Episode 196 - The Epicurean Arguments In Cicero's On Ends - Book Two - Part 06

I see I have collected the 'smooth motion" references here:

Quote from Cassius

Diogenes Laertius Book II Aristippus

"He laid down as the end the smooth motion resulting in sensation."

Post

RE: Epicurus And Pleasure As The Awareness Of Smooth Motion

Text references to smooth motion or smoothness:

Diogenes Laertius Book II Aristippus

"He laid down as the end the smooth motion resulting in sensation."

Lucretius Book Two (Bailey):

[398] There is this too that the liquids of honey and milk give a pleasant sensation of the tongue, when rolled in the mouth; but on the other hand, the loathsome nature of wormwood and biting centaury set the mouth awry by their noisome taste; so that you may easily know that those things which can touch the senses…

Cassius

May 10, 2023 at 9:36 AM

Episode 196 of Lucretius Today is Now Available! We continue to cover fascinating material that is highly relevant to our conversations, so again I wanted to get this out as quickly as possible.

As we discuss words like "normal" or "regular" to describe the pleasure of daily life even in the absence of stimulation, I think we should remember DeWitt's focus on "health" as a description of the normal regular non-painful condition (page numbers refer to DeWitts "Epicurus and his philosophy")

VS54. We must not pretend to study philosophy, but study it in reality, for it is not the appearance of health that we need, but real health.

I am not sure where this comes from in Horace, but on p 29 of the book: "For this ambitious program of expansion the school was prepared as any Greek school had ever been or ever would be. Not only was every convert obligated to become a missionary; he was also a colporteur who had available a pamphlet for every need. "Are you bloated with love of praise? There are infallible rites," wrote Horace, "which can restore your health if only you will read a pamphlet three times with open mind."

Also page 66: "Neither was he in debt to his teachers for his hedonism. None of them was a hedonist. He was in debt to Plato for suggestions concerning the classification of desires and the calculus of advantage in pleasure, but differed from both Plato and Aristippus in his definition of pleasure. To neither of these was continuous pleasure conceivable, because they recognized only peaks of pleasure separated either by intervals void of pleasure or by neutral states. In order to escape from these logical dead ends Epicurus worked his way to a novel division of pleasures into those that were basic and those that were decorative. The pleasure of being sane and in health is basic and can be enjoyed continually. All other pleasures are superfluous and decorative. For this doctrine, once more, he was in debt to no teacher.

- Letter to Menoeceus: 122] "Let no one when young delay to study philosophy, nor when he is old grow weary of his study. For no one can come too early or too late to secure the health of his soul."

- page 148 in regard to time - "The line of reasoning may be sketched as follows: a human being is susceptible of sickness but sickness is not a permanent attribute. only a temporary condition, that is, an accident. Sickness in its turn may be long or short. but this quality of length or brevity is not a permanent attribute but an accident. Therefore it is an accident of an accident. Next. by analogy, since we associate time with states of health or sickness. the time of their duration is said to be long or short. Thus long and short become predicates of time while in reality they apply only to states of health or sickness. This amounts to saying that in the phrases "a long time" or "a short time" the adjectives are transferred epithets.

page 217 - He also had something new to say on the true relation of pleasure to pain. Some had believed them true opposites on the ground of universal pursuit and universal avoidance. Others had firmly denied this on the ground that some pleasures were good and some bad, while some denied that any pleasures were good. Neither were either laymen or philosophers agreed upon the nature of pain; Antisthenes and the Spartans classified it as good. Epicurus discovered a logical position for himself by positing an indissoluble connection between pleasure and health and between pain and disease. No one could then with

reason deny that pleasure was a true opposite to pain since it would mean denying that health was a true opposite to disease. Neither could men deny that health was a good and disease an evil. By the same token pleasure was bound to be a good and pain an evil.

page 223 - It follows from this that pleasure is not to be opposed to pain on the ground alone that all creatures pursue the one and avoid the other: the two are true opposites because they stand in the same relation as health which preserves and disease which destroys. It is for this reason that the one is good and the other is evil, Vatican Saying 37: "Human nature is vulnerable to evil, not to the good. because it is preserved by pleasures, destroyed by pains." This may be taken to mean that pleasure, as it were, is nutriment to the human being, as food is, and that human nature reaches out for it just as each living thing by some natural impulse seeks its appropriate food. It is no accident that the following statement of Aristotle is to be found in his discussion of pleasure: "And it may well be that in the lower animals there is some natural good, superior to their scale of existence, which reaches out for the kindred good." With this surmise Epicurus would have concurred: all creatures

seek pleasure as if food; they avoid pain as if poison.

