Use Of The Term "Metaphysics" In Discussing Epicurus

It's slippery, and I avoid using it altogether.

I've heard pretentious scientists use "metaphysics" as a slur to belittle the discipline of philosophy, and I've heard academics use "metaphysics" as a badge of honor to belittle physical science. Barnes & Noble uses the word to advertise something closer to "magic" or "alchemy".

Within an Epicurean context, the idea of anything "after-physics" seems unhelpful. After all, the Garden "supposes the study of nature provides the proper space for the voices of the facts."

The thing is, even Aristotle's Physics could be described as a text on metaphysics according to the modern meaning of that term. Both words, physics and metaphysics, had each of them one meaning in antiquity, and have both of them quite another meaning now. In antiquity, both branches were viewed predominately through the lens of logic, and neither of them were subjected to the method of rigorous experimentation against the standards of reproducibility and falsifiability. In modern usage, that method has come to mark out the shifting boundaries between the scientific study of nature and the non-scientific, the latter of which includes both common pseudoscience (the claims of which are usually falsifiable and generally have been falsified) and what we call the philosophical branches of metaphysics, theology, eschatology, etc.--the claims of which are often not falsifiable.

I say 'usually falsifiable' and 'often not falsifiable' because most systems of thought straddle the boundary, the opinions of Stephen J. Gould notwithstanding. For example, the claim in alchemy that lead can be transmuted into gold through basic chemistry (rather than high-energy particle physics) can be tested, has been tested, and has not produced the desired result; however, the corresponding claim in Hermeticism that the divinely-natured human soul can make an analogous spiritual ascent cannot even be tested. This latter claim falls outside of what we would now call physics, but it did not necessarily fall outside of what the Greek philosophers called physics.

All of that is to say that I do not favor a change in nomenclature. Both Aristotle and Epicurus discussed whether motion was possible, and whether anything can come from nothing, and whether atoms and void or love and strife or the four classical elements were the building blocks of nature, and both Aristotle and Epicurus referred to their studies of these questions as physics. We should focus our attention instead on clarifying, when necessary, the distinction between the ancient and the modern meanings of that word.

Quote from Cassius

Quote from Eikadistes

After all, the Garden "supposes the study of nature provides the proper space for the voices of the facts."

Sounds like you have a particular reference in mind there Eikadistes?

If I may?

"Nevertheless, she [Epíkouros’ school] has withdrawn the Dialectic [and] rejects it for want of qualification; for they suppose the [study of] natural [phenomena] provides [the proper] space for the voices of the facts." from Eikadistes' own translation of Diogenes Laertios (10.31).

Quote from Cassius

This might be an American take and not have the same effect in Europe.

Same in Europe, I'd say, except less witchcraft, more esoteric (in case that matters…).

Quote from Joshua

For example, the claim in alchemy that lead can be transmuted into gold through basic chemistry (rather than high-energy particle physics) can be tested, has been tested, and has not produced the desired result

Quote from Joshua

Both words, physics and metaphysics, had each of them one meaning in antiquity, and have both of them quite another meaning now. In antiquity, both branches were viewed predominately through the lens of logic, and neither of them were subjected to the method of rigorous experimentation against the standards of reproducibility and falsifiability. In modern usage, that method has come to mark out the shifting boundaries between the scientific study of nature and the non-scientific, the latter of which includes both common pseudoscience (the claims of which are usually falsifiable and generally have been falsified) and what we call the philosophical branches of metaphysics, theology, eschatology, etc.--the claims of which are often not falsifiable.

[…]

Both Aristotle and Epicurus discussed whether motion was possible, and whether anything can come from nothing, and whether atoms and void or love and strife or the four classical elements were the building blocks of nature, and both Aristotle and Epicurus referred to their studies of these questions as physics. We should focus our attention instead on clarifying, when necessary, the distinction between the ancient and the modern meanings of that word.

I agree

The introduction of Warren's Cambridge Companion On Epicureanism says its chapters entitled "Epicurean atomism", "Cosmology and meteorology", "Psychology", and "Action and responsibility" are the ones which discuss "the major subject areas" of "physics and metaphysics".

I suppose "metaphysics" really does need an obligate qualifier, such as "esoteric metaphysics", "Platonic metaphysics", … in the same way as one wouldn't write in a vacation postcard "Dear friends, we landed safely. There is weather." Instead, weather is one of those words, which always need further qualification, too.