Don and his badger-like investigations
LOL!!! So, there'll be a badger on my coat of arms. I'll need to change my username to Τροχος, a word used by Aristotle to refer to an animal that appears to have been referring to a badger... But no one is sure. 
Μodern is Ασβός but that's too easy.
The text in Diogenes Laertius for PD5 is slightly different than the text of VS5. Often, VS5 is simply referenced as PD5 ... but while the text is VERY similar, it is not identical.
PD5 Diogenes Laertius text: Οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδέως ζῆν ἄνευ τοῦ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως, <οὐδὲ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως> ἄνευ τοῦ ἡδέως. ὅτῳ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ ὑπάρχει ἐξ οὗ ζῆν φρονίμως, καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ὑπάρχει, οὐκ ἔστι τοῦτον ἡδέως ζῆν.
It is impossible to live a pleasant life without living wisely and well and justly, and it is impossible to live wisely and well and justly without living pleasantly. Whenever any one of these is lacking, when, for instance, the man is not able to live wisely, though he lives well and justly, it is impossible for him to live a pleasant life. (Hicks)
VS5 text: Οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδέως ζῆν ἄνευ τοῦ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως, ὅπου δὲ τοῦτο μὴ ὑπάρχει, οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδέως ζῆν.
It is impossible to live a pleasant life without living wisely and well and justly, and so where these do not exist, it is impossible to live a pleasant life. (Vat.gr.1950 manuscript, with translation repurposing Hicks with the exception of ὅπου "where" vs ὅτῳ "whenever".)
(NOTE: This should really also be posted to the VS5 thread but that section is locked... Cassius?)
By Zeus! I don't know what to believe now! 
Here's the manuscript of VS67
Here is the Wotke & Usener footnotes:
I haven't dug into this one yet, so I'm not sure how many differences there are. But I can definitely see κτηματα in the manuscript as opposed to the common text's χρήματα!
ἐλεύθερος βίος οὐ δύναται κτήσασθαι χρήματα πολλὰ διὰ τὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα <μὴ> ῥᾴδιον εἶναι χωρὶς θητείας ὄχλων ἢ δυναστῶv, ἀλλὰ συνεχεῖ δαψιλείᾳ πάντα κέκτηται· ἄν δέ που καὶ τύχῃ χρημάτων πολλῶv, καὶ ταῦτα ῥᾳδίως ἃν εἰς τὴν τοῦ πλησίον εὔνοιαν διαμετρήσαι.
Common translation: A free person is unable to acquire great wealth, because that is not easily achieved without enslavement to the masses or to the powers that be. Instead, he already has everything he needs, and in abundance. But if by chance he should have great wealth, he could easily share it with his fellows to win their goodwill.
κτηματα "pieces of property, possessions"
χρήματα "needs; things that one needs or uses; goods, property; money; things, matters, affairs"
So, maybe not earthshattering ... but I' goin gto have to dig into the rest of the discrepancies and see.
As far as the parallel constructions go, maybe it's enough that they end in the same letters?
σοφίαν φιλίαν
νοητον ἀθάνατον
Although those are very common grammatical endings, so...
Still, there's no arguing with what it actually written in the manuscript!
* ὁ γενναῖος περὶ σοφίαν καὶ φιλίαν μάλιστα γίγνεται, ὧν τὸ μέν ἐστι νοητον ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ἀθάνατον.
An alternative translation: "One who is noble in mind most of all depends upon wisdom and friendship — one is a good perceptible to the mind, thinkable, and imaginable; the other, everlasting and perpetual."
I would take that that friendship is so important, one can barely conceive of its importance.
γενναῖος "noble in mind, high-minded" From γέννα (génna, “descent, birth, origin”) + -ιος (-ios). Compare ἀγενής (agenḗs "of no family, ignoble, mean, cowardly, vile"). Think of the name Eugene "well-born, noble"
σοφίαν (sophian "skill in matters of common life. sound judgement, intelligence, practical wisdom") Remember this is also the exact element in philosophy "φιλοσοφία ".
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, σοφία
γίγνεται has a number of connotations including:γ. παρά τι to depend upon...
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, γίγνομαι
νοητος
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, νο-ητός
αθάνατος
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, ἀθα?́να^τ-ος
Well, would you look at that! It was hiding in DeWitt (p. 226) all along!
DeWitt uses the noeton in the manuscript and NOT the thneton "correction."
I'm taking another look at this... Yes, we're starting the morning out with a bang. Good thing it's a holiday and I don't have to go to work!
That first letter is clearly an epsilon: ε
The next letter is a ligature for sigma+tau (i.e., s+t): pasted-from-clipboard.png
and the next letter rounds out esti: εστι
The next letter appears to me be a nu which would start νοητον. I don't see any room for θν(ητον) and that letter is clearly a familiar variant of nu. It matches that middle version here perfectly: pasted-from-clipboard.png
Yep, the manuscript has νοητον. Jury still out if it's a scribal error or not, but the manuscript clearly has νοητον. Is this an instance of Usener knowing better than the scribe? The manuscript dates from between 1301 and 1350, so we're NOT talking anywhere near contemporary with the *original* sources... but still, it's all we got.
