Posts by Pacatus

Quote from Kalosyni

I hope this shows that Epicureans are actually embracing many desires by fulfilling desires, and that we need not fear the feeling of desire, but instead turn towards the ones that nature gives us with joy.

Well said – and bears repeating! Thank you.

You mentioned PD08: “No pleasure is a bad thing in itself; but the means which produce some pleasures bring with them disturbances many times greater than the pleasures.” [Also VS50]

That also means, to me, that no desire is a bad thing in itself. Desire is what awakens and guides the pursuit of pleasure (from your Torquatus quote: "pleasure is matter for desire" ). It’s not the desires that are a problem, but – sometimes – how we act, or refrain from acting, in their pursuit; and the consequences of their fulfillment. That is the guardrail exception – not the rule. (As you once said so succinctly: “There are no rules, only choices.” My sage therapist, when I was going through a hard time, said much the same thing. I have not forgotten your reminder! )

People who gravitate toward an “ascetic Epicureanism” often cite Epicurus’ criticism of profligacy in the Letter to Menoceus: “ … When, therefore, we maintain that pleasure is the end, we do not mean the pleasures of profligates and those that consist in sensuality, as is supposed by some who are either ignorant or disagree with us or do not understand, but freedom from pain in the body and from trouble in the mind.

“For it is not continuous drinkings and revelings, nor the satisfaction of lusts, nor the enjoyment of fish and other luxuries of the wealthy table, which produce a pleasant life, but sober reasoning, searching out the motives for all choice and avoidance, and banishing mere opinions, to which are due the greatest disturbance of the spirit.” [131, in part, and 132]

But, I would read that as a caution that needs to be seen through the lens of (contextualized by) PD10: “If the things that produce the pleasures of profligates could dispel the fears of the mind about the phenomena of the sky, and death, and its pains, and also teach the limits of desires (and of pains), [then] we should never have cause to blame them: for they would be filling themselves full, with pleasures from every source, and never have pain of body or mind, which is the evil of life.” [My emphasis and brackets]

Epicurus’ breakdown of desires into (1) natural and necessary, (2) natural and unnecessary and (3) unnatural is a wise guide to healthful and beneficial choosing. But “No pleasure is a bad thing in itself.”

Some thoughts triggered by the following comment by Don from the discussion of the Monday Zoom meeting: “One of the benefits of this forum is it gives a chance to read Epicurus and his school with fresh eyes and lets the texts, all of the available ones, speak for themselves.”

I think discussion on a forum like this can support a kind of perspectivist process of learning, viz. “the epistemological principle that perception of and knowledge of something are always bound to the interpretive perspectives of those observing it. While perspectivism does not regard all perspectives and interpretations as being of equal truth or value, it holds that no one has access to an absolute view of the world cut off from perspective.” No one has a “god’s-eye-view” – or a “view from nowhere” – from which to analyze reality.

Perspectivism - Wikipedia

Nietzchse is considered to be the first major developer of this principle:

“Nietzsche's perspectivism begins by challenging the underlying notions of 'viewing from nowhere', 'viewing from everywhere', and 'viewing without interpreting' as being absurdities. Instead, all viewing is attached to some perspective, and all viewers are limited in some sense to the perspectives at their command.”

The Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset also took a perspectivist view (is there a pun there? ).

“From different positions two people see the same surroundings. However, they do not see the same thing. Their different positions mean that the surroundings are organized in a different way: what is in the foreground for one may be in the background for another. Furthermore, as things are hidden one behind another, each person will see something that the other may not.”

– José Ortega y Gasset (some years back I read almost all of Ortega’s work).

I agree with the principle – with the following proviso: from an Epicurean perspective, such perspectivism must be properly grounded in and constrained by the κᾰνών. Otherwise, it could collapse into the kind of relativism that Nietzsche, for example, eschewed – or skepticism -- while refuting Nietzsche’s error: “There are no facts, only interpretation.”

[Remember, though, that The Will to Power is a collection of Nietzsche’s philosophical notes, not the final declaration of his thought.]

Happy Thanksgiving!

I had a chess acquaintance some years back (I recall he was a mathematician) who argued that the universe is finite but unbounded: unbounded because there isn’t anything else (including space) – hence the notion of a boundary is incoherent; finite because its expanding means that, at any moment, it is of a certain “size” (dimensionality?).

I might not be putting that well – and I have no competence re physics/cosmology. It might just reflect an overly pedantic parsing. I just thought it was interesting.

I don’t recall anything about eternality, but definitely there was no notion of genesis ex nihilo (which I also think is incoherent).

Quote from Kalosyni

The antidote to this situation is that folks ought to create an outline of what they believe are the Epicurean tenets, and include the sources in the texts.

For me (just myself) that would be a lot of busy-work that would just distract from my attempts (and sometimes struggle) to apply Epicurean thought – as best as I interpret it at the time – to my daily living. The test of those interpretations (mine) is how they work to enhance my eudaimonia (hedone, aponia, ataraxia) – without regard to whether they are “heterodox” or “orthodox,” or who judges that. That's not to say that such a practice might not be helpful to someone else.

