Posts by Cassius

I just rewatched the Matthew Lampert video above, and I was impressed all over again. He does a very good job explaining how the real issue is what it means to "know" something without getting sidetracked on other issues.

I agree it's sophistry, but it does raise deep questions about "what's the starting point for how you are sure you know anything." Plato and the rest apparently took it very seriously, and I guess I can understand why they did, and therefore why Epicurus and the rest had to treat it later on.

Presumably this is also where the Academy descended later into rank skepticism, because they didn't have a better answer to this than "recollection," which very few accept. Apparently that's why both Stoics and Epicureans proposed similar but different solutions.

Also, I see that lots of the Youtube videos spend a lot of time talking about the specific example of "virtue," as if there's something unique about virtue, and that wastes a lot of time. The real issue applies to knowing *anything*, and whether what you think is the truth about something is the full trial, the partial truth, or what. It's the old question about what is "truth?" Do we know truth by example, by definition, or by what "test of truth?"

We need a clear and concise presentation of the problem Plato thought had been identified (and apparently this didn't start with him) and then how prolepsis helped Epicurus respond to the perceived dilemma, along the lines of the article referenced in the first, without falling into skepticism himself.

So far this video by Matthew Lampert is the best I have found setting forth Meno's issue. There is also a Greg Sadler video on this one, and I will link it below, but I don't consider it as good as the first one. I'll keep looking for a better video that sets out the basic issue.

Matthew Lampert: if you only watch one video, watch this one:

Greg Sadler:

Just for reference below is the rest of that article (the first part). The "Agreements" section is in the context of this list of disagreements which comes first. If one were to take the "Agreements" out of context one would be get a very inaccurate picture of how deeply the two viewpoints diverge -- which I would say could hardly be greater in terms of overall outlook on the nature of the universe and the nature of the best life for human beings.

Quote

EPICUREANISM, a philosophy of adjustment to the social changes after *Alexander the Great (336–323), founded by Epicurus, 342/1–270 B.C.E., "the most revered and the most reviled of all founders of thought in the Greco-Roman world" (De Witt). Recent scholarship sees in it a "bridge" to certain rabbinic and Christian moods. Epicurus taught freedom from fear and desire through knowledge as the natural and pleasurable life. He endorsed religious observance but denied earthly involvement of the perfect gods and with it providence, presage, punishment, and penitential prayer. The transformation of Epicureanism into a competitive sect celebrating Epicurus as "savior" increased the already existing opposition to it. Rhetorical literature falsely accused Epicurus of materialistic hedonism. Complaints of Epicurean dogmatism, "beguiling speech" (Col. 2:4), and compelling argumentation (of Avot 2:14 "…[know] what to answer the Epicurean") are frequently heard. Rabbinic condemnation reflects knowledge of Greco-Roman rhetoric, experiences with individuals and centers (Gadara, Gaza, Caesarea), and, possibly, the favoritism shown to Epicureanism by *Antiochus Epiphanes and *Hadrian. "Epicurean" became thus a byword for "deviance" – ranging from disrespect to atheism – in Philo, Josephus, and rabbinism alike (see *Apikoros). An early unexpanded version of the "four who entered 'Paradise'" (Ḥag. 14b) may once have signified Epicurus' school ("the garden"), since it fits Akiva's past, Ben Azzai's celibacy and many Epicurean sayings, Elisha b. Avuyah's heterodoxy, and Ben Zoma's gnosticism (Epicureanism and Gnosticism were equated also by the Church Fathers). Akiva's "mystical" admonition (Ḥag. 14b) could easily have been a parody on the "apocalyptic"-enthusiastic style of the Epicureans (parallel parody H. Usener, Epicurea, fragm. 364; Gen. R. 1:5, Theodor-Albeck, p. 2 mentions "nothing from nothing"; Mid. Ps. to 1:22 the "automatic" universe; cf. Jos., Ant., 10:280).

Some background on Meno's Paradox

A Puzzle about Definitions

• Socrates has told us he knows how to reject faulty definitions. But how does he know when he has succeeded in finding the right definition? Meno raises an objection to the entire definitional search in the form of (what has been called) “Meno’s Paradox,” or “The Paradox of Inquiry” (Meno 80d-e).

