Posts by Bryan

Quote from Don

I don't remember Epicurus talking about the intermundia.

Let me throw in some quotes as a jumping-off point, I may be misunderstanding.

"...that Cosmoi such as this are also infinite in number is able to be thoroughly comprehended, and that such a Cosmos also has the force to be produced both in a cosmos and in the intermundia [μετακοσμίῳ] – which we say is the separation intervening between cosmoi"
^{[Epicurus to Pythocles, Lives 10.89a]}

"Acknowledging the divine to be eternal and incorruptible, [Epicurus] says that a god has providential care for nothing, and that there is no such thing at all as providence or fate, but that all things are made by chance. For the divine reposes in the intermundane spaces [ἐν τοῖς μετακοσμίοις], (as they) are thus styled by him (for outside the world he determined that there is a certain habitation of the divine denominated "the intermundane spaces [τὰ μετακόσμια]" and that the divine surrenders himself to pleasure, and takes his ease in the midst of supreme happiness) – and that neither has he any concerns of business, nor does he devote his attention to them."
^{Saint Hippolytus of Rome (fl.c. 210 CE), "Philosophical Questions" (Refutation of all Heresies) 22.3}

Quote from Don

I find it hard to believe Epicurus would advocate for giant humans with quasi-blood floating in a no-place without a world to inhabit.

Philodemus' On Piety makes a clear case for this -- the idea is that a process can be eternal -- just as if a waterfall was always fed it would never stop existing, and all waterfalls are impervious to bullets, swords, and other direct damage.

Worlds are closed systems, so the waterfalls in a world will eventually stop -- but between worlds there is no closed system and the flow of matter is infinite.

Are you saying that Philodemus was going his own direction with the statements in that work?

Also, I feel as though Cicero tracks well here and can be supported from other angles, are you saying Cicero is making this up?

"And since it is agreed that the gods are most blessed, and that no one can be blessed without virtue, nor can virtue exist without reason, nor can reason reside anywhere except in human form, it must be admitted that the gods are of human appearance–yet that form is not a body but as it were a body, and it does not have blood but as it were blood. Epicurus, however, who has not only seen with the mind but also handled, as it were with the hand, things hidden and deeply concealed, teaches that the power and nature of the gods are such that they are perceived not by sense but by mind, and not with any solidity nor as countable things, like those which he, because of their firmness, calls steremnia; but rather through images apprehended by likeness and succession, since an infinite series of similar images arises from innumerable indivisibles and flows toward us, while with the greatest delight the mind, fixed and intent upon those images, grasps by understanding what the nature is that is both blessed and eternal."
_{Cicero (fl. 66 BCE), De Natura Deorum, 1.16.43 - 20.56 (Velleius' monologue)}

Quote from Don

Amen (to use the religious term... still looking for a good Epicurean alternative).

I am being cheeky at this point -- you know the term better than most! The “religious-based” affirmative of choice was:

"νὴ Δία"
Philodemus quoting Epicurus, On Piety, 1.31.877-898

"νὴ Δία"
Plutarch quoting Epicurus, Non Posse, 1101A

"νὴ Δία"
Plutarch quoting Epicurus, Against Colotes, 1112E

"ἀλλὰ μὰ Δία"
Epicurus, On Nature, Book 28, P.Herc. 1479, fr. 13 (col. 2 sup.)

"νὴ Δία"
Eusebius of Caesarea quoting Epicurus, Preparation for the Gospel, 14.27.10, 779A

"νὴ Δία"
[unknown biographer], Life of Philonides, P.Herc. 1044, fr. 25 fin.

"νὴ Δία"
The Oxyrhynchus Consolation, P.Oxy. 2.215, col. 1, lines 1-11

Quote from Pacatus

Quote from Bryan

false are those contested and not attested by evident reality"

Just as an aside: the Pyrrhonians would not call those “false” but indeterminate or undecidable (ἀνεπίκριτα).

We have the category "pending (προσμένον)" for things which are simultaneously not attested (μὴ ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον) and not contested (μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρούμενον), because indeed in that case there is no evidence either way.

