Prolepsis of the gods

Quote from Rolf

Actually, could somebody take a crack at explaining fundamentally what prolepsis is? Is it innate knowledge that we’re born it? I’m more confused than I thought!

Rolf I’ve been doing (undoubtedly) superficial research on the internet to get this topic more firmly in my mind. How does this approach sound to make Prolepsis more concrete (ish) by comparing the major schools of the ancient era?
Prolepsis within Epicurus’ thought is the acquisition of knowledge, the process that comes from experience through the senses, and truth can be determined from repeated experience and thinking about what we know.

Prolepsis within Plato’s (stoic)thought is the acquisition of knowledge from innate sources, divine eternal universal truths.

Prolepsis within Skeptic (Phyrro) thought is that you can’t trust either of the above for definitive acquisition of knowledge since you can’t prove either is true.

Epicurean philosophy, prolepsis (προλήψις) is one of the three “criteria of truth” that Epicurus proposes as the foundation of knowledge, along with sensation (αἴσθησις) and mental “correction” or «tuphos» (πῠρρός, in the sense of confusion, which shows us the limits of error). Here are the key points:

1. What is prolepsis?

Preliminary notion: prolepsis is an “anticipation” of what we understand by general terms – for example “man”, “tree”, “fire”, etc.
Formation: it is born from the repeated experience of sensations. When you see a tree many times, you slowly outline the generic image “tree”.
Function: it serves as a mental schema through which you immediately recognize and judge living objects and ideas, without having to analyze them from scratch each time.
Epicurus insists that, because of prolepsis, we can say that:

“Prolepsis is something acquired by nature [φύσει], not by learning [διδασκαλία].”
– (Diogenes Laertius, Lives and Doctrines of Illustrious Philosophers, X.86)
2. Prolepsis, “innate” or acquired knowledge?

Epicurus does not claim that prolepsis are innate in the Platonic way (as reminiscence would be in Plato).
They are not transmitted from birth in a complete state, but:
They start from sensation: the senses (sight, hearing, etc.) provide the raw material.
They crystallize through habit: repetition of experiences creates mental patterns.
Thus, we have a kind of “innate potential” to form prolepsis — the natural capacity of the mind to resort to them — but not the content already formed at birth.
Therefore, prolepsis are “innate” in the sense that they are part of our natural way of knowing, but their content is fixed along the way, with each repeated encounter with the objects of the world.
3. The role of prolepsis in knowledge and ethics

Criterion of Truth
Without prolepsis we would have no fixed meanings: we would not know what “mountain” or “family” mean when we encounter them.
It allows us to quickly judge whether or not a new sensation corresponds to an already familiar image.
Establishing norms of pleasure and pain
Prolepsis are landmarks when we decide what is good for us and what is bad for us:
We know “in advance” (through prolepsis) what ugly versus tasty foods look like.
They help us recognize natural and lasting pleasures and distinguish unnecessary desires that bring anxiety.
4. Why do confusions arise?

Some interpreters confuse prolepsis with an “innate idea” in the scholastic or rationalist sense. Epicurus, however, avoids innate ideas as an independent source of pure knowledge.
Furthermore, prolepsis are not permanently fixed: if you repeatedly observe something unforeseen (e.g. a new fruit), prolepsis adjusts.
In short
Prolepsis = generic concept formed on the basis of repeated sensations.
It is not a full content from birth, but an innate capacity to form and adapt these concepts.
Essential role in establishing truth and in guiding Epicurean ethics (choosing pleasures and avoiding pains).
I hope you now envision more clearly how Epicurean prolepsis works! If you still have questions (e.g. about the difference from Stoic or skeptical perceptions), let me know and we will clarify them.

Stefan -- If you are knowledgeable about the Stoic version of prolepsis and their efforts to develop a standard of truth, please comment further on that. Most of our readers do not have a comparative background about how the schools addressed the Meno problem and related issues, so if you have studied that issue it would be helpful to hear your thoughts.

Epicurean prolepsis vs. Stoic prolepsis
1.1. Origin
Epicurus: generic images ("tree", "man") are formed by repeated sensations.
Stoics: prolepsis is a cognitively marked impression, ready to receive the assent of reason.
1.2. Function
Epicurus: serves to classify and evaluate pleasures and pains.
Stoics: provides a starting point for deciding whether an impression is kataleptic, i.e. infallible.
1.3. Trust
Epicurus: prolepsis can be corrected on the basis of new experience.
Stoics: a kataleptic prolepsis cannot be false, being accompanied by an internal "sign" of veracity.
Katalepsis: the Stoic standard of truth
2.1. Definition
Katalepsis (κατάληψις) = impression so clear and coercive that it admits of no false equivalent.
2.2. The criterion of non-contradiction
A cataleptic impression cannot generate internal contradictions; reason recognizes it as coming from the real object.
2.3. The role of logos
The rational mind validates cataleptic impressions, ensuring coherence between sensation and judgment.
The encounter with the Meno problem
3.1. The Platonic dilemma
How do you look for something you don't know and how do you know what to look for?
3.2. Stoic response
Paradigmatic prolepsis (universal notions) are "primary imprints" of reason, not innate transcendent ideas.
3.3. Epicurean contrast
Epicurus rejects any innate idea; concepts are formed gradually, through the repetition of sensory experiences.
Implications and criticisms
4.1. Skeptical criticism
Carneades and Sextus Empiricus attacked the dogma of infallible impressions (the illusion of the tower in the desert).
4.2. Stoic response
The adhesive katalepsis also includes the consciousness of clarity: an internal feeling that accompanies truthful impressions.
4.3. Modern resonances
Prefigurations of the contemporary debate on "justified true belief" and the illusions of perception.
Comparative conclusions
5.1. Epicurus
Modest epistemology: senses + adjustable prolepsis + non-contradiction.
5.2. Stoics
Aspire to an infallible criterion (katalepsis), grounded in a native rationalism.
5.3. Both schools
Rejected the transcendent world of the Platonic Forms, basing knowledge on experience and "incarnate" reason.

Quote from Stefancuvasile

mental “correction” or «tuphos» (πῠρρός, in the sense of confusion, which shows us the limits of error).

Hello Stefancuvasile! I must admit my own confusion, I have never seen τύφος or πυρρός in connection with the criteria of truth.