  The argument can be shown to be sophistical, but Plato took it very seriously. This is obvious, since his response to it is to grant its central claim: that you can’t come to know something that you didn’t already know. That is, that inquiry never produces new knowledge, but only recapitulates things already known. This leads to the famous Doctrine of Recollection.

An Objection to Inquiry

The argument known as “Meno’s Paradox” can be reformulated as follows:

1. If you know what you’re looking for, inquiry is unnecessary.
2. If you don’t know what you’re looking for, inquiry is impossible.

3. Therefore, inquiry is either unnecessary or impossible.

   An implicit premise: Either you know what you’re looking for or you don’t know what you’re looking for.

And this is a logical truth. Or is it? Only if “you know what you’re looking for” is used unambiguously in both disjuncts.

We definitely need to keep working on making prolepsis / anticipations understandable to normal people of ordinary education. In reading a 2023 work which Matteng brought to our attention, I want to highlight the following passage passage to the effect that both Epicureans and Stoics looked to (their own) view of PROLEPSIS as the answer to "the Meno Problem."

We haven't yet gotten to the Epicurean sections of Cicero's Academica, but that's on the horizon for our podcast. By the time we get there we are going to want to have developed our understanding of what the Meno problem is, and how Epicurus addressed it using the concept of prolepsis / anticipations.

In his 2023 article The Elaboration of Prolepsis Between Epicurus and the Stoics, Jean-Baptiste Gourinat states:

Quote

In both schools, preconception is also a preliminary tool for research, discussion and intelligence, as explicitly said for Epicurus by Diog. Laert. X 33 and Cic. DND I 43. 83 Similar views are attributed to the Stoics by Cicero in Acad. II 21 and Acad. I 42, which was seen as a parallel answer to what was coined as the Meno problem:

That the problem advanced in the Meno, namely whether search and discovery are possible (εἰ οἷόν τε ζητεῖν καὶ εὑρίσκειν), leads to a real impasse. For we do not, on the one hand, try to find out things we know –a futile proceeding– nor, on the other, things we do not know, since even if we come across them we do not recognize them: they might be anything. The Peripatetics introduced the conception of “potential intuition” but the origin of our difficulty was actual knowing and not knowing. Even if we grant the existence of a potential intuition, the difficulty remains unchanged. How does this intuition operate? It must be either on what it knows or on what it does not know. The Stoics make the “natural conceptions” responsible (οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς τὰς φυσικὰς ἐννοίας αἰτιῶνται). If these are potential, we shall use the same argument as against the Peripatetics; and if they are actual, why do we search for what we know? And if we use them as a starting-point for a search for other things that we do not know, how do we search for what we do not know? The Epicureans introduce “preconceptions”(οἱ δὲ Ἐπικούρειοι τὰς προλήψεις); if they mean these to be “articulated” (διηρθρωμένας), search is unnecessary; if “unarticulated”(ἀδιαρθρώτους), how do we extend our search beyond our preconceptions, to look for something of which we do not possess a preconception? (Plutarch, fr. 215f Sandbach = Extracts from the Chaeronean)

Footnote 83 is: " See also Sextus Emp. AM I 57 and XI 21: “according to the wise Epicurus, it is not possible to inquire (ζητεῖν) nor to come to an impasse (ἀπορεῖν) without a preconception”.

This post needs to be the beginning of an extensive discussion of what "The Meno Problem" was to Plato, the presumptions that underlay Plato's view of the issue, and how Epicurus addressed the problem with his innovative use of the term "prolepsis." Getting a grip on the original problem should go a long way toward understanding how Epicurus was using the term prolepsis and what he expected us to understand about it. This isn't rocket science - the problem posed by Plato appears to be relatively straightforward, and the answer given by Epicurus should be equally straightforward.

