Episode 359 - EATAQ41 - Cicero Begins His Defense of Academic Skepticism

Welcome to Episode 359 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.

This week we are continuing our series reviewing Cicero's "Academic Questions" from an Epicurean perspective, which gives us an overview of the issues that split Plato's Academy and helps us understand Epicurus' position on the same issues. This week will continue in Section 20 of Book 2, where we are now seeing Cicero argue on behalf of skepticism, and we will be interjecting Epicurean responses.

Our text will come from
Cicero - Academic Questions - Yonge We'll likely stick with Yonge primarily, but we'll also refer to the Rackham translation here: Cicero On Nature Of Gods Academica Loeb Rackham : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

As we proceed through the end of Academic Questions, these are the topics we expect to cover:

24. Lucullus's Extended Rebuttal of the Academic Doctrine, and His Concluding Appeal to Cicero (2:XIII)
25. Cicero Begins His Reply (2:XX)
26. Cicero Lays Out the Syllogism About Assent and Opinion (2:XXI)
27. Cicero Turns to Antiochus's Own Inconsistency (2:XXII)
28. Cicero Defends His Citation of the Ancient Philosophers (2:XXIII)
29. Cicero Adds Chrysippus and the Cyrenaics, Then Returns to Arcesilas and Zeno (2:XXIV)
30. Cicero Returns to Attacking the Senses (2:XXV)
31. Cicero Presses the Sun's Size and the Limits of Trained Perception (2:XXVI)
32. Cicero Turns the "Art" Argument Back on Lucullus (2:XXVII)
33. Cicero Multiplies Examples From Madness (2:XXVIII)
34. Cicero Attacks Reason and Dialectics: The Sorites Paradox (2:XXIX)
35. Cicero Presses the Liar Paradox (2:XXX)
36. Cicero Presents Carneades's Own Positive Doctrine of Probability (2:XXXI)
37. Cicero Distinguishes the Academic Position From Epicurus's (2:XXXII)
38. Cicero Defends Probability Against the Charge That It Cannot Support Memory or Action (2:XXXIII)
39. Cicero Answers the "Self-Refuting" and "Two Incompatible Propositions" Objections (2:XXXIV)
40. Cicero Broadens the Argument Beyond the Stoics (2:XXXV)
41. Cicero Reflects on His Own Position Among the Competing Schools (2:XXXVI)
42. Cicero's Survey of Disagreement Among the Natural Philosophers (2:XXXVII)
43. Cicero Presses the Problem of Providence and the Limits of Physics (2:XXXVIII)
44. Cicero's Survey Continues: The Soul, the Antipodes, and the Motion of the Earth (2:XXXIX)
45. Cicero Asks Which Natural Philosopher He Would Even Choose to Follow (2:XL)
46. Cicero Turns to Ethics: Even the Gods Are Disputed (2:XLI)
47. Cicero's Roll Call of Rival Schools on the Chief Good, Part One (2:XLII)
48. Cicero's Roll Call of Rival Schools on the Chief Good, Part Two (2:XLIII)
49. Cicero Weighs Zeno Against Antiochus on Virtue and the Happy Life (2:XLIV)
50. Cicero Catalogs the Stoic Paradoxes About the Wise Man (2:XLV)
51. Cicero's Climactic Debate Between Pleasure and Honor (2:XLVI)
52. Cicero Turns to the Canon of Truth, and Zeno's Hand (2:XLVII)
53. The Dialogue's Close (2:XLVIII)

One of the issue we came across in this Episode was the Cicero stating early in his own defense of Academic Skepticism that he himself was "not a wise man." (See quote below)

Combined with other statements we've come across already, and more we expect to confront, it's pretty clear that the question of "whether knowledge is possible" is closely related to the question of the existence of a wisdom - or of the wise man. Socrates of course said something to the effect that he was the wisest of men because he knew that he knew nothing. Does that mean Socrates, or the god, held Socrates to be a wise man? Likewise it appears that the Stoics held that the wise man can know truth, but that wise men as as rare as phoenixes. I also think I recall from Tusculan Disputations or On Ends that Cicero criticized Epicurus (or his followers) for holding Epicurus to be a wise man.

So the question of whether someone is "wise" or "a wise man" appears to be very close to a term of art in this debate about knowledge.

At this point I haven't found it yet but it will be worth pinning this down if possible. Do we have direct quotes stating that Epicurus was "wise" or "a wise man," or that in distinction with Socrates Epicurus "knows" the things he teaches as true? If so that will fit into the reconstruction of how the Epicureans themselves spoke about this question of the possibility of knowledge.

Quote from Cicero - Academic Questions - Section XX

But I myself am very apt to adopt opinions, for I am not a wise man, and I direct my thoughts, steering not to that little Cynosura,

The nightly star, which shining not in vain,

Guides the Phœnician sailor o’er the main,

as Aratus says; — and those mariners steer in a more direct course because they keep looking at the constellation,

Which in its inner course and orbit brief

Surely revolves; —

but looking rather towards Helice, and the bright north star, that is to say, to these reasons of a more expansive kind, not polished away to a point; and therefore I roam and wander about in a freer course. However, the question, as I said just now, is not about myself, but about a wise man.

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In this quote above I left in this elaborate analogy or illustration of choosing to navigate by the North Star verses CIcero saying that he is better off navigating by a more expansive view.

We (Joshua) addressed this in the podcast that will be out later this week, but the allegory is deep and probably also deserves a lot more development. Presumably Cicero is saying that he does not accept that the North Star truly reflects a fixed point by which to navigate, but if he can't be sure of that why would he think it makes sense to pick a wider constellation that roams and is much more difficult to pin down? Joshua picks out details of the story of the nurses of Zeus for whom the stars are named, and I suspect there is more to that story as to why one of the nurses seems the most reliable while the other nurse roamed about.

All Brittain says is: