Posts by Onenski

It looks like the Vatican Sayings show simplified versions (or with a more common language in some cases) of some Principal Doctrines.
I share a comment that can be interesting from Enrique Álvarez' dissertation:
"In both cases [PD 5 and VS 5], we can see how the genre of the florilegium is effective in the transmission of doctrine at the price of rounding off and simplifying the contents. Thus, PD 5 has become an effective aphorism that is a reminder of the reciprocal implication of pleasure and virtue.

Indeed, we understand that "this" (τοῦτο) in the last sentence refers to the doctrine taught by both members of the biconditional: if there is no pleasure there is no virtue and if there is no virtue there is no pleasure. As for SV5, we interpret that the compiler's purpose has been to express the Epicurean doctrine in the form of a simple argument having the form of the modus ponens, in this case, with negative premises: if one does not live with virtue, one does not live with pleasure; one does not live with virtue, therefore, one does not live with pleasure. τοῦτο, at the end of SV5 takes up the protasis of the first premise of the modus ponens, that is, sentence P of the form of reasoning: P then Q, and P; therefore Q." (El Gnomologium Vaticanum y la filosofía de Epicuro, 2016, p. 212)

You're right, Don, there's not a Hartel manucript, I didn't read correctly.
Besides, the author, Alberto Enrique Álvarez from the Autonomous University of Madrid gives some reasons for the νοητὸν interpretation. One of them it's that at the end of the Letter to Menoeceus Epicurus points out that philosophy is an immortal good. I add part of the Enrique's commentary:

"Undoubtedly, the usual structure of parallelisms and oppositions that constitutes many of the sentences, and even the phonetic similarity νοητόν / θνητόν, impel to the correction, which makes it possible to obtain in the text the pairs philosophy-mortal / friendship-immortal. However, these are not sufficient reasons to modify a manuscript whose writing and sense are clear.

[...]

So there is no reason to attribute to philosophy the qualifier of mortal. Hartel's correction is not necessary. It imposes on the text a spirit of symmetry that neither the sense of the sentence nor the thought of Epicurus demand.

[...]

As Bailey says, this is perhaps the greatest exaltation of friendship in Epicurus' work that remains to us; and, in the same sense, Cicero expresses himself, who assures us that Epicurus carried friendship to heaven with his praises (eam [i. e.,

amicitiam] Epicurus in caelum efferat laudibus). The fact of extolling friendship is understandable, because, as we have seen on several occasions, it guarantees security among men, which is one of the conditions of ataraxia, in such a way that it allows the wise, within human limits, to live as a god.

Now, what is not necessary is that the praise of friendship should entail the corresponding degradation of philosophy, especially when the role of wisdom in the happiness of the wise man is as relevant as that of friendship. That is why we maintain the qualifier "intellectual" that SV78 assigns to wisdom, refusing its modification by "mortal"." ("EL GNOMOLOGIUM VATICANUM Y LA FILOSOFÍA DE EPICURO", p. 460-463)

Hi everybody,
A traditional translation of VS 78 is: "The noble man is chiefly concerned with wisdom and friendship; of these, the former is a mortal good, the latter an immortal one." [Ὁ γενναῖος περὶ σοφίαν καὶ φιλίαν μάλιστα γίγνεται, ὧν τὸ μέν ἐστι θνητὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ἀθάνατον.]
I just read a different translation (I found it in a PhD dissertation in Spanish). Probably, Don can say something about it. The author affirms that the original form of the Saying is:

Ὁ γενναῖος περὶ σοφίαν καὶ φιλίαν μάλιστα γίγνεται, ὧν τὸ μέν ἐστι νοητὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ἀθάνατον.

But, he says, there was a correction in Hartel manuscript which changed νοητὸν (intelectual) for θνητὸν (immortal) (there's a footnote which refers to "Wotke y Usener 1888: 197"). Apparently, Long & Sedley (and Bailey) took that correction as well as most of editors.

In brief, the translation would be: "The noble soul ocuppies itself with wisdom and friendship; of these the one [wisdom] is an intelectual good, the other [friendship] immortal".

I think this can enrich our understanding of this VS, or at least add something to discussion.

I'll be there, see you!

Hi, everybody!

