Posts by Bryan

I would be very grateful for any information in regard to finding Giovanni Indelli and Voula Tsouna's treatment of Philodemus' On Choices and Avoidances, published by Bibliopolis in 1995. Dr. Tsouna let me know today that she is not aware of any place the book is available, and she only has two, one here with her in California and the other in Greece, so she was not able to provide me with a copy.

Here is KD 10 from a somewhat different angle:

εἰ τὰ Ποιητικὰ τῶν περὶ τοὺς ἀσώτους ἡδονῶν

ἔλυε τοὺς φόβους τῆς διανοίας

τούς τε περὶ μετεώρων καὶ θανάτου καὶ ἀλγηδόνων

ἔτι τε τὸ πέρας τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐδίδασκεν καὶ τῶν ἀλγηδόνων :

οὐκ ἄν ποτε Εἴχομεν ὅ τι μεμψάμεθα αὐτοῖς

πανταχόθεν ἐκπληρουμένοις τῶν ἡδονῶν -

οὔτε τὸ λυπούμενον Ἔχουσιν -

Ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κακόν·

If the things that produce the pleasures of degenerates

released the fears of the mind

about the heavens and death and pains

and if those things taught the the Limit of desires and of pains:

then we would never have had anything to hold against them

who would be filling themselves from all places with pleasures-

and they would not have pain or sadness from any place-

which is exactly what 'evil' is.

 TOYC ΑCΩΤΟΥC “profligates” οἱ ἄσωτοι–τῶν ἀσώτων: libertines, spendthrifts; a lost case; from ἄσωτος–ἀσώτη–ἄσωτον: having no hope of safety, in desperate case, abandoned, past any hope of recovery. ἄσωτος

ΜΕΜΨΑΙΜΕΘΑ “(then we would not) blame” μέμφομαι–μέμφεσθαι: hold (acc.) against (dat.); here, “we would (not) have held (ὅ τι) against (αὐτοῖς).”

Thank you, Elli, for your response. I thank you also for your past comments on TO AΦΘΑΡΤΟΝ with its meaning of "that which is not in touch" which is good to keep in mind along with the connotations of "that which is self-sufficient" and "independent."

As we know, Epicurus reminded the people of his day not to add to their natural conceptions of gods, and to preserve them in the state "as the typical idea of a god is (mentally/naturally) engraved, ὡς ἡ κοινὴ τοῦ θεοῦ Nόησις ὑπεγράφη (X123b)." We have no ability to deny the existence of the conception, or the gods themselves, because "the knowledge of them is clear, ἐναργὴς δέ ἐστιν αὐτῶν ἡ Γνῶσις.” Which of course it is. Telling all the people around the world that the gods do not exist is like telling people that they themselves do not feel hunger or pain. They feel it, they know it. For an atheist to be made, a person must accept arguments that fight against their natural anticipations of the gods (or they assume the additional cultural ideas regarding the gods are the same as their anticipations, judge both to be ridiculous, and deny both together) – just as for a religious person to be made, they must accept additional ideas along with their natural anticipations.

Regarding the use of "intuitive apprehensions of the mind" ἡ φανταστικὴ ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας, we do have the use by Epicurus in KD24 and ΔΛ X51. “The entire graphic perception of the mind” “the full pictorial focus of the mind” “the complete visual attention of the mind.” Because all thought is based upon images, the use of φανταστική (‘graphic’) here is only further explaining the process of mental focus; the whole phrase is therefore equivalent to ἡ ἐπιβολή τῆς διανοίας (‘the perception of the mind’) alone, which Lucretius translates (2.740) as animī iniectus ‘a casting of mental energy’ or ‘a throwing out of the attention.’ Instead of using the modern analogy of ‘focusing’ the mind (as though the mind were something like a camera), Ἐπίκουρος and Lucretius use the analogy of ‘throwing’ or ‘casting’ the mind (as though the mind were something like a net). Put simply, animī iniectus and ἡ επιβολή τῆς διανοίας are equivalent to our modern use of ‘attention.'

