeners, let me remind you of several ground rules for both our podcast and our forum.

First: Our aim is to bring you an accurate presentation of classical Epicurean philosophy as the ancient Epicureans understood it.

Second: We won't be talking about modern political issues in this podcast. How you apply Epicurus in your own life is of course entirely up to you. We call this approach "Not Neo-Epicurean, But Epicurean." Epicurean philosophy is a philosophy of its own, it's not the same as Stoicism, Humanism, Buddhism, Taoism, Atheism, Libertarianism or Marxism - it is unique and must be understood on its own, not in terms of any conventional modern morality.

Third: One of the most important things to keep in mind is that the Epicureans often used words very differently than we do today. To the Epicureans, Gods were not omnipotent or omniscient, so Epicurean references to "Gods" do not mean at all the same thing as in major religions today. In the Epicurean theory of knowledge, all sensations are true, but that does not mean all opinions are true, but that the raw data reported by the senses is reported without the injection of opinion, as the opinion-making process takes place in the mind, where it is subject to mistakes, rather than in the senses. In Epicurean ethics, "Pleasure" refers not ONLY to sensory stimulation, but also to every experience of life which is not felt to be painful. The classical texts show that Epicurus was not focused on luxury, like some people say, but neither did he teach minimalism, as other people say. Epicurus taught that all experiences of life fall under one of two feelings - pleasure and pain - and those feelings -- and not gods, idealism, or virtue - are the guides that Nature gave us by which to live. More than anything else, Epicurus taught that the universe is not supernatural in any way, and that means there's no life after death, and any happiness we'll ever have comes in THIS life, which is why it is so important not to waste time in confusion.

Today we are continuing to review the Epicurean sections of Cicero's "On the Nature of The Gods," as presented by the Epicurean spokesman Velleius, beginning at the end of Section 10.

For the main text we are using primarily the Yonge translation, available here at Archive.org. The text which we include in these posts is available here. We will also refer to the public domain version of the Loeb series, which contains both Latin and English, as translated by H. Rackham.

Additional versions can be found here:

• Frances Brooks 1896 translation at Online Library of Liberty
• Lacus Curtius Edition (Rackham)
• PDF Of Loeb Edition at Archive.org by Rackham
• Gutenberg.org version by CD Yonge 

A list of arguments presented will be maintained here.

Today's Text

XVII. Here, then, you see the foundation of this question clearly laid; for since it is the constant and universal opinion of mankind, independent of education, custom, or law, that there are Gods, it must necessarily follow that this knowledge is implanted in our minds, or, rather, innate in us. That opinion respecting which there is a general agreement in universal nature must infallibly be true; therefore it must be allowed that there are Gods; for in this we have the concurrence, not only of almost all philosophers, but likewise of the ignorant and illiterate. It must be also confessed that the point is established that we have naturally this idea, as I said before, or prenotion, of the existence of the Gods. As new things require new names, so that prenotion was called πρόληψις by Epicurus; an appellation never used before. On the same principle of reasoning, we think that the Gods are happy and immortal; for that nature which hath assured us that there are Gods has likewise imprinted in our minds the knowledge of their immortality and felicity; and if so, what Epicurus hath declared in these words is true: “That which is eternally happy cannot be burdened with any labor itself, nor can it impose any labor on another; nor can it be influenced by resentment or favor: because things which are liable to such feelings must be weak and frail.” We have said enough to prove that we should worship the Gods with piety, and without superstition, if that were the only question.

For the superior and excellent nature of the Gods requires a pious adoration from men, because it is possessed of immortality and the most exalted felicity; for whatever excels has a right to veneration, and all fear of the power and anger of the Gods should be banished; for we must understand that anger and affection are inconsistent with the nature of a happy and immortal being. These apprehensions being removed, no dread of the superior powers remains. To confirm this opinion, our curiosity leads us to inquire into the form and life and action of the intellect and spirit of the Deity.

XVIII. With regard to his form, we are directed partly by nature and partly by reason. All men are told by nature that none but a human form can be ascribed to the Gods; for under what other image did it ever appear to any one either sleeping or waking? and, without having recourse to our first notions, reason itself declares the same; for as it is easy to conceive that the most excellent nature, either because of its happiness or immortality, should be the most beautiful, what composition of limbs, what conformation of lineaments, what form, what aspect, can be more beautiful than the human? Your sect, Lucilius (not like my friend Cotta, who sometimes says one thing and sometimes another), when they represent the divine art and workmanship in the human body, are used to describe how very completely each member is formed, not only for convenience, but also for beauty. Therefore, if the human form excels that of all other animal beings, as God himself is an animated being, he must surely be of that form which is the most beautiful. Besides, the Gods are granted to be perfectly happy; and nobody can be happy without virtue, nor can virtue exist where reason is not; and reason can reside in none but the human form; the Gods, therefore, must be acknowledged to be of human form; yet that form is not body, but something like body; nor does it contain any blood, but something like blood. Though these distinctions were more acutely devised and more artfully expressed by Epicurus than any common capacity can comprehend; yet, depending on your understanding, I shall be more brief on the subject than otherwise I should be. Epicurus, who not only discovered and understood the occult and almost hidden secrets of nature, but explained them with ease, teaches that the power and nature of the Gods is not to be discerned by the senses, but by the mind; nor are they to be considered as bodies of any solidity, or reducible to number, like those things which, because of their firmness, he calls Στερέμνια; but as images, perceived by similitude and transition. As infinite kinds of those images result from innumerable individuals, and centre in the Gods, our minds and understanding are directed towards and fixed with the greatest delight on them, in order to comprehend what that happy and eternal essence is.

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Episode 234 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. This week we deal with Marcus Aurelius' views of fate and the gods, and we discuss the canonical basis for the Epicurean view of divinity.

For those of you who follow channels on Youtube, please note that the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available in full as a Youtube Channel:

We're still all audio, of course, but Youtube has "ingested" (their term) the full podcast archive, so now those who use Youtube as their main media center will be able to subscribe and listen to old episodes and follow new episodes as they are released directly in Youtube.

It also looks like closed captioning is operational, so that means Youtube has processed the audio into text, which should make the content of the episodes more "findable" than before.

There may be some hiccups as the "ingestion" settles in, but I've tested it briefly and it looks to be fully operational.

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