Gourinat continues this way:

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So Epicureans and Stoics seem to have resorted to “natural conceptions” or “preconceptions” as a solution to the Meno problem, 84 alternative to the Platonic doctrine of the reminiscence, and even to the actualization of potential knowledge in the Peripatetic school. Zeno’s criticism of Plato’s theory of ideas was famous, 85 and he could hardly have adopted one of its corollaries: recollection. It is striking that both Epicurus and the Stoics seem to have borrowed something from some empiricist passages of Plato: the wax analogy in the Theaetetus in the case of the Stoics and the book simile in the Philebus in the case of the Epicureans. In the Theatetus, however, Plato explicitly argues that the wax simile is not a suffi cient expla nation, since these empiricist views cannot explain intellectual errors, especially in the case of mathematics. Th us, the Hellenistic philosophers needed to account for the origins of our knowledge in cases where empirical concept-formation was not a sufficient explanation. According to Plutarch, Chrysippus as well as Epicurus also needed to explain what we start from, when we want to pursue an enquiry: without a preconception of something, we cannot search for it since we would not even know what we are looking for.

I suspect that all of us are not going to find ourselves in full agreement with the way that Gourinat ultimately unwinds the issues, because (as Gourinat says himself) he sees contradictions in Epicurus' view of prolepsis as a criteria of truth. But regardless of that it's clear that we need to go back and reconstruct the question and the possible answers.

In this context I will close the post with Diogenes of Oinoanda's Fragment 5 (Martin Ferguson Smith), which I think is related. We need to ask not only "Who will choose to seek what he can never find?" but also "Who will choose to seek, or who can understand, something of which he has no prior notion whatsoever?"

Fr. 5
[Others do not] explicitly [stigmatise] natural science as unnecessary, being ashamed to acknowledge [this], but use another means of discarding it. For, when they assert that things are inapprehensible, what else are they saying than that there is no need for us to pursue natural science? After all, who will choose to seek what he can never find? Now Aristotle and those who hold the same Peripatetic views as Aristotle say that nothing is scientifically knowable, because things are continually in flux and, on account of the rapidity of the flux, evade our apprehension. We on the other hand acknowledge their flux, but not its being so rapid that the nature of each thing [is] at no time apprehensible by sense-perception. And indeed [in no way would the upholders of] the view under discussion have been able to say (and this is just what they do [maintain] that [at one time] this is [white] and this black, while [at another time] neither this is [white nor] that black, [if] they had not had [previous] knowledge of the nature of both white and black.

Quote from briefvacation

Thanks for the response, you got to the core of what I was asking which was: is understanding truth an end in itself, or a way of getting to pleasure.

It certainly seems like a chicken and egg situation, but presumably that's why there are several branches of philosophy that need to be brought into consistency to reinforce each other. You can stake your flag on choosing to listen to nature, and realize that pleasure/pain is the only faculty given by nature directly for choice and avoidance, but you can't be truly confident of that conclusion in intellectual discussions until you have a consistent physics and epistemology. And given the way the world is a constant bombardment of conflicting opinions, in the end most people find it is important to them to be able to justify that position using reason and an understanding of the way the universe really works.

Thank you for responding to the welcome thread briefvacation!

I you are 18 you are certainly not too young. If you are sincerely interested in Epicurus and here to learn more about Epicurean philosophy, then we'd certainly like to hear from you with any questions you may have.

Welcome Sulaiman.... Please review our introductory materials as contained in your Welcome message here:

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Welcome Sulaimanaarbi

Welcome sulaimanaarbi

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Cassius

October 31, 2024 at 12:00 PM

If you have any questions please respond to that thread, tell us abou your interest in Epicurus, and we'll do our best to answer!

Welcome sulaimanaarbi

There is one last step to complete your registration:

All new registrants must post a response to this message here in this welcome thread (we do this in order to minimize spam registrations).

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Please say "Hello" by introducing yourself, tell us what prompted your interest in Epicureanism and which particular aspects of Epicureanism most interest you, and/or post a question.

This forum is the place for students of Epicurus to coordinate their studies and work together to promote the philosophy of Epicurus. Please remember that all posting here is subject to our Community Standards / Rules of the Forum our Not Neo-Epicurean, But Epicurean and our Posting Policy statements and associated posts.

Please understand that the leaders of this forum are well aware that many fans of Epicurus may have sincerely-held views of what Epicurus taught that are incompatible with the purposes and standards of this forum. This forum is dedicated exclusively to the study and support of people who are committed to classical Epicurean views. As a result, this forum is not for people who seek to mix and match some Epicurean views with positions that are inherently inconsistent with the core teachings of Epicurus.

