Posts by Pacatus

Thoughts on Organization

The following are loosely adapted (and stripped down) from the “twelve traditions” perspective of AA and other 12-step groups:

1. The Epicurean Community (the “Garden”) exists for the common well-being and happiness of its members, as founded in Epicurean philosophy and based in friendship.
   
   
2. There is only one authority for the Community, and that is the Canon,* as it has evolved and is actively interpreted by the Community members themselves.
   
   
3. The only requirement for membership is the sincere desire to learn and apply Epicurean philosophy personally in one’s life, according to one’s own circumstances and understanding.
   
   There are no “loyalty oaths” or “pledges of allegiance” required.
   
   
4. The Epicurean Community is a community, not an institution. Hierarchical structure should be minimized – while recognizing leadership roles such as “administrator” or “monitor” or “secretary” and the like (for in-person as well as online groups and meetings) as necessary for the functioning of the Community.
   
   
5. Although professionals in various disciplines (such as philosophy, sociology, physics, neuro-science and the like) may have much value to add to the understanding of Epicurean philosophy – especially its application in modern times – the Garden is not a professional association, but a community of like-minded people, all of whom have a voice.
   
   With that said, individual members have varied areas of expertise (such as translation) and levels of knowledge pertaining to the philosophy itself, which ought to be acknowledged and respected.
   
   
6. No dues or membership fees should be required (as this might effectively deter from membership some who sincerely desire to learn and apply Epicurean philosophy). But voluntary contributions may be openly welcomed as needed to support the practical functioning of the Community – so long as they are not used to create a “ranked hierarchy” of membership status on that basis.
   
   This is not to preclude membership designations based on such things as participation in the Community.
   
   
7. Both the Community (as a group) and individual members may pursue outreach activities for the purpose of bringing Epicurean philosophy to as wide an audience as possible. But members who prefer to remain anonymous as such, outside the Community, should have that anonymity honored and protected by all in the Community.
   
   
8. No member of the Community should ever, in such a way as to implicate the Community (or pretend to speak on its behalf), express any opinion outside on such controversial issues as those of partisan politics or sectarian religion.
   
   (Anyone may, of course, express their personal understanding of how Epicurean philosophy informs their opinions on such matters – while taking care not to implicate the Community or its other members.)
   
   
9. All discourse among members should be characterized by civility, respect and friendliness – even (and especially) where strong opinions differ.

++++++++++++++++

* “Canon” here could include all of the “classical” Epicurean corpus – such as Lucretius; or only the extant works attributed to Epicurus himself, with others included as “classical” interpreters.

+++++++++++++++

These are my thoughts – but I would not argue them, or make an issue out of any of them. I’m just, personally, not that strongly wedded to the question.

A simplistic example of what Wittgenstein meant by confusing the context of different “language games” –

Behind a closed door, I am heard to say: “The goal is to topple the king.”

Outside the door, royal guards hear my utterance and rush to warn the king of a pending coup.

But I am really hunched over a chess board, talking about the ultimate goal of chess: checkmate.

Quote from Kalosyni

I wasn't specific enough

I doubt that perfect precision in language is ever possible. Maybe the most we can strive for is to understand one another (in whatever Wittgensteinian “language game” sets the context).

But you’ve laid out some good guidelines here – so I wouldn’t lament that you weren’t “specific enough”: I think we all get it (within the “language game” where we are aware of Sedley and Frances Wright) – so I think you did a good job.

+++++++++++++++++++

EDIT: I also think this goes to Philodemus’ understanding of poetry (as opposed to philosophical prose) – and its purpose. Didactic poetry is possible, but even there (à la Lucretius) we have metaphor and such, that need to be interpreted.

“Even the principle of Epicurean pleasure requires making sacrifices.” It requires choices and trade-offs. And not sacrifice to the “principle” – let alone to some “principle of Epicureanism.” And the trade-offs are simply for the practical goal of happiness defined as the most pleasant/pleasurable life (which includes others). You seem to be largely just substituting the word “principle” for “ideal.” Or perhaps deliberately confusing them. Are you trying to craft an “Epicureanism” that is really subsumed under Stoic values and ethics? It sounds like it.

I am sure you’ll be able to find plenty of people to take loyalty oaths and pledges of obedience, and to sacrifice themselves on the altar of your principles, Peter, at the beck of their leaders (under whatever “ism” you invoke). I will not be one of them – and that’s on principle. (Argumentum finale est.)

Quote from Peter Konstans

The requirement that people should be willing to sacrifice their lives to save their friends and maintain their honor and integrity would ensure that we attract serious people.

That strikes me as quite different from being willing to sacrifice one's life for a set of dictated principles.

Peter, you might find this essay informative: https://www.academia.edu/36564126/The_P…_the_Epicureans

I have become, lately, more interested in Gaius Cassius Longinus – particularly the relationship between his anti–totalitarian (anti-Caesarian) politics and his Epicurean philosophy. There seems to be some question as to how much his Epicureanism informed (or at least supported) his extreme actions in support of the Republic – as opposed to Julius Caesars’s totalitarian quest.

