Is All Desire Painful? How Would Epicurus Answer?

Quote from Cassius

I would ask, "In Epicurean theory, is ANYTHING in life (even desire) always pleasurable except pleasure, or is anything always painful except pain?"

There is no pain or pleasure apart from the two feelings. I'm not saying you are intentionally, but your phrasing makes it sound like there is some abstract absolute thing called "pain" and "pleasure." There is no pleasure apart from the feeling of pleasure; there is no pain apart from the feeling of pain. When a person is experiencing something painful, there is pain. When there is no painful feeling, there is pleasure. When a person is experiencing a pleasurable feeling, there is pleasure. Saying something like "except pain" paints the wrong picture. It's similar to saying "When I'm dead..." There is NO "I" when death is present. Likewise, there is no "pain" without someone experiencing a painful feeling.

I'd also add that there is no "desire" without someone desiring something.

As to "Is All Desire Painful?"... What happens if we expand it: "Is every desire accompanied by painful feelings?" since as I said, there is no standalone "pain" without a person feeling painful feelings.

If we look at some expanded synonyms or definitions that encompass the connotations of desire (epithymia; verb epithymeo) "set one's heart upon a thing, long for, covet, desire" there is definitely a perceived lack of something that someone wants to acquire. However, there is also the idea of aspiring to something, wanting to achieve something. In that case, is it a pleasant feeling to feel you are working toward a positive goal??

I don't know if my ramblings help the discussion, but this is an interesting question. I can see how the split happened in the discussion!

Note: I started to write up a separate thread, but then noticed Cassius created this one. So I'm just copying over what I wrote there.

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In light of a recent thread on the categories of desire, and another recent conversation on the topic of this thread, I wanted to add some clarity to why I answer the title question affirmatively; yes, I am provisionally of the opinion that desire is a kind of pain. As I said in a recent conversation, this is a consistent opinion, though not a strong one. I really am quite uncertain about this.

Desire is a conscious or unconscious feeling in the mind of wanting something; a preference to have where I have not, or to have not where I have.¹ Because a.) desire is a feeling, and because b.) "the feelings are two, pleasure and pain", desire is either;

1. Always pleasureable
2. Sometimes pleasureable and sometimes painful, or
3. Always painful.

The first proposition strikes me as facially absurd, but if some one wishes to defend it I'll hear them out. The main theater of dispute is between the second and third propositions. Before I begin, I'll note something that will quickly become obvious - that this argument, which is ultimately about feelings, pathe, is also an argument about words and definition, and about how language is used and how it should be used.

Take, for example, the phrasing of the thread title; Is Desire a Kind of Pain? I argue that it is. But it could be said that in defending that precise construction I am using language in a way that is self-serving. This can be seen in my response to the following deductive argument:

• P1. There is nothing other than pain that is always painful, and there is nothing other than pleasure that is always pleasureable.
• P2. Desire is by definition something other than pain, and also something other than pleasure.
• C. Desire, then, is neither always painful, nor always pleasureable.

And now my response, in which I categorize desire differently:

• P1. The feeling of pain is always painful.
• P2. The feeling of pain is differentiable. Just as we speak of mental pain vs bodily pain, it is possible to speak with even greater precision of the kinds of mental pain, and the kinds of bodily pain.
• P3. Each kind of pain is always painful when it is present.
• P4. Desire is a kind of mental pain.
• C. Desire is always painful when it is present.

You see the importance of language. Now, here are my immediate responses to some other objections:

• Isn't my desire for the continuation of something good that I already have pleasureable?

No. The current enjoyment is pleasureable, and the feeling of security that comes with certainty of (if that were possible), or confidence in, future enjoyment is also pleasureable. Future pleasures are not pleasant until you feel them. Future pains are not painful until you feel them. Let's explore this further with the next objection:

• If it's Christmas Eve and presents are expected Christmas morning, isn't it pleasureable to anticipate those presents?