All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from other viewpoints, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit by our community of happy living through the principles of Epicurean philosophy.

One way you can be most assured of your time here being productive is to tell us a little about yourself and your background in reading Epicurean texts. It would also be helpful if you could tell us how you found this forum, and any particular areas of interest that you have which would help us make sure that your questions and thoughts are addressed.

Please check out our Getting Started page.

We have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.

"Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Norman DeWitt

The Biography of Epicurus by Diogenes Laertius. This includes the surviving letters of Epicurus, including those to Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoeceus.

"On The Nature of Things" - by Lucretius (a poetic abridgement of Epicurus' "On Nature"

"Epicurus on Pleasure" - By Boris Nikolsky

The chapters on Epicurus in Gosling and Taylor's "The Greeks On Pleasure."

Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section

Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section

The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation

A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright

Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus

Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)

"The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially the section on katastematic and kinetic pleasure which explains why ultimately this distinction was not of great significance to Epicurus.

It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read. Feel free to join in on one or more of our conversation threads under various topics found throughout the forum, where you can to ask questions or to add in any of your insights as you study the Epicurean philosophy.

And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.

(If you have any questions regarding the usage of the forum or finding info, please post any questions in this thread).

Welcome to the forum!

In my skimming this work so far, the article I have found most interesting is "The Elaboration of Prolepsis Between Epicurus and The Stoics: A Common Challenge To Innatism?" by Jean-Baptist Gourinat.

The article contains very useful background and a chart comparing uses of prolepsis by Epicurus and the Stoics. He also draws together the evidence that Epicurus and Zeno were not so much at war with each other but that much of the war with the stoics started with Chrysippus.

So far I think he tends to take a different approach than several of us here, in holding (underlined) that "In other words, preconceptions are mental images stored and engraved in the mind, but they also include a conception of what something is, they are the basis for human knowledge and recognition of universal objects, and they are naturally formed in the mind, without being taught."

But regardless of that, he draws a distinction between Diogenes Laertius and Cicero that I think most of us recognize:

Quote

However, there is a difference between the two accounts, sinc e Diogenes Laertius gives examples of preconceptions of natural kinds (i.e., human, horse, or cow) and describes a concept formation that is the result of sense-perception and memory. Cicero by contrast does not refer to the preconceptions of natural kinds but to the preconceptions of the gods, and he does not say that we form this preconception by perception and memory, but that we have an “inborn” (insita uel potius innata) knowledge that nature has “engraved in our minds” (insculpsit in mentibus):

quote omitted... then

Quote

Here, Cicero does not explicitly attribute to Epicurus the claim that we are born and come to life with such a preconception of the gods already implanted in our minds at the very moment of our birth. However, he uses such words as insitus and innatus that point to an innate knowledge, not depending on any sense experience. 41 He also insists that nature engraves preconceptions in our mind, not memory. And indeed it is clear that, whatever maybe the process of formation of our notions of the gods, they cannot come from repeatedly seeing gods as we see humans, horses, and cows and by memorizing the impressions we have of such natural kinds. Thus with the description given by Cicero, it seems that the preconceptions of the gods is formed quite differently from the empiricist way by which we form a preconception of a cow. It is implanted by nature and does not seem to have an empirical origin. It is not the case in Cicero that the prolepsis is built on memory nor in such a way that “the senses give the lead” (προηγουμένων τῶν αἰσθήσεων). It remains that both kinds of preconceptions are sketches or delineation of things, engraved in the mind and preliminary to enquiry and discussion.

I wrote my last post in a hurry and probably i should go further. Earlier today I had been reading David Hume's "Dialogues on Natural religion, and one of the characters in that Dialogue was a strong mystic who was focused on suffering in life as the main reason for being concerned about "gods." I observe over time that there is a significant tendency in some circles to focus on "escaping pain" rather than "obtaining pleasure," and even though in Epicurean terms those end up being the same thing, anyone who does not think strictly in Epicurean terms (and that is 99.9% of people today) will not realize that since there are only two categories of feelings, "absence of pain" measures out to have precisely the same meaning as "pleasure." Rather than knowing Epicurus' equivalency of terms, they tend to think that he is prioritizing organizing one's life to 'minimize pain" rather than to "maximize pleasure." Again those turn out to be the same thing in Epicurean terms, but ask any Buddhist or Stoic or someone else who is focused on the idea that "life is suffering" or that "suffering is good" and they are likely to think that you mean something else.

