Why pursue unnecessary desires?

Quote from Don

One's occupation doesn't define them as a living breathing human being.

Thanks for the thorough reply, Don .

I just want to say that, lest anyone think I was being elitist with my reference to factory workers et al – I spent pretty much all of my second decade, and some of the third, as pure “blue-collar” labor: washing dishes in a restaurant basement kitchen, a few years in a couple of canneries, and eight years of seven-day rotating shift work in a paper mill. So, of course, I know your comment here is right on.

I'm a bit late but, to me, practical v philosophical isn't a useful distinction as they are ideally one in the same for an Epicurist. Maybe surface v in depth, dilettante v serious student or something along those lines provides a better comparison?

Thinking about "natural and unnecessary"...(natural but unnecessary is another way to think about it):

You need a jacket to keep warm but it doesn't matter what it looks like.

Unnecessary for it to be a new jacket.
Unnecessary for it to be "in fashion" or a particular style.
Unnecessary for it to be a certain type of fabric or color.
And, a blanket could keep you warm if you don't have a jacket, but a jacket is easier to wear because it won't fall off.

So Epicurus would tell everyone to buy a single black jacket when they reach 18 or full height, and never buy another one until that one falls into rags? As a matter of principle, why would anyone using the NNUU formula do more than that?

Because you like different colors? That's unnecessary.

Because you like different styles? That's unnecessary.

Because you don't like to look at worn threadbare clothing? That's unnecessary.

And on and on...

How does the classification itself lead to any other result?

My point is that the classification itself standing alone is useless or even harmful, just like "pleasure is the absence of pain" can be destructive, without other overriding information.

In one case, the additional information that is needed is that there are only two feelings, which means that the absence of one is the presence of the other. In this case, the additional information is that all pleasure is desirable and worthy of choice if it brings more pleasure than pain, therefore you will never think of limiting yourself only to desires that are "necessary and natural," especially since you also know that there are no supernatural gods or ideal forms that require everyone to follow a prescribed list of what is "natural" or "necessary" for them.

New jackets in many (but not all) cases are going to bring more pleasure than pain. Thus the "principle of the classification" (as Torquatus says) explains that "unnatural and unnecessary" can be expected to cost more in pain.

I'd say the classification system was not intended to be a hard and fast rule philosophical rule, but a tool, almost like a price predictor or cost estimator - a way of predicting how much pain to expect from an action so that you can then decide if the pleasure will be worth it. The future isn't certain and we disdain fortune-telling, but that doesn't mean we don't need a practical way of predicting what will happen from pursuing alternative choices.

And as a rule of prediction, it works very well - "nothing could be more useful...." per Torquatus. So it's very productive to use the classification system to predict the costs of your pleasures. But the overriding rule is to seek out more pleasure than pain using the cost estimator, not to use the cost estimator as an end in itself.

So I would also analogize this classification system to "virtue," which is necessary to consider in order to obtain happiness, but which is not the end in itself. Both "virtue" and this classification system can be very destructive if taken out of context and put into the place of the end rather than of the means.

I don't think I'll be able to feel settled about this until I feel that "natural and unnecessary" has been adequately defined.

We know that Epicurus was 1) influenced by, 2) transformed and adapted, and 3) argued against, some aspects of the philosophical ideas that were popular during his time in ancient Greece.

Does anyone know which section of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics talks about "unnecessary desires" ? Bryan  Don  Joshua

According to an internet search:

"Aristotle also identified unnecessary desires, which he viewed as those that go beyond the essential and contribute to excessive consumption, luxury, and unhappiness. These desires are often associated with material possessions and status, rather than genuine human needs."

I want to add this: The only way it would make sense to conclude that you would never pursue anything other than natural and necessary desires would be to believe that as a matter of natural law or some other necessity or flat guarantee, that pursuing anything other than natural and necessary desires is guaranteed to lead to more pain than pleasure.

