Discussion of the Society of Epicurus' 20 Tenets of 12/21/19

As we talk about this I would be interested in more background about the purpose of the statement.

My key issue has always been knowing the framework of what is going on.

For example, this forum website has rules for posting that describe what is within limits (relating to the study of Epicurus) and off limits (current day divisive politics) but the website as a whole has no larger goal than promoting the study of Epicurus, and people can participate here so long as they stay within the rules, and they know (or should know) that there is nothing implied beyond that

In terms of the Sociery of Epicurus or any organization that appears to have a "membership" character, then there is implicit or explicit agreement that members agree to the terms of membership.

Are these 20 Tenets intended to serve that function? If so, then their formulation implies that they were prepared in a way that is endorsed by the group as a whole.

Some groups try to be democracies or representative republics in which officers are elected to set such terms. Or a group can have oligarchy or a dictatorship. I dont think Epicurus or his philosophy rules out any of those forms in proper situations, but as an individual we all have preferences about what we participate in.

If this is a statement prepared by Hiram as his own personal viewpoint he has no obligation to any of us to even consider modifying any part of it. In that case we all agree or disagree as individuals and wish each other well.

The trick in any organized activity involves being clear with others what they are getting into by that group activity. So its really presumptuous to say more than "I agree" or "I disagree" when there is no request or mechanism or idea that anything is open to change.

I am personally perfectly good with any decisions Hiram makes because the Society of Epicurus is his project. I have just always wanted to make clear where the lines are drawn so that no one misunderstands, and that's the reason I repeat that here.

So with that as additional background I will make more comments on individual issues without implying that the list itself should be changed, as I was not a part of formulating it or any kind of officer of the Society of Epicurus.

Yes, I know, but the Tenets do not make it clear that advantage means pleasure the way the whole of the writings does. I don't suppose I'll restate that if you don't see my point, though.

On 12, regarding the gods, I would not agree that idealist interpretations are coherent with Epicurean Philosophy. He was opposed to that kind of thing.

I would take him at his word, that he intuited the existence of material beings who experienced maximum pleasure.

For myself, here is my innovation, which I do not consider incoherent with the philosophy. I don't think whether those beings exist as he described or not is a structural pillar. If he had never said it, I don't think any of the rest would be damaged. I think it is sufficient to say that not having to worry about supernatural beings at all prevents me from worrying about the stuff people worried about in his time. I am not closed to the possibility of there being some ETs out there who live as he described-- I don't see what would make it impossible, and no supernatural magic would be necessary.

However, for me, the most important part is the reminder that the degree of pleasure of our lives is on a spectrum, and right in front of me I can see that some are more skilled than others at getting it. So the part about "living as gods among men" is the most relevant, and it is pragmatically achievable right here on our planet.

If I wrote any Tenet about it, it would be not to insult Epicurus by saying he might have been lying about the gods or that he meant something different than what he said. And I would not require any member to believe in the gods as he described them, despite that being a difference with Epicurus, but I would not allow the substitution of an ideal or a metaphor. The same as we now know more about the sun-- there's no need to say he was lying about that or using a metaphor-- he was incorrect. I don't know that he was incorrect about his gods, but he might be, and I think that is acceptable to say.

I am sorry that I am posting only sporadically due to travelling. As a "subtotal" of where we are at the moment, I am agreeing in full with Elayne's commentary as to the problems she sees, and the only ones of the list that I agree with in full are the ones I listed above.

It's going to take me time to list out each one and summarize my problems with them. That's one reason I posted the subheading to this forum to the effect that no one should presume that I agree with the Society of Epicurus position simply because Hiram and I have had a cordial relationship for many years.

Hiram and I have different perspectives about what is important in Epicurean philosophy and how to promote it. To a certain extent I am glad whenever anyone writes about Epicurus, but on the flip side there is a lot of dispute about what Epicurus meant in many aspects, so it's important to be clear.

[Much more to come......]

SOE1: “Objective” nature is knowable via the sensations.

