Discussion of Article - "Aristotle - Introduction From An Epicurean Perspective"

    This thread is for discussion of the article below, which - like the Sextus article - focuses on providing citations rather than just providing broad generalizations -

    Article

    Aristotle - Introduction From An Epicurean Perspective

    Many readers think of Aristotle as the down-to-earth empiricist who turned away from Plato toward nature and the senses. His own words show otherwise: knowledge from first principles rather than the senses, a finite world with no void, a divine unmoved mover, and happiness as virtue and contemplation instead of pleasure. A guide to eight of Aristotle's core works and the passages that matter to Epicureans.
    Cassius
    October 27, 2026 at 11:50 AM

    Quote

    This is the hinge on which the two philosophies turn. For Epicurus, the senses are the first and indispensable standard of truth, and nothing can overrule them: “nor can one sensation refute another,” and “nor again can reason, for all reason is dependent upon sensations” (DL X.32). For Aristotle, the senses are the starting point, but knowledge in the proper sense lives somewhere else: in demonstration from necessary first principles, about objects that “cannot be other than they are.”

    This is a great article! I found this part a bit difficult, because I can see Epicurus agreeing that the senses are the starting point, but critical judgments come from our mind. After all -- although the senses are the foundation of our philosophy -- nevertheless, the structure of the philosophy is made through reason and judgment.


    Letter to Herodotus 10. 52a:
    "And regarding this [mental activity of judgment in us], if it is not attested or is contested [by sensation], falsity is produced; but if [our judgement] is attested or is not contested [by sensation], truth is produced. Firmly maintaining this judgment is indeed very necessary, so that the criteria according to evident reality are not confuted and a misinterpretation would not, being similarly affirmed, confuse everything."


    Also, in a way, we do have our necessary first principles, which cannot be other than they are:

    To Pythocles 10.86a:
    "It is also necessary to not distort what is impossible to know, and it is not necessary to use a similar theorizing [of allowing multiple explanations] in every case: for example, either with our reasonings about lifestyles or with our reasonings in accordance with our clarification of the other natural problems which do not allow for multiple explanations, such as that (1) the universe exists as body and as intangible nature, or that (2) elements are indivisible -- and all such things, indeed, as have a singular agreement with what appears."