I was reading Plautus' play Trinummus ("The Three Coins"). Though it's not epicurean and there aren't specific epicurean characters, I found an interesting quote. I think it can be the description of an epicurean person:

Hic homost omnium hominum praecipuos,
voluptatibus gaudiisque antepotens:
ita commoda quae cupio eveniunt,
quod ago adsequitur, subest, subsequitur,
ita gaudiis gaudium suppeditat.

According to Perseus Translation: This individual is the very first of all men; excelling all in pleasures and delights.

So truly do the blessings which I desire befal me, that whatever I undertake is brought about, and constantly succeeds: so does one delight succeed other delights.

This is another translation: Here's the man that tops mankind entire in joys and delights beyond comparement!

Ah, the glorious way my desires work out! The way the things I want troop up to me, stand by, troop after me, joy treading on the heels of joy!

I'm interested in learning some latin, and also I think that it can be great to memorize this kind of quotes in order to have a reminder of pleasure, joy and happiness.

So, hope you like it.

So far, in my understanding of EP, pleasure and pain are complementary. Whenever I talk about my pleasure I'm referring also to a reduction of my pain and vice versa (as the vessel picture of Lucretius suggests). So, "pleasure is the goal" might be a short way to say "reduction of pain and increasing of pleasure are the same thing, and that's the goal of life, e.g. the best way a human being can live. Pleasure and Pain as absolute concepts or things don't exist, these words refer to the feelings produced by the activities we do".

I know this answer refers to a technical understanding of pleasure and pain in EP, and I understand that you, Godfrey, are trying to emphasize the role of pain in practical calculations (or, using Epicurus' words, the "choices and avoidances" in daily life).

I agree that for someone who doesn't know these nuances it's simplistic (and a little misleading) just to say "pleasure is the goal". For new people it's better to explain in longer phrases what's the best way of life for Epicurus (e. g. "the goal of life").
But, for a settled epicurean it can be useful as a reminder. At least, I sometimes repeat to myself "pleasure is the beginning and end of a happy life", specially when I'm stressed or sad.

I hope this helps. (Or, if I'm wrong, I'd like you to tell me.)

For me, Epicureanism is about: trying to be free from superstitions, looking for and enjoying satisfaction, recognizing everyday joys as well as identifying the sources of memorable pleasures. It's also to see life as a chance of living as pleasantly as we can, and death as the natural end of that chance.

ThinkingCat, I hope you find motivation to deep in epicurean philosophy, and develop (with time) your own perspective, so that you can share with us your own conception of Epicureanism in (more or lees) 30 words. 🤗

Hi, Kalosyni .

In the case of Epicureanism I think that the goal can be reached with the help of these resources:

* Reflection on epicurean arguments (reading and remembering epicurean letters, for example). Especially, the fact that pleasure is the beginning and end of a happy life.

* Memorization of principal doctrines in order to have the arguments present in daily life.

* As a way of moral reminders: portraits, rings or cups with the picture of Epicurus. The idea is to remember the practice of pleasure. (In the case of the statue, the divine Epicurus remembers the divine character of those who live pleasantly).

* Friendship and frank criticism for the correction in the practice of Epicureanism.

* Remember good moments in life (as Austin recommends): every day, or whenever we are bored or we are suffering.

For Aristotle:

* Musical education (this is parte of an educational plan in Politics VII). My interpretation is that music reproduces passions, and if we get used to moderate passions, then we are prone to moderation in passions and actions.

* Habituation (a frequent and directed practice of every virtue with the help of a teacher or any guidence). (NE, II.9)

* Appreciation of tragic plays (this can increase moral understanding of human circumstances and decision making). (Poetics)

* Friendship: a virtuous friend can help in developing virtue or correcting vices. (NE VIII and IX)

In both cases (and I dare to say that in all cases) the most important it's a personal engagement in the conception of the goal of life.

Here's a Spanish version of the text cited by Ciceron (and supposedly found in Herculanum), the APOKARTERŌN:

This is from Frischer's Book The Sculpted Word, Cassius.

Quote from Don

Epicurus is saying "most people" don't know how to be at rest or how to be active. An Epicurean should be able to find pleasure in both stillness/rest and activity/motion.