Objection To SOE1: The relevant definition of "objective" in dictionary.com is: "not influenced by personal feelings, interpretations, or prejudice; based on facts; unbiased." In this context, the most likely way a normal person will interpret the phrase "objective nature," despite the scare quotes around "objective," is that this tenet is saying that there is a reality of nature that is knowable in a way that is not influenced by personal feelings, interpretations, or prejudice. While that can be interpreted in a reasonable way to mean that what you are talking about are observations of a factual nature that can be confirmed by repeated experiment, even that is very ambiguous and overbroad and does not define the context of the point being made. In a philosophic list like this the implication is going to be taken that there are abstract ethical principles existing in nature apart from and independent of human observation. That position is the opposite of the position taken by the Epicurean texts. Per Epicurus the universe has no center, no organizing supernatural or outside force, and nothing exists eternally unchangeable within nature other than the elements and void. The most controversial issues in human life that Epicurus addressed is whether there are things such as "virtue" or "good" or "moral worthiness" or "supernatural gods" that exist for all people at all times and all places. This is where people like Catherine Wilson, and Hiram in many of his writings, get Epicurus wrong. Epicurus held clearly (explicitly in PD 30-40, and many other places implicitly) that there is no absolute or "objective" morality of any kind. Starting off the list with a sentence that can be read to imply that objective morality exists, or even that there is a single perspective from which any matter of any kind can be viewed as always the same over time and place, undercuts this key aspect of Epicurean thought.

SOE2: “Subjective” nature is knowable via the value-setting pleasure and aversion faculties, by which we know what is choice-worthy and avoidance-worthy.

Objection To SOE2: Much of my objection to SOE1 is relevant here because dividing observations between objective and subjective on an ambiguous and broad basis simply reinforces majority existing religious / secular humanist error that there is a single "good" or proper way to live that is valid for all people at all places and all times. Further, to the extent we are now talking in a way that acknowledges that people *necessarily* view nature through their subjective faculties, pleasure and pain are not the only faculties by which nature is knowable - Epicurus set out the full list of the five senses, the feelings (pleasure and pain) and the anticipations. In this context the word "value" can also be ambiguous, because it can be read to imply that pleasure and pain should be used to develop abstractions ("values"?) that then take the place of the feelings as an absolute rule. If Epicurus stood for anything in the field of ethics, it is that the faculty of feeling, which is purely contextual and changes over time and place and is never exactly the same between individuals, must always be understood to take precedence in choices and avoidance. Even the use of the terms choice-WORTHY and avoidance-WORTHY carries an implication that is non-Epicurean. There is no action or avoidance that is *always* to be chosen or *always* to be avoided regardless of context, and any description that implies that a course of action should be taken or avoided apart from the particular results that it brings is unEpicurean. The term "worthy" and "worthiness" is to my observation generally associated in most discussion with absolutist religious/secular humanist/ idealist systems.

SOE3: While sensations tell us that something IS or exists, it does not tell us WHAT it is. For THAT cognitive process, we must rely on a faculty tied to both language and memory. The faculty of anticipation helps us to recognize abstractions and things previously apprehended.

Objection to SOE3: This formulation sounds uncomfortably close to Ayn Rand, and suffers from the same ambiguities. The issue is not that everything can be placed into an abstract Aristotelian or Kantian category that floats in the air and to which all must confirm. The issue is that "what" a thing is ultimately comes down to "how it relates to us." Language and memory and the faculty of anticipations do not put us in touch with a cosmic system by which we can categorize everything to tell us "what it is" apart from our own existence. The essential point here is that since we are talking about epistemology here, the fundamental must always be kept first that we perceive nature subjectively through our individual faculties, and that there is in fact no cosmic catalog of things or ideas to which we must conform our observations.

SOE4: We may infer the unseen / un-apprehended based on what has been previously seen / apprehended by any of our faculties; and we may re-adjust our views based on new evidence presented to our faculties.

Objection to SOE4: First I objection to the use of the word "may." We in fact "must" make judgments (or decide to suspend judgment) if we are going to survive, or hope to live pleasantly. In order to live happily in the face of religion and our questions about the nature of the universe and life after death, we must infer the nature of atoms and void, which are imperceptible, from those things which are perceptible. Also we "must" adjust our views to conform to evidence, and that means both being firm and confident about those things which we have observed to be reliable in the past, while also taking into account new evidence that may come to our attention. The point that this tenet is obscuring is the issue of dogmatism and confidence in our conclusions. Not all conclusions are likely to be subject to change and it is not appropriate to take the modern majority position that in almost any question "anything is possible." For all of human existence there is no reliable evidence that anything has ever been created from nothing, and it is not appropriate to fail to separate questions such as that from questions that are clearly beyond all human knowledge and on which we have no information whatsoever. As written SOE4 avoids that issue of when to have confidence in our opinions, which is the most important of all.

SOE5: Our words and their meanings must be clear, and conform to the attestations that nature has presented to our faculties.

