Toward A Better Understanding of Epicurean Justice And Injustice (With Examples of "Just" and "Unjust")

Onto KD 38...

Another long one and the last of the δίκαιος-related KDs, although 39 and 40 have relation to living in a community. We'll probably take a look at those as well before circling back around to thornier issues related to "justice" and "civilized behavior." I've tried to use some of the same translations that show up here as well as in the earlier KDs.

KD 38: Ἔνθα μὴ καινῶν γενομένων τῶν περιεστώτων πραγμάτων ἀνεφάνη μὴ ἁρμόττοντα εἰς τὴν πρόληψιν τὰ νομισθέντα δίκαια ἐπ’ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων, οὐκ ἦν ταῦτα δίκαια. ἔνθα δὲ καινῶν γενομένων τῶν πραγμάτων οὐκ έτι συνέφερε τὰ αὐτὰ δίκαια κείμενα, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τότε μὲν ἦν δίκαι’, ὅτε συνέφερεν εἰς τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίαν τῶν συμπολιτευομένων· ὕστερον δ’ οὐκ ἦν ἔτι δίκαια, ὅτε μὴ συνέφερεν.

Let's break this down...

38.1 Ἔνθα μὴ καινῶν γενομένων τῶν περιεστώτων πραγμάτων ἀνεφάνη μὴ ἁρμόττοντα εἰς τὴν πρόληψιν τὰ νομισθέντα δίκαια ἐπ’ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων, οὐκ ἦν ταῦτα δίκαια.

"When surrounding circumstances have not changed and what deeds had appeared 'civilized' do not appear to fit the preconception of civilized behavior, then those were not 'civilized.'"

The ἔργων here is sometimes translated as "things" but that strikes me as such a non-descriptive term as to be unhelpful. Things are also used to translate some of the nominalized words, so that's not helpful. Hicks translates it as laws but there is no νόμον here. Epicurus Wiki uses "practice. I've used "deeds". Here is the LSJ entry http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…7:entry=e)/rgon

I've also used "circumstances" again to translate πραγμάτων as in KD 37.

38.2 ἔνθα δὲ καινῶν γενομένων τῶν πραγμάτων οὐκ έτι συνέφερε τὰ αὐτὰ δίκαια κείμενα,

Note the parallel writing style again between this part and the previous one. We'll try and approximate this in our translation:

"But when the times do change and circumstances that were civilized no longer bring mutual benefit,

38.3 ἐνταῦθα δὲ τότε μὲν ἦν δίκαι’, ὅτε συνέφερεν εἰς τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίαν τῶν συμπολιτευομένων·

"... then, on the one hand, they were 'civilized' when they brought mutual advantage among companions living as fellow-citizens or members of one state;..."

38.4 ὕστερον δ’ οὐκ ἦν ἔτι δίκαια, ὅτε μὴ συνέφερεν. "...on the other hand, when later it no longer brought a mutual benefit, then it was no longer civilized behavior."

Let's bring it all back together...

"When surrounding circumstances have not changed and what deeds had appeared 'civilized' do not appear to fit the preconception of civilized behavior, then those were not 'civilized.' But when the times do change and circumstances that were civilized no longer bring mutual benefit, then, on the one hand, they were 'civilized' when they brought mutual advantage among companions living as fellow-citizens or members of one state; on the other hand, when later they no longer brought mutual benefit, then they were no longer civilized behavior."

This again emphasizes the contextual nature of civilized, orderly behavior, what we have called "justice" before. The primary criteria here seems to be whether laws or deeds bring mutual advantage or benefit to those living as members of a state. As long as that's the case, it's "just." Is that how we define justice now? Is that a recognizable definition of "justice"? "Civilized, orderly behavior that confers mutual benefit to parties"? What in the past could have conferred mutual benefit but no longer does? Remember, it's mutual benefit to not harm or to be harmed. But then we have to consider the earlier KD that talked about the power to or desire to enter into mutual agreements.

Thoughts?

