How Emotions Are Made: The Secret Life of the Brain by Lisa Feldman Barrett

Quote from Don

-Sensations

-Pain/Pleasure

-Prolepses

My understanding is that this order is meaningful and now even more so in light of LFB's research (and, I should include, from others):

- the sensations include all of our sensory input

- This input then impacts our "feeling" of pain or pleasure, or as LFB states, pleasure/displeasure.

-and our minds use this to compare our past experience to our current situation.

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This is a point that I think deserves discussion over time. Have you seen a commentator assert that the "order is meaningful," or do you have other reasons for making that deduction? I believe if I recall correctly that DeWitt asserts that they basically go hand in hand, rather than sequentially. I see why it would be tempting to order them in the way that you have, as that would coincide with an order of processing if "prolepses" are equated with "concepts," but again that is probably the ultimate question.

At this point in my thinking I would interpret this aspect differently, and suggest that the three legs of the canon are not in fact the steps by which concepts are formed, but are the "checks" against which concepts are judged for accuracy. Probably as an example I would suggest that "concepts" can be made up out of whole cloth, with no input whatsoever from the legs of the canon, such as "let A=B" then "let B=D" therefore "A+B = A+D" or whatever you'd want to construct from pure words. Those would be (I think) conceptual constructs formed separately and apart from experience of any kind.

So in fact i would think that considering prolepses to be the equivalent of concepts and considering them to be the result of sensations and feelings, rather than a separate category of experience, would produce a dramatically different result than considering prolepses to be an experience or measurer of its own.

Quote from Don

But it seems to me that there is probably a faculty we're born with but individual prolepses have to come from experience in utero, early in life, or even later. To say we're born with prolepses seems to me to fall into the realm of Plato

In regard to that, I would say that is where it is essential to distguish the faculty from the perceptions it generates.

We are born with eyes, yet not with visions of trees. The mechanism of eyesight, however, is innate.

Presumably if prolepses are an equal leg of the canon, rather than concepts formed after experience, then the "faculty of prolepses" would be innate.

Quote from Godfrey

A quick post; today is pretty busy so it may be a while before I get back on....

In reacting to Don 's post, I think one of LFB's points is that sensations in a particular instance don't come first. A prediction comes first and the sensations serve as a reality check as you can see from the description of a prediction loop. So the sensations are "true" but they don’t seem to be primary.

Another thing that seems like it might be fruitful to discuss is affect and the affective circumplex.

Good point, Godfrey ! I appreciate and agree with your clarification there.

On the "sequence" issue I think this is probably the key section of DeWitt's view on that question:

With the continual caveat that (1) Epicurus' philosophical perspective might not be the same at all as what modern science is looking at, and (2) we need to be constantly on guard as to the implications of any particular approach.

I believe DeWitt to be correct at least insofar as he is stressing that there is a human functioning process that Nature set up for us to use to determine what to consider to be "true," and that this biological process is not "abstract reason" or "abstract logic." That would be the takeaway of most any version of the whole "canon of truth" discussion.

At this point I don't know what LFB's takeways would be. I did finish listen to the podcast today however, and I agree that we would expect her takeaways to be similar.

Oh, and I should be clear: Much of the time, I'm thinking out loud when I post so I'm not committed to any of my previous assertions.

Just to make things slightly more difficult for everyone

Quote from Don

Oh, and I should be clear: Much of the time, I'm thinking out loud when I post so I'm not committed to any of my previous assertions.

Just to make things slightly more difficult for everyone

LOL! Probably that should be a caveat to at least 3/4 of what most everyone (including me!) posts here on the forum!

Also on the topic of "take-aways" I think it's useful to review these couple of paragraphs from DeWitt. As I read it, it's possible that he is right or possible he is wrong about the way he is interpreting the functioning of the anticipations. However I think in his diagnosis of what Epicurus was trying to do, he is almost certainly correct.

If we (Epicurus) want to defeat both rationalism and skepticism, we have to be able to articulate a totally natural (non-abstract-logic-based) process which allows us to have confidence in the conclusions we reach based on our observations. This process cannot rely on abstract logic, or else abstract logic takes over like the proverbial camel with nose under the tent, so it has to be ejected entirely except as a supplemental factor. Likewise we can't let observation alone rule the day, without drawing any conclusions, but that would effectively amount to skepticism and establish the rule that we can never have confidence in anything.

So to some extent this is an issue that is probably like the free agency and the swerve. As with the swerve, we may not be able to describe the mechanism of consciousness with certainty, nor should we really think that we need to (since such a task would be as impossible as asking to view the entire universe in order to see if it has an end). All we really need to do is to articulate in broad terms that there are mechanisms by which we can have confidence in living happily if we eject both skepticism and rationalism in favor of reliance on the faculties that Nature gave us.