We also have "pending" for phenomena that are apparently both attested and contested, because in that case there is conflicting evidence about the original source (the hypokeimenon) and more observation is needed.

The idealist position would have to argue there is no original source (no hypokeimenon). But according to Epicurus, if there is no original source, the object is not real -- and the proposition that it is real, is necessarily false (such as the proposition "minotaurs exist").

_{Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), Against the Logicians, 1.203 - 216}
"While outlining what is true and false, [Epicurus] says 'what is true is that which exists in such a way as it is said to exist -- and what is false is that which does not exist in such a way as it is said to exist. And sensation (existing as capable of taking hold in response to the things falling under it, and neither removing nor adding nor changing anything to it) is unreasoning -- yet it reports truly in every case and in this way comprehends what exists – just as that very thing exists by nature. But with all sensible things existing as true: the things able to be judged differ – and some of them are true -- but others false'"

Quote from Pacatus

Quote from Bryan

false are those contested and not attested by evident reality"

Just as an aside: the Pyrrhonians would not call those “false” but indeterminate or undecidable (ἀνεπίκριτα).

We have the category "pending (προσμένον)" for things which are simultaneously not attested (μὴ ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον) and not contested (μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρούμενον), because indeed in that case there is no evidence either way.

We also have "pending" for phenomena that are apparently both attested and contested, because in that case there is conflicting evidence about the original source (the hypokeimenon) and more observation is needed.

The idealist position would have to argue there is no original source (no hypokeimenon). But according to Epicurus, if there is no original source, the object is not real -- and the proposition that it is real, is necessarily false (such as the proposition "minotaurs exist").

_{Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), Against the Logicians, 1.203 - 216}
"While outlining what is true and false, [Epicurus] says 'what is true is that which exists in such a way as it is said to exist -- and what is false is that which does not exist in such a way as it is said to exist. And sensation (existing as capable of taking hold in response to the things falling under it, and neither removing nor adding nor changing anything to it) is unreasoning -- yet it reports truly in every case and in this way comprehends what exists – just as that very thing exists by nature. But with all sensible things existing as true: the things able to be judged differ – and some of them are true -- but others false'"

Quote from Cassius

prolepsis to be an experience

Yes, a prolepsis is an experience, but not a process of thought.

The prolepseis are the direct experiences we have when we think of something.

Anybody who uses the words “god” or “water” or “minotaur” has a sense of what they are talking about. That sense is always real, but we are left to determine what physical objects exist as the original source (the hypokeímenon).

Hypokeimenon - Wikipedia

If there is no correspondence (sympátheia) between an original source and the prolepsis, then it exists only as a mental impression and the word used for it is “empty."

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_{Clement of Alexandria (fl. 190 ^CE), Miscellenies, 2.4}

"Epicurus... supposes an anticipation to be [our mental] perception's certainty: and he defines an anticipation ^[1] as attention directed toward something evident – and ^[2] [as attention] directed toward an evident concept of a thing {or "of a situation"}. And [Epicurus says] that it is not possible either to investigate, nor to be at a loss, nor indeed to judge -- but not even to refute -- without an anticipation."

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^{Philodemus (_fl.c. 70 BCE), On Piety, 1.66A.1882-1911}
"Time is distinguished as existing as an anticipation; and just as, in the Thirty-Second [book of On Nature], Epicurus says that the evident realities of the gods are thoroughly comprehended as existing, even though existing as a single [object of thought] among those [other objects of thought] in the original sources [of the films from their bodies], nevertheless [these detectable realities of the gods] have a nature less mentally perceptible than that of other existing things."

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_{Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), Against the Logicians, 1.203 - 216}

"[For Epicurus] the particularly of sensation is to receive only what is present and moving it: but not to thoroughly separate that [1] what is here is one thing -- but [2] what is underlying there is another thing."

"so then, of the judgments, according to Epicurus, some are true, and others are false: true are those attested and not contested by evident reality -- false are those contested and not attested by evident reality"

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Quote from Cassius

prolepsis to be an experience

Yes, a prolepsis is an experience, but not a process of thought.

The prolepseis are the direct experiences we have when we think of something.