It does not appear to me that there are any grounds of necessity on which that can be argued to be the case, or that there are any such that statements in Epicurean philosophy. In contrast, the starting point is the statement that all pleasures are desirable, but some will bring more pain than pleasure. It seems to me a stretch to say that there is any flat list that always must be followed to the exclusion of the general rule, even if there are generalizations, such as excessive pursuit of sex or romantic love, that can be made as a warning against that course.

The only way there could be such a flat list would be if there were supernatural gods, or ideal forms, or some other mechanism that guaranteed such a result. Otherwise it's up to us to analyze our own circumstances to determine what is likely to result for us.

Kalosyni's search for an explicit definition is a good way of looking at the problem, but I think part of the answer will be that while all sorts of explanations can be given, a major part of any correct explanation is that no explicit flat list that applies to everyone can be given.

Note: Just in case I am not being clear with the term "flat list," I mean "flat" in the sense of evenly and explicitly applying to everyone at all times in all places and in all circumstances. So a "flat list" would be an explicit list of do's or "don'ts" that always applies without any exception whatsoever.

Quote from Cassius

The only way it would make sense to conclude that you would never pursue anything other than natural and necessary desires would be to believe that as a matter of natural law or some other necessity or flat guarantee, that pursuing anything other than natural and necessary desires is guaranteed to lead to more pain than pleasure

That is very insightful and something I've certainly never thought of! Well done.

Following up on Don's last comment, there seems to me to be an important issue in how we approach:

PD29. Among desires, some are natural (and necessary, some natural) but not necessary, and others neither natural nor necessary, but due to idle imagination.

as against -

PD03. The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once.

As I see it, Torquatus was able to take a dogmatic and literalist position on the argument that when you're not in pain you're in pleasure, because it's definitional - virtually mathematical - that when one is absent the other is present.

But when referring to PD29 he talks in terms of profitability or suitableness or usefulness (depending on the translator) which seems to me a more "practical" basis for the analysis.

[45] I ask what classification is either more profitable or more suited to the life of happiness than that adopted by Epicurus? He affirmed that there is one class of passions which are both natural and needful; another class which are natural without being needful ; a third class which are neither natural nor needful; and such are the conditions of these passions that the needful class are satisfied without much trouble or expenditure ; nor is it much that the natural passions crave, since nature herself makes such wealth as will satisfy her both easy of access and moderate in amount; and it is not possible to discover any boundary or limit to false passions.

Nothing could be more useful or more conducive to well-being than Epicurus's doctrine as to the different classes of the desires. One kind he classified as both natural and necessary, a second as natural without being necessary, and a third as neither natural nor necessary; the principle of classification being that the necessary desires are gratified with little trouble or expense; the natural desires also require but little, since nature's own riches, which suffice to content her, are both easily procured and limited in amount; but for the imaginary desires no bound or limit can be discovered.

Now I certainly think that both doctrines ( "pleasure is the absence of pain" and the "classification of the desires" ) are both practical and useful, it seems to me that the first is more clearly a definitional choice that derives from logic (it's clearly possible to break pain and pleasure into subcategories, so it's by intelligent choice that we reduce them to two). The classifications of desires are are also matters of choice, but it's harder to see because in the case of the terms "pleasure" and "pain" we all know that there are many different types of pleasures and pains. In the case of "necessary desires" however, we jump more readily to the idea that there's only a short and definable list of what is "natural" and "necessary."

Actually as I am writing this I am talking myself into a somewhat different view from where I started...... I am now liking the natural and necessary classification more, if we can link it to the same kind of broad analysis as pain and pleasure, and resist the temptation to think that there's a strict absolute list. Maybe the necessity to analyze and understand the two separate classification systems in the two different doctrines complements each other!

One thing I will say about it is that it strikes me that there is a connection between thinking it is a good idea to (1) categorize all feelings into two categories and (2) categorize all desires into four categories. There's no necessity that we do either, and we could have chosen to come up with many categories, but it makes good sense to reduce them as far as reasonably possible, and it provides a useful framework for analysis.