An analogy that I thought of is Christian theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s implication in the plot to assassinate Hitler (for which he died in a Nazi concentration camp).

Discussion?

+++++++++++++++++++

Do I need to say that I am not affirming political assassination as a moral choice? I am just asking the broader question …

His main biography is here: Gaius Cassius Longinus - Main Biography

So, Peter, in this “Epicurean ‘church’” you seem to espouse –

Would those who disagree with any of its tenets/creeds/commandments be told to simply “get in line, or get out?” Would that be a free choice, or come with threats – à la the Catholic Inquisition?

How authoritarian (totalitarian) would the kind of leadership hierarchy you seem to propose be?

Would there be some kind of incentivized informant network to identify heretics?

My eldest son identifies as a (neo-) Stoic: Would I need to shun him? Denounce him?

I have dear friends who identify as (liberal) Christians – do I need to mock/shun/denounce them?

You seem to think that people should be willing to sacrifice their lives for the prescribed “Epicurean” principles. Is that not just another demand for absolute allegiance to an idealism?

And what price personal integrity?

++++++++++++++++

I personally doubt that what would survive under your program (as outlined here) would be “Epicurean” except in name only, since I think that this philosophy is – at core – anti-idealist. And anti-totalitarian.

Eikadistes: If religious feelings (e.g. awe and wonder) and sentiments – and rituals and the like, inherited or your own – bring pleasure, then embrace them. I always liked “high church” services – Episcopalian – with the bells and incense, etc., after a priest friend described it all as “holy fun”. And I can still take pleasure in Gregorian chant. And I can find inspiration and intuitive insight in contemplating various archetypes of the “divine” as representing the highest blessedness and eudaimonia, or as aspects of nature – even if I don’t think they exist in reality (I tend to the “idealist” understanding, but I also maintain a certain agnosticism on the subject), with what I take to be an Epicurean attitude (a strict-atheist psychiatrist that I briefly knew – not as a patient – suggested similar contemplation as usefully therapeutic).

But when I could not believe in, and bind myself to (religare), the “cultic” rules and commands of the church – adherence to received theology and creeds without question, confession of sins for salvation, etc. – then it was time to extricate myself (even if that was painful at the time). I suppose that one might participate in such religious ceremonies as a (secret) Epicurean, but I could not (or at least I would have to eliminate for myself certain contents of the service, and just be quiet).

Having travelled a long way from a darker version of Christianity to a more enlightened, open-minded version to Zen to (briefly) a neo-Stoicism, I find Epicureanism to be a kind of Kuhnian “paradigm shift” in thinking – in many ways, including questions of gods and religion, and religious activity. And I found Joshua‘s point about pietas versus religio in post #25 helpful.

With all that said, I go back to Kalosyni‘s 5 points in post # 16: If they apply to your understanding of religion, then I have no problem (but, again, that seems to reflect a kind of paradigm shift from more conventional understandings of the word).

“The trouble may be cleared up by considering the terminology used by these two philosophers.”

Yes – as when the Stoics distinguish between pathe and eupathe, while the Epicureans treat pathe as such: signaling either pleasure or pain/disturbance (physical or mental).

The Epicurean division of aesthesis (sensus), pathe (adfectio) and prolepsis (intuitio) seems just, all round, more clear.

“Philodemus seems to make explicit the connection between affections and self-consciousness, and he identifies affections as ‘sense perceptions of themselves’ (ἑαυτῶν ἐπαισθήσεις, col. XII). This is underscored in col. XV, where Philodemus says that we have a perception of pleasure that is discrete from our perception of the object that produces it. In the same column, Philodemus makes another important claim: that “we also have a perception of (ἐπαισθάνεσθαι) the fact of seeing.”

And (although I could be wrong) I don’t see that “being aware of x” and “being aware that I am aware” and “being aware that I am also aware of the affect that being aware has upon me” necessarily leads to an infinite regression. Except in the most radically abstract application of logic.

Zeno was Philodemus' teacher.

Zeno of Sidon - Wikipedia

“Women are the only exploited group in history to have been idealized into powerlessness.” Erica Jong

(I never really read her prose – e.g. her novel Fear of Flying – but I have her book of selected poems, Becoming Light, into which I delve for inspiration now and then. “I guess the thing that I'm most proud of is that I kept on writing poetry. I understand that poetry is sort of the source of everything I do. It's the source of my creativity.” Erica Jong)

Ah, ever the zealous romantic – I,
painting butterflies on philosophy,
whilst drawing on the Canon redes to keep
sane amidst the raucous insanity,
wonder on love: embrace, and laugh – and weep.

+++++++++++++++

“rede” – (archaic) counsel, advice, guide.

Quote from Don

Epicurean or not, women's lives were circumscribed within the general Greek culture.

Epicurus pushed the edges of such circumscription within the Garden (it seems to me) – and that’s clearly all he could do. But that “that’s all” can serve as an exemplar for when circumstances change – and the Leontion’s and Themistas of our time (and other strong women) can be celebrated.

