Is gratitude a katastematic or kinetic pleasure?

Quote from TauPhi

everything that is alive, has senses and a brain (or the corresponding organ) capable of translating sensory inputs into experiences, is equipped with katastematic pleasure at birth. This pleasure is, simply put, background noise to life.

As such, katastematic pleasure has nothing to do with intensity, location and duration. These can be descriptors of kinetic pleasures. If one really wants to apply these descriptors to human katastematic pleasure, they would look something like this:

intensity: subjective and unquantifiable

location: somewhere between one's ears

duration: lifespan

This is interesting, but in pondering it, I keep coming back to Epicurus' wording. To paraphrase: the healthy functioning of the body and lack of disturbance in the mind. But, to me, this mustn't be considered simply background noise, and it still consists of intensity, location and duration.

For something to be a pleasure, by definition it must be felt. With this in mind, a "background state" could easily be misconstrued (and typically is, outside of this forum) as a "neutral state", even though I don't think that's what you're saying TauPhi .

By being in either the body or the mind, these felt pleasures have a location. They have duration, which can be anything from fleeting to long lasting. (Think of times when your body feels really great or your mind is really clear. For me, these times are fleeting. If they're long lasting for you, tell me how you do it!) And they have varying intensities, depending on the particular situation.

So apparently where this is leading me is to the conclusion that ataraxia and aponia are most likely the katastematic pleasures. But they are like all other pleasures in that they vary in intensity, location and duration. If there is anything that categorizes them as separate from other pleasures (notice that I studiously didn't say "makes them special") it's the breadth of their locations: aponia being throughout the body at a given moment and ataraxia being throughout the mind at a given moment. Unless, of course, you're a god. (Which kind of sounds similar to a Stoic sage as I write this... but I digress.)

To bring this back to burninglights ' original question:

The Greek word for gratitude is χαρις (kharis) which is directly related to χαρα (khara), the specific kinetic/energetic pleasure in DL10.136. And both words are related to χαίρω (khairō), rejoice, take pleasure in a thing, etc.:

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, χαίρω

So, to provide a response to the original question, in light of the etymology of the words, "gratitude" is a kinetic/energetic pleasure.

I'm so conditioned to just say "kinetic pleasure" that I wanted to once again, for my own peace of mind (pun intended), to look again at what Epicurus is quoted as saying in DL 10.136:

ὁ δ᾽ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ Περὶ αἱρέσεων οὕτω λέγει: "ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀταραξία καὶ ἀπονία καταστηματικαί εἰσιν ἡδοναί: ἡ δὲ χαρὰ καὶ ἡ εὐφροσύνη κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργείᾳ βλέπονται."

That last line:

ἡ δὲ χαρὰ καὶ ἡ εὐφροσύνη κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργείᾳ βλέπονται

has some interesting constructions.

κατὰ κίνησιν (accusative)

along/through/in motion, as opposed to "rest" (στάσις; related to katastematic)

ἐνεργείᾳ (dative) by means of activity/action (opposite of dynamie)

There's a lot of to-do in philosophical discourse of the time about enargeia vs dynamei that is beyond me for now. It seems to do with actual action vs potential power/strength?

In any case, just saying "kinetic vs katastematic" masks a whole lot of stuff going on under the surface.

Quote from Don

In any case, just saying "kinetic vs katastematic" masks a whole lot of stuff going on under the surface.

That's my thought too, and that's why I also think that the ultimate crux of the issue is that Epicurus is extending the word "pleasure" to cover both the exciting/stimulative type of activities that everyone acknowledges to be pleasure, plus what I would call - if I were German - EveryOtherExperienceOfLifeThatIsNotPainful.

It's the sweeping inclusion of normal everyday healthy non-painful existence (which is what is being referenced in response to Chysippus' hand argument) under the word "pleasure" that is the revolutionary issue and which makes "a life of pleasure" an attainable goal.

Within that sweeping overall term there are all sorts of pleasurable experiences, including (referencing Don above) "ataraxia ... the tranquility of mind that results from ridding one's mind of fears of death and the gods and obtaining a proper understanding of natural phenomena, and so on." Within that big picture framework I can see the usefulness of discussing k/k matters as a means of being sure we understand every detail. But the big picture is not established by the k/k detail, and any valid interpretation of a k/k distinction is going to have to fit within the big picture that all non-painful life experience is "pleasure."

