Gratitude and Weakness (Especially In Relation to the Gods)

    I've been mulling over the concept of "gratitude" with respect to KD1:


    KHARISI - ΧAΡΙΣΙ - χάρισι - /'kʰa.riːsi/ - the dative plural inflection of χάρις (kháris) from χαίρω (khaîrō, “rejoice”, “take pleasure in”, “delight”) meaning “gratitude”, “favour”, “partiality”, “partisanship”, “indebtedness”, “benevolence”, “care”.


    Kuria Doxa I indicates that ΧAΡΙΣΙ (or kharisi, variously translated as "gratitude", "favour", "partiality", "partisanship", "indebtendess", "benevolence", and "care") is a form of weakness. Epicurus identifies "gratitude" (kharisi) as being incompatible with the character of an animal living their best life. Kuria Doxa I seems emphatic that ΧAΡΙΣΙ (kharisi) is to be discouraged.


    In nearly every other extant document, "gratitude" (expressed using forms of kharis) is encouraged as an indispensable moral practice:


    In his Epistle To Menoikeus, Epicurus encourages the old to practice gratitude "so that although old [they] may stay young in good things owing to gratitude [kharin] for what has occurred." He repeats this point in Vatican Saying 17: "the old man [...] has secured the goods about which he was previously not confident by means of his secure sense of gratitude [khariti]."


    In Vatican Saying 55, Epicurus seems to encourage the practice of gratitude as a remedy against depression and regret: "Misfortunes must be cured by a sense of gratitude [khariti] for what has been and the knowledge that what is past cannot be undone". Gratitude seems to be encouraged through the practice of Remembrance, exemplified by Epicurus in his final Epistle To Idomeneus as a means of managing pain.


    In Vatican Saying 69, Epicurus identifies the "ingratitude [akhariston] of the soul" makes animals "greedy for unlimited variation in its lifestyle". This seems to be a consequence of failing to abide by Nature, exemplified by the failure to recognize the fact that the greatest pleasures are the most abundant, whereas the most rare luxuries always seem to instigate unnecessary stress.


    In a fragment, Epicurus reinforces the aforementioned prioritization of desire. He is recorded as having said "I am grateful [kharis] to blessed Nature, because she made what is necessary easy to acquire and what is hard to acquire unnecessary" (U469).


    At numerous points in De Rerum Natura, Lucertius encourages gratitude (grata) and rejects thanklessness (ingrata), echoing Epicurus' recommendations in his Epistles (found in at least Book III.931-42, III.955-60, III.1003-1010).


    ... given all of this, I am wondering: what is unique about the employment of kharisi in KD1 that contradicts these other usages?

    Quote from Nate

    ... given all of this, I am wondering: what is unique about the employment of kharisi in KD1 that contradicts these other usages

    Presumably that a "god" would be so self-sufficient that it would never experience an emotion of receiving something that it lacked previously?


    I would see this as tending to show how the human conception of a god is probably constructed logically as an expectation (based on isonomia and similar observations extrapolated out) as much as a subject of particular observation.


    In my mind that would not diminish the sincerely of the statement or the expectation of reality that gods do exist, but would parallel other things I see as logical constructs. For example that is how I see "absence of pain" as being the "limit of pleasure" (there are only two so they are defined as the opposite of the other) rather than as a specific positive description of a particular feeling.


    So I would see putting a characteristic that is very beneficial to humans in a negative light in relation to the gods as stemming from a similar logical construct. Even pain has actual benefits to us in our world (though we define the best life as having none), but pain would have no benefit to a being living in a perfect state.


    Just preliminary thoughts....

    "One who is blessed/completely happy/blissful and imperishable/indestructible has no troubles themself nor causes troubles for others; as a consequence, they are affected by neither anger nor gratitude; because all this would be an indication of weakness/sickness/lack of strength."


    ἀσθενεῖ

    • weakness
    • sickness
    • moral weakness, depravity

    Being affected by anger as a sickness or weakness makes sense, but why would being affected by gratitude be a sign of weakness? In the Letter to Herodotus, Epicurus wrote (10.77) "For troubles and anxieties and feelings of anger and partiality do not accord with bliss, but always imply weakness and fear and dependence upon one's neighbours." This appears to demonstrate that the negative aspects of anger or gratitude would be that it would show a lack of self-reliance / αυτάρκεια. If we needed reassurance / affirmation from others and didn't just do things because they were pleasurable, we're not truly living a blessed life.

    I would answer yes to Cassius's sentiment when he says:

    Quote from Cassius

    a "god" would be so self-sufficient that it would never experience an emotion of receiving something that it lacked previously?