It's the connotations of the words that cause us all the problems. "Rest" implies sitting around doing nothing. "Motion" implies physical movement, even though savoring memories, or anything that implies change, is also within the idea of motion. And while "kinetic" is going to evoke frenzy in English-speaking minds, "katastematic" is never going to evoke anything but "woo" or being "comatose" at best.

I can see why it is tempting to define things in the negative so as to give maximum latitude to the expression that anything done during the normal healthy state - whether it involves motion, rest, or whatever, that is not painful is pleasurable.

I want to point something else out that Joshua raised in the podcast that I think is extremely important. Joshua pointed out not one but two sections (if I recall correctly, in regard to (1) pleasure being one name that describes many pleasurable feelings, and (2) the meaning of "variety") where Cicero's analysis of pleasure seems to be tracking very closely to Plato's Philebus analysis.

I think we need to hold open the strong possibility that not only Torquatus/Cicero, but also Epicurus himself, were intentionally tracking Plato's anti-pleasure analysis.

And that's going to lead us back to the issue of "the limit of pleasure," which was raised as a huge issue in Philebus. I think we are going to find that the term "limit of pleasure" has a very precise reason for being such a central part of the analysis. As part of that, I think we will find that the "limit of pleasure" or "height of pleasure" is not a "DESTINATION" at all, but the "best" ongoing way of conducting the journey of life.

We have been raising but not satisfactorily answering (in my view, at least not fully) the question of why - if on a particular day we should reach 100% pleasure) we should want to live any longer. That's like asking why, if we climb to the top of Mount Everest, we should want to continue to live at all. No one but a Stoic or other warped personality would conclude that meeting a goal like that "once" is "good enough for a lifetime."

I think we're going to conclude that just like the predominance of pains over pleasures describes Epicurus' last day, defining the "limit of pleasure" as containing both "stimulative" forms and "non-stimulative" forms allows us to describe "the best life." But "the best life" is not a destination, but a journey, and just as pleasure was desirable all the way along, more pleasure so long as we can live another day it is also desirable.

The consolation involved in having a "limit of pleasure" is that it gives us a day to day goal to strive for, and it tells us that this is the "best we can do" just like we keep our cars tuned and cleaned so that they run at tip-top performance. The purpose of getting cars in tip-top condition is not so they can sit still and be looked at, but so that they can perform as cars are able to do at the top of their game.

So I think if we continue to compare our Epicurean texts to Philebus, as Joshua is doing, we're going to see that it is a mistake to think of the "end" or "goal" of life as a single destination at which we can arrive and then be satisfied and think to ourselves that "it's time to die."

Quote from Letter to Menoeceus

And he who counsels the young man to live well, but the old man to make a good end, is foolish, not merely because of the desirability of life, but also because it is the same training which teaches to live well and to die well. Yet much worse still is the man who says it is good not to be born but ‘once born make haste to pass the gates of Death’.

Quote from Diogenes Laertius

[136] Epicurus differs from the Cyrenaics about pleasure. For they do not admit static pleasure, but only that which consists in motion. But Epicurus admits both kinds both in the soul and in the body, as he says in the work on Choice and Avoidance and in the book on The Ends of Life and in the first book On Lives and in the letter to his friends in Mytilene. Similarly, Diogenes in the 17th book of Miscellanies and Metrodorus in the Timocrates speak thus: ‘Pleasure can be thought of both as consisting in motion and as static.’ And Epicurus in the work on Choice speaks as follows: ‘Freedom from trouble in the mind and from pain in the body are static pleasures, but Joy and exultation are considered as active pleasures involving motion. '

When your mind is not being excited, but is operating at its normal speed and doing its normal things, is that something that can be well conveyed in English using the word "static"?

When your body is not being stimulated through massage or in any other ways that moves the senses from their standard state of good health and operation, can that condition be conveyed using the word word "static"?

Even more so, an untranslated Greek word does not convey what is sought to be conveyed. To be clear, the untranslated word has to immediately be explained, or else you are left with an impasse with the Ciceros of the world, and the normal reasonable man is going to agree with Cicero. Just as Cicero said, this is not a dark subject where use of technical language can be excused. This calls for clarity, and I feel sure that Epicurus gave the explanation with clarity, and that our problem arises because the clear and detailed explanation did not survive, not that he or his later heads of the school refused to give one.