Anybody who uses the words “god” or “water” or “minotaur” has a sense of what they are talking about. That sense is always real, but we are left to determine what physical objects exist as the original source (the hypokeímenon).

Hypokeimenon - Wikipedia

If there is no correspondence (sympátheia) between an original source and the prolepsis, then it exists only as a mental impression and the word used for it is “empty."

----------------------

_{Clement of Alexandria (fl. 190 ^CE), Miscellenies, 2.4}

"Epicurus... supposes an anticipation to be [our mental] perception's certainty: and he defines an anticipation ^[1] as attention directed toward something evident – and ^[2] [as attention] directed toward an evident concept of a thing {or "of a situation"}. And [Epicurus says] that it is not possible either to investigate, nor to be at a loss, nor indeed to judge -- but not even to refute -- without an anticipation."

----------------------------------

^{Philodemus (_fl.c. 70 BCE), On Piety, 1.66A.1882-1911}
"Time is distinguished as existing as an anticipation; and just as, in the Thirty-Second [book of On Nature], Epicurus says that the evident realities of the gods are thoroughly comprehended as existing, even though existing as a single [object of thought] among those [other objects of thought] in the original sources [of the films from their bodies], nevertheless [these detectable realities of the gods] have a nature less mentally perceptible than that of other existing things."

--------------------------------------------

_{Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), Against the Logicians, 1.203 - 216}

"[For Epicurus] the particularly of sensation is to receive only what is present and moving it: but not to thoroughly separate that [1] what is here is one thing -- but [2] what is underlying there is another thing."

"so then, of the judgments, according to Epicurus, some are true, and others are false: true are those attested and not contested by evident reality -- false are those contested and not attested by evident reality"

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Plutarch also records a long list of mocking epithets. In an effort to explain the apparent antagonism between the epithets and VS79, I think we can look at:

ΚΔ 39 "He who has best composed himself regarding his lack of confidence from external circumstances is the person who has made things kindred for the cases in which this is possible, and for the cases in which this is not possible [at least has made] things not foreign. However, for as many cases as he could not even to do this: he made himself unmixed (and removed as many as it was profitable to accomplish this)."

This leave us with:

And for those people who "we enjoy not interacting with" it seems also possible to "enjoy critiquing them" even to the point of "enjoying critiquing them with critical epithets."

I am not aware of the term in ancient literature. However, let me include this section from Epicurus' On Nature, Book 25, which seems to be related to the idea:

"…[1] Those movements that have been fully generated are fully produced according to the penetration of certain particles, and [2] those other movements are produced according to the proximity of particles, and also in some way [3] that movement which is not being raised up by nature, but produced by one’s spirit comprehending the memory and inductive consideration of its fulfillment in itself, more or less.

…of those movements that result according to the crowded-together atoms, but even the crowded-together atoms clearly move similarly. For they had a nature to fully generate such things and to begin such a task, the same atoms in accordance with a way arising from the same separation…

…one’s own actions are generated in the previously mentioned way, existing as productive of the same things. Yet, although they have a nature that could be productive of these and those achievements, many actions that people generate are made unproductive because of themselves – not through the same cause of movement of both the atoms and themselves. Against these unproductive generated actions we especially contend and rebuke, while resenting those who have a temperament from their birth in accordance with a disturbing nature – just as we do in the case of all living beings that choose to act counterproductively.

…we are contending with many people simultaneously and instructing about this issue, which is contrary to the cause of the same way of thinking that all motion is in accordance with necessity. Thus, whenever something is fully generated, [i.e., one’s consciousness], that comprehends a certain difference in the atoms in a certain mentally distinguishing way, but not as though from a different separation in space, [i.e., even though the soul can be distinguished from the atoms that compose it as its own emergent object, the soul is not physically distinct from the atoms that compose it.] one gains control of the cause of mental movements out of his own conscious choice. Then he simply delivers those conscious mental movements up to the primary natures of the atoms, and he makes this mentally generated movement entirely a standard that tests for truth.

