Was Epicurus a Psychological Hedonist, an Ethical Hedonist, Both, or Neither?

Quote from Cassius

It is a key statement that we have free agency to choose our paths, and that is why we praise some actions and people and blame others. Otherwise why would be concerned about determinism and say that it is better to believe supernatural religion than to be a determinist?

Do you think psychological hedonism is incompatible with agency/free will? The only people I have seen making this claim are arguing *against* psychological hedonism. It seems like a straw man.

I will qualify my position slightly. I don't believe it is impossible to pursue pain. Only that someone who did that consistently would be dead, in prison, or in a mental institution.

Quote from Don

I don't know whether we're talking past each other or if we actually disagree. I think it's the latter but I'm not sure how deep that disagreement goes.

I suspect we don't disagree that much at all, and that much of the issue is the potential of unstated presumptions lurking beneath the surface that both you and I would reject but that we have not fully fleshed out at this point.

Was Epicurus a Psychological Hedonist, an Ethical Hedonist, Both, or Neither? - Epicureanfriends.com

www.epicureanfriends.com

Several (all?) of the pro-ethical hedonism sources there seem to suggest that psychological hedonism would make philosophy unnecessary. Or at least it would make ethics unnecessary, which to an Epicurean amounts to the same thing.

On the contrary, I think Epicurean philosophy, as a missionary philosophy, practically requires psychological hedonism.

Assume someone has chosen an ultimate end other than pleasure.

How could you persuade this person to pursue pleasure (or anything else) instead? I say you can't - there is no argument that would influence them in the slightest.

Choice of ultimate ends is non-rational. To choose an end rationally means choosing it on the basis of some other criterion. An ultimate end cannot be chosen rationally, because the ultimate end is itself the ultimate criterion. If it is chosen based on some other criterion, then it is not the ultimate end.

Being non-rational, ultimate ends are not subject to argumentation. It would be like trying to persuade someone that chocolate ice cream tastes better than vanilla.

Luckily, we can persuade people, because we all do in fact pursue things we hope will result in pleasure (or happiness, or feeling good, or whatever people may choose to call it).

But we are not really persuading anyone to pursue pleasure. We are persuading them that pursuing pleasure consciously and purposively is a more effective way to achieve the ultimate end that we already share.

Quote from Todd

How could you persuade this person to pursue pleasure (or anything else) instead? I say you can't - there is no argument that would influence them in the slightest.

Choice of ultimate ends is non-rational. To choose an end rationally means choosing it on the basis of some other criterion. An ultimate end cannot be chosen rationally, because the ultimate end is itself the ultimate criterion. If it is chosen based on some other criterion, then it is not the ultimate end.

Being non-rational, ultimate ends are not subject to argumentation. It would be like trying to persuade someone that chocolate ice cream tastes better than vanilla.

I gather this is the heart of your argument, and I am going to have to think about it because I don't follow it as written.

1. it's a bedrock principal of Epicurus that we have free will, so all sorts of arguments can be used to persuade people of things.

2. Choice of ultimate ends is nonrational.... because choice means something made on the basis of another critierion...? Why is this so. Why can I not choose myactions based on any criteria and in any direction that I choose? Ultimatetly, nothing stops me from choosing not to live at all - I can commit suicide to escape whatever someone claims to be necessity for me, can I not?

3. So I don't see how it is necessary to accept that ultimate ends are non-rational, as we argue about them all the time.

There's definitely a step of necessity in here that I don't think I am grasping (or willing to agree to) from what you are arguing so maybe you or others can comment further? Very possibly on first reading I am just missing your point.

Quote from Cassius

1. it's a bedrock principal of Epicurus that we have free will, so all sorts of arguments can be used to persuade people of things.

I am not denying free will. I don't think free will has anything to do with my argument.

It might be relevant to note that free will doesn't mean you can choose anything. Nature has set limits.

Quote from Cassius

2. Choice of ultimate ends is nonrational.... because choice means something made on the basis of another critierion...? Why is this so. Why can I not choose myactions based on any criteria and in any direction that I choose? Ultimatetly, nothing stops me from choosing not to live at all - I can commit suicide to escape whatever someone claims to be necessity for me, can I not?

I am not saying you can't choose. I'm saying you can't choose rationally (when it comes to an ultimate end). If you can choose it rationally, then the thing you are choosing is not really an ultimate end. This is the logical basis of the example Don and I have both given where we keep asking, "Why...?"

Quote from Cassius

3. So I don't see how it is necessary to accept that ultimate ends are non-rational, as we argue about them all the time.

The choice of ultimate ends is non-rational. It seems to me that this is logically necessary for something to be an ultimate end.

