Toward A Better Understanding of Epicurean Justice And Injustice (With Examples of "Just" and "Unjust")

In your scenario, the burglar has initiated an unjust act in going against the laws of the community (I'm assuming there are laws against burglary and murder in this hypothetical society especially if it's our own). The potential victim is protecting themselves from harm.

As for definitions of harm let's let Epicurus speak for himself. He says specifically in several KDs:

μὴ βλάπτειν μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι.

Neither βλάπτειν nor βλάπτεσθαι.

βλάπτειν

Infinitive of βλάπτω

to disable,to hinder

to harm, to hurt, to damage

βλάπτεσθαι

middle/passive infinitive of βλάπτω

which refers the action/benefit back to oneself

That's where the "don't be harmed" comes from.

Here's the LSJ for βλάπτω for full context:

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…7:entry=bla/ptw And http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…8:entry=bla/ptw

I think it's also significant that Epicurus does not use to wilful wrong (ἀδικεῖν)

Quote from Cassius

Ok maybe where I am going is back in the direction of "examples.". Is protecting oneself from a murderer something that comes under the heading of " justice " at all?

Quote from Cassius

I think most pple today would say that it does. Are you saying Epicurus would not (say that self-protection involving harm to the aggressor) because that does not fall under the category of justice?

To the first question:

Yes.

You are protecting yourself from being harmed. I believe Epicurus would say, if possible, make decisions that don't put yourself in a situation in which you can be harmed. But, if chance does put you there, it is natural for you to not want to be harmed.

Eschewing the word "justice", I would fall back on δίκαιος's sense of "civilized behavior." Self-defense is justified under "Neither βλάπτειν nor βλάπτεσθαι."

I guess that also sort of addresses question #2.

Quote from Cassius

ok but suppose the two people involved in rhd murder hypothetical were on a desert island totally isolated from all organized communities or other people entirely? Would self defense then still be a matter of "justice"? Now clearly it is desirable / proper under Epicurean texts, but the question is must Epicurean justice be a matter of "society"?

Epicurean justice or civilized behavior appears to me to be entirely contextual between human beings existing in a community of any size.

Have the two castaways agreed on any ground rules? Or are they bound by the laws of the society from which they sailed? Those are the questions that would need answering.

You can have a "community" (what you call "society") of two people I'd say as long as they've agreed on an agreement on how to coexist on the island. If they cannot agree or decide not to agree, then maybe "civilized behavior" isn't an appropriate frame for their interaction.

Quote from Cassius

Maybe that last part is the key point. Is Epicurus talking about justice using his own terminology? As with gods, how much of the outside terminology is he accepting?

I think like gods, he's boiling down the definition to its most basic essence. Gods = blessed and uncorruptible ones; justice = neither harm nor be harmed. People may embellish those definitions but almost everyone could agree on those boiled down definitions.

Are the gods blessed and uncorruptible beings?

Yes, but they're also...

Wait, wait! Not so fast! That's enough.

Is it just to not harm nor be harmed.

Yes, but it's also...

Wait! Wait! That'll do.

Quote from Bryan

justice must be created, it does not just float around and therefore without us fabricating it by mutual agreement it will not be around at all.

I like the way you wordsmithed that!

That brings up a question: Is there a "natural" agreement among humans to neither harm nor be harmed, or does that have to be mutually agreed upon?

I'm thinking if a culture/society/community made a law that it was legal to kill people with red hair, would that law then be just for that society? It would be legal, but would it be just for members of that society?

My answer would be "no, it is not just" because a red-haired person would constantly live in fear of harm. That's what I'd say Epicurus meant by justice is the same for all people ... But what does he mean when he says if circumstances change. We're back to mutual benefit then. The red-hair murder law does not mutually benefit those with red hair in that society.

I'm not saying any of this is easy, but I do think Epicurus gave us a framework and some basic criteria to decide if acts were just. Why else would he bother to talk about living justly etc. if there was no way to know what that meant.

I'm not sure if I agree with all your conclusions but don't have any strong arguments at this time.

I wanted to share the most recent podcast I listened to with Lisa Feldman Barrett:

https://www.tenpercent.com/podcast-episod…man-barrett-336

It's a Buddhist podcast, so skip the first could minutes if you like... But I highly encourage you to listen to the end. I think it connects directly to our discussion here.

She and the host talk about parallels with her research and Buddhist Abhidharma. But I still contend there are strong parallels between her research and Epicurean philosophy.

Enjoy if you get the chance to listen and post if you see parallels too especially in the social aspect they discuss at the end.

Quote from Cassius

Oops I need to ask this Don -- skip how many minutes?

She starts at 2:36

Quote from Cassius

Thank you I will listen to that ....

Also, I think this is the appropriate time to restate what I think ought to be implicit, but maybe not:

I think when Epicurus argues that "justice" does not exist in the air, he is not saying that the issues involved aren't of vital importance to the people involved, or that we should hold back from taking forceful, even "extreme," action to try to stop or resolve circumstances that we find painful. He's not saying that the red-heads should not defend themselves, or that we who presumably would be pained by their elimination (for whatever reason - they're our friends, they are us, or we just don't like the idea of eliminating anybody) should not take strong action to defend them.

He's simply saying that when we act to defend the red-heads, we should be clear that we are doing so because we ourselves are impelled to do so by our "feelings" (or however we want to describe that). What we're NOT doing is because we are impelled to by some force of "natural justice" that was instituted by the gods, or which exists as somewhere as a platonic or aristotelian absolute.

I think it's necessary to make this point regularly because we would not be being "heartless" to follow these last ten PD's to their logical conclusion, we would just be being "clear-sighted" when we realize that it's up to US to vindicate our viewpoints.

And to me, that has a much more forceful value than thinking that there is some kind of universal "justice" that can somehow defend itself, or that somehow motivates every human being if we just somehow can find a way to bring it to the surface. As I read it, Epicurus is emphasizing that those things DON'T exist, and that if we want to truly respect our feelings and follow them, then we'll ourselves take action, to the best of our ability, to see that the red-heads (this example) are protected.

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Agreed... Although that doesn't mean I'm not still grappling with the implications.

Lisa Feldman Barrett hits these exact points at the end of that episode, too.

Quote from Don

But I highly encourage you to listen to the end.

Oh, I just wanted to add, Cassius , that when I said the above, I meant "I highly encourage y'all" so I didn't want you to think I was ordering you around!