Objection to SOE5: Of course we should be as clear as possible in using words. The issue is what is meant by clarity, and how we go about being clear. The issue that I detect in this tenet is that it carries the implication that nature has "testified" ("attested") some particular abstract truth that is the same for everyone. No, nature has not done that. Nature has simply provided us a set of faculties, including the ability to form abstractions (including words) and it is entirely up to us to convey meaning through the use of words or other methods that have been established in the past by agreement to be assignable to certain observations. Nature has not attested to anyone the meaning of "yellow." Nature has simply set up circumstances in a particular time and place that most humans visualize in a similar way under similar conditions, and to these conditions certain people have assigned the word "yellow" while certain others in other languages have assigned other totally different words. The point that Epicurus was making about clarity, and avoiding going on infinitely without reaching any conclusions, is tied totally to the fundamental that observations are contextual and that different people experience things differently. Clarity comes through examples, not by connection with some abstraction made by supernatural gods, ideal forms, etc.

SOE6: All bodies are made of particles and void.

Objection to SOE6: There is a component to this that was essential to Epicurus and is controversial, and that is the issue about whether the elemental particles are themselves indivisible. Epicurus appears to have held that indivisibility is essential for a number of reasons, most apparently leading to to the need to point to something that is ultimately unchanging in order for the regularity we see in the universe to be grounded in nature and not in supernatural gods. I agree with him that the issue of indivisibility is critical and needs to be explicitly stated.

SOE7: Bodies have essential properties and incidental properties.

Objection to SOE7: This one also is probably too broad. The Epicurean physics is explicitly that there are indivisible elemental bodies which are not composed of anything smaller, AND there are "bodies" which are composed of more than one elemental particle and void. Elemental particles don't really have "essential" properties and they certainly don't have "incidental properties. Elemental bodies have shape and size and the few other characteristics that Epicurus listed, but those properties never change. It might be ok to call those fundamental properties "essential" with some definitions to explain that, but elemental particles never have "unessential" properties so talking about "essential properties" of elemental properties is probably wrong. As i read the texts and commentaries the term "bodies" is generally used to refer to those combinations of elemental properties that eventually rise in size to become perceptible to our senses. It is at that level that "essential" and "incidental" really comes into play, at the point when you can add and subtract attributes to a thing and make decisions about what is "essential" or not. Freedom or slavery, war or peace, are definitely incidental qualities that can come and go without changing the underlying nature of the thing being discussed (such as society, individuals, groups, or whatever). But it is probably a very different question to evaluate "essential properties." We might say that water is wet and can't be made un-wet without changing it's character, but who gets to say what is "Essential" and what is not? Is "essential" not a matter of human decision and definition? The word "essences" is regularly attached to Aristotelian discussions of "essences" as opposed to Plato's "ideal forms," but both "ideal forms" and "essences" are invalid concepts in Epicurean terms.

SOE8: Nothing comes from nothing.

Objection to SOE8: This is very close to the way it is stated in the texts and I see no reason to object to this. I will say that Lucretius attaches this to the statement "at the will of the gods" so that he is emphasizing that "nothing comes from nothing at the will of the gods." I need to go back and look at Herodotus to see if the same thing is stated there, but definitely "nothing comes from nothing" is a correct Epicurean statement.

SOE9: All things operate within the laws of nature, which apply everywhere.

Objection to SOE9: The concept of "laws of nature" is very troublesome today. Itis my opinion that this is regularly interpreted to be the equivalent of saying "laws of nature's god" or even "laws of god" in the sense that it implies that there is some being "Nature" which has adopted a set of rules about how everything must work. I think the proper statement is that the universe operates according to the properties of the essential particles, motion, and void, and that everything that we see arises from the interactions of those three things. There really is no such thing as a "law of nature" that applies everywhere; perhaps if you can somehow stipulate that under exactly the same conditions then the elements will respond the same way, but that seems very different from saying that "the laws of nature apply everywhere."

SOE10: All that exists, exists within nature. There is no super-natural or unnatural “realm”; it would not have a way of existing outside of nature. Nature is reality.

Objection to SOE10: I think this one is essentially a correct statement of the Epicurean position.

SOE11: The end that our own nature seeks is pleasure. It is also in our nature to avoid pain.

Objection to SOE11: "Nature" in general has no "end." The inanimate/nonliving part of nature has no relation to pleasure. The animate/living part of nature is guided by pleasure and repelled by pain. "Our own nature" -- does that mean we as individuals? If so yes, but that applies to all living things too.

SOE12: There are three acceptable interpretations of the Epicurean gods: the realist interpretation, the idealist interpretation, and the atheist interpretation.

