This is a minefield, so I’ll just register an occurrent thought. Epicurus clearly thinks that all pleasures are perceived (or available to perception), so I find G&T compelling on that front. The thing is, if all pleasures are a kind of perception, and all perceptions are a kinesis, then all pleasures are kinetic. Some are (perhaps) just more kinetic than others. Now, you could invent a different kind of perception, one in which the subject and the object of perception are somehow the same (that’s, as I understand it, Aristotle’s attempted, semi-incoherent solution), but G&T don’t see any indication of that solution in Epicurus. And I'm not sure I do either.
So for what it's worth, I'm inclined to think the difference is that katestematic pleasure is always there, always available to perception. I can call it to mind and experience it wherever I am. 'Kinetic' pleasure comes and goes. But that's just me shooting from the hip.