Epicurus clearly focuses on the view that life is short, and only life gives an opportunity for pleasure, and that nature's calling is to maximize pleasure. Nature gives us huge numbers of ways to do that, and given Epicurus' expansive way of viewing pleasure, the wise man will always have more reason for joy than for vexation.

So that distinction between "running from pain" vs "pursuing pleasure, even when some pain is required" is what I wanted to emphasize.

If Epicurus had thought that you could submit to a supernatural god and thereby obtain an eternal life of pleasure, he would certainly have done so. He wanted to know the truth, and he concluded that pleasure in life is the best we can hope for, so he developed a theory that allowed him to do that. But the starting point was wanting to know the truth, and only then did he decide that pleasure and pain are the way to measure the best life. He didn't start with a preferred conclusion and a willingness to bend the truth to what he wanted.

Quote from briefvacation

It seems that the main reason Lucretius advocates for right understanding is so that one can avoid being lead astray to false beliefs about the afterlife which lead to pain and distress.

Welcome to the forum and I agree with Joshua's response. However I do not think it is correct presumption that Lucretius or Epicurus "advocate for right understanding" mainly because of the pain and distress of false beliefs about the afterlife. Yes those are major concerns of life, but it is recorded that Epicurus started off his philosophic career because he rejected the conventional views of chaos and creation of the universe (which led him to atomism). Yes atomism leads to views that erase fears of an afterlife, but Epicurus and Lucretius are concerned mainly with having an intelligent view of the question which they can have confidence is correct. If they had thought that it was correct that a god was going to reward or punish them after death, then they would have gone with what they thought was correct, and they would have been "more catholic than the pope." They didn't choose their opinions solely because of the way those opinions made them feel emotionally, they chose the opinion which in fact deprives them of hope of a happy afterlife because they thought that conclusion was correct.

Welcome briefvacation

There is one last step to complete your registration:

All new registrants must post a response to this message here in this welcome thread (we do this in order to minimize spam registrations).

You must post your response within 72 hours, or your account will be subject to deletion.

Please say "Hello" by introducing yourself, tell us what prompted your interest in Epicureanism and which particular aspects of Epicureanism most interest you, and/or post a question.

This forum is the place for students of Epicurus to coordinate their studies and work together to promote the philosophy of Epicurus. Please remember that all posting here is subject to our Community Standards / Rules of the Forum our Not Neo-Epicurean, But Epicurean and our Posting Policy statements and associated posts.

Please understand that the leaders of this forum are well aware that many fans of Epicurus may have sincerely-held views of what Epicurus taught that are incompatible with the purposes and standards of this forum. This forum is dedicated exclusively to the study and support of people who are committed to classical Epicurean views. As a result, this forum is not for people who seek to mix and match some Epicurean views with positions that are inherently inconsistent with the core teachings of Epicurus.

All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from other viewpoints, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit by our community of happy living through the principles of Epicurean philosophy.

One way you can be most assured of your time here being productive is to tell us a little about yourself and your personal background in reading Epicurean texts. It would also be helpful if you could tell us how you found this forum, and any particular areas of interest that you have which would help us make sure that your questions and thoughts are addressed.

Please check out our Getting Started page.

We have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.

"Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Norman DeWitt

The Biography of Epicurus by Diogenes Laertius. This includes the surviving letters of Epicurus, including those to Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoeceus.

"On The Nature of Things" - by Lucretius (a poetic abridgement of Epicurus' "On Nature"

"Epicurus on Pleasure" - By Boris Nikolsky

The chapters on Epicurus in Gosling and Taylor's "The Greeks On Pleasure."

Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section

Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section

The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation

A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright

Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus

Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)

"The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially the section on katastematic and kinetic pleasure which explains why ultimately this distinction was not of great significance to Epicurus.

It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read. Feel free to join in on one or more of our conversation threads under various topics found throughout the forum, where you can to ask questions or to add in any of your insights as you study the Epicurean philosophy.

And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.

(If you have any questions regarding the usage of the forum or finding info, please post any questions in this thread).

Welcome to the forum!