Sometimes I share my interpretation. Sometimes (often) feedback may cause me to reconsider and revise that – but always, for me, it will come back to personal practice and experience: that, for me, is the ultimate canon.

I do not criticize – let alone dismiss! – the scholarly work that goes on here (translation, analysis, interpretation, etc.). It has helped me.

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Addendum (sorry): I did do a personal outline when I first came here; I've revisited it a couple times. Maybe will again, if I think it will be helpful on my journey.

Just to note, Lampe is author of The Birth of Hedonism: The Cyrenaic Philosophers and Pleasure as a Way of Life, which I read.

One of the interesting things that I recall is that, on what are often taken to be the major differences between the Cyrenaics and the Epicureans – i.e., the Cyrenaics’ emphasis on physical, as opposed to mental, pleasures; and a strict “presentism,” as opposed to including future considerations in building a life of eudaimonia – Lampe argues that, although they are differences, they are more differences of degree than of substance. For the rest, ask me no questions!

Disclosure: I’ve never been a big fan of didactic poetry (no real justification: de gustibus non est disputandum). But I am getting some renewed interest here in the role that lyric verse might play in that context. Partly, I have Kalosyni to thank for that: her introduction of Omar Khayyam into Epicurean consideration a while back led me to 1) buy new copies of the Rubaiyat (kindle and paperback) to keep by my side, and 2) to explore, just a bit, Fitzgerald’s steadfast belief that Khayyam – far from being a Sufi – was really an Epicurean (at least in spirit).

So now I may be finding new ways to look at Lucretius …

I also found this review of another overly-expensive book: https://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/1997/1997.02.12/

I think this might have been the thread: Introduction---Joshua's Notes on "The Good Poem According to Philodemus", by Michael McOsker

Here is a link to a PDF copy of the full Yapijakis and Chorousos article quoted by Patrikios above:

https://societyofepicurus.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Yapijakis-Chrousos_Epicurean-Eustatheia.pdf

Here is a link to a PDF of the Christos Yapijakis article quoted by Patrikios above: https://www.epicuros.gr/arthra/23_filo.pdf

This site has a brief review of the above book: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/…018401E33F97963

The book itself is well beyond my budget.

Reading the free sample on Amazon of the book mentioned by Joshua at the recent Zoom meeting, I came on this quote:

“While Epicurus scorned poetry as frivolous, Lucretius believed Epicurean philosophy needed poetry’s explanatory and persuasive power to be understood and embraced, and he justifies his choice to write in verse with a robust defense of natural philosophical poetry.”

– Jesse Hock, The Erotics of Materialism: Lucretius and Early Modern Poetics.

I seem to recall some discussion on here (maybe re Philodemus' treatise on poetry) about whether Epicurus' was a general dismissal of poetry per se, or whether he was reacting to the superstitious nature of such Greek poetry of his time, as in Homer.

I have finished Aioz and Boeri’s Theory and Practice in Epicurean Political Philosophy: Security, Justice and Tranquility. These are my personal thoughts:

Despite the extensive lacunae in the received Epicurean literature; despite the anti-Epicurean slanders of such as Cicero, Plutarch and Epictetus; and despite those slanders having been accepted by many modern scholars – even those sympathetic to Epicurean philosophy, even those attracted to it – despite all that, there is an identifiable, if bare-bones and subject-to-personal-adaptation, foundation for socio-political activity in Epicureanism based on social compacts against harm, with considerations of justice and equity.

And, for me, that brings some “peace of mind” (ataraxia). Here’s why –

It made me realize that there is a cogent philosophical, socio-ethical counter to (a) Platonic illusionism, (b) Stoic virtue-flogging, (c) divine-command superstition and (d) perhaps especially in my case, Kantian duty-mongering (his metaphysics of morality) other than the “moral noncognitivism” that I briefly embraced.

My socio-political activities now are much reduced, compared to my years before retreat-to-the-country retirement – or subsequent late-life move back to more urban environs – mostly voting and occasional voice. I can look back on those years without thinking they are wedded to delusive aberrations vis-a-vis Epicureanism. Or reflecting an unrecognized moral noncognitivism. Although I certainly didn’t know it at the time, they seem perfectly in accord with Epicurean notions of social justice/equity – rooted, perhaps in prolepsis, but also subject to rational analysis.

And, as I say, that brings me some peace of mind.

I recommend Aioz and Boeri unreservedly (though it is a bit of a scholarly slog).

Thank you for bearing with me …

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LATE ADDENDUM: I want to add that, far from any criticism (express or implied) for those who choose lathe bios and general escape from the political vicissitudes and social turmoils, I heartily affirm that choice. It has been mine for much of my post-middle-age life – and mostly still is. I am not anti-social, but do live much of the time as a quasi-recluse.

Quote from Don

Maybe disagreement is a little strong

Don

From Aioz and Boeri:

“The normative or regulative function of the Epicurean political model is embodied in the preconception of the just.”

[I’m nearly ¼ through the book. So, much more to wade through.]