…we praise others not merely through a cause of movement that originates out of themselves, but through that cause of movement that originates out of themselves toward the best tasks and mental perceptions. At this time, we contend with them in no way. But for us, along with… of atoms… to those that have applied themselves. And even while we are fully clearing out the cause of movement that originates out of ourselves… or not instructing about as many things as simultaneously…

…however one refers to his self-generated movement, it is clear it exists with a nature that is fully indicated by his experience of it – even while it is not referred to as itself or according to itself…

…according to our mental perception, our primary composition would – not out of necessity – force out some of the movement that has been fully generated up to the point of certain kinds of such a thing as our own non-necessitated movements being fully generated, while our primary atomic composition would force out some movement up to the point of a soul being produced – and even a soul having an arrangement and movement as great as this, given that some movement of this kind is necessarily generated from a composition such as this [i.e., the soul's subtle physical nature makes it susceptible to both moving and being moved].

But one’s atomic composition would force out some movement up to the point of movement such as this – specifically, the movement of this or that kind of soul – being fully generated not out of necessity. Or at least one’s atomic composition would force out some volitional movement whenever someone advances to the stage of life of such volitional initiations being fully generated not according to necessity, but by having the force of movement from himself and from his own cause…

…regarding those who sincerely struggle to move themselves toward the best tasks, we do not contend with those people, and they are not holding onto laziness. But neither do we venture to encourage or provoke them toward the most opportune things, as their temperaments have already coagulated from a nature which itself is poorly assembled, and which is not fastening and igniting the cause of movement for something in a different way to the coagulation of their temperaments, which is similar to… Although we are bringing forward the cause,[ i.e., the responsibility for our own movement], we do bring it forward for as many as…"

Odd synchronicity for the article and your comment, which both also occurred today! I was unaware.

Here are both versions for ease of direct comparison. My guess is that either Cicero alone is correct, or Diogenes is also correct and multiple letters were sent out.

Yes, thank you! This is new to me.. but, now that it is actually accessible, hopefully we all can dig in!

The section titles in the text are unlikely to have been placed by Lucretius, but are ancient·

The three manuscripts that De Rerum Natura is based on are Codex Oblongus (from the early 800s CE), Codex Quadratus (from the mid-800s CE), and the partial Codex Gottorpienses (from the late 800s CE -- of which less than half is preserved)·

Oblongus is the source for the titles, and contains 182 titles· The titles in Gottorpienses, in the sections that survive, agree with Oblongus (allowing for some errors)·

Quadratus does have spaces in its text in the same locations as the titles of Oblongus, but only ten of these spaces actually contain the titles·

This suggests that the titles were present in the lost manuscript that was used to create all three surviving manuscripts· The occasional use of Greek for the titles suggests they came from an edition that was created sometime before the 400's CE, (probably as early as the 100's CE)·

I think Dewitt was focusing on ἡ χάρις (grace) for this.... and even here the alpha privative (i.e., ungrateful) shows itself to be important to Epicurus' thought.

Great episode -- it’s nice to have Cicero fighting with us, to some degree, against the Stoics.

Thank you both for your encouraging words!

Thank you for this helpful input!

Black pages are my intention, and I am happy that this now seems to be the default.

I do my work with black pages, and I really think that is best way to view it.

Don , Godfrey
Thank you very much!

I have a quick technical question for you both... when you open the document, does it have a black background, or is the page mostly white?

Hello all, this should be the final update until we get to Book Two.

(There are some spacing issues that will not be resolved until all the books are complete.)

Epicurus encouraged the avoidance of paideia, but this clearly did not mean the avoidance of “learning in general.” He expected people to read, understand grammar, grasp the basics of physics, and think carefully about epistemology. He accepts all useful learning, but rejects becoming a "professional" in any one field.

"Both those around Epicurus and those around Pyrrho seem more commonly inclined to the opposition toward those from the professions. Those around Epicurus [oppose the professions, on the grounds] that the professions contribute nothing to the perfection of wisdom "
_{Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), Against the Grammarians, 1-3}

It seems that Epicurus even wrote a letter giving advice to people who were caught in a profession.

"Seneca to his Lucilius, greetings.