    PD1 refers to those who are incorruptible and completely blessed. So, we "mere" humans should show gratitude.


    We need to also take into account what Diogenes Laertius reports that:

    [121] Two sorts of happiness can be conceived, the one the highest possible, such as the gods enjoy, which cannot be augmented, the other admitting addition and subtraction of pleasures.


    It seems there could easily be two standards when it comes to gratitude as well, one "such as the gods enjoy" and one for the rest of us who should be thankful for our pleasures that we experience.

    There's a pleasurable aspect to gratitude as well, such as the gratitude of waking up to a beautiful day in a beautiful place. Whereas normal folk may feel a pleasing sense of gratitude in this case, apparently a god would experience the pleasure but no gratitude.

    Quote from Godfrey

    There's a pleasurable aspect to gratitude as well, such as the gratitude of waking up to a beautiful day in a beautiful place. Whereas normal folk may feel a pleasing sense of gratitude in this case, apparently a god would experience the pleasure but no gratitude.

    I *think* part of it is that a god is literally by definition filled with maximum pleasure already and only would experience the variety of pleasure expressed in PD18.

    Quote from PD18

    Pleasure in the flesh admits no increase when once the pain of want has been removed; after that it only admits of variation...

    Great paper! Thanks for sharing. The take on the gods near the end seems spot on from my perspective:

    Quote

    The gods exist, but because they are ‘blessed and indestructible’ they need not feel gratitude. Gratitude indicates weakness and is relevant only for those who have deficiencies and thus need others to help or benefit them. That humans feel anger or gratitude reveals our limitations and dependency. So, if wisdom enables a human to ‘live as a god among men’ (Ep. Men. 135), would not a wise and virtuous person also have no need for gratitude?

    The answer, it seems to me, must be ‘no.’ The fact that gods feel no gratitude does not mean that we should not; though Epicureans seek to emulate the gods’ tranquility and happiness, no human can attain their invulnerability or immortality, and any desire to do so would be unnatural and empty.

    It is important to remember, in this context, that for Epicureans all virtues—like moderation and justice—are defined not absolutely, by an independent objective standard. They are instrumentally valuable because they contribute to a pleasurable life, and so what counts as virtuous in a case depends on what in fact produces happiness (Ep. Men. 132).

    ...for indestructible and perfectly self-sufficient gods, gratitude is not a value, while for vulnerable and deficient humans, it is. No matter how wise we become, we cannot eliminate these facts about what we are. Gratitude is part of how we achieve what limited and imperfect self-sufficiency we can obtain.

    "It is important to remember, in this context, that for Epicureans all virtues—like moderation and justice—are defined not absolutely, by an independent objective standard. They are instrumentally valuable because they contribute to a pleasurable life, and so what counts as virtuous in a case depends on what in fact produces happiness (Ep. Men. 132)."


    Definitely a paper I want to read. That simple statement has profound implications, and I think is very difficult to appreciate without working on a drastic overhaul of the way we think. The same action that we normally see as courageous becomes in fact foolhardy in the wrong circumstances. The action isn't just "courageous, but sadly turned out wrong" but in fact no longer meets the definition of courageous in the first place.


    At least in my mind that is very hard to appreciate. My mind wants to say courage is courage is courage and place the blame for a bad result somewhere else (luck? fate? gods?) rather than think that courage has no set definition that applies at all times and places.


    But that seems to be exactly what Epicurus is saying, and he hammers it home apparently in his own words in those statements about "justice" at the end of the PDs.

    One more thing -- I think that last observation from the paper is the key to understanding PD5 and Epicurus' whole position on virtue. PD05 isn't the way to accommodate Epicurus to Stoicism and reconcile them as similar, it's the way - by explaining the totally different perspectives on virtue - to show how drastically incompatible they are.


    “It is impossible to live a pleasant life without living wisely and well and justly, and it is impossible to live wisely and well and justly without living pleasantly. Whenever any one of these is lacking, when, for instance, the man is not able to live wisely, though he lives well and justly, it is impossible for him to live a pleasant life.” Hicks (1925)

    Basically, PD05 says, to me, you can't live pleasantly without living virtuously BUT virtue is not the end/goal. The virtues contribute to living pleasantly, and living pleasantly is a result of living virtuously. But one's eye should always be on the pleasant life lived.

    Quote from Don

    one's eye should always be on the pleasant life lived.