I totally agree with this interpretation, Don .
Today I shared with Cassius, Kalosyni and Joshua that it's interesting that rest and motion in VS 11 are related to the two typical (mis)interpretations of epicureanism: in one hand, we have those who say that epicureanism is like cirenaicism, a constant and endless serch for pleasures (you know, sex, drugs and rock & roll) and, in the other hand, the ascetics who say that Epicurus was just following the tranquility, or calmness.
Evidently, those who (mis)interpret epicureanism in any of those ways commit a similar mistake that people in the case of rest and motion. Life contains both rest and motion and epicureanism understands that and gives tools to find pleasures in them.

This year was published a new book on epicurean political philosophy: "Theory and Practice in Epicurean Political Philosophy. Security, justice and tranquility" by Javier Aoiz & Marcelo Boeri

Description:

"The opponents of Epicureanism in antiquity, including Cicero, Plutarch and Lactantius, succeeded in establishing a famous cliché: the theoretical and practical disinterest of Epicurus and the Epicureans in political communities. However, this anti-Epicurean literature did not provide considerations of Epicurean political theory or the testimonies about Epicurean lifestyle. The purpose of this book is to shed light on the contribution of Epicurean thought to political life in the ancient world.

Incorporating the most up-to-date material, including papyri which have been recovered from Herculaneum, documents of Greek epigraphy and the prosopography of the Roman Epicureans, this volume will bring to the foreground new testimonies surrounding the public activities of the Epicureans. In this way, the reader will learn that Epicurean political theory is, in fact, a crucial ingredient of its philosophy. As a result, this connection creates an ongoing dialogue with the Greek philosophical tradition, revealing the presence of Plato in the Epicurean philosophy."

They are latin-american prominent researchers in Ancient philosophy. I think Aoiz has worked on Aristotle and Boeri on the Stoics (I suppose this fact suggests a possible bias, but it can be interesting to see what they have to say on this topic).

Here's the Amazon link -
https://www.amazon.com/-/es/Javier-Ao…&s=books&sr=1-4

I'm interested. I love that book

The details of the Odyssey are these: Helen's drug was put in the wine of Telemachus and Menelaus, because they were crying a lot. They didn't notice that they were drinking it. The duration of the effect was of one day. After the drank the wine, they went to sleep.
The text says that they "forget every evil" or "every ill",. Since Telemachus can't forget that his father is lost (because he wouldn't know why he's in the palace of Menelaus), the drug probably just stopped the mental pain, he remembers the same.
The passages continues saying that even the death of their parents, or any relative, wouldn't make them cry for one day.
Adapting to epicurean causes of suffering, if I take the drug, it's possible that I still have worries about death, gods, security from other men, etc., but I won't feel any suffering. I could even have more pleasures: be with friends, have a banquet, study nature, dance or whatever. In this case, I guess the only problem can be prudence, because some fears are useful, and the drug doesn't permit to feel them.

Anyway, I don't want to present the thought experiment in a tricky way and make the discussion more and more hypothetical. I just thought that it's another example of the common objection to epicureanism.

Quote from Kalosyni

The correct understanding is to think about how Epicureans aim to live as blissfully as the gods. Do the ancient gods sit alone in quietude? No, they are always sitting or dancing blissfully together in a long and enjoyable feast. So they need people, and they need friends.

Thanks for that observation, Kalosyni . Maybe I was a little excited yesterday , you're right: friends not only help in facing pain, but they give color to our life and pleasures.

In Odyssey Book IV, 220-230 we can read this:
Then Helen, daughter of Zeus, took other counsel. Straightway she cast into the wine of which they were drinking a drug to quiet all pain and strife, and bring forgetfulness of every ill. Whoso should drink this down, when it is mingled in the bowl, would not in the course of that day let a tear fall down over his cheeks, no, not though his mother and father should lie there dead, or though before his face men should slay with the sword his brother or dear son, and his own eyes beheld it.

It was interesting to me the idea of a drug that produces relief from mental pains, and it's specially striking that it's present in a very ancient text.

I know the epicurean point of view on thought experiments (so I think it wouldn't be adequate to ask you if you would take the drug). But I remember the Principal Doctrine No. 10, so, do you think Epicurus would accept Helen's drug?

Also, thinking about Principal Doctrine No. 5, I think it can be interpreted like this: virtues produces a happy life, and a happy life produces a virtuous behaviour. So if that drug produces the absence of mental pain (of course, we would have to keep eating, sleeping, drinking, etc.), then we would act virtuously and pleasurably (and according to VS 79, we wouldn't disturb us or anyone else).