I think we're all in agreement as to the importance of the Epicurean focus on the importance of freedom from fear of the gods and fear of death. What I don't know that we are all together on is that (1) if there are only two feelings, and (2) if someone is alive they are aware of feeling something(s), and (3) each and every one of those feelings is *either* pleasure or pain but not both in the same part of the person's body or mind.

I actually think most all of us *are* together on that last paragraph, but we're not together on the ramifications of what that last paragraph means. Cicero wouldn't accept that pleasure can embrace both stimulative pleasures and normal ordinary healthy feelings of proper functioning, and I am not sure that we (like Cicero) are all together in accepting it either. It would be surprising if all of our readers here, new and old, *were* all together, because it's a dramatic redefinition of the normal use of the word.

Thank you for your post Godfrey. I'll try to clarify few things and explain in more detail where I suspect our points of view differ.

Firstly, this:

Quote from Godfrey

For something to be a pleasure, by definition it must be felt. With this in mind, a "background state" could easily be misconstrued (and typically is, outside of this forum) as a "neutral state", even though I don't think that's what you're saying TauPhi .

I am strongly opposed to the idea of a "neutral state". I agree with Epicurus that there are only two distinct states (pleasure and pain). Katastematic pleasure, in my understanding, has nothing to do with neutrality. Quite contrary, it's felt constantly throughout one's life and is sometimes disturbed by pain caused mainly (but not only) by fear which distorts our perception of life's experiences. So, in my mind, katestematic pleasure is synonymous to background noise to life or a will to live or healthy release of dopamine in our brains. It is close to @Don's metaphor of an ocean (if I read it as intended) or mine of a forest which I made sometime in the past. It's what makes us want to experience life.

Which brings me to your next observation. Here we definitely see things differently.

Quote from Godfrey

But, to me, this mustn't be considered simply background noise, and it still consists of intensity, location and duration.

"Background noise" might not be perfect description of katastematic pleasure but I hope my clarification above gives better picture of how I see this kind of pleasure. I treat it separately from every other pleasure (for me every other pleasure is kinetic) and I deprive katastematic pleasure of duration for a reason. The duration is there but the pleasure lasts exactly as long as our lives and ends with our death.

If katastematic pleasure would be fleeting and unstable and lasted only for some time, k/k division would make no sense and would be reduced to an absurd. I mean, how much time do we need to declare a pleasure long-lasting so it's katastematic and no longer kinetic? 15 minutes? Two days? 5 years? At this point we might as well start discussing which superhero is better, Superman or Spiderman?

As far as the remaining two descriptors are concerned (location and intensity), I have my reservations as well.

Location is simpler, so I start with this one. Katastematic pleasure, they way I understand it, is located in our minds. By that I mean our minds, if they are healthy, interpret our lives as a pleasurable phenomenon.

Intensity is the descriptor I have the most problems with. And it applies to both katastematic and kinetic pleasures. In my eyes, this descriptor is too vague to be considered a good descriptor of pleasure. Which pleasure is more intense? Eating strawberry ice cream or watching sunset at the seaside? There is innumerable variety of pleasure and all of it is unquantifiable. How can we say that one variety of pleasure is more intense than the other? Ice cream is 5 and sunset is 3?

Even if we consider only one variant of a pleasure, let's say watching sunset, and try to establish intensity levels we hit the wall quite quickly. Watching sunset for 2 seconds is less pleasurable than watching it for the whole minute? If yes, by a factor of what?

So, I say yes to variety of pleasures but I'm not too sure about intensity of pleasures.

Quote from Godfrey

(Think of times when your body feels really great or your mind is really clear. For me, these times are fleeting. If they're long lasting for you, tell me how you do it!)

I wish I could tell you how I do it but, unfortunately, I don't so I can't. And I hope I was clear about that katastematic pleasure is neither of these things, in my humble opinion. I treat both clarity of mind and healthy body as kinetic pleasures. No matter if they last a day or a year. (Well, a year in my case is just wishful thinking at this point. I'm too old for that kind of privilege.)

I think you're on to something, burninglights , especially in light of what Epicurus says in the letter to Herodotus (to paraphrase):

[37] "I devote my continuous energy to the study of natural science and reap the calm enjoyment of a life like this."