    And you could think of gratitude as a kind of awareness and recognition that you are living pleasantly and pleasurable - therefore gratitude is always a necessary ellement, as Nate pointed out in the very first post:

    Quote from Nate

    In nearly every other extant document, "gratitude" (expressed using forms of kharis) is encouraged as an indispensable moral practice:

    Although I wouldn't call it a "moral" practice, but rather a wise practice :saint:

    Quote from Don

    Basically, PD05 says, to me, you can't live pleasantly without living virtuously BUT virtue is not the end/goal. The virtues contribute to living pleasantly, and living pleasantly is a result of living virtuously. But one's eye should always be on the pleasant life lived.

    Yes i think what you are saying is the correct statement of the Epicurean view, but I don't see PD5 saying that one's eye should be on pleasure than on virtue. It doesn't explicitly or even implicitly say that, does it? (I would think you have to go to Torquatus or to Diogenes of Oinoanda to hit that point home.) In the case of PD5 he seems to be equating the two phrases ("living virtuously" with "living pleasantly") and it seems to me that you have to understand something else which is not stated to make sense of the equivalence.

    I agree that one unstated point is, as you say, that (1) the goal is pleasure rather than virtue.

    But the other unstated presumption is that (2) virtue is not absolutely tied to a certain set of facts, just like pleasure is not tied to a certain set of facts. (Eating ice cream is sometimes pleasurable and sometimes not, right?)


    Actually maybe I should ask, Don, do you agree with this sentence from the paper as written, or would you modify it?


    "It is important to remember, in this context, that for Epicureans all virtues—like moderation and justice—are defined not absolutely, by an independent objective standard. They are instrumentally valuable because they contribute to a pleasurable life, and so what counts as virtuous in a case depends on what in fact produces happiness (Ep. Men. 132)."

    Quote from Cassius

    Actually maybe I should ask, Don, do you agree with this sentence from the paper as written, or would you modify it?


    "It is important to remember, in this context, that for Epicureans all virtues—like moderation and justice—are defined not absolutely, by an independent objective standard. They are instrumentally valuable because they contribute to a pleasurable life, and so what counts as virtuous in a case depends on what in fact produces happiness (Ep. Men. 132)."

    Yes. I agree with the quoted passage.

    Quote from Little Rocker

    Yeah, I've wondered about the same thing. I seem to remember that concern showing up in the objections section of a paper I read on Epicurean gratitude by Ben Rider (attached in its pre-published form)

    This is precisely what I needed. Thanks!


    "VII. Gratitude is weakness?

    I argue that, for Epicureans, gratitude is necessary for a happy human life. But some passages seem to say that gratitude is actually a sign of weakness. In particular, this claim appears as a premise in Epicurus’ argument that we have no reason to anticipate rewards and punishments from the gods:

    What is blessed and indestructible has no troubles itself, nor does it give trouble to anyone else, so that it is not affected by feelings of anger or gratitude. For all such things are a sign of weakness. (KD I; compare Letter to Herodotus 76-77, Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods 1.45 = IG I-16)

    The gods exist, but because they are ‘blessed and indestructible’ they need not feel gratitude. Gratitude indicates weakness and is relevant only for those who have deficiencies and thus need others to help or benefit them. That humans feel anger or gratitude reveals our limitations and dependency. So, if wisdom enables a human to ‘live as a god among men’ (Ep. Men. 135), would not a wise and virtuous person also have no need for gratitude?


    The answer, it seems to me, must be ‘no.’ The fact that gods feel no gratitude does not mean that we should not; though Epicureans seek to emulate the gods’ tranquility and happiness, no human can attain their invulnerability or immortality, and any desire to do so would be unnatural and empty.

    It is important to remember, in this context, that for Epicureans all virtues—like moderation and justice—are defined not absolutely, by an independent objective standard. They are instrumentally valuable because they contribute to a pleasurable life, and so what counts as virtuous in a case depends on what in fact produces happiness (Ep. Men. 132). We see this most clearly in Epicurus’ analysis of justice: Justice exists because of ‘a pledge of reciprocal usefulness’ (KD 31), a ‘pact about neither harming another nor being harmed’ (KD 33). Justice is ‘in general outline’ the same for all humans, but what counts as just may vary depending on circumstances—’the peculiarities of a region,’ for instance (KD 36)—and when circumstances change, it could happen that a law that was originally useful and just ‘no longer possesses the nature of justice’ (KD 37; also KD 38). We should not become fixated on abstract notions but instead ‘simply look to the facts’ (KD 37).

    In the same way, then, it is unsurprising that, for indestructible and perfectly self-sufficient gods, gratitude is not a value, while for vulnerable and deficient humans, it is. No matter how wise we become, we cannot eliminate these facts about what we are. Gratitude is part of how we achieve what limited and imperfect self-sufficiency we can obtain."


    This seems to be consistent with the position that has thus far been enumerated.