Just a note on personal “context”: Epicurean philosophy offers – to me – well-prescribed guardrails against my innate Cyrenaic instincts, and a cogent, practical countervailing philosophy vis-a-vis my Kantian/Stoic upbringing/programming. A late discovery on both counts. Everything else is secondary (though clearly intellectually interesting – and therefore a source of pleasure ).

@ Cassius : With regard to the gods, I agree (but there remains the idealist-versus-realist question…). With regard to pleasure=absence of pain, that formula is somewhat dependent on the context of Epicurean philosophy (in which there is no “neutral” state) – much, perhaps, as pathe in Stoicism needs to be understood, formulaically, as something other than eupathe.

But – on his deathbed, Epicurus was clearly in pain. He was able to find compensating pleasure (and happiness) elsewhere. That is part of the power of the philosophy.

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In that context , I think we stop trying for non-contextual understandings generally. A famous (infamous?) Wittgenstein quote on terminology: "Don't look for the meaning; look for the use."

Quote from Don

In modern Western culture, this is what happiness means for most people: a fizzy, effervescent quality that many people see as inherently short-lived. "Are you happy?" means, it seems to me, to most people to convey a bubbly, giddy feeling

I disagree (not what I generally mean – even without much reflection). And I disagree that there is (or can be) some non-contextual definition of “happiness” that can be applied except in the most abstract of cases. The same for “pleasure” – really no less problematic than “happiness.”

I think the search for some philosophical, context-free precision in such language will always fail – except in the narrow hallways of academia. In this, I continue to follow Wittgenstein’s insights on “ordinary language.”

With that said, “happiness” and “well-being” (as opposed to “ill-being”) are not – to my mind – unrelated. And, as has been discussed many times, that embraces the mental as well as (and maybe even more so than) the physical – e.g., Epicurus on his deathbed.

And, in Epicurean philosophy, “happiness” (and well-being, for that matter) is related to pleasure – the pleasurable/pleasant life. As opposed to, say, Stoic virtue.

Don , You and I have disagreed on this before. I have thought of eudaimonia as “happy well-being.” I continue to do so, as I still think they are related. A disagreement among friends : and one that itself may depend on context.

Oh -- and kudos on the Monty Python reference!

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I have not addressed “meaning.” Another broadly-defined term. And, to my mind, far more fraught than “happiness” – which is something that I feel.

An interesting article on scientific studies of corruption in the English-language edition of El Pais. (I’ve been lately reading a few non-US news outlets, to get away from any “suffocation” from strictly local views.)

What science reveals about our tendency toward corruption

A bribery experiment involving people from 18 countries reveals that the phenomenon is largely subject to circumstance

english.elpais.com

This particular quote caught my attention (from an Epicurean point of view): “The prestigious researcher Robert Klitgaard summarized it by saying that corruption is not a crime of passion, but a crime of calculation. And people who choose to be corrupt are making very explicit calculations — namely, how much profit they can make, how likely they are to get caught and the consequences if they are.”

But there are some other views, that indicate pathe might also be involved ...

On re-reading this whole thread, I have some (possibly disjointed) thoughts:

1. Maybe we should allow all the meaning possibilities of δίκαιος, and allow our translation/understanding to rest on context (such as “justice” or “civilized behavior” or …). The same for the concept of justice itself: it is not synonymous with broader terms such as “rightness” or “moral” (which I generally take in a social context, as opposed to ethics – but sometimes they are treated as synonymous). And I think the appropriate limits of that term, in line with Epicurean philosophy, are well-delineated here.
2. Along the lines of Cassius reference to “malum in se” (or “bonum in se”), I think there can be some provisional Epicurean affirmation of something like those notions (excluding idealisms such as Plato’s or Kant’s). And I suggest appeal can be made to prolepsis.
3. We have talked about prolepsis as an innate ability for pattern recognition. But I think that is too narrow. I have used “intuition” – as “a. the power or faculty of attaining to direct knowledge or cognition without evident rational thought and inference; and b. immediate apprehension or cognition.” (Merriam-Webster)
4. Although that faculty will vary individually, I take it as an innate hereditary ability across humanity – as much as the other criteria for knowledge: sensation and feeling. Perhaps evolutionarily. And I think there are broadly common (though not absolute or universal) prolepseis (which themselves may give rise to pathe) including moral questions – e.g., the raping of an infant. Even in a group that had no “justice compact” regarding that behavior. And I don’t think that is strictly a matter of an individual’s proclivity for pleasure or choice-worthiness.
5. Therefore, prolepsis could provide a natural foundation for some common perspectives on what people might think of as “malum in se” or “bonum in se” – without any appeal to idealisms. Universal/absolute? No. But a broad generality based on a commonly evolved faculty.

All of this really came in a rush of mental “hypertexting,” so might not be so carefully laid out …

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Aside: There was some discussion about how broad a community/society might be appropriate to consider – e.g. the polis, the nation, etc. I would suggest that, in our highly connected modern world, the old Stoic idea of kosmopolites is not totally out of bounds: trying to hide out with your select group of friends – or even a metaphorically walled-in nation state – may not, ultimately, offer all that much security. And I’m not much into being a bread-and-water-in-a-cave survivalist.