Perhaps, but anticipating is not the same as desiring. I can anticipate a slap to the face without ever desiring one. It is possible to experience both feelings at once, or, if not, then in quick succession. But the desire, when and if it is felt, is felt as a kind of pain.

Note that I have said nothing about the intensity of that pain. It may be the slightest prick, or it might be much greater.

If one does experience the desire for their Christmas presents on Christmas Eve, the desire is felt in that moment.

I'll stop there for now. Again, I don't feel nearly as strongly about this as I might seem to let on, and I think I could be easily persuaded to a different opinion. Epicurus himself refers to "desires that are not accompanied by pain when they go unfulfilled" in the Principle Doctrines. If he's right, I'm probably wrong.

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¹ I suppose I'm drawing a distinction between desires, which are mental, and fundamental biological urges, which are physical, and which even insects respond to. Do tapeworms have desires? I would think not...

Quote from Cassius

"In Epicurean theory, is ANYTHING in life (even desire) always pleasurable except pleasure, or is anything always painful except pain?"

Are you asking if a particular set of unfolding circumstances will always produce pleasure or always produce pain in a human being?

Such that:

If I am hungry and I eat something sweet it will always produce a feeling of pleasure.

-or-

If I someone forcefully sticks bamboo shoots under my fingernails it is always painful.

??

Quick thought: desire is not a feeling. Desire is a function of the mind. We can have a feeling about a desire. But desires are cognitive.

Not sure if that helps. Placing here for later.

Does the same hold for grief, sorrow, guilt, shame, fear, despair, etc?

Is happiness always pleasureable?

Is desire really only a function of the mind? Isn't it often physical... maybe even primarily physical? It ultimately has to be as everything is physical, even the mind.

One thing that's important, per my understanding of Epicurus, is to not conflate desires with pleasures. I interpret this, rightly or wrongly, as desires are not feelings and therefore not pains. Pleasure/pain is one biological function, desire is another.

I also think that it would be instructive to review modern biochemistry in this regard; it may or may not clarify Epicurus, but we have more information than he did and so it's worth reviewing the ideas from a contemporary standpoint. It's of note that our contemporary standpoint often validates Epicurus' thinking to a large degree, which is one reason why I for one find EP so appealing.

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Is there any external thing or circumstance (that is not itself defined as always painful) which at some time does not lose its character as generally painful and become pleasurable?

Does the meaning of this question change if you remove the word external?

This is a tangent, but consider the following Principle Doctrine:

Quote

PD35. It is not possible for one who acts in secret contravention of the terms of the compact not to harm or be harmed to be confident that he will escape detection, even if, at present, he escapes a thousand times. For up to the time of death it cannot be certain that he will indeed escape.

Why does Epicurus think this is a problem for "the one who acts"? Cicero in On Ends suggests that this is not an effective deterrent; would Epicurus agree with him?

On Ends, Book II:

Quote

For those things which you were saying were very weak and powerless arguments,—when you urged that the wicked were tormented by their own consciences, and also by fear of punishment, which is either inflicted on them, or keeps them in constant fear that it will be inflicted. One ought not to imagine a man timid, or weak in his mind, nor a good man, who, whatever he has done, keeps tormenting himself, and dreads everything; but rather let us fancy one, who with great shrewdness refers everything to usefulness—an acute, crafty, wary man, able with ease to devise plans for deceiving any one secretly, without any witness, or any one being privy to it. Do you think that I am speaking of Lucius Tubulus?—who, when as prætor he had been sitting as judge upon the [pg 149]trial of some assassins, took money to influence his decision so undisguisedly, that the next year Publius Scævola, being tribune of the people, made a motion before the people, that an inquiry should be made into the case. In accordance with which decree of the people, Cnæus Cæpio, the consul, was ordered by the senate to investigate the affair. Tubulus immediately went into banishment, and did not dare to make any reply to the charge, for the matter was notorious.