συμπολιτευομένων

sympoliteuomenōn

"to live as fellow-citizens or members of one state" also mid., οἱ συμπολιτευόμενοι "one's fellow-citizens"

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/morph?l…0:chapter=1&i=1

My note: The word incorporates συμ- sym- "together" (English sympathy, synergy, symmetrical, etc.) and πόλις polis (Anc. Greek "city-state", English political). That's what Aristotle meant when he said "Man is a political animal" i.e., one that naturally belongs in a polis, a social community (so, a more accurate translation of that is "man is a social animal.") All these KDs have to do with community, mutual benefit, civilized behavior within a social compact, laws, etc. The whole idea of dikaios has no meaning outside that framework it seems. Dikaios "justice/civilized behavior" has no meaning outside civilization or at least a mutually-agreed-upon social network.

Quote from Cassius

you're thinking that while we use the word "just" or "justice" to describe some types of dealings between any two people in most any context, Epicurus was limiting it to a more "organized society" context?

I'll have to think about that, but I do think the social component is very important in the philosophy. And where do your two hypothetical people exist? Are they members of a community? What "rules" or "laws" govern their interaction?

For example, I'm assuming there were rules governing social interactions in the Garden of Epicurus so there could be "just" and "unjust" actions there... unless the rules governing social interactions there were those of the larger polis of Athens especially in light of Epicurus's embrace of taking part in the civic religious celebrations of the city-state.

Quote from Cassius

You know, this part of the discussion reminds me that I intentionally entitled the thread "With examples of Just and unjust" and I am not sure we've made much progress on that

Oh, it's coming Be patient.

To jumpstart this discussion again, I had the following thoughts on my way to work today:

Pain and pleasure, the senses, and the prolepses are the criteria for making personal decisions on what is choice-worthy and what is not.

Justice is not concerned with the personal but the community. Civilization/society/community is not a person or being. Therefore, "it" does not have access to the Canon.

Therefore, pleasure and pain on a personal level doesn't enter into the criteria of what is just or righteous.

The criteria for justice is "not being harmed or not causing harm" which of we wanted a metaphorical civilized Canon *could* equate to "pleasure" (not being harmed) and "pain" (not causing harm) with the understanding that this is only a metaphor.

Therefore, the personal pleasure or pain that the individual experiences has no bearing on whether an action is just or not.

Discuss...

Quote from Cassius

. By this point, there is no "justice" in the actions between two individuals alone.

I wouldn't go that far.

Scenario: If someone kills someone else, that's "only" an interaction between two people, but it has ramifications for the community as a whole. Party A caused harm to party B, therefore - under this criteria of justice -, that is not an act of civilized behavior, it is not δίκαιος, and so is worthy of punishment.

So, my understanding is that "justice" is concerned with *interactions* between and among individuals as it affects the stability and peace of the community. As such, there are any number of interactions between two people that would fall under that purview.

Quote from Cassius

but the basic point you are making is that we should consider justice to be an entirely "civil" concept and maybe use words like "fairness" for strictly personal relations ?

Maybe... So, how do you define the difference between "justice" and "fairness" then? Is there any if we go back to the criteria of "not being harmed & not causing harm"? What are you thinking of as "strictly personal relations"?

I'm wondering if there is an analogy with "civil" and "criminal" offenses? I'm not a lawyer (but I know someone who is ), but it seems both of those arenas have to do with seeking justice for injured (harmed) parties. If either civil or criminal offenses go unpunished, that harms society as a whole as in those acts become sanctioned by not being punished and so are detrimental to the community.

What are your thoughts on that route?

Just checking KD 31-38... The word pleasure ηδονή or its synonyms or variants do not appear in them, which makes sense. Like I said above, pleasure has to do with individual humans. I am coming to the idea that "justice" "civilized behavior" has to do with providing individual human beings the most conducive environment in which to live the most pleasurable life. An environment - a community - which allows humans to make the choices and rejections that lead to a pleasurable life based on the Canon. The community must uphold the criteria of "not being harmed and not doing harm": the most basic agreement for a just/civilized community no matter the size: a band of Neanderthals living in a cave to a nation like the US and so on. Acts between people must uphold that agreement. Acts between nations must uphold that agreement... Where that agreement exists! That's the tricky part of these KDs.