Objection to SOE12: What does "acceptable" mean? Acceptable so as to be a member of Society of Epicurus? Acceptable so as to not be considered an enemy of Epicurus? These categories listed here have no generally accepted definitions so would require explanation. I cannot imagine that any interpretation that implies that Epicurus was intentionally being less than honest with his statements on gods would be acceptable to a "Society of Epicurus." And Epicurus' statements were very specific -- he used the term "gods" to refer to naturally-occurring, non-supernatural, non-omnipotent beings which he held do exist somewhere in the universe, but not here on Earth, and having no concerns about us whatsoever, but about which we are able to either perceive or conceive aspects of pleasurable living that can serve as worthwhile things for us to contemplate and emulate. Obviously much has been lost and is unclear but no interpretation that does not accept that Epicurus meant what he said should be acceptable (in my opinion) to a society modeling itself after Epicurus.

SOE13: The goal of religion is the experience of pure, effortless pleasure.

Objection to SOE13: This statement seems to me to have no foundation in the Epicurean texts whatsoever. Are you saying "should be" rather than "is"? In that case the goal of a "proper" religion would be to promote pleasure and avoid pain, just as the purpose of every tool would ultimately be the same. But unless I am mistaken you are certainly not meaning to imply that this "is" the goal of every current world religion.

SOE14: Death is nothing to us because when we are, death is not and when death is, we are not. Since there is no sentience in death, it is never experienced by us.

Objection to SOE14: As stated I think this is a pretty accurate summary of the Epicurean position, especially the first sentence. The second sentence is also true, but we do experience death by observing it occur in other living things, and this would probably be the appropriate point to discuss something else that is extremely important: that the "issue of death" is hugely important to us (Epicurus was referring to "the state of being dead" not the many other issues surrounding death). Many many other texts tell us to live aggressively, not waste our time, think about death in the future, etc. with the point being that it is critical to remember that we are going to die so that we are properly motivated not to waste our time.

SOE15: Under normal circumstances, we are in control of our mental dispositions.

Objection to SOE15: The "under normal circumstances" probably is so ambiguous that it negates any benefit from this tenet. The Epicurean point in my understanding is that we should work to remain in control of our mental dispositions (like we work to control everything else) so that we maximize pleasure and minimize pain. By mentioning mental dispositions without really stating anything significant about them, the implication is that you are endorsing some kind of Stoic mind control that leads to suppression of emotions. Presumably you would only want to suggest that painful emotions should be kept under control, but even that would likely be a non-Epicurean interpretation, since it is recorded in DIogenes Laertius that Epicurus said that the wise man feels his emotions more deeply than others, and this is no hindrance to his wisdom.

SOE16: Choices and avoidances are carried out successfully (that is, producing pleasure as the final product) if we measure

advantages/pleasures versus disadvantages/pains over the long term. This means that we may sometimes defer pleasure in order to avoid greater pains, or choose temporary disadvantage, but only and always for the sake of a greater advantage or pleasure later.

Objection to SOE16: I strongly object to the implication that there is a weighty Epicurean preference for "the long term" in general, over the short term in general. As stated in the Letter to Menoeceus the wise man chooses of that which is best, not which is most plentiful. In Epicurean pleasure terms this is going to back to the point that "time" is not at all the only, or the most important, way to measure pleasure. Epicurus did not provide specific methods of measuring pleasure, presumably because Nature did not establish a uniform rule for doing so. We can say that we want to "maximize" pleasure or pursue the "most" pleasure, and minimize pain and pursue the least pain, but those words do not tell us anything about time or intensity or any other specific universal way to minimize pleasure. Is it "worth it" to climb to the top of Mt Everest if you die at the summit? There is no Epicurean universal answer to that question - it is an individual choice. In that case, you only get to make that choice once (if you die at the summit) so you better be right! But there is no Epicurean way to say that the person is "wrong" who chooses to make the climb knowing he will never return.

SOE17: To live pleasantly, we must have confident expectation that we will be able to secure the chief goods: those things that are natural and necessary for life, happiness, and health. Therefore, whatever we do to secure safety, friendship, autarchy, provision of food and drink and clothing, and other basic needs, is naturally good.

Objection to SOE18: "Chief goods" is not a term that Epicurus employed and implies that there is an outside ranking of pleasure which does not exist. The natural and necessary observations are helpful for analysis because it helps us consider the result, but WE weigh the result and make our own determinations of how much pleasure and pain is worthwhile - nature does not do that for us and there is no uniform rule established by nature. All of the things you have listed (especially / even autarchy and friendship) are tools that are generally useful in the pursuit of pleasure, but for every single one of these there are going to be times when we forgo or avoid these in our own pursuit of pleasure. Even food and water are to be avoided when fasting is necessary for survival or better health; air to be avoided when holding one's breath to escape danger is necessary; etc. And so it is explicitly wrong to imply that such things are "naturally good" in each and every circumstance. The only thing that Epicurus said is **always** desirable is pleasure itself, which is the result of activities that are themselves always contextual and sometimes to be chosen and sometimes to be avoided.