I would see this as Epicurus being both practical and philosophical at the same time.

Quote from Cassius

One thing I will say about it is that it strikes me that there is a connection between thinking it is a good idea to (1) categorize all feelings into two categories and (2) categorize all desires into four categories.

Another insightful idea! You are on a roll, my friend! I like that direction.

Tonight's discussion helped me to see the impossibility of neatly categorizing the desires. These three “categories” really might be best seen as a spectrum, from the natural/necessary end of being easy to obtain with a huge pleasure payoff, to the unnatural/unnecessary end of being impossible to obtain with a very dubious pleasure payoff.

i put together this chart to assist in conversation in our Monday zoom discussion about this topic. My summary of each answer is brief and no doubt grossly inadequate to what the speaker had to say, but I think the variation in answers might be good food for thought as the discussion continues. No doubt each person was thinking something different, especially as I explained the question, but the fact that the result of the Yes/No question was almost evenly split indicates that the answer does not seem to be obvious to everyone..

As Tau Phi asked me, my own answer to the first two columns would be "Pleasure / No," but like everyone else I would have explanation for each answer (and that's what we are discussing in this thread.).

Thinking further about the question "What is the goal of life?"

...more directly: "What is my goal in life?" -- I would add more such as well-being, satisfaction, peace of mind, and pleasant abiding...in addition to pleasure (enjoyment) and happiness.

Quote from Kalosyni

"What is my goal in life?" -- I would add more such as well-being, satisfaction, peace of mind, and pleasant abiding...in addition to pleasure (enjoyment) and happiness.

I would tend to concur with you, Kalosyni . My only tangent or adjacent thought on that is that all those (well-being, satisfaction, peace of mind (ataraxia?), and pleasant abiding) are, in fact, ALL pleasure per "absence of pain = pleasure" and "the feelings are two." So, the "goal of life" is pleasure, writ large.

The problem that enters in is that there are so many ways to define pleasure above the "pleasure/pain" dichotomy. I think that's why Epicurus can write (paraphrased) "the health of the body and the tranquility of the mind is the goal (telos) of a blessed life" and "pleasure is the goal (telos)" and "if indeed eudaimonia is present, we have everything; if eudaimonia is not present, we do anything to have eudaimonia."

INTRODUCTORY NOTE: Bryan or Eikadistes or anyone good with ancient Greek - PLEASE feel free to check my grammar etc in the Letter to Menoikeus. If I'm missing something, this post just missed the mark! Thanks!

One thing that struck me tonight was the rest of that section in the letter to Menoikeus that discusses the categories of desires. Here's my translation (emphasis added - see commentary below the quote):

Quote

(127) ... on the one hand, there are the natural desires; on the other, the 'empty, fruitless, or vain ones.' And of the natural ones, on the one hand, are the necessary ones; on the other, the ones which are only natural; then, of the necessary ones: on the one hand, those necessary for eudaimonia; then, those necessary for the freedom from disturbance for the body; then those necessary for life itself. [128] The steady contemplation of these things equips one to know how to decide all choice and rejection for the health of the body and for the tranquility of the mind, that is for our physical and our mental existence, since this is the goal of a blessed life. For the sake of this, we do everything in order to neither be in bodily or mental pain nor to be in fear or dread; and so, when once this has come into being around us, it sets free all of the calamity, distress, and suffering of the mind, seeing that the living being has no need to go in search of something that is lacking for the good of our mental and physical existence. For it is then that we need pleasure, if we were to be in pain from the pleasure not being present; but if we were to not be in pain, we no longer desire or beg for pleasure. And this is why we say pleasure is the foundation and fulfillment of the blessed life. [129] Because we perceived pleasure as a fundamental good and common to our nature, and so, as a result of this, we begin every choice and rejection against this, judging every good thing by the standard of how that pleasure affects us or how we react to considering experiencing that pleasure. And because pleasure is the fundamental and inborn good, this is why not every pleasure is seized and we pass by many pleasures when greater unpleasant things were to result for us as a result: and we think many pains better than pleasures whenever greater pleasure were to follow for a longer time by patiently abiding the pain. [130] So, all pleasure, through its nature, belongs to us as a good; however, not all are elected; and just as all pains are entirely evil by their nature, so not all are always to be shunned.It is proper when judging these things to consider what is advantageous and what is not advantageous for you; in other words, what the consequences will be. We consult the consequences of our actions; because, on the one hand, pleasure over time can lead to pain; and on the other hand, pain can lead to pleasure.