Another comment after reading Hume's Dialogue: Truer words were never spoken than this passage from DeWitt's Book, under the section "True Opinions: False Opinions" - "In the succession of philosophers the place of Epicurus is immediately after Plato and Pyrrho the skeptic. Platonism and skepticism were among his chief abominations."

Hume seems to see the same thing, and he structures his entire Dialogue as a debate between skepticism and dogmatism. He let's "mysticism" have a voice initially, but then has the advocate of mysticism walk out before the end as if no reasonable person, whether dogmatist or skeptic, will accept the mystic's arbitrariness.

Epicurus' whole argument about the gods - and everything else for that matter - is framed in terms of how you refute the claims of skepticism that nothing is knowable. Epicurus' conclusions about happiness, pleasure, death, life - the whole ball of wax - are framed in terms of "how" we are confident that his conclusions are true. And the "how" derives from taking the position that we test "truth" according to what we get from the canonical faculties. The feelings of pleasure and pain are as "true" to us as the data we gather from the five senses, and the rest of the picture is that the data from images/prolepsis must be viewed that way as well.

Truth isn't measured by X number of scientists or philosophers or priests telling us that it is so, and we don't wait for "gods" to tell us what is true either. Seems to me that the best way to look at it is that Epicurus held opinion about anything to be "true" if that opinion is consistently confirmed, and without contradiction, by the data from the three canonical sources.

Quote from Eikadistes

I wanted to mention that I've recently com across a few scholars who suggested that this trilemma actually comes from a Skeptic (perhaps Carneades the Academic), and not Epicurus (Larrimore, Mark Joseph. The Problem of Evil: A Reader. Blackwell, 2001). Based on De Ira Dei David Hume attributes this argument to Epicurus: “Epicurus’s old questions are yet unanswered. Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?“ (Dialogues concerning Natural Religion 1779). While it comports with Epicurean theology, it does not correspond with any extant writings of Epicurus nor another Epicurean. I also note that Lactantius documented this material approximately 600 years after Epicurus was teaching in Athens. <https://twentiers.com/anger-of-god>

Excellent post Nate. Now that I am fresh from reading Hume's Dialogue in which it appears, I tend to agree that it was a skeptic who framed the argument this way. As presented, it is focused on "the problem of evil" and tightly interwoven with the position that it is illogical to take the Stoic position that "god" is benevolent. The real root of it seems to be as part of the larger argument that there is so much pain and suffering in the world that a "good" god is impossible. While that argument helps against "design," and definitely has aspects that rings of the Epicurean argument that the world has so many defects that it can't have been designed by a benevolent god, it rings to me of having a much more "skeptical" flavor than Epicurus would have used.

As we know Epicurus focuses on stating the positive things that we *should* believe about gods - that they are living beings blessed and imperishable. While the two perspectives can be made to fit together, to me the Hume/Lanctatius version rings with a real emphasis on suffering that does not strike me as the way Epicurus would have presented anything.

When Epicurus presents suffering it's usually (always?) in the context of how suffering can be avoided. After all pain is generally manageable if long and short if intense. Seems to me Epicurus' focuses on the remedy to pain and suffering and it would be uncharacteristic of him to use an argument that takes as its premise an emphatic endorsement that suffering inevitably dominates the human condition.

I made a long set of notes on my reading of Humes "Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion" and they are now here:

Thread

David Hume and his "Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion"

Not sure yet how to approach the Hume material from Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, or how much time we will have for it in the podcast beyond the Riddle, but I may collect a few notable quotations as I go through it. It's notable that none of the major players are advocating an Epicurean position:

• Whether your scepticism be as absolute and sincere as you pretend, we shall learn by and by, when the company breaks up: We shall then see, whether you go out at the door or the window; and

…

Cassius

October 30, 2024 at 7:54 AM

Let's use this thread to discuss David Hume. If we develop enough detail we can create a subforum, but let's start here.

This morning (10/30/24) around 9:00 AM EST, our hosting provider had a brief outage, and EpicureanFriends was unavailable for approximately an hour. As a reminder, if you ever find EpicureanFriends inaccessible, look for updates at our emergency backup wiki, which should be accessible at CassiusAmicus.com, or our main Twitter/X feed which is at https://x.com/CassiusAmicus.