SOE18: Autarchy furnishes greater possibilities of pleasure than slavery, dependence, or relying on luck; The unplanned life is not worth living, and we must make what is in our future better than what was in our past.

Objection to SOE18: This formulation screams out for a "generally" qualification, for the reasons stated above. Yes these observations are generally seen to be likely to produce the most pleasurable results, but Epicurus was very clear in presenting his philosophy as contextual, and the elevation of social choices like autarchy or independence (which implies a kind of radical individualism to many people) is likely to lead to confusion on the broader point. the Epicureans were careful even to evaluate "friendship" in terms of the pleasure it brings, and not as an end in itself.

SOE19: Friendship is necessary for securing happiness. It is advantageous to promote Epicurean philosophy in order to widen our circle of Epicurean friends.

Objection to SOE19: As just stated in relation to 18, it is perilous to imply that "friendship" as an abstraction is necessary for happiness. The Epicurean texts are clear that everything is contextual, even friendship, and this statement is not contextual - no individual example of "friendship" or any particular "friend" is stated in the Epicurean texts to be across-the-board necessary. The second sentence in this tenet seems to me to clearly be true, but it is a much more narrow statement than the first sentence.

SOE20: Human relations should be based on mutual benefit.

Objection to SOE20: This one pretty well sums up what I see as the major problem with the analysis behind most of the objections above, because it has "humanism" written all over it. Epicurus did not write in terms of "human relations" but in terms of humans pursuing pleasure individually and in groups. The last ten PD10's make absolutely clear that while "justice" is an agreement not to harm or be harmed, it is also absolutely clear that there is no way to enumerate such agreements in absolute terms, and it is also clear that such agreements are to be broken immediately when they become disadvantageous to either party's pursuit of pleasurable living. The clear point of these final PD's is that there IS NO Epicurean "Golden rule" that we must always treat others as we would want to be treated ourselves because each decision is going to be based on the circumstances of the individuals involved: there are no ideal virtues, no supernatural morals, no across-the-board rules for which there is any authority to say that we should always follow them. In this formulation, "mutual benefit" is not only hopelessly vague, but the "mutual" part has absolutely no foundation whatsoever and in fact the clear thrust of many other doctrines is the opposite. PD10 emphasizes that depravity has no absolute definition; that everything must be judged by its result, and the only standard that nature has set is that we find pleasure desirable and pain undesirable. This is the same issue where Catherine Wilson is hopelessly off base when she injects her on social preferences into Epicurean philosophy. In referring to her I give her credit in the recent podcast interview that she admits that she is outside Epicurean orthodoxy in doing so, but the matter isn't just being "outside' orthodoxy -- it turns Epicurean philosophy on its head for ANYONE at ANY TIME to suggest that their own moral or ethical preferences are anything but personal to them.

Quote from Hiram

Since you're not exactly "amenable to frank criticism" as Philodemus would put it, I will excuse myself from giving you parrhesia unless requested

I presume that is addressed to me and will say that of course I do not want you to hold back your "frank criticism." Obviously while we agree on a considerable number of things we disagree strongly on other things. The best way for everyone to move forward it to discuss things as clearly as possible to sharpen the differences. Yes those differences may lead us at some point to going totally (as opposed to partially) different ways, but if that were to happen then even that would still be for the best if it is due to legitimate differences rather than misunderstandings.

Patriarchy, Matriarchy, Hierarchy, Oligarchy, Monarchy, Diarchy, Triarchy, Autarchy, Anarchy...and happy holidays for all.

I would like to comment here, for a few greek words such as : αυτάρκεια, αυταρχία, εγκράτεια & ευδαιμονία.

The greek word "αυτάρκεια" [pron. as aftárkea] consists of two words which are : “εαυτός” (thyself) + the verb “αρκώ” [pron. arkó] that means “It’s sufficient or it’s enough” i.e. aftárkea means the self-sufficient, but some persons that do not know the greek language at all, they transformed this word, in english, as "Autarchy"!

However, as a greek Epicurean I thought to make for this specific word a small statistical research, and I made it on my personal FB profile. Well, the majority of my FB friends who know both greek and english very well, they understood (correctly) the meaning of the word “autarchy” as <<the monarchy, the despotism and dictatorship>>, since “autarchy” includes the word "ευατός" (thyself) + the verb “άρχω” [pron. árcho] that means oneself that rules/governs others. So, the word «αυταρχία» [pron. as aftarchéa], as it is used in greek language till our days, it means oneself i.e. a man that rules/governs others; and it's synonym with the word “monarchy” i.e. oneself that governs others.