Quote from Cassius

With the continual caveat that (1) Epicurus' philosophical perspective might not be the same at all as what modern science is looking at, and (2) we need to be constantly on guard as to the implications of any particular approach.

Agreed, but I don't think it's counter to the philosophy to try to incorporate our best understanding of nature. Epicurus and the founders didn't have access to the last 2000+ years of science, so the fact that we can even have this conversation comparing modern neuroscience with Epicurus's philosophy is mind-boggling to me!

Quote from Cassius

I believe DeWitt to be correct at least insofar as he is stressing that there is a human functioning process that Nature set up for us to use to determine what to consider to be "true," and that this biological process is not "abstract reason" or "abstract logic." That would be the takeaway of most any version of the whole "canon of truth" discussion.

From what I read, DeWitt is surmising there's a sequence but basically so intertwined it's hard to say which comes first. She's yes Barrett would not give logic a part in this. Godfrey is right to in saying: Past experience gives us the ability to build "concepts" (read Epicurean prolepses). Our senses are compared to these concepts/prolepses which affects our affective circumplex (read Epicurean pathē: pleasure/pain ηδονή/άλγος).

https://www.academia.edu/resource/work/4310042

Of possible interest here is Sedley's paper on Epicurus's On Nature Book XXVIII on language which talks quite a bit about prolepses and how the mind works especially in relation to language.

Quote from Godfrey

The only thing that I would add to this is that if understanding the mechanism in more detail helps us to increase pleasure, then it is worthwhile to do so to the degree that it does so.

Agreed, with the question always being "Does this increase detail in understanding actually produce that result?"

What I am not sure about, since I haven't gone as far into the details of LFB as you guys have, is whether the result increases confidence in resisting rationalism and idealism in thinking, or the reverse. I think there is a constant tension in the pursuit of any "detail" or "tool" that we not get so consumed in the detail that we lose sight of the reason we are pursuing the detail. We are never interested in knowledge for the sake of knowledge; the issue is whether it contributes to living happily. And the obstacle to living happily is only sometimes the lack of knowledge (such as might be the case when we need knowledge to diagnose and cure a disease, for example). Someone who gets a disease profits tremendously from drugs that treat that disease, and if we haven't pursued the knowledge to develop the drug, then we have a problem.

But there's also the constant issue that I think is present in Epicurean teaching that the disease we are treating and inoculating against is not a something that stems purely from lack of knowledge, but from an affirmative warped way of thinking that actually has a constituency behind it pushing its malevolent influence on unsuspecting people.

Skepticism, nihilism, rationalism, idealism, and on and on are the primary philosophical opponents that we are playing against just as much as we're playing against schizophrenia or other "clinical" conditions. We aren't in the game solely to respond to clinical conditions that developed naturally, though we do want to respond to those too.

I think that the ancient Epicureans diagnosed an example of this problem in the Stoic (and earlier) fixation on "virtue." Pursuing virtue became a tool in the minds of some people that transcended its function in happy living, and became an end in itself, with terribly misleading effects.

Sometimes it is in fact true that "the cure can be worse than the disease." If the pursuit of clinical knowledge ends up for any reason taking our eye off the overall goal, and leaves us open to other harms (because we fail to address them) then in philosophical study too the "cure" (pursuit of knowledge for the sake of knowledge) can be worse than the disease, by leaving us open to more powerful enemies which must at the same time be constantly guarded against.

An example of this occurs I think in our reading of Lucretius or many of the details of Epicurean physics. If we get too caught up in the comparison of Lucretian-age "science" against modern-day "science" then we can easily lose focus on the overall message. And that is something that is tempting to do, because all of us can easily get caught up in appreciating how far "ahead of its time" Epicurean physics turned out to be, as if the point of the discussion was to appreciate "the history of science" or something similar. If we see Lucretius as an exercise in the history of science it's very easy to lose sight of the fact of how the conclusions and philosophical benefits from science have in many ways regressed, rather than progressed, from the ancient Epicurean period. The Epicureans looked at their science and saw in it confirmation of the absence of supernatural gods, of the fact that we have but one life to live, of the fact that pleasure is the goal of life, and the fact that there can be no absolute standards of virtue or justice. If our "science" today isn't sustaining those conclusions with even greater clarity than before, then I think we have to seriously question how much "progress" has really been made.

Quote from Cassius

What I am not sure about, since I haven't gone as far into the details of LFB as you guys have, is whether the result increases confidence in resisting rationalism and idealism in thinking, or the reverse.

