Characteristics of the Wise Man, 1-9 Rough Draft of Outline

Another way of stating my concern is to observe that I think it is pretty clear that the goal and the guide in Epicurean terms is "pleasure." That means that the goal of life cannot be "to be a sage" and the guide of life cannot be "a sage" or "to follow a sage," and those terms strike me as particularly hazardous if we consider "sage" to be synonymous with "a wise man" and if we consider how important it is not to embrace "wisdom" as the goal or the guide of life.

Is it possible that all this discussion of "sage" is overlay by Diogenes Laertius using his non-Epicurean philosophical categories?

OK I tentatively have to register disagreement on where we are on that, as I do not see your distinction between longest period and long-term, and I think we are talking about the difference between things that may be poorly expressed as "quantity" vs "intensity." I see that you might be saying that we add it all up and judge it as the total at the end of one's life but I am not sure that helps us any to get past the point that "duration" is only one aspect of the measure.

I think where I am going on "fullness" (and I am not sure I recall where DeWitt went) is that "fullness of pleasure" implies "fullness of pleasure possible to you under your circumstances" and not a reference to an absolute measure in terms of quantity or intensity or any other factor.

I am thinking that this is an issue that is related to "purity" of pleasure, in which "pure pleasure" is a statement of experience in which all experience is pleasurable with no mixture of painful experience, but that even this term of "pure pleasure" does not create an absolute standard, but again a measurement of what is possible for the particular individual.

I think all this is very complicated and I am definitely open to modification but I do think firmly that comparisons of pleasure and pain are going to be relative, and that terms like quantity and purity and intensity and duration are going to be useful but always short of an "absolute" way in which we can compare various lives and say that one particular version is "best" as a rule.

(As usual I want to note that i see this is a very fun and very useful discussion!)

Yes so in that sense "being a sage" is a parallel term to "living virtuously" and I have no problem with that, but I always get ready to "shout" with Diogenes of Oinoanda whenever I think someone is elevating the means to the end.

Now I know you are far too far along to be doing that yourself, but that's definitely the impression I get from a lot of people who talk about "Epicurus the Sage" and things like that, and I think it's a hazard that's easy to encounter. Since I am sure that you are doing it here maybe I should just say let's carry on forward

But I do think that we still have a lot to do on the clear meaning of terms like "sage" and "fullness of pleasure." So that when Epicurus uses the term in the letter to menoeceus I would strongly presume that he is using it in a generic way and not as a term of art as in the comic book "Epicurus The Sage" for example.

It is the proverbial slippery slope / walking on edge of the canyon for sure!

And though reason is not able to assign a cause why an object that is really four-square when near, should appear round when seen at a distance; yet, if we cannot explain this difficulty, it is better to give any solution, even a false one, than to deliver up all Certainty out of our power, to break in upon our first principle of belief, and tear up all foundations upon which our life and security depend. For not only all reason must be overthrown, but life itself must be immediately extinguished, unless you give credit to your senses. These direct you to fly from a precipice and other evils of this sort which are to be avoided, and to pursue what tends to your security. All therefore is nothing more than an empty parade of words that can be offered against the certainty of sense.

And it's particularly easy since virtually EVERY other person in every other tradition takes the position that "wisdom" is the goal, and virtue is its own reward. And I probably am being overly cautious by saying "virtually."

Well I can certainly see how longest duration can be different from "long term" pleasure using the illustration, but I am thinking that in both examples the issue being discussed is "time," while I think that "time" is probably not the only factor in judging what is the "most pleasurable" -- in that "purity" would also be a consideration, while what I am really thinking is the major issue is "intensity" -- in that one person can judge getting to the top of Mount Rushmore for a moment such an exhilarating experience that it is worth ten years of looking up at it from the foot of the mountain.

Maybe someone else can jump in and give us a different perspective?

Thanks Don for the link to the singular "they". I was not aware of this usage but will try to get accustomed to use it. When I wrote my comment, I hesitated for some seconds to ponder whether there might be a correct gender neutral pronoun in English and whether it would be as clumsy as the new "er/sie" and other politically correct solutions for gender neutral language in German which I still refuse.

Excellent visual aids Don!

For a different perspective, hopefully not too different, there is the idea of the best life being the pleasantest life. Opposed to that is the idea of the best life as a life of continual recurrence of unsatisfied desire, which would allow repeated opportunities for pleasure if pleasure is considered to be the satisfaction of a desire.

I'm not sure if this adds to the discussion; I'd like to think it through some more but will have to get back to it.

Quote from Godfrey

For a different perspective, hopefully not too different, there is the idea of the best life being the pleasantest life.

A large part of the question seems to be "How do we measure, or define, 'most pleasantest'?"

I'm wondering whether we need to. If the Epicurean life is guided by the pursuit of pleasure, there is no hierarchy of pleasure, and the limit of pleasure is the removal of all pain and fear, then intensity and duration of pleasure are meaningless, practically speaking. They are useful only as rhetorical tools as in PD3 and PD9.

In other words, as long as you are pursuing a life of pleasure, what is most pleasant doesn't matter. And it can't be measured in either intensity or duration. This is why Epicurus could have such pleasure as he was dying in agony: he was still pursuing pleasure, and the pleasure of his thoughts was driving out the pain of his strangury. Similarly for a sage on the rack.

A life of pleasure is pursued moment by moment. So wouldn't the proper measurement be the feeling of pleasure in each moment? That would be duration. Wouldn't the greatest intensity then be the lack of any pain in that moment?

I'd refer that fragment to PD3:

Quote

The limit of enjoyment is the removal of all pains. Wherever and for however long pleasure is present, there is neither bodily pain nor mental distress.

The key, I think, is the second sentence. We pursue pleasure, and do it wisely. That's something that we can control. Despite our best efforts we can't assure our good health: Epicurus was an example of that, but he still lived a life of pleasure. If he had had stable health and a firm confidence in keeping it, he would have reached the limit of pleasure.

This is one of the few texts I can think of that refers to a superlative experience of pleasure ("jubilation unsurpassed"):

Plutarch, That Epicurus actually makes a pleasant life impossible, 7, p. 1091A: Not only is the basis that they assume for the pleasurable life untrustworthy and insecure, it is quite trivial and paltry as well, inasmuch as their “thing delighted” – their good – is an escape from ills, and they say that they can conceive of no other, and indeed that our nature has no place at all in which to put its good except the place left when its evil is expelled. … Epicurus too makes a similar statement to the effect that the good is a thing that arises out of your very escape from evil and from your memory and reflection and gratitude that this has happened to you. His words are these: “That which produces a jubilation unsurpassed is the nature of good, if you apply your mind rightly and then stand firm and do not stroll about {a jibe at the Peripatetics}, prating meaninglessly about the good.”

Now would it be desirable to live every moment of life experiencing "jubilation unsurpassed"? I think so, and I think this example does stand for the ability to rank some pleasures as more pleasing than others. And it may be there there is no "legitimate" "absolute" standard by which you can say that one pleasure is more pleasing than another other than saying. "I feel this pleasure is more pleasing to me than that one, or those."

But there's a lot to consider about these points.

It "might" be true, but would also be very important to flesh out and explain, that it is a core Epicurean principle that:

There there is no standard by which you can say that one pleasure is "objectively" more pleasing than another, for all people at all times, and from any "absolute" perspective. The only proper way of comparing pleasures is from the perspective. "I feel this pleasure is more pleasing to me than that pleasure."

Would that be correct?