Thus, the word "autarchy" has neither the meaning of the self-govern nor the self-sufficient actually, since there is already a similar greek word for the self-govern which is “εγκράτεια+εγκρατής” (pron. engrátia+engratis) and in english is "self-restraint" or "temperance". Although, Epicurus has nothing to do with the self-govern or the self-restraint or temperance, of course. Epicurus just spoke clearly for self-sufficient - aftárkea - that is a mean that is measured - as any other mean - through hedonic calculus according to the circumstances and the consequences of the experiences for the achievement of the goal of pleasure.

In addition, and in the same way "autarchy" is being used to mean "self-sufficient," I would ask: Why not transform the Greek word "ευδαιμονία" [pron. as eudaemonía] in English as "eudaemon+archy" ("pleasure-archy")? Why not? Because the deepest purpose, above all, of "-archy/archo" is the meaning of governing others! Some people seem to want to use Greek words even when they change their meaning, because they do not consider their etymology at all. And when I say "they do not consider," I mean, above all, that they do not have a clue about the clarity that Epicurus was asking for!

Quote from Hiram

that you just use my words to build a bigger wall between us, so it feel so pointless and I don’t feel like you will profit from anything I say anymore,

Hiram:

Building a wall between us is not my intent at all, and it is definitely not true that I do not profit from what you say.

As I see it, you have always had more of an emphasis on "building bridges to other traditions" while my emphasis has always been more on getting a more clear understanding of what Epicurus himself said without regard to bridges to other traditions.

I have been thinking about these issues in relationship to the sometimes competing goals of "truth" vs. "happiness." I think it is tempting for some people to start with "happiness" as their goal, and to think that it is not necessary to be concerned about whether the path to happiness aligns with "truth" or not. And then we have to overlay that with one of the issues we have discussed here, which is the issue of "objective" vs. "subjective" truth.

I cannot speak for other traditions, but I identify with Greco-Western traditions, and within that there is I think a dedication to the premise that while the "truth" may not always be happy, the best way to happiness is always going to be found by starting looking for the truth. That's why I think Epicurean philosophy starts with physics and epistemology (as did Lucretius) rather than by ethical conclusions. If it were "true" that the universe had been created by a supernatural god, then we would move heaven and earth to try to find out and conform ourselves to that divine will. And that is why Epicurus was considered a "dogmatist" -- even though we perceive the universe subjectively through our senses, we analyse the situation and have confidence that some observations (absence of a supernatural god creating the universe) are so well confirmed by the evidence that we can be "dogmatic" that we are correct on such issue.

It is only because we first start out by concluding that there ARE no supernatural gods that we conclude that feeling is the only proper goal. Now if that builds a wall between an Epicurean and all religious-based non-Epicureans, then so be it, as far as I am concerned. And to the best I can tell, that was Epicurus' attitude as well. It would be nice to expand our circle of Epicurean friends as far as possible, but not at the expense of the basic truth that the best path to happiness (a life guided by pleasure) comes by rejecting all pretence to the supernatural.

So while it is very tempting for me to stretch my understanding of the texts in an attempt to agree with you when I sense that we disagree, I think it is not a good choice to disguise the disagreement.

And that is where I think it is clear that I do profit from these exchanges with you.

As I see it, you frequently occupy an untenable middle ground between Epicurean philosophy and humanism, and I think that you sense that, but have simply decided to weigh in with humanism due to your personal preferences. I certainly have personal preferences myself, and at appropriate times and places I express them, but the reason we came together in the first place and collaborate has been the promotion of Epicurean philosophy in general, not particular applications of it with which you or I might personally disagree.

I hope for the future that we can have these discussions a thousand times over, with thousands of new people, because I think the issues we are confronting are crucial. And they are likely inevitable for many years to come. Everyone is going to have to decide whether the "truth" (which is that nature does not endorse their personal sense of pleasure) is more important than first acknowledging that it is the feeling of pleasure (which is not experienced in the same way for everyone) that is the guide, not any personal application of a specific pleasure that is the same for everyone. It is easy to have an organization dedicated to the pleasure of fishing, and within that group there can be all types of fishing which virtually everyone in the group can appreciate. But Epicurean philosophy teaches "the feeling of pleasure" as a replacement for false ideas of supernatural gods and universal ideals, rather than "pleasure as experienced by Americans" or "pleasure as experienced by Russians" or "pleasure as experienced by Saudi Arabians." And on and on -- the point is easy to see, but not to accept within the framework of supernatural religion or of idealistic one-size-fits-all theories like "humanism."