XVII. We are not, therefore, inquiring about a man who is merely wicked, but about one who mingles cunning with his wickedness, (as Quintus Pompeius32 did when he repudiated the treaty of Numantia,) and yet who is not afraid of everything, but who has rather no regard for the stings of conscience, which it costs him no trouble at all to stifle; for a man who is called close and secret is so far from informing against himself, that he will even pretend to grieve at what is done wrong by another; for what else is the meaning of the word crafty (versutus)? I recollect on one occasion being present at a consultation held by Publius Sextilius Rufus, when he reported the case on which he asked advice to his friends in this manner: That he had been left heir to Quintus Fadius Gallus; in whose will it had been written that he had entreated Sextilius to take care that what he left behind him should come to his daughter. Sextilius denied that he had done so. He could deny it with impunity, for who was there to convict him? None of us believed him; and it was more likely that he should tell a lie whose interest it was to do so, than he who had set down in his will that he had made the request which he ought to have made. He added, moreover, that having sworn to comply with the Voconian33 law, he did [pg 150]not dare to violate it, unless his friends were of a contrary opinion. I myself was very young when I was present on this occasion, but there were present also many men of the highest character, not one of whom thought that more ought to be given to Fadia than could come to her under the provisions of the Voconian law. Sextilius retained a very large inheritance; of which, if he had followed the opinion of those men who preferred what was right and honourable to all profit and advantage, he would never have touched a single penny. Do you think that he was afterwards anxious and uneasy in his mind on that account? Not a bit of it: on the contrary, he was a rich man, owing to that inheritance, and he rejoiced in his riches, for he set a great value on money which was acquired not only without violating the laws, but even by the law.

As I said, this is a tangent. But it might be instructive.

Time warping from ancient Rome to the recent past... Several years ago I took some notes from https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/P…58/#!po=31.0811; here are some select quotations:

“From sensory pleasures and drugs of abuse to monetary, aesthetic and musical delights, all pleasures seem to involve the same hedonic brain systems, even when linked to anticipation and memory. Pleasures important to happiness, such as socializing with friends, and related traits of positive hedonic mood are thus all likely to draw upon the same neurobiological roots that evolved for sensory pleasures.”

“We note the rewarding properties for all pleasures are likely to be generated by hedonic brain circuits that are distinct from the mediation of other features of the same events (for example, sensory, cognitive) (Kringelbach 2005). Thus, pleasure is never merely a sensation or a thought, but is instead an additional hedonic gloss generated by the brain via dedicated systems (Frijda 2010).”

“Identification of hedonic substrates has been advanced by recognizing that pleasure or “liking” is but one component in the larger composite psychological process of reward, which also involves “wanting” and “learning” components (Smith et al. 2010).”

“In conclusion, so far as positive affect contributes to happiness, then considerable progress has been made in understanding the neurobiology of pleasure in ways that might be relevant. For example, we can imagine several possibilities to relate happiness to particular hedonic psychological processes discussed above. Thus, one way to conceive of hedonic happiness is as "liking” without “wanting.” That is, a state of pleasure without disruptive desires, a state of contentment (Kringelbach 2009). Another possibility is that moderate “wanting,” matched to positive “liking,” facilitates engagement with the world. A little incentive salience may add zest to the perception of life and perhaps even promote the construction of meaning, just as in some patients therapeutic deep brain stimulation may help lift the veil of depression by making life events more appealing. However, too much “wanting” can readily spiral into maladaptive patterns such as addiction, and is a direct route to great unhappiness. Finally, happiness of course springs not from any single component but from the interplay of higher pleasures, positive appraisals of life meaning and social connectedness, all combined and merged by interaction between the brain’s default networks and pleasure networks. Achieving the right hedonic balance in such ways may be crucial to keep one not just ticking over but actually happy.” [I cringe at the use of "higher" pleasures, but overall, I'm seeing a distinction between pleasure networks and wanting (desire) networks.]