You now understand that you must be led out of those flashy and harmful occupations, but you ask how you might achieve that... so look around for this – if you see this, grab it with full force and all your strength: strive to strip yourself from those duties... Read the letter of Epicurus that pertains to this very issue, the one addressed to Idomeneus, whom Epicurus urges to flee as much as he can and to hurry, before some greater force intervenes and takes away the freedom to withdraw.

He nevertheless adds that nothing should be attempted unless it can be done suitably and at the right time. But when that long-awaited time finally comes, he says one must leap out. He forbids the one thinking about flight to fall asleep, and he hopes for a saving exit even from the most difficult things, if only we do not rush before the right time, nor delay at the right time."
_{Seneca (fl. 35 CE), Letters to Lucilius, Letter 22, sections 1-5}

The Diogenes referenced there is Diogenes of Tarsus. We know he wrote "Selections (Ἐπιλέκτα)," as well as an "Epitome of Epicurus' Ethical Doctrines."

The two words in question are closely related:

ἡ ἀγωγή = “conduct,” “training,” “discipline,” “method/practice,” literally “a leading.”

ἡ διαγωγή = “way of life,” “mode of living,” “manner of spending one’s life” literally “a leading through.”

So this could be anything from "conduct is way of life" to "practice is a mode of living," to "education is recreation." ἡ ἀγωγή can mean "education" but only in context, and the typical word for "education" is ἡ παιδεία.

Here are some other potentially related quotes (education in each case is ἡ παιδεία):

"[Epicurus is said] to write in a letter to Pythocles 'Avoid all education, blessed one – after taking up a little boat!'" _{^{Diogenes Laertius (fl.c. 220 CE), 10.6}}

I shall recall the most truth-loving Epicurus: who, though he was uninitiated in general education – he considered those people blessed who were proceeding toward philosophy similarly to himself ¬ uttering such words: 'I bless you, O dear one, because – clear of all education – You have rushed toward philosophy!'" _{Athenaeus (fl.c. 200 CE), Deipnosophists, 13.53}

"Natural science makes men who are neither boasters, nor productive of discourse, nor showing themselves to be involved in the education that is much-contested among the public ¬ but rather serious and also self-sufficient in their own particular goods – while not greatly considering things among the [current] situations" _{Epicurus, VS 45}

"Through the writings of Epicurus all men and all women beg and plead with Pythocles – so that he does not desire the so-called "liberal" education _{^{Plutarch (fl. 80 CE), Non Posse, 1094D, 12 sup.}}

"Epicurus, although he seems to be bitterly hostile to the Professors; in his book On Gifts and Gratitude he definitely tries to prove that it is necessary for the wise to learn grammar. Necessary, as we should say, not for the wise only but for all men." _{Sextus Empiricus (fl.c. 200 CE), Against the Grammarians, 1.49}

Interestingly, in Greek, "school" is the opposite of "occupation"

Possessing power is clearly harmful to the extent that it brings increased stress and dangers. However, possessing power is clearly beneficial to the extent that it can be used to provide security and stability.

ΚΔ 7: "Some people want to become respected and popular, thinking to preserve for themselves stability from people in this way. If the life of those like this is stable: then they fully acquire the good of nature. However, if it is not stable, then they do not possess that which they craved from the beginning according to what is naturally compatible to them."

ΚΔ 14: "...stability from people is produced to some extent by a resistant force and resourcefulness..."

Many people like the idea that the powerful person who harms other people will inevitably come to a bad end.... if not in this life, then at least in the next. But, very often, powerful people are convinced they are living "prudently and correctly and justly" in relation to their group -- and many are able to live a stable and pleasurable life even if there is a trail of victims (from a different group) behind them.

While it is true that "What is just by nature exists as that which is of mutual interest among what mutually benefits in not harming each other and not being harmed. (ΚΔ 31)" Epicurus is clear that this justice is not universally applicable:

ΚΔ 32 "As many among the living beings as do not have the ability to make mutual agreements for themselves (those regarding not harming one another and not being harmed) regarding these things, in no way are they just or unjust, and likewise also as many among the ethnicities as do not have the ability or do not want to make mutual agreements for themselves regarding not harming and not being harmed."

DaveT, I agree. Legal is not the same as just. Many harmful actions can be committed without much fear if the perpetrator has enough power or protection.