I think I see this same tension in the work of Catherine Wilson, whose recent books in many ways hark back more to the DeWitt model than to the Okeefe "absence of pain" nonsense. Wilson seems to throw her weight behind a common sense interpretation of pleasure, and she is willing to state fairly clearly that she is an Epicurean, and not a Stoic, despite what is no doubt a lot of peer pressure to "just get along" with everyone.

And yet she laces her Epicurean writings with her own personal political preferences that contradict the core issue that we are talking about -- that EVERYONE has personal political preferences because everyone is an individual with a different experience of what is pleasing to them -- and Wilson undercuts her credibility and effectiveness by not acknowledging that.

Epicurean philosophy is not "humanism" and in many ways it is the *opposite* of humanism, which is just as "universalistic" and "absolutist" in nature as is Christianity, Judaism, or any variation of Abrahamic religion.

These are the issues that I see dividing us, but I don't take them personally and I hope that you will not either. We may well take them in different directions, which as I keep saying I think is inevitable since specific experience of pleasure is not the same for everyone. But let me be clear that when I say that I am not inviting a "split" -- what I am hoping for over time is that we will have communities of Epicureans worldwide who will acknowledge that while they have their own respective views of the happiest way to live, that the basic insights of Epicurus about the nature of the universe, and the pursuit of happiness being justified by nature, gives them truly a shared basis for working out their differences in a much better way than supernatural religion or absolutist humanism would ever allow.

Hiram, I don't have time for a long reply, since I am spending time with my daughter this weekend. There is a history here that is not being directly confronted. You recently published a very cutting and misleading article that you admitted was directed at this group, and you've been dismissive of me and others in our private group messages. You've made multiple public comments that were covertly aggressive, towards Cassius, Elli, and me. It doesn't really work to "nicely" insult people as you have. So I think it is disingenuous to say all this.

I am being straightforward here. I know nothing about you personally, so I am not making a personal insult. But your direction in philosophy is _not_ consistent with science. It has a strong thread of idealism for which there is no basis in reality. I do think Epicurus' ethics was consistent with his physics. It does upset me that you are using your public platform to put Epicurus' name on a version that doesn't fit the physics. I think it hurts our chances of spreading a reality-based philosophy that leads to pleasure. I and others have tried to persuade you away from this course, but it has not worked. We have tried the friendly approach to no avail.

Epicurus was straightforward about his opponents. He called them names, like Plato "The Golden." I am not a name-caller, but I am not going to be fake with you. As long as you pursue the course you've chosen, I'm going to say I think you are making a tragic mistake. And I hope you change your mind.

Because idealism is so popular and familiar, you will have an easier time attracting fame and followers than someone who promotes the non-idealistic perspective. It sells, big time, because it's already the trend. You will have the appearance of speaking for Epicurus. This seems an utter disaster to me.

Speaking plainly about what I see you doing is not meant as a jibe at you. It is meant for the benefit of people who may be learning on this site, in hopes that they will choose a life of real pleasure instead of the idealism you are promoting. If I am not plain about it, they may miss the differences, simply because reality based philosophy is so radically unusual.

First, fwiw I find this discussion quite valuable in challenging and clarifying my understanding.

Elli as one who knows nothing about Greek, I've been curious about that word autarchy so thanks for that clarification.

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Objection to SOE6: There is a component to this that was essential to Epicurus and is controversial, and that is the issue about whether the elemental particles are themselves indivisible. Epicurus appears to have held that indivisibility is essential for a number of reasons, most apparently leading to to the need to point to something that is ultimately unchanging in order for the regularity we see in the universe to be grounded in nature and not in supernatural gods. I agree with him that the issue of indivisibility is critical and needs to be explicitly stated.

This is best split off into another thread: my sketchy understanding of atomic/subatomic particles ends at around 1978. What current sources of information are there on the subject that are comprehensible to a layman? I think some study of this would be useful in order to examine how current thinking aligns with Epicurus' conception of atoms. Much of the current understanding seems to be theoretical, as was Epicurus'. I don't want to become a nuclear physicist but I think it's a fertile topic for study and discussion. Particles, waves, energy, theoretical process... enough science to contribute to the philosophy. (I think we've touched on this elsewhere but I haven't tracked it down yet.)

Here's a link to a previous post on the subject:

Fields, Particles, and the Reality We Live In

maybe Bruce Schumm's Deep Down Things about particle physics? My dad is a particle physicist, so I have heard him talk about it all my life. He still gives me lectures on magnetic fields when I visit him.