A. "my continuous energy to the study of natural science" (pleasure through motion)

B. "the calm enjoyment of a life like this." (katatematic pleasure)

C. reap: A leads to B

You just to put the work in on A to live the calm life of B.

Quote from Don

C. reap: A leads to B

The actual word used is:

ἐποίησα (epoiēsa)

1st person singular aorist indicative active

from ποιέω (poieō, from which we actually get the word poet)

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, ποιέω

In this case:

I created

I brought into existence

I produced

I made

So, "reap" is a more poetic but entirely acceptable way of saying "From the pleasure of my study of natural science, I produced my calm life."

Quote from Don

You just to put the work in on A to live the calm life of B.

TauPhi , I think that burninglights ' post #32 above does a good job of clarifying what I was trying to describe as to how my understanding of katastematic pleasure differs from what you are describing. And I find this understanding of it useful in using our reasoning and agency to craft our most pleasant life.

Quote from TauPhi

I am strongly opposed to the idea of a "neutral state".

We're definitely in agreement there.

Quote from TauPhi

it's felt constantly throughout one's life and is sometimes disturbed by pain caused mainly (but not only) by fear which distorts our perception of life's experiences.

My main question is whether or not this is correct. Whether there is actually a background state, or a constant fluctuation between pain and pleasure in all parts of the body and mind. I'm beginning to see it as the latter.

Quote from TauPhi

If katastematic pleasure would be fleeting and unstable and lasted only for some time, k/k division would make no sense and would be reduced to an absurd. I mean, how much time do we need to declare a pleasure long-lasting so it's katastematic and no longer kinetic? 15 minutes? Two days? 5 years? At this point we might as well start discussing which superhero is better, Superman or Spiderman?

Ataraxia and aponia have no inherent time component as far as I can determine as a non-Greek speaker. If they define katastematic pleasure, there is no reason why katastematic pleasure would have to have a particular time component, let alone last a lifetime. The only reference to time is the secure knowledge of their continuance, which depends on prudent choices and avoidances. In this case, they're "stable" because you've done the work necessary and can tap into the particular feeling of pleasure at any time, even though you don't feel it all of the time.

It does seem to me that kinetic pleasures, in general, have less breadth of location than have ataraxia and aponia. But that depends on the exact definitions of ataraxia and aponia.

I hope I'm making sense and not driving people crazy with this line of thought! My own thinking is evolving, and we have so few sources to go on that it seems necessary to do the digging to really try to get a handle on the deeper ideas. And as always I welcome frank speech!

As for Superman and Spidey, I have my opinions. But those belong in another corner of the internet (a corner to which I never go )

I had further thoughts this morning on the importance of what's going on under the surface of DL 10.136. I think I've stumbled on this idea before but never explicitly formulated it.

In that citation from Epicurus's On Choices and Rejections (sorry, I really dislike "Avoidances"), he posits two kinds of pleasure:

A. "katastematic" pleasures which I think we agree has something to do with "stability," however we're defining that for the moment.

B. pleasures derived from motion by means of activity.

Here's my morning thought:

Pleasures of the B variety are initiated or are derived through motion by means of activity. I get the impression that κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργείᾳ refers to motion initiated both by voluntary action of oneself and activity acting upon a person.

LSJ has ενέργεια defined, in part, as the opposite of εξις (exis): "a being in a certain state, a permanent condition as produced by practice (πρᾶξις)."

That εξις "a permanent condition as produced by practice" sounds a lot like what I and others have been trying to say about "katastematic" pleasures. Epicurus himself wrote that he produced the permanent condition of his calm life through his practice of studying natural science. And I interpret that "calm" as referring to his mind being calmed from fears, anxieties, etc. of gods, death, etc. by internalizing - by *knowing* - the natural explanation of phenomena.

So, my offering is that katastematic pleasure is the pleasure derived from slowing down and experiencing the "permanent condition as produced by practice." If we want to describe it as "background" that could work, but that seems now to me to shortchange the experience. Katastematic pleasure derives from practice, study, work, activity, ἐνεργείᾳ, but once you have that stable foundation, no one can take it away.

I need to think about this more, but this is off the top of my head on a Friday morning.