Quote from Cassius

the argument that he was a strong opponent or he forbid it is to me just more evidence of how hostile much of the academic world is to Epicurus

Even among scholars who, for one reason or another, carved out for themselves a niche in Epicurean scholarship. Even if sometimes it's a subconscious bias that creeps in. I hope Sider's work on the actual poems of Philodemus is better!

Whilst reading Sider on Philodemus poetry, I came across the following –

Sider (pp. 35-36):

“as both Chilton and Grilli agree, Epicurus does allow his followers to marry, although only in exceptional circumstances. This view is in line with the several other less than absolute strictures of Epicurus listed by Diogenes, including the general prohibition against writing poetry.38

“What these exceptional circumstances are neither Epicurus nor our sources spell out, but we may imagine that much would depend on the character of the woman. Since, moreover, women were welcome into the Garden for their intellectual abilities, these fellow Epicureans would seem to be obvious candidates for wives. Since, furthermore, women were appreciated for their bodies as well as their minds, sex being regarded as a providing a natural, albeit unnecessary, pleasure, sexual passion would not be expected to stop at marriage. …

“A woman who could satisfy both body and mind would make the ideal wife.”

Use of the phrase “allow … although only …” implies that Epicurus’ authority was such that he could also forbid (disallow) his followers from marrying.

++++++++++++++++++

Now the comments in this thread, including Cassius in post #8 and Don translations, indicate that no one here would be in agreement with such authoritarian innuendoes. Nor does Hick’s “Occasionally he may marry …” imply that.

But there seems to be some such authoritarian interpretation out there in the scholarly world.

++++++++++++++++++

I looked up the Chilton article, "Did Epicurus approve of marriage? A study of Diogenes Laertius 10.119" and found it here: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4181668…an_tab_contents

Chilton proffers the following interpretation: “In general the wise man will not marry but sometimes depending on the circumstances of his life, he will marry” – but then argues that it must be wrong.

Chilton also discusses the question of the wise man “turning away from his purpose,” etc., discussed in this thread above from post #5.

But Chilton does not – unless I missed it – suggest that Epicurus in some authoritarian manner allowed/forbade marriage unless some approved conditions were met.

+++++++++++++++

Chilton is also cited here, “Epicurus on Sex, Marriage and Children” by Tad Brennan: https://www.jstor.org/stable/270440?…an_tab_contents

Brennan says that Epicurus “advised against marriage … but permitted it in exceptional cases.” (p. 348-349) This could be taken as a somewhat weaker position than Sider’s – but seems a bit confusing.

He also says, referring to Epicurus’ will: "These texts, then, show that Epicurus did permit and indeed encourage marriage and child-rearing-not as a rule, but for certain Epicureans, in certain circumstances. And they also indicate what sort of circumstances these were.”

He concludes on marriage: “By and large, Epicurus will advise Epicureans not to marry, but sometimes, in exceptional circumstances, he will advise certain of them to marry.” (p. 350) Advise, not allow/permit/forbid.

All in all, Brennan seems at best sloppy on his use of language.

A quote from Sider’s book:

“In addition to the above considerations in the proper assessment of poetry, another important criterion requires that hearing or reading the poem in question provide its audience with pleasure of a correct Epicurean sort. In brief, as Asmis ably demonstrates, Epicurus, despite what later detractors said of him, was willing to accept poetry, although with reservations. In particular, the wise man could be trusted to have the proper attitude, able to listen to the recitation of poetry without succumbing to its Sirenic charms or accepting its claims to do anything more than provide harmless pleasure. Poetry, that is, can be classified in Epicurean terms as a natural but unnecessary pleasure. As such it was allowed a place at the banquets attended by Epicureans, where, at least originally, it was listened to but not subjected to immediate literary criticism, which would detract from the pleasure. … It is thus possible to apply Philodemos' general view of poetry to the epigram in particular, as the performance of epigrams at dinner parties (see above) fits perfectly into our picture of the symposia held in the Epicurean Gardens of Naples and surroundings.”

Joshua and I discussed some of this briefly before at RE: Introduction---Joshua's Notes on "The Good Poem According to Philodemus", by Michael McOsker

Another interesting comment by Sider in a footnote: “Like Aristotle, Philodemus demands ordinary human values. Differently from Aristotle, however, Philodemus clearly distinguishes the ‘thought’ of the poem as a whole, as presented by the poet, from the thought of the characters."

Quote from Cassius

Anything significant you think worth discussion about that, please post a new thread - perhaps in the subforum on Philodemus

Will do. I'll keep this thread on topic to Philodemus' poetry.

While working on my Philodemus poem, I just stumbled on the book The Epigrams of Philodemos: Introduction, Text, and Commentary by David Sider. Now I feel the need to read it before continuing. But, in the early pages, he broaches a very interesting topic: that the relationship between various sub-schools of Epicureanism was not all peace and light. Philodemus was loyal to his teacher Zeno of Sidon, and engaged in “much internecine polemic” with the Epicureans of Rhodes (where Philodemus may have also studied for awhile).