Ultimate ends can of course be discussed, and discussed rationally.

Quote from Todd

The choice of ultimate ends is non-rational. It seems to me that this is logically necessary for something to be an ultimate end.

Yes, this is the step I clearly don't understand. Don can you help me? Presumably there is something about the word "ultimate" I am not following.

Quote from Cassius

Presumably there is something about the word "ultimate" I am not following.

I mean the telos.

Well either in English or in Greek, we still choose our own utlimate course in life, do we not? I certainly understand that nature gives us the feelings of pleasure and pain, but it is exactly the fact that we can at any particular moment in life choose pain if we wish (or death, for that matter) that is the subject of discussion, is it not?

Quote from Cassius

that is the subject of discussion, is it not?

I don't feel like it is.

Yes, we can choose. We can choose pain.

For the sake of argument, I am conceding that we can choose ultimate ends.

My key points are:

1) If you are really choosing an ultimate end, you cannot use any rational/logical criteria in making the choice. If you do, that disqualifies the thing as an ultimate end.

2) A result of (1) is that many of the things people say are ultimate ends don't really qualify

3) Another result of (1) is that no argument can possibly persuade someone to change their ultimate end (if it really is an ultimate end). That doesn't mean they can't change their mind. It just won't be because they were convinced by any argument.

Quote from Todd

1) If you are really choosing an ultimate end, you cannot use any rational/logical criteria in making the choice. If you do, that disqualifies the thing as an ultimate end.

Why? What about an ultimate end makes it unchoosable using reason in making the choice?

Quote from Cassius

What about an ultimate end makes it unchoosable using reason in making the choice?

It's not that it is unchoosable, it's that it is self-contradictory.

If you have a reason for choosing something as an ultimate end, then you are implying that *the reason* is actually a higher end. So you have definitely chosen an end, but by your own tacit admission it is not your ultimate end.

Quote from Todd

If you have a reason for choosing something as an ultimate end, then you are implying that *the reason* is actually a higher end.

Pretty obviously we are going in circles so I will think for a while before replying further. But as far as I am concerned I can choose as my ultimate end virtue, or piety, or pleasure, or absence of pain viewed as nothingness as some people argue, and probably all sorts of other things.

I'm not a determinist so i am not willing to acknowledge that I cannot make my own decision about these things rationally, without reference to the goal of my own choosing. And I would think since I can choose "none of the above," including death, then that's evidence that I can rationally choose my telos.

I certainly wouldn't admit, if you were saying it, that nature has any kind of tracendental purpose behind pleasure or pain, or that any transcendental purposes exist in the universe.

So I see the issue as pretty clearly that we all are born programmed choosing pleasure or pain, but as we grow older we are influenced by all sorts of things, and we can use our reasoning mind to overrule the original programming, and we can choose to pursue virtue, piety, or all sorts of other things other than pleasure, whether viewed as immediate pleasure or total pleasure.

If we couldn't choose between these ends there would be no point in having this conversation, would there?

Quote from Cassius

I certainly wouldn't admit, if you were saying it, that nature has any kind of tracendental purpose behind pleasure or pain, or that any transcendental purposes exist in the universe.

No, not saying anything like that.

Quote from Cassius

If we couldn't choose between these ends there would be no point in having this conversation, would there?

I am not trying to put any limits on concrete choices, beyond what nature herself imposes.

But I do think there are logical constraints on what can be considered an ultimate end.

I won't try to push this any further (for now).

Ok...just one more thing that maybe will make sense.

What would you say if I told you my ultimate end was doing laundry?

Would you say, well, you have free will...so that is your choice.

Or would you rather say, I don't think you understand what an ultimate end is.

The second is more like what I'm trying to say.

Quote from Cassius

Well either in English or in Greek, we still choose our own utlimate course in life, do we not?

Sure, everyone can choose their course in life, what path they take.

But if we're talking about the goal/telos/summum bonum, no. That's baked into existence. The whole deal with that is what is the ultimate end, in the case of Epicurus' philosophy, that end is pleasure.

Quote from Cassius

I'm not a determinist so i am not willing to acknowledge that I cannot make my own decision about these things rationally, without reference to the goal of my own choosing. And I would think since I can choose "none of the above," including death, then that's evidence that I can rationally choose my telos.

Telos is not for you to choose Cassius . It's the ultimate goal for living creatures set by Nature. Telos for living creatures is pleasure. Human rationality can change it as much as I can rationally decide I can jump 10 feet high. I can't. It doesn't mean Nature took free will from me. Free will is not an ability to do whatever one wants. It's the ability to do whatever is permitted within a framework called Nature. Humans are part of Nature. We are not above it. We cannot set our own telos. That would make us supernatural. It would render philosophy completely meaningless too. Philosophy is not a discipline that can teach us how to jump 10 feet high. It's a discipline that teaches us how high we can actually jump. I think Don and Todd explained this clearly enough.