Elayne, hello! It has been a great to hear you on the podcasts, and I am happy to be speaking with you now.

Quote from Elayne

I think we should not find ourselves saying "these observations don't fit my model so I'm going to disregard them because I like my model", but instead say "my model no longer fits my observations as well, so I'll either make a new model or wait for more observations-- and in the meantime I'll continue to have confidence that I can make observations of reality."

This is a thoroughly scientific and most reasonable position to take. This is our position for the first class of things mentioned in KD 24, but Epicurus would differentiate between those inferences which we consider subject to correction and those inferences which we consider to be fully confirmed and certain conclusions. 

MODELS FOR THE UNINSPECTED

(1) "that which is believed regarding what is still pending confirmation (τὸ δοξαζόμενον κατὰ τὸ προσμένον)" -- These are observable things which we have not yet fully observed. For all the things in this class we are totally open to the possibility for future correction if (when we have the opportunity for closer and repeated examination) we receive observations that contradict any theories we may have previously considered regarding them. This view in line with most modern scientific approaches.

FOUNDATION (THE INSPECTED AND EXPERIENCED)

The second class are all the things we are able to directly observe (2) "that which is actually present to sensation, feelings, or the whole visual focus of the mind (τὸ παρὸν ἤδη κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ πᾶσαν φανταστικὴν ἐπιβολὴν τῆς διανοίας) -- These are things which can be sensed and inspected and form the basis of all our clear thinking.

MODELS FOR THE UNINSPECTABLE

The third class are all the things we cannot directly observe (3) "that which is unobservable (τὰ ἄδηλα)" -- These invisible things must be tested by their observable interactions with class (2) things actually present (τὸ παρὸν ἤδη). Because our conclusions about things in this class are based upon their visible interactions with (2) what is directly observable and not based upon (1) that which is pending confirmation, we are certain about the conclusions we have reached regarding them. Clearly, this final view is antagonistic to most modern scientific approaches.

Great Stuff! Certainly we distinguish between (1) what is technically visible but too distant for us to observe, (2) what we can observe and (3) what is unobservable. Here is KD 24 from a somewhat different angle.

Εἴ τιν᾽ ἐκβαλεῖς ἁπλῶς αἴσθησιν καὶ μὴ διαιρήσεις τὸ δοξαζόμενον κατὰ τὸ προσμένον καὶ τὸ παρὸν ἤδη κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ πᾶσαν φανταστικὴν ἐπιβολὴν τῆς διανοίας, συνταράξεις καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς αἰσθήσεις τῇ ματαίῳ δόξῃ, ὥστε τὸ κριτήριον ἅπαν ἐκβαλεῖς. εἰ δὲ βεβαιώσεις καὶ τὸ προσμένον ἅπαν ἐν ταῖς δοξαστικαῖς ἐννοίαις καὶ τὸ μὴ τὴν ἐπιμαρτύρησιν, οὐκ ἐκλείψεις τὸ διεψευσμένον: ὡς τετηρηκὼς ἔσῃ πᾶσαν ἀμφισβήτησιν κατὰ πᾶσαν κρίσιν τοῦ ὀρθῶς ἢ μὴ ὀρθῶς.

"if You reject even one sensation and will not separate

(1) a theory about what is still pending

versus (2) what is actually present according sensation,

feelings, or the whole visual focus of the mind:

then you will disturb the remaining senses with empty thought

as you will reject the whole basis of judgment.

also if You affirm

(1) all that which is still pending in theoretical concepts

along with (2) that which is not pending confirmation:

…you will not avoid error

since you will have retained all doubt

regarding all judgment of what is true or not true."

(1) τὸ προσμένον ἅπαν ἐν ταῖς δοξαστικαῖς ἐννοίαις “all that which is still pending [confirmation] regarding theoretical concepts” is equivalent to τὸ δοξαζόμενον κατὰ τὸ προσμένον ‘a theory about what is still pending’ (both of which are explaining τὸ δοξαζόμενον), as in the common observation of the distant square tower.