Quote from burninglights

One thing I'm not clear on with katastematic pleasure being "a permanent condition as produced by practice" is whether this implies that the practice must be ongoing for the permanence to remain.

Is Don or anyone saying that Epicurus classified katastematic pleasure as "permanent?" Are we beginning to tread on "once saved always saved" theology?

Quote from Cassius

Quote from burninglights

One thing I'm not clear on with katastematic pleasure being "a permanent condition as produced by practice" is whether this implies that the practice must be ongoing for the permanence to remain.

Is Don or anyone saying that Epicurus classified katastematic pleasure as "permanent?" Are we beginning to tread on "once saved always saved" theology?

I suppose yes, for my part... Without all the Christian baggage. And it's not just saying "I believe"!!

If you root out false beliefs, superstitions, fears of divine retribution, anxiety about death, etc., yes, those are gone and permanent, IF you've really put the work in to pull them out, root and branch (to stick with the agricultural metaphors). It's the work of really studying, thinking on it, and internalizing that's the hard part.

Well said Don .

One of the values of thinking of katastematic pleasure as "a permanent condition produced by practice" is thinking of practice as an action or actions that we can and must take to benefit our well-being. I like that, at least for me, this seems more active than passive. I'm on the fence as to whether to think of KP as a permanent state, however. Stable, yes. But stability doesn't necessarily imply permanence. A volcano can be stable for ages, and then erupt. An illness can be stable until it gets better or worse.

TauPhi has referred to KP as the will to life, which is a permanent thing. I'm not denying that there is a will to life, in fact I agree that there is. But I question whether that is what KP is referring to. I'm thinking that life presents each of us with long term challenges (financial stability, stable good health, stable food and shelter, aging, caring for loved ones, and other things that come up). Doing prudent work of planning and preparation to address these challenges, and others, results in a stable freedom from fear and worry (i.e. pleasure) with respect to each individual challenge. This type of pleasure is quite different from the Cyrenaic type of pleasure which needs to be constantly replenished.

(Cross-posted... this post is in reponse to Don 's post #37.)

Quote from Cassius

Are we beginning to tread on "once saved always saved" theology?

You could go even further and define hell as "absence of god"... um... katastematic pleasure  

Quote from burninglights

Compare Epicurus's description:

“Joy and delight are seen to consist in motion and activity.” (DL 10.136)

With the following from Lucretius:

“This will whereby we move forward, where pleasure leads each one of us, and swerve likewise in our motions neither at determined times nor in a determined direction of place, but just where our mind has carried us. For without a doubt it is his own will which gives to each one a start for this movement, and from the will the motions pass flooding through the limbs.” (2.251ff)

From my perspective, you are spot on.

Remember, too, that "consist in motion and activity" is not technically what the Greek says. It's an instrumental dative there with "activity" being ἐνεργείᾳ which means "by (means of) 'energeia'."" It's pleasures through "kinesis" by means of "energeia." Well, that's clear as mud, right? It seems this is Epicurus again wrestling with the current philosophical debates and terms of his day, as energeia, kinesis, dynamis, etc., go back to Aristotle. And if you were a Greek philosopher in Athens *after* Aristotle, you had to contend with that environment. At its basic sense (to the best of my ability right now), Energeia is the putting into action of some potential (dynamis).

See also

Aristotle: Motion and its Place in Nature | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

There seems to be in the "pleasures consisting in motion by means of 'being-at-work'" a sense of bringing about pleasure through the actual work of motion of the individual. The motion, through the work/activity/actuality of the individual, brings about the pleasure.

Look at the words in the Lucretius translation: move forward, swerve in our motions, will, gives to each one a start, movement, motions.

Those are all active working words there.

I am becoming more convinced that the banal "kinetic pleasures" translation hides SO much that Epicurus was trying to get across here.

Quote from burninglights

All of this does actually align pretty well with the 'traditional' interpretation of these terms as reported by Cicero -- that a kinetic pleasure would be the pleasure of drinking when thirsty and katastematic being the pleasure of having fulfilled that desire. I think that, probably to hone his attack, he just picked a really banal and myopic example.

Yes - Cicero's discussion isn't unreasonable. No one - including Epicurus - seems to have ever alleged that (1) *acting toward a desire* and (2) *fulfilling a desire* are exactly the same thing. You'd have to be pretty obtuse to argue that those are exactly the same in every respect and that it isn't at least somewhat reasonable to distinguish them from each other.

The bigger questions include:

1 - Do both of these concepts (1) and (2) deserve to be included under the label of "pleasure?"

2 - Are (1) and (2) the the *only* type of pleasures, or are there (3) other activities / actions / conditions that also fall within pleasure which are not related to desires being acted toward or fulfilled?

3 - Do any of these concepts (1) or (2) or (3) stand intrinsically or by some absolute standard as superior, hierarchically, to the other(s), such that they separately deserve to be considered to be the "ultimate pleasure" or "highest pleasure" or the "best pleasure" or "real pleasure" for all people at all times and at all places?

As I understand it Epicurus would answer:

1- Yes.

2 - No.

3 - No.

Quote from Cassius

(1) *acting toward a desire* and (2) *fulfilling a desire* are exactly the same thing.

Call me pedantic, but I wouldn't characterize the two kinds of pleasure in exactly that way. Both "acting toward" and "fulfilling" are action words from my perspective. Maybe "experiencing pleasure while acting on a desire" and "resting in the experience of a fulfilled desire"? But even that doesn't sound right to me. The key concepts from my perspective are action and rest. Maybe - maybe! - mirroring Aristotle's idea of energeia and dynamis although I'm still REALLY shaky on my understanding of those terms.

Quote from Cassius

1 - Do both of these concepts (1) and (2) deserve to be included under the label of "pleasure?"

While I'd say "yes" to Cassius 's question posed here, I refer the reader to my pedantic post no. 48 above.

Quote from Cassius

2 - Are (1) and (2) the the *only* type of pleasures, or are there (3) other activities / actions / conditions that also fall within pleasure which are not related to desires being acted toward or fulfilled?

It seems to me that there are only two types of pleasure, but I'd again characterize them as "action" and "rest" (with obvious more explanation needed to flesh out those two words). I may also use "change" and "stability" (NOT "static") but also something like unreliable pleasures vs. those pleasures one can be confident in having. Pleasures that depend on energeia are subject to being able to perform the actions necessary to experience them, while the other kind are available without putting forth the effort of activity. *That's* the importance of a word like aponia. It's not painlessness (as far as I can see), it's effortlessness, from ἄπονος (áponos, “without toil or trouble, effortless, painless”).

Yes I agree Don's pointing out an improvement on the fulfillment aspect, so I would reword:

Cicero's discussion isn't unreasonable. No one - including Epicurus - seems to have ever alleged that (1) *acting toward a desire* and (2) *being fulfilled* are exactly the same thing. You'd have to be pretty obtuse to argue that those are exactly the same in every respect and that it isn't at least somewhat reasonable to distinguish them from each other.

The bigger questions include:

1 - Do both of these concepts (1) and (2) deserve to be included under the label of "pleasure?"

2 - Are (1) and (2) the the *only* type of pleasures, or are there (3) other activities / actions / conditions that also fall within pleasure which are not related to desires being acted toward or being fulfilled?

3 - Do any of these concepts (1) or (2) or (3) stand intrinsically or by some absolute standard as superior, hierarchically, to the other(s), such that they separately deserve to be considered to be the "ultimate pleasure" or "highest pleasure" or the "best pleasure" or "real pleasure" for all people at all times and at all places?

As I understand it Epicurus would answer:

1- Yes.

2 - No.

3 - No.

Quote from Don

It seems to me that there are only two types of pleasure, but I'd again characterize them as "action" and "rest" (with obvious more explanation needed to flesh out those two words).

As for this part I'd say "if we want to talk in terms of action and rest there are only two, but there are many ways to categorize and describe forms of pleasure."

And making the whole issue a question of "movement" being the key question bakes into the cake doubt about the status of "stillness." It becomes very difficult to see how the status of "health" of body or mind is a pleasure if "movement or stillness" is elevated as the defining criteria.

I see issues of movement as one of many ways to slice and dice aspects of pleasure, but I wouldn't elevate movement to the core issue. The core issue is whether whatever we are talking about is pleasing to us or not, and it's not necessary to specify anything more than "being alive and without pain." If we specify that we are alive and what we aren't feeling in a particular experience is pain, then what we're feeling at that experience is pleasure, regardless of how fast or slowly that thing is "moving."