My first response to that is "Yes, it does resist those." My take on LFB is that her research shows that our bodies naturally inform us how to act. Our bodies want to be in equilibrium, to have our budgets in balance. We ignore that at our peril. Understanding that things that gives us pleasure are generally positive for our well-being and things that move our affective circumplex toward high arousal levels of displeasure are negative for it. With caveats, per LFB, that things like exercise may be unpleasant in the moment and make us run a deficit in our body budget but will pay benefits in the long run. And not automatically assigning emotions to our affective feelings but instead looking at the underlying physical characteristics can get us in touch with pleasure and displeasure in our lives.

Quote from Don

Our bodies want to be in equilibrium, to have our budgets in balance.

How does "equilibrium" square with: "For we recognize pleasure as the first good innate in us, and from pleasure we begin every act of choice and avoidance, and to pleasure we return again, using the feeling as the standard by which we judge every good."

Is talk about "equilibrium" going to carry one down the road to "tranquility" - or even Buddhism - instead of to "pleasure?"

My first reaction is that tranquility/equilibrium ("neither pain in the body nor trouble in the mind") are defined specifically as pleasure by Epicurus.

I'm still of the general opinion that Epicurus's goal or telos is "living pleasurably" and not "pleasure" which sounds to me like we need to be titillated at all times.

I fully agree that the greatest good can't be imagined "without the joys of taste, of sex, of hearing, and without the pleasing motions caused by the sight of bodies and forms" but there's nothing inherently inconsistent with Epicurus's philosophy to wanting to have a calm mind and a pain free body.

Quote from Don

nothing inherently inconsistent with Epicurus's philosophy to wanting to have a calm mind and a pain free body.

Absolutely agreed that there is nothing inconsistent about that, the issue would be that of being strictly rigorous in identifying the goal - the "end of nature," rather than getting sidetracked on lesser issues that are only part of the goal, like some people tend to do when they focus on the means rather than the end.

As for the distinction between "living pleasurably" and "pleasure" I think that the issue revolves around the context in which you're discussing the issue. If you're in a strictly philosophic debate you reduce things down to as essential and clear a concept as possible, so you end up expressing it like Torquatus did with his formulation:

Quote

I will start then in the manner approved by the author of the system himself, by settling what are the essence and qualities of the thing that is the object of our inquiry; not that I suppose you to be ignorant of it, but because this is the logical method of procedure. We are inquiring, then, what is the final and ultimate Good, which as all philosophers are agreed must be of such a nature as to be the End to which all other things are means, while it is not itself a means to anything else. This Epicurus finds in pleasure; pleasure he holds to be the Chief Good, pain the Chief Evil.

When we start talking about "living pleasurably" we're getting in the details of exactly what pleasures we're pursuing in a particular moment. When we talk about "pleasure" it sounds like we're at that higher level of identifying our ultimate goal (such as "virtue" vs "piety" vs "reason" vs "wisdom" vs "pleasure")

Both perspectives are valid and should not be seen to be at war with each other, or that one needs to replace the other.

Quote from Cassius

Both perspectives are valid and should not be seen to be at war with each other, or that one needs to replace the other.

Point well taken. It just worries me at times that people (opponents primarily) may try to use the single word "pleasure" to mischaracterize the philosophy as Cyrenaic hedonism.

Quote from Godfrey

The affective circumplex

OK we're going to need some definitions soon!

Quote from Don

may try to use the single word "pleasure" to mischaracterize the philosophy as Cyrenaic hedonism.

What is this "may" stuff? Two thousand years of it and you can bet your life the misrepresentation / confusion will last another two thousand years too! I'm afraid this is something we just have to live with and do our best to avoid, but not by watering down the true philosophy.

Quote

When, therefore, we maintain that pleasure is the end, we do not mean the pleasures of profligates and those that consist in sensuality, as is supposed by some who are either ignorant or disagree with us or do not understand,

More seriously you are of course right, but the issue that takes precedence (at least in my mind, and in many circumstances) is that clarity and the benefit of ourselves and our friends trumps everything else, regardless of what the "rabble" choose to believe!

Quote

VS 29. For I would certainly prefer, as I study Nature, to announce frankly what is beneficial to all people, even if none agrees with me, rather than to compromise with common opinions, and thus reap the frequent praise of the many.

Quote from Cassius

More seriously you are of course right, but the issue that takes precedence (at least in my mind, and in many circumstances) is that clarity and the benefit of ourselves and our friends trumps everything else, regardless of what the "rabble" choose to believe!

When you say rabble, I relish the fact that Epicurus literally uses όι πολλοί "hoi polloi" (the many, literally) to refer to the masses who misunderstand our hold false opinions.

More seriously (to borrow a phrase), I think it behooves all of us in all circumstances to be clear in our minds what we mean and to be clear in our presentation. I have no argument with those who say the goal is pleasure period, but I'm going to always read that as live pleasurably.