Also, Hiram, I am uncertain about Philodemus' accuracy in representing Epicurus. You lean heavily on him. I decided to become an Epicurean because he was the only philosopher I'd ever read whom I agreed with. I tested Epicurus' words against my knowledge of the world and found him valid, which is a different process from learning the ideas from scratch. I approve of him because he was right, rather than having learned what was correct from him.

I do not find that all of Philodemus' writings are as accurate about reality as Epicurus was. I'm not 100% convinced Philodemus understood things accurately, and I don't mind questioning the value of his advice.

To Hiram Crespo Thessaloniki 15th of October 2014

5757 N. XXXXXXX Rd., XXXXX

Chicago IL 60660 USA

My dear Hiram,

I hope this parcel of mine to find you strong and well.

I am really sorry to say to you, but I did not manage to read your book.

As I told you I have many greek books to read now. I hope next month, I will read it.

Then I’ll give it to my greek epicurean friend for giving it to the publisher of “XXXXXXXXX” if there is a possibility to be translated into the greek language.

I enclose to you the tea of the mountain of gods, Olympus, and a bottle of a good virgin olive oil, as I promised.

I hope you enjoy both of them.

We keep in touch at the FB profile as usual.

With my best and friendly epicurean regards,

Elli XXX

-------------------------------------------------

This was the letter that I had sent to Hiram 5 years ago that is followed after he already sent me his book with an attached cold letter by his publisher. For speaking on Ethics that is to say, Hiram did not act like the wise Epicurus who was sending letters to his friends with many of his wise admonishments and his feelings of care above all.

However, when I did not manage for his book to be translated into the Greek language, due to the financial crisis that strikes and the editions in Greece, he did not like that of course. In the meantime, when I was speaking with frankness of speech to him e.g. as the above that is wrong to use the word “autarchy” for "self-sufficiency", as well as, for some other important issues OR when I spoke with frankness to some unknown and non-epicurean persons on the FB EP group, he suggested to delete me as an admin and as an epicurean friend from there, and please think of it, that his suggestion was in the day of my birthday when he never wished me anything at all. And that is because I did not follow educational instructions on how to write comments with prologues, epilogues, paragraphs, commas, full stop, question marks, and exclamation points! The same educational instructions were for Cassius too. Yes, indeed, this is the “epicurean friendship" that Hiram is proclaiming about and around. I wonder now who builds walls around him ? And who is the person that was never participated in anything with anyone on that FB EP group from the beginning till now? In the meantime when the newcomers were passing by from there, many of Hiram's comments were ads for his book.

But the most important is that he imagines himself that is like Philodemus who was the chief-guide in a villa-school in the Roman city of Herculaneum that was supported by a wealthy sponsor with the name Piso, and all the people must obey his epicurean -mixed with idealism - teachings. And when someone will speak to him with frankness that somewhere he is wrong, first he speaks behind his back and then he says in front of that someone that he /she does not accept the Philodemu's parrhesia, as he/she has an ill-will using a harsh language, for taking all these as personal attacks to him or to someone else like him.

So, here are some simple thoughts by Epicurus on the wise man :

- A man cannot become wise in every kind of physical constitution, or in every nation.

- The wise man shows gratitude, and constantly speaks well of his friends whether they are present or absent.

- The Epicureans assert that the wise man will not make elegant speeches.

- The wise man will not become a tyrant.

- The wise man will leave books and memorials of himself behind him, but he will not be fond of frequenting assemblies.

- One wise man is not wiser than another.

- The wise man gathers together a school, but never so as to become a leader of crowds.

- The wise man will give lectures in public, but it will be against his inclination and never unless asked.

- The wise man will teach things that are definite, rather than doubtful musings.

Quote from Godfrey

I don't want to become a nuclear physicist but I think it's a fertile topic for study and discussion.

As you say Godfrey this needs a thread of its own. As I understand the point, I too think that Epicurus would say that you don't want or need to become a nuclear physicist. The issue revolves more around what I understand to have been the logic games that the philosophers had been playing with infinite divisibility, relating too to the issue of questions like how it would be impossible to walk across a room because the distance could be looked as as always decreasing by half (poor summary but as you say - needs a different thread). I think this was an area that derives more from "it must be the case" deduction, just like the swerve of the atom. The very act of discussing it is what Epicurus advised too, because knowing that there are reasonable theories which explain things without the existence of supernatural gods goes a long way toward toward the peace of mind of all of us who are not, and never will be, nuclear physicists. And that's not to mention the peace of mind needed by the nuclear physicists themselves, who themselves do not know, and will never know "ultimate" answers.

Godfrey have you read any Victor Stenger? I know that Alex says that his physics books are very good and at least largely compatible with Epicurus, but I have not found the time to read them myself so I cannot verify that personally.