What struck me this evening was what immediately follows the categorization. To review the categories (as I understand them) spelled out in this letter are:

1. natural desires (φυσικαί physikai)
   1. desires that are both necessary and natural (καὶ τῶν φυσικῶν αἱ ἀναγκαῖαι)
      1. necessary desires for eudaimonia
      2. necessary desires for the freedom from disturbance for the body
      3. necessary desires for life itself
   2. desires which are only natural (αἱ φυσικαὶ μόνον hai physikai monon)
2. empty, fruitless, or vain desires (κεναί kenai)

The word "unnecessary" doesn't seem to be used in the letter. Now, the sentiment does show up in VS20 (which is also nearly the same as PD29). If we look at VS20 there are interesting issues in the manuscript:

Post

VS20 source in Vat.gr.1950

epicureanfriends.com/wcf/attachment/3912/

https://digi.vatlib.it/view/MSS_Vat.gr.1950.pt.2/0256

402v

I'm skeptical now to say that VS20 = PD29 since we've seen some discrepancies in a one-to-one duplication of VS's and PD's.

The transcription of this VS/PD appears to run here:

τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μέν εἰσι φυσικαὶ καὶ ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ δὲ φυσικαὶ καὶ epicureanfriends.com/wcf/attachment/3913/ ἀναγκαῖαι, δὲ αἱ δὲ οὔτε φυσικαὶ οὔτε ἀναγκαῖαι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ κενὴν δόξαν γινόμαι.

or as it appears to be...

τῶν…

Don

July 8, 2023 at 9:46 PM

The manuscript appears to run:

τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μέν εἰσι φυσικαὶ καὶ ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ δὲ φυσικαὶ καὶ μέν οὔκ ἀναγκαῖαι, δὲ αἱ δὲ οὔτε φυσικαὶ οὔτε ἀναγκαῖαι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ κενὴν δόξαν γινόμαι.

Of the desires, on the one hand, there are the natural and necessary; then the natural ones and the not necessary ones; then the not natural and not necessary arising from empty belief.

VS20's categories seem to be able to be listed like this:

1. the natural and necessary desires
2. the natural and not necessary desires
3. not natural and not necessary desires arising from empty belief

But I've gotten off on a TANGENT!!

My point (egads, I'm easily distracted) is what came after the categories in the letter to Menoikeus:

[128] The steady contemplation of these things equips one to know how to decide all choice and rejection for the health of the body and for the tranquility of the mind, that is for our physical and our mental existence, since this is the goal of a blessed life.

This takes me back to Cassius 's idea to categorize all desires into (four) categories. I'm not sure there are four, but his point is well taken.

Plus, the phrase that stands out for me in the letter is: The steady contemplation of these things equips one to know how to decide all choice and rejection.

This steady contemplation is ἀπλανὴς "not wandering, steady, fixed" θεωρία "consideration, theory, speculation; contemplation". This word θεωρία shows up in the characteristics of the sage in Diogenes Laertius, Book X.120: The sage will also enjoy themselves more than others in contemplation, speculation, and theorizing.