Wikipedia has a nice table of ancient Greek miniscule writing including some ligatures for those who want to dive into these waters with me:
and this page is even more thorough:
Would these have any relevance for this discussion with wisdom/Sages and friendship being discussed?
[U386]
Philodemus, On the Life of the Gods, Vol. Herc. 1, VI col. 1: ... to the gods, and he admires their nature and their condition and tries to approach them and, so to speak, yearns to touch them and to be together with them; and he calls Sages "friends of the gods" and the gods "friends of Sages."
[ U539 ]
Cicero, On End-Goals, Good and Bad, I.20.65 (Torquatus to Cicero): On the subject of friendship... Epicurus’ pronouncement about friendship is that of all the means to happiness that wisdom has devised, none is greater, none more fruitful, none more delightful than this. Nor did he only commend this doctrine by his eloquence, but far more by the example of his life and conduct.
Just putting these here for discussion on the topic at hand. No strong feelings one way or the other on applicability.
There's the manuscript link.
codex Vaticanus Graecus 1950 (1950 is the reference number, not a date incidentally)
The Vatican Sayings begin at the bottom of folio 401v with the big red Τ for Το μακαριον και αφθσρτον ... (PD1 and VS1)
Hartel is trying to "improve" the manuscript. Usener evidently accepts the θνητον of the manuscript but adds Hartel's improvement as a footnote to be thorough.
I usually try to stick with the manuscript. So...
There's the line in codex Vaticanus Graecus 1950, starting at the red O for ὁ γενναῖος...
Here's the Greek as shown in Wotke & Usener:
78* ὁ γενναῖος περὶ σοφίαν καὶ φιλίαν μάλιστα γίγνεται, ὧν τὸ μέν ἐστι θνητὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ἀθάνατον.
Their footnote then says: (line) 26 θνητον| νοητον V : verb. (verbessert von) H.
What does the manuscript look like to me?
ὁ γενναῖος περὶ σοφίαν καὶ φιλίαν μάλιστα γίγνεται, ὧν τὸ μέν ἐστι... Wait for it....
pasted-from-clipboard.png Well, would you look at that!
It certainly looks like νοητον to me!! And I don't think you have to know Greek to see those first markings don't look like θνητον. For example, here's a theta from elsewhere in the same saying from agathon:
There's no "loopy" theta at the beginning of that word νοητον within the manuscript. Hmmm.....
That said, Epicurus did like his parallel constructions and thneton "mortal", athanaton "undying" would be more in keeping... BUT that's not what the manuscript says! νοητόν is the Attic variation of νοητός.
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, νο-ητός
"falling within the province of νοῦς,"
So, I'm not saying some scribe didn't misspell the word and write νοητον when it should have been θνητον ( as the prevalent wording has made it), All it would take are two letters. And the parallel of mortal/immortal is in keeping with Epicurus's style... but again, that's not what the manuscript has. And, to the best of my knowledge, we don't have another instance of this saying anywhere else, do we?? As far as I know, this manuscript is the ONLY copy of the "Vatican Sayings" so there's nothing to "compare" to.
GREAT FIND, Onenski !!!
Source (Wotke & Usener, 1888):
Spruchsammlung; [Gr.] entdeckt u. mitgetheilt von K. Wotke.
Key to Source/Manuscript initials
V = Codex Vaticanus gr. 1950
W = verbessert von Dr. C. Wotke
U = verbessert von Usener
H= verbessert von Hartel
So, according to p.197, the Codex Vaticanus gr. 1950 (V) has θνητον (mortal) but Hartel "improved/amended" the text to νοητον, maybe for the same reasons we find it hard to interpret. Hartel appears to be a German scholar, like Usener and Wotke, not the name of a manuscript.
I've been giving this ocean metaphor more thought, and I'd like to share a refinement that Godfrey offered this evening at our happy hour. I hope he doesn't mind my posting. I think it's a brilliant modification.
So, my issue of seeing katastematic pleasures as the ocean and kinetic pleasure as the waves was the idea of seeing waves as disturbances. There is a tradition of comparing ataraxia (a quintessential katastematic pleasure) to sailing on calm seas. Waves, to me, signified disturbance, turbulence, etc. Not something to take pleasure in.
Enter Godfrey 
...He offered that if the ocean is katastematic pleasure, think of the waves as surfers do. Surfers seek out waves, large and small. They can ride them for a long time, sometimes they wipe out. To me, even the wipe outs are a valuable metaphor. Maybe those are the pleasures that aren't necessarily choiceworthy by everyone?? But, in any case, waves CAN be pleasurable. Thanks, Godfrey !!
So, I'm trying to not become completely enamored of the ocean/wave metaphor...but I'm liking this. As you've seen, I've left out Cicero's "Torquatus" material so far. I'm still not convinced Cicero is a reliable narrator, but supposedly Cicero requested Atticus to get Phaedrus's Epicurean text "On the Gods" when Cicero was writing his "On the Nature of the Gods." But what happens if we take this ocean/waves metaphor and look at what "Torquatus" has to say. I'm not going to be exhaustive, but let's take a look...
And therefore Epicurus would not admit that there was any intermediate state between pleasure and pain; for he insisted that that very state which seems to some people the intermediate one, when a man is free from every sort of pain, is