I'll have more to say about this later after I review more material, but in the meantime here is the article by Larry Waggle summarizing the position that Epicurus was an ethical rather than psychological hedonist:

Epicurus: Psychological or Ethical Hedonist?

So far I have not been able to locate a link to the Cooper article for the same position, but I'll keep looking for that.

The Waggle paper concludes:

Quote

In sum, given the methodological considerations discussed above, I find that there is ample evidence in the surviving remains of Epicurus thought that the type of hedonism he advocates is ethical hedonism. Contrary to the positions taken by other schools, notably the Stoics, he does think that our lives and what we do with them are up to us. This would be impossible if he were advocating some sort of psychological hedonism. Clearly, he was concerned about the problem of determinism, and he carefully shaped his discussion of pleasure to take this into account.

I'm not convinced by Waggle's paper. I'm posting excerpts from his paper below in italics.

For example...

If our nature predisposes us to seek pleasure and avoid pain, we start from a predisposition describable as psychological hedonism.

Correct, and I read Epicurus as saying this - our nature, in fact the nature of all living beings - is to seek pleasure and avoid pain. Okay so far.

if Epicurus were committed to a position of psychological hedonism, this would be inconsistent with his views on determinism, as well as the other claims he makes concerning reason's ability to affect choice and our nature.

No, it wouldn't. First, Epicurus is not "committed to a position of psychological hedonism." We're trying to pigeonhole him into a category of our making. I realize categorizing can be satisfying, but this could just be anachronistic. Second, identifying the telos/The Good/etc is like identifying a way things are like evolution. You can choose to believe in evolution, you can actively work against it being taught. That doesn't make evolution by natural selection any less the way the world works. Humans evolve. Life evolves. That's just The Way Things Are. Same for the ultimate motivation of all actions.

[Epicurus] does think that our lives and what we do with them are up to us.

Of course he does. The point I've been trying to make is that we, as rational creatures, can choose to swim with the tide toward The Good or we can fight against, even though we're always going to be pursuing pleasure unwisely and ending up with more pain for no good reason other than we want to try to substitute "Virtue" or something else for the goal and to try to dethrone Pleasure from the seat of The Good, The Goal, The Telos, Summum bonum. Pleasure isn't going anywhere. That's how things work.

The major problem I see with Waggle is his definition of psychological hedonism.

He gives this definition:

Quote from Waggle

By psychological hedonism, I mean, a descriptive theory that holds that human beings are always motivated by pleasure.

Very well. That's the standard definition.

But when he gets down to specifics, it becomes apparent that he really means:

"...a descriptive theory that holds that human beings are always motivated by immediate pleasure."

That is emphatically not what any sane proponent of psychological hedonism believes. It's the kindergarten version.

If that was what people meant by psychological hedonism, it would be immediately obvious to anyone that it was false, and there would be no point in having this discussion.

As a result of this changing of definitions, most of his paper consists of straw man arguments.

Example 1:

Quote from Waggle

On the other hand, if Epicurus' ethical theory, in fact, is an ethical hedonistic one, then human beings ought to seek pleasure, properly construed, and we may in fact deny ourselves immediate gratification for the sake of either some greater future pleasure or for the sake of some one else.

That is true as far as it applies to ethical hedonism. The "on the other hand" is the problem. Contrary to Waggle, it applies equally to psychological hedonism.

Example 2:

Quote from Waggle

Further, if Epicurus were advocating psychological hedonism, there would be little point in his claim that there are some pleasures one ought to avoid. Strictly speaking, if he is, in fact, advancing a psychological hedonist theory, we would not be able to choose pain and avoid pleasure. In fact Epicurus makes it clear that we, in fact, ought to avoid some pleasures and choose some pains.

Example 3:

Quote from Waggle

Other environmental influences may likewise influence us, correctly or not so. But this would be impossible if we are always seeking pleasure, however understood, as is the case in psychological hedonism.

Example 4:

Quote from Waggle

Hence, if Epicurus were committed to a position of psychological hedonism, this would be inconsistent with his views on determinism, as well as the other claims he makes concerning reason's ability to affect choice and our nature. Woolf does not discuss this implication when he advances a psychological hedonist reading of Epicurus' hedonism, and I find this to be a critical fault in this analysis.

Well, good for Woolf is all I can say. He probably doesn't discuss it because he is using a reasonable definition of psychological hedonism.