But the community needs to be peaceful and stable. Justice maintains this peace and stability. Unjust acts need to be punished to maintain that peace and stability. Epicurus seems to rely heavily on one's conscience to get the person to not engage in unjust acts for fear of getting caught and of punishment. But the last two KDs may also figure into this. So, that's where I'll be going next.

However, y'all feel free to comment on these thoughts, too.

Quote from Cassius

When you say "the community needs...." you are making an observation that is no doubt true (organizations of any kind have a need to perpetuate their existence)

As far as perpetuation of an organization's existence, Epicurus himself made explicit arrangements for the continuation of the Garden in his will.

But I think the use of the word "organization" is wrong here. I would advocate consistently for terms like "community" "society" "civilization" that is the social medium/environment in which individuals live. Ancient Greeks were very concerned about how individuals lived in common. Those outside of common society were looked at with suspicion. That's why Greek ἴδιος idios meaning "private, separate, one's own" could give rise to the English word idiot. I think Epicurus is addressing these concepts in the last set of KDs.

Quote from Cassius

but I see nothing in the texts that indicate to me that Epicurus was in any way concerned with the needs of "organizations."

Hmm. I see KD 31-40 concerned about nothing else except the interrelation among individuals, community, and "justice." We talk about the contextual and relative nature of the philosophy. These last KDs are *all* about justice as a contextual principle concerning how individuals interact in a society. There is no "justice" apart from that context. I'm going back and re-reading the posts on KD 31-38 and then working on 39 and 40, but that's my take on them in recollecting.

Quote from Cassius

It seems to me that Epicurus was focused on the issues of feelings - pleasure and pain - and only individual human beings have those feelings.

Exactly. The majority of the KDs specifically focus on the individual, the use of the Canon, death (of the individual), etc., etc. But the individual doesn't exist in a vacuum. How do we live in community (whether it's Athens or the Garden)? Epicurus addresses this in 31-40. He set out an entire system from atoms to the cosmos and *everything* in between. Book V in Lucretius addresses the rise of humans and civilization and so this discussion of what justice is seems to fit right into that.

Quote from Cassius

Now he might have been referring to organizational concepts as a part of showing how they are obstacles to pleasure, as he referred to false religions and false philosophies, so it is a possibility that he was singling out "justice" for attention given its status as one of the classic "virtues" which are elevated to ends in themselves.

Bingo (in part)! If your community has no justice and is just "red in tooth and claw" or even "nasty, brutish, and short" you're going to have a hard time living a pleasurable life. I think this is why your fav Atticus could justify his resistance to developments in his society. He felt that direction didn't provide for the context of living a pleasurable life and so fought to restore peace and safety/stability.

To your second point, I think Epicurus was singling out justice because it was/is necessary for living a pleasurable life. That's why he can say living justly, wisely, and nobly is living pleasurably and vice versa. If we get along with our fellow members of our community and feel safe, we have a better chance of living pleasurably. Therefore, "not doing harm and not being harmed" are the most basic "natural" definition of justice. It's not imposed by a god or even Nature but is the foundational agreement among individuals upon which civilization itself is built.

Mea culpa on the Atticus

I agree generally with your post; however, I think Epicurus's "don't harm; don't be harmed" is a "general rule" BUT only meaningful in context. It's not an absolute or Platonic ideal but it is a criteria against which to decide "just" actions for society... just like the Canon is a criteria against which to decide actions for the individual. As he says injustice is not bad itself but its effects are what are used to decide. Breaking society's agreement - at its most basic "don't harm; don't be harmed" - upsets the individual's ability to live pleasurably and upsets the community's ability to provide for an environment conducive to living pleasurably.