PD32

  • Bailey: 32. For all living things which have not been able to make compacts not to harm one another, or be harmed, nothing ever is either just or unjust; and likewise, too, for all tribes of men which have been unable, or unwilling, to make compacts not to harm or be harmed.

    **ΟΣA TΩΝ ΖῼΩΝ ****ΜΗ EΔΥΝATΟ ΣΥΝΘΗΚAΣ ΠΟΙEΙΣΘAΙ ****TAΣ**

    **ΥΠEΡ TΟΥ ΜΗ ΒΛAΠTEΙΝ AΛΛA ΜΗΔE ΒΛAΠTEΣΘAΙ ****ΠΡΟΣ**

    **TAΥTA ΟΥΘEΝ ****ΗΝ ΔΙΚAΙΟΝ ****ΟΥΔE AΔΙΚΟΝ·**** ΩΣAΥTΩΣ ΔE**

    **ΚAΙ TΩΝ EΘΝΩΝ ****ΟΣA ΜΗ EΔΥΝATΟ ****Η ΜΗ EΒΟΥΛETΟ ****TAΣ**

    **ΣΥΝΘΗΚAΣ ΠΟΙEΙΣΘAΙ ****TAΣ ΥΠEΡ TΟΥ ΜΗ ΒΛAΠTEΙΝ ΜΗΔE**

    **ΒΛAΠTEΣΘAΙ. **


    “Those animals which are unable to enter into an argument of this nature, or to guard against doing or sustaining mutual injury, have no such thing as justice or injustice. And the case is the same with those nations, the members of which are either unwilling or unable to enter into a covenant to respect their mutual interests.” Yonge (1853)


    “Those animals which were incapable of making compacts with one another, to the end that they might neither inflict nor suffer harm, are without either justice or injustice. Similarly those tribes which either could not or would not form mutual covenants to the same end are in the like case.” Hicks (1910)


    “Those animals which are incapable of making covenants with one another, to the end that they may neither inflict nor suffer harm, are without either justice or injustice. And those tribes which either could not or would not form mutual covenants to the same end are in like case.” Hicks (1925)


    “For all living things which have not been able to make compacts not to harm one another or be harmed, nothing ever is either just or unjust; and likewise too for all tribes of men which have been unable or unwilling to make compacts not to harm or be harmed.” Bailey (1926)


    “To all animate creatures that have been unable to make the covenants about not injuring one another or being injured nothing is just nor unjust either; this statement holds equally true for all human races that have been unable or unwilling to make the covenant about not injuring or being injured.” DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 295 (1954)


    “There is no such thing as justice or injustice among those beasts that cannot make agreements not to injure or be injured. This is also true of those tribes that are unable or unwilling to make agreements not to injure or be injured.” Geer (1964)


    “Nothing is just or unjust in relation to those creatures which were unable to make contracts over not harming one another and not being harmed: so too with all peoples which were unable or unwilling to make contracts over not harming and not being harmed.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 125 (1987)


    “For those living creatures that are unable to form compacts not to harm or harm others or to be harmed, there is neither justice nor injustice. It is the same for all tribes of men unable or unwilling to form compacts not to do harm or to be harmed.” O'Connor (1993)


    “There was no justice or injustice with respect to all those animals which were unable to make pacts about neither harming one another nor being harmed. Similarly, [there was no justice or injustice] for all those nations which were unable or unwilling to make pacts about neither harming one another nor being harmed.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)


    “For all living creatures incapable of making agreements not to harm one another, nothing is ever just or unjust; and so it is likewise for all tribes of men which have been unable or unwilling to make such agreements.” Anderson (2004)


    “Some animals are incapable of entering into compacts that agree not to inflict harm in order to avoid suffering harm: in the cases of such animals neither moral right nor moral wrong can be said to apply. Similarly, there are communities which are either incapable or unwilling to make treaties that undertake not to inflict harm in order to avoid suffering harm: [in the cases of such communities, the concepts of moral right and moral wrong cannot be said to apply either.]” Makridis (2005)


    “With regard to those animals that do not have the power of making a covenant to not harm one another or be harmed, there is neither justice nor injustice; similarly for those peoples who have neither the power nor the desire of making a covenant to not harm one another or be harmed.” Saint-Andre (2008)


    “Nothing is either just or unjust in the eyes of those animals that have been unable to make agreements not to harm each other or be harmed. The same is true of those peoples who are unable or unwilling to make covenants not to be harm or be harmed.” Strodach (2012)


    “Those animals incapable of making agreements with one another, that they may neither inflict nor suffer harm, are without justice or injustice. The same is true of peoples who are unable or unwilling to make such agreements.” Mensch (2018)


    “There was nothing just or unjust regarding any animals that were unable to make agreements not to harm others or be harmed; and likewise among any culture that were unable or unwilling to make agreements not to harm or be harmed.” White (2021)

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