Excellent list. Understanding how we come to our conclusions is necessary in order to have certainty about them.

“οὑχὶ καὶ [διαφέρει] τοῦ φανεροῦ Tάφανὲς; καὶ παρακρούειν ἡμᾶς Ἔχουσι σθεναρῶς, ἐπειδὴ τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν ζῷα [παραφυλάττοντες] εἶναι φθαρτὰ, τοὺς θεοὺς ἀφθάρτους ὑπάρχειν λέγομεν; Kαὶ πάντων γενητῶν καὶ φθρτῶν ὄντων, τὰς τῶν ὀλων ἀρχὰς ἀγενήτους εἶναι καὶ ἀφθάρτους [ἀξιοῦμεν]; Φιλοδήμου Περὶ Cημείων XX.20-30

Isn’t the invisible [different] from the visible? Can’t they strongly slap us aside, because [while observing] that the living things around us are destructible, we say that the gods are indestructible? And although all things are created and destructible, [we think] that the elements of all things are uncreated and indestructible?”

Philodemus quoting Bromius (Cf. De Lacy “On Methods of Inference” pg. 69-70)

Hello Elli, yes that is right on topic, very amusing, and new to me! Thank you.

"Observation is everything" is the position of a type of skeptic, who does not want to form a workable and understandable mental model of how nature works. We are far closer to "everything we think we base on observation, and we infer by analogy from this empirical basis in order to conceive that which cannot be observed."

I very much agree. This gives the translation just a little bit of added interpretation, but is certainly more natural.

"Τhis very thing is pleasure:

Escaping from pain-

because It is not possible for pleasure to be placed anywhere

when neither What is painful nor What is distressing is any longer making way for it."

-Metródoros

"The limit in the amount of pleasures

is the Removal of all pain.

Whenever there is Pleasure,

then for that time that it is present,

there is no Pain or Sadness

or any Mixture of both."

Metródoros makes the same point from a different angle:

"Τhis very thing is the good:

Escaping from the bad-

because It is not possible for the Good to be placed anywhere

when neither What is painful nor What is distressing is any longer making way for it."

Τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν ἐστι:

τὸ φυγεῖν τὸ κακόν-

ἔνθα γὰρ τεθήσεται Tἀγαθόν οὐκ Ἔστιν

ὅταν μηθὲν ἔτι ὑπεξίῃ μήτε Ἀλγεινὸν μήτε Λυπηρόν"

–preserved by Plutarch at 1091 A-B in his diatribe "Ότι ουδέ ήδεως ζην έστιν κατ' Επίκουρον"

"What is complete and independent neither itself has troubles nor hands any over to another, therefore it is not wrapped up in tempers or favors- because everything of that sort exists in what is imperfect."

Regarding weakness/imperfection, Philodemus directly connects human weakness with our need for friendship. While discussing the importance of mutual friendship (ἡ συμφυλία) he says that generosity is necessary:

"...ἀμέλει δὲ καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῶν τῶν ἀσθενῶν

καὶ προσδεομένων πρὸς τὰ χρειώδη τῆς φιλίας"

"...particularly for us who are imperfect/weak and

and in need also of the necessary things that come from friendship"

De Dis (Book 3), PHerc 26.fr.87 second paragraph, beginning half way through line 5 (http://163.1.169.40/gsdl/collect/P….a.01.hires.jpg)

Thank you, Elli, for your kind greeting! I have benefited greatly from your wise comments in the past, and I am happy to be here and to begin doing so again.

Cassius this is a very nice website! Brilliant content, easy to navigate, and it is wonderful to see the organization that you have achieved here so effectively on the message boards.

Rearranging and organizing Diogenes' comments is a good idea. The translation you have is excellent and follows my own preference for simplicity where it is possible.

Here are some personal notes I have on the Principle Doctrines along with some new translations.