So I gather that the pleasure/pain network is separate from wanting (desire), but that they are integrally intertwined. This makes sense in light of our difficulty in determining whether desire is pain. It also reinforces the idea of desires not being the same as pleasure/pain when considered in regard to the categories of desires.

Another way to look at this might be that ice cream and desire both can lead to pleasure/pain, but neither are pleasures or pains. Ice cream and desire are different types of things from pleasure/pain, as well as from each other.

My mind goes back and forth, but one question and direction that hit me was...(I'm going to a little stream of consciousness here, so bear with me as I think through this, admittedly a little haphazardly)...

Is All Desire Painful? If one answers it is, doesn't Epicurus call us to avoid pain? I realize that sometimes we choose pain for a greater pleasure. However, if we are going to maintain that something as basic to human nature as "desire" (epithymia) is ALWAYS painful - and we know its painful - isn't that a rationalization that we should limit desires to ONLY those that are natural and necessary? If ALL desires at ALL times are painful, why would we want to engage in activity that is guaranteed to bring us pain? Note, I'm not endorsing this rationalization. But if we maintain that "desire = pain" someone could make this argument.

I know we have to have a feeling about everything in our lives while we're living. We live. We feel. I've done this before to try to get our fixation off of one English word. Here are the 19 headwords for ἐπῐθῡμῐ́ᾱ in Woodhouse, S. C. (1910) English–Greek Dictionary: A Vocabulary of the Attic Language‎:

appetite idem, page 35.
aspiration idem, page 45.
bent idem, page 74.
caprice idem, page 112.
concupiscence idem, page 156.
craving idem, page 182.
desire idem, page 215.
hunger idem, page 410.
inclination idem, page 428.
itch idem, page 461.
longing idem, page 498.
lust idem, page 505.
passion idem, page 597.
predilection idem, page 634.
proneness idem, page 653.
vagary idem, page 942.
want idem, page 961.
whim idem, page 976.
wish idem, page 983.

If we begin to say desire is different from aspiration or wish, I don't know whether we can do that and keep to the spirit of the texts we have. That comb might be too fine. I'm thinking specifically of Epicurus' desire to plan for his community's and his friends' futures in his will. Did that aspiration/wish/desire bring him pleasure or pain? Was it painful to aspire/desire a good future for his friends and school?

Digression...

Note in VS21, Epicurus only talks of necessary, natural, and harmful desires. There's no talk of unnecessary or empty. Only desires which are harmful. Is he lumping "unnecessary" and "empty" together? I don't think so. I think his categorization (with doing absolutely no research into academic papers, etc.! so that caveat) categorization of desires was a work in progress. The slightly different wording in Menoikeus, the Principal Doctrines, the Vatican Sayings, show that he revisited this idea for quite some time and we see that reflected in the various ways of talking about desires.

VS21. Nature must be persuaded (πειστέον), not overpowered (βιαστέον). And we will persuade nature by fulfilling the necessary desires, and the natural desires too if they cause no harm, but sharply rejecting the harmful desires. (Saint-Andre translation w/slight variation)

VS21. οὐ βιαστέον τὴν φύσιν ἀλλὰ πειστέον· πείσομεν δὲ τὰς ἀναγκαίας ἐπιθυμίας ἐκπληροῦντες, τάς τε φυσικὰς ἂν μὴ βλάπτωσι, τὰς δὲ βλαβερὰς πικρῶς ἐλέγχοντες.

πειστέον = win oversomeone to an act or course of actione sp. by speech or entreaty, oft. opp. compulsion or deception

NOTE the order in VS21: We are instructed to fulfill the NECESSARY desires and then the NATURAL desires " if they cause no harm" (ἂν μὴ βλάπτωσι). That "harm" is used throughout the latter PDs: PD31 (to not harm one another or be harmed), PD32 (With regard to those animals that do not have the power of making a covenant to not harm one another or be harmed... making a covenant to not harm one another or be harmed.), PD33 (Justice ...is always a compact to not harm one another or be harmed), PD35 (an agreement to not harm one another or be harmed ).