I think there's a common opinion that opposes to this approach (the farmacological), but if we consider the goal (the happy life), are these means adequate? If they are or not, why?

Or what do you think?

Quote from Cassius

so that you may easily know that those things which can touch the senses pleasantly are made of smooth and round bodies, but that on the other hand all things which seem to be bitter and harsh, these are held bound together with particles more hooked, and for this cause are wont to tear a way into our senses, and at their entering in to break through the body

I was recently reading this fragment of DRN. It called my attention the application of a sort of principle of similarity between our senses and the shapes of the atoms. When the atoms of a substance "fit" in our senses, we experience pleasure.

Certainly it's possible to explain bodily pleasures by pointing out to the shapes or fitting properties of the objects or substances that we see, smell, touch or hear. I guess it would be one among other explanations.

But it's very related to a passage of the Letter to Menoeceus: "Because we perceived pleasure as a fundamental good and common to our nature" (129). We feel bodily pleasure when we experience something that it's according to our body, even in an atomic level.

If my intuitions on this relation are correct, then I was wondering how we can explain mental pleasures (from an atomic point of view) if it's possible. I'm not sure if there's a thread on "simulacra". Maybe the theory of simulacrum can tell us something on the pleasure of mental pictures or memories (or it's even useful to the explanation of prolepsis as pattern recognition). Specially if our psychés (a.k.a. souls, minds, animas) cover our bodies and the simulacra incide in how we feel mentally. I don't know, maybe I'm wandering.

I don't know what you think, guys.

Quote from Cassius

The "canon" is the measuring tool given by Nature against which we compare our thoughts and speculations to decide if they are consistent with reality and with our feelings of pleasure and pain

I found this sentence interesting and I don't know if problematic. I really hope I won't misinterpret you, Cassius.

Is there an assumption that Nature gave us tools to know the world?

I've read that from an evolutionary point of view (which I think is plainly consistent with epicurean philosophy) is problematic to think that some of our capacities evolved to have knowledge of the world. Specially because knowing the world (in a complete, maybe platonic way) is not something that we needed to survive.

From this perspective (I read it in a book called "The enigma of reason" by Sperber and Mercier), as primates, and before as mammals, we needed fast, or automatic, cognitions (we can include pattern recognition, for example) in order to survive. But as a social species, we developed different capacities that include language (verbal, visual, etc.) and a capacity to convince others (give reasons and make rationalizations). None of this capacities is designed (I mean, being the product of the mechanisms of natural selection) to know truths of the world.

I think my point is just to observe the assumption that Nature gave us tools to know the world, because precisely Epicurus tried to reject the existence of purposes in Nature (or maybe not and I'm misinterpreting Epicurus 🙈). And also I thought this could be relevant, or at least interesting.

In response to this:

Quote from Cassius

I think we probably ought to be clear on this word since we are using it so often. Is it an exact synonym of "thinking" or of "consciousness" or what ?

In contemporary discussions there's a distinction between fast and slow cognitions (also called system 1 and 2, respectively) and is accepted in several disciplines (you can see more in "Thinking fast and slow" by Daniel Kahneman).

I hope this helps.

Of course! I'd love to share what I know

Thank you!

Quote from Don

Metrodorus stresses the importance of both kinds of pleasures, but he also wrote a book entitled "On the Source of Happiness in Ourselves being greater than that which arises from Objects."

Hi, Don!

I think I have another possible interpretation of Metrodorus' book title. This is the idea: who is "ourselves" referring to? The first and obvious interpretation is "each one of us, internally". Another possible interpretation is "us, as a community of epicurean friends".

What I mean is that we can derive two very different ideas from the title of the book. The first one is, I think, in some sense ascetic, or individualistic: "I can be happy and have pleasure by myself. I don't need the objects around me" (I'm exaggerating for clearness). The second one is more social: "the greatest pleasures are not in wine, banquets, money, etc. The greatest pleasures are in ourselves, people, in the moments we have in our community with our friends".

All this depends, of course, on the ambiguity of the "ourselves" in English, so if it doesn't exist in Greek, just ignore my comment 😅

In any case, my own opinion about katastematic pleasures is that I think they don't derive from epicurean physics, so the only reason we can have to defend them must be a practical reason. So, if we accept the distinction between kinetic and katastematic pleasures, it must be because is useful for having a joyful life.