Epicurus is calling Menoikeus to consider every desire in light of these categories he just laid out. So, in keeping with Cassius 's idea, we should be able to categorize every desire we have into natural, necessary, or empty. If we go by VS20, every desire should be natural and necessary, natural but not necessary, or empty. We can ask the question of every desire at any given moment "Will this desire lead to pleasure?" and "How much struggle will I need to fulfill this desire?" and "Is the pain of struggle worth pursuing this desire?" And similar questions. That *steady contemplation* is what is important and why this categorization is a TOOL and not an EDICT. Epicurus isn't *telling* us what desires to fulfill. He's instructing us to APPLY his tools and assess what each desire offers in the way of the goal of pleasure (whether that pleasure is sensory, or memory, or any other type of pleasurable outcome).

Don that has me thinking too about another comment that was made tonight, I think by Tau Phi to Kalosyni, that in her example of thinking about a "jacket," that -- even for the same person - a "jacket" might one day be natural, might another day be necessary, and another day (possibly) be unnatural or unnecessary.

In other words, that virtually any single concrete desire we could name (excepting only extreme examples like "world dictator" or the like) might migrate between the categories based on circumstances.

If so (and i think it's yes) what does that do to the attempt to make the categories into a hard and fast list?

Quote from Cassius

If so (and i think it's yes) what does that do to the attempt to make the categories into a hard and fast list?

There can be no "hard and fast" list of any of the myriad desires because it's (like much of Epicurus' philosophy) all very contextual. Granted, there are some desires that can be labeled necessary: The desire to breathe, the desire to eat, etc. BUT even there consider this:

We ALL have the desire to breathe. What happens when this desire occurs if you're trying to hide from someone who wants to kill you? You're holding your breath to remain undetected. The desire to breath is overidden by the context of your desire to remain hidden and safe. I realize that's an extreme example, but I think it illustrates the point.

I think a corollary of this is that we have to ask what is our motivation for our desires. We have to look from where desires arise.

Take for example, running for political office. Is the motivation for that desire grounded in right belief or arising from empty vain belief? Is the motivation to work for more safety and security for one's community (and hence oneself) or to amass power to self-aggrandize or use power to manipulate others (which would/should make you always fearful of reprisal or other harm)?

FWIW, For my own review and for anyone else curious, I'm going to review the words Epicurus used in his categorization of desires:

"Desire" ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΑ epithymia : desire, yearning; craving, want, wish

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, ἐπιθυ_μ-ία

"Natural" ΦΥΣΙΚΟΣ physikos: natural, produced or caused by nature, inborn, native

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, φυ^σικός

"Necessary" ΑΝΑΓΚΑΙΟΣ anangkaios : necessary; necessary (physically or morally); indispensable (NOTE: That last connotation puts a little different spin on "necessary")

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, ἀναγκ-αῖος

"Empty" ΚΕΝΟΣ kenos : empty, fruitless, void; vain, pretentious (NOTE: this is the same word Epicurus uses in "atoms and void" Think of empty space, no ground. Beliefs or desires that are kenos have nothing valid underpinning them or supporting them. They're a house built on sand to bring in a biblical metaphor.)

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, κενός

So, it seems like there are:

• Natural desires
• Natural and necessary desires
• Natural and not necessary desires
• Empty desires (neither natural nor necessary?)

Quote from Don

Think of empty space, no ground. Beliefs or desires that are kenos have nothing valid underpinning them or supporting them. They're a house built on sand to bring in a biblical metaphor.)

If this is the same word used in regard to atoms, then let me ask this question:

Does "empty space" necessarily have a completely negative connotation in the way we are often interpreting it? Were it not for empty space, the universe could not exist as it is - the atoms would have no place through which to move.

I'm not yet suggesting it - though I might - that being "empty" might not be a 100% negative concept in Epicurus' thinking. It's not like the atoms are "at war" against the void - they are both needed to make the world work, and without void the atoms would be able to do nothing. And if empty were looked at as a concept that has some positive benefit, then maybe that observation would need to be extended to the ethical side as well.