I would also add that, from the letter to Menoikeus, the "unnecessary" desires are encompassed within the natural desires in VS21: "among the natural desires some are natural and necessary whereas others are merely natural"

Quote from Cassius

whether desire is separable from pain or pleasure or both.

Desire cannot be separable from pain or pleasure because we have feelings about everything that happens to us. While we are alive, we always FEEL pleasure or pain in varying degrees. BUT is it right to say "Desire IS painful?" I'm not so sure...but...hmmm...I'm not sure.

Quote from Godfrey

Is desire really only a function of the mind? Isn't it often physical... maybe even primarily physical? It ultimately has to be as everything is physical, even the mind.

I agree that everything is physical, or material if you will. I'm not sure what you mean by "physical" in this sense. Do you mean you can "feel" desire in the sense that a particular desire "makes your heart ache" or desiring something so hard you become sick to your stomach wanting it?

Quote from Godfrey

not conflate desires with pleasures.

Completely, 100% agree with this!!

Quote from Godfrey

desires are not feelings and therefore not pains. Pleasure/pain is one biological function, desire is another.

My only hesitation with this wording is that we can feel pain or pleasure ABOUT a desire? But I completely agree that we need to remember the natural/necessary/etc. categorization is about desire NOT pleasure.

Quote from Godfrey

So I gather that the pleasure/pain network is separate from wanting (desire), but that they are integrally intertwined. This makes sense in light of our difficulty in determining whether desire is pain. It also reinforces the idea of desires not being the same as pleasure/pain when considered in regard to the categories of desires.

That does seem instructive, and I'd generally agree with your conclusions.

Quote from Joshua

Does the same hold for grief, sorrow, guilt, shame, fear, despair, etc?

Is happiness always pleasureable?

Interesting questions. I would say we feel pain in relation to those emotions, by definition... however, if someone is feeling the - let's say - "pain of fear" in a haunted house ride at an amusement park, are they feeling pain or pleasure? They expect to feel fear and yet they seek it out as a form of pleasure.

I would have to say that "happiness" is always pleasurable, especially if we're going to equate that with "eudaimonia": Reflect on what brings happiness, because if you have that you have everything, but if not you will do everything to attain it. (letter to Menoikeus) (Digression: ( just realized that he's not actually saying "we will do anything to have happiness." He's saying we will do everything to have what brings happiness. Slightly different emphasis.)

Quote from Cassius

And he who counsels the young man to live well, but the old man to make a good end, is foolish, not merely because of the desirability of life, but also because it is the same training which teaches to live well and to die well. Yet much worse still is the man who says it is good not to be born but ‘once born make haste to pass the gates of Death’.

You're on to something, but don't overly rely on that translation to make your point. Here's my translation:

So, the one who exhorts, on the one hand, for the one who is young to live nobly; and, on the other hand, the one who is old to come to an end nobly is a good-hearted simpleton not only because life is to be welcomed** but also because the practice of living well, nobly, and beautifully and the practice of dying well, nobly, and beautifully are the same. But far worse is the one who says, on the one hand, it is well not to be born; or, on the other hand, "failing this, to pass through the gates of Hades as soon as possible."

**οὐ μόνον ὰ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς ἀσπαστόν,... "not uniquely or only because of the 'welcoming-ness' of living,..." Or maybe better "because life is to be welcomed,..."

ἀσπαστός = welcome (whose arrival is a cause of joy)

Quote from Cassius

the concepts of pain and pleasure themselves "are" by definition pain and pleasure - everything else we discuss (this is what I meant by "external" earlier) is a reaction that varies with circumstance.

I don't like the word concepts here. Pain and pleasure are visceral felt sensations and are experienced by all creatures. Granted, we have to give words to them whether that is pain/pleasure, algos/hedone, dolor/voluptas. But they're not, in the end, abstract or constructed concepts like emotions.