    I have been trying to find more fragments to flesh-out Epicurean religiosity, largely through Philodemus. It seems to me that he (and apparently Hermarchus, based on fragmentary attestation I'm still trying to organize) had concerns about the status of the gods' social lives and their speech patterns; that, combined with the analysis of gratitude, which is a seemingly human-unique, conscious behavioral practice (there are better words for that) Not to suddenly follow a distracting tangent, but this lends a lot of credence to the "Realist interpretation" of the Epicurean deities.


    I am leaning away from the "Idealist interpretation" because it seems to rob the god(s) of blessedness.


    I am also approaching this inquiry with an assumption: I personally have assumed that the gods were once not gods. My conception of a deity is a being who, through choice and personal development, has mastered the natural ethical path to achieve a perfect, animal life; this carries an additional assumption that they must exist, because, if such beings do not exist in an infinite universe, than choice if futile and ethics is an exercise in futility.


    I think that KD1 seems incompatible with the "Idealist interpretation" if we rob the god(s) of their blessed ability to make perfect choices, having created (through development) a supportive circle of excellent companions; if gods are just inspiring thought-forms generated by cosmic particles that have intermingled through the void, they aren't much different that inspiring shapes in the clouds or any other experience that can be explained as an optical illusion.


    As a side-note, perhaps Lucretius is assuming too much of a poetic license in describing Epicurus as a god if Epicurus (and, as it seems, Philodemus) had such specific preconceptions of the forms of deities.

    Quote from Nate

    about the status of the gods' social lives and their speech patterns; that, combined with the analysis of gratitude, which is a seemingly human-unique, conscious behavioral practice (there are better words for that)

    Yes it would be pushing the envelope for the Epicureans to be talking about such things if they viewed them as wholly abstractions.


    As for whether the gods evolved to that state, I tend to hesitate there, and to consider this to be a more complex application of the eternality issue - I am not sure there. Maybe individual instances of types of gods in particular intermundia evolved toward and arrived at perfection, but if there was never a start to the universe it's hard to say that applies to the whole.


    Evolution might be another aspect of human experience that does not apply to gods.

    That leads me to another question:


    Were/are the god(s) animal(s)?


    If not, how can a feeling-being be "eternal" in the temporal sense of things?

    Here's a section from my Menoikeus translation:

    Quote from Nate

    It seems to me that he (and apparently Hermarchus, based on fragmentary attestation I'm still trying to organize) had concerns about the status of the gods' social lives and their speech patterns

    If you compile those sources, I'd be very interested to see them.

    I'm posting this as food for thought, and because I don't see it suggested elsewhere:


    Perhaps we're reading it wrong? The usual reading is that the gods are "unaffected by [hypothetical] anger [that they might otherwise feel] and [hypothetical] gratitude [that they might otherwise feel]."


    Could it be credibly inferred that the anger and gratitude that the gods are immune to is our anger and gratitude?


    It doesn't matter whether your words are "My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?" or "into thy hands I commend my spirit"; the result is the same. The gods, by virtue of being gods, are necessarily deaf to human griefs, as well as human joys.


    Under this new reading, the first Principal Doctrine falls in line with the recurring literary devices that mark the whole series; the Chiasmus, and the Antimetabole. I can summarize a few examples, with the caveat that brevity is the mother of misinterpretation.


    1. Do not trouble about the gods, for the gods do not trouble about you.

    2. When we are, death has not come. When death has come, we are not.

    3 and 4. What is good is easy to get, what is terrible is easy to endure.

    5. It is not possible to live pleasantly without living [x], and it is not possible to live [x] without living pleasantly.

    6. Take courage from other men, or at least from men who can give courage.

    11. If suspicion of nature did not trouble us, we should not trouble to study nature.


    I write these merely to isolate the main point--that the literary devices are constantly repeated, and are there for a reason.


    From Wikipedia;


    Quote

    Chiasmus derives its effectiveness from its symmetrical structure. The structural symmetry of the chiasmus imposes the impression upon the reader or listener that the entire argument has been accounted for.[13] In other words, chiasmus creates only two sides of an argument or idea for the listener to consider, and then leads the listener to favor one side of the argument.


    As I say, food for thought. And thanks to my old copy of Walter Harding's edition of Walden for alerting me to these literary devices.


    Quote

    When my hoe tinkled against the stones, that music echoed to the woods and the sky, and was an accompaniment to my labor which yielded an instant and immeasurable crop. It was no longer beans that I hoed, nor I that hoed beans; and I remembered with as much pity as pride, if I remembered at all, my acquaintances who had gone to the city to attend the oratorios.

    -Henry David Thoreau