To be fair, part of the problem may be that it *does* survive but we do not see it due to translation issues and our own prejudices. Statements like PD08 that no pleasure is a bad thing in itself may be intended to show in the negative that all pleasure is desirable, and that we are to treat these statements as logical axioms which allow of no exceptions and have to be carried to their logical extremes.

So whether we are talking about "defining katastematic" or just being clear in the first place, the challenge is the same - we need to convey what is being discussed in plain English. Healthy operation of body and healthy operation of mind are not *that* hard to designate clearly, and we need to find better ways to do so.

It isn't a full explanation to say "Absence of pain is pleasure, and that the greatest pleasure" which is basically all Cicero allows Torquatus to do in answer to Cicero's questioning.

I will admit that I am getting the idea that there is a deeper mystery here. How did it ever get to the point in 50BC that Cicero could make a colorable argument that the relationship between pleasure and absence of pain was not being explained satisfactorily even by the Epicureans themselves? It's almost as if (A) the Emperor Julian in celebrating the disappearance of the texts, and (B) Cicero saying that no one but Epicureans read the Epicurean texts (I think that was Cicero, wasn't it?), and (C) Cicero warning Torquatus not to argue that the Epicureans didn't enjoy literature, because Epicurus never argued that, and (D) Philodemus complaining about people who were oversimplifying ---- are all pointing us toward a problem that was developing in the decades between Epicurus and Cicero.

How could it get to the point where Cicero could make this argument that Epicurus was unclear and hope to be taken seriously? Was our problem of lack of transmission of texts already beginning then?

I think that's something else we need to explore.

It is maddening that the Principal Doctrines do not include in their top statements - or at all! - the simple positive statement that "pleasure is desirable."

I am sure there are more, but I can see two main possible explanations for this:

(1) Epicurus was treating his letter to Menoeceus, or some other document where he does say this, as a preliminary statement even more fundamental than the list contained in the Principal Doctrines.

(2) Epicurus was being "in your face" again (like "the sun it is the size it appears to be") and taking a rigorously logical position that it is not necessary to say what is not necessary to say. This *might* be what Torquatus is alluding to at line 30 of On Ends Book One:

[30] Every creature, as soon as it is born, seeks after pleasure and delights therein as in its supreme good, while it recoils from pain as its supreme evil, and banishes that, so far as it can, from its own presence, and this it does while still uncorrupted, and while nature herself prompts unbiased and unaffected decisions. So he says we need no reasoning or debate to shew why pleasure is matter for desire, pain for aversion. These facts he thinks are simply perceived, just as the fact that fire is hot, snow is white, and honey sweet, no one of which facts are we bound to support by elaborate arguments; it is enough merely to draw attention to the fact; and there is a difference between proof and formal argument on the one hand and a slight hint and direction of the attention on the other; the one process reveals to us mysteries and things under a veil, so to speak; the other enables us to pronounce upon patent and evident facts.

Given our recent discussions, anyone want to suggest other possibilities?

Quote from TauPhi

First of all, #196 is really, really good. Well done Cassius, Joshua and Kalosyni. I smiled to myself several times during the podcast. The pleasure issues you're discussing and the points you're making are top-notch.

Thank you TauPhi. I have to apologize to Martin. He was there too, but he joined late and I was so wrapped up in the conversation that I did not notice so I did not call on him at the end.

I need to dig into the full chapter that Gosling and Taylor devote to the K/K issue, but here is Nikolsky speaking in a way I think all of us are in agreement with:

While I think Gosling & Taylor are the gold standard on this question, they have a habit of writing in ways that require care. For example it appears that they write a long paragraph about views with which they disagree and expect the reader to understand that they disagree solely because they start the paragraph off with "Notoriously."

After a page they do get around to describing the kind of view that they "oppose," and their position becomes more clear because they have described the "notorious" view as "awkward," and in the end they become much more clear. But it takes dedicated reading to pull out their conclusion.

I post this almost as an aside rather than for the K/K reference: I am just not familiar enough with Plutarch but the name "Theon" jumps out. I guess this may well relate to the name Theon in "A Few Days In Athens...."

Last excerpt: As I read it, this is as close as Gosling & Taylor get to a clear conclusion:

Quote from Godfrey

VS11: For most people, to be quiet is to be numb and to be active is to be frenzied.

I agree that this sounds like it could be related to the same topic in which the wise man can find pleasure in varying speeds of activity.

The overriding goal here ought to be to understand first what Epicurus is advising and then we will have plenty of time to decide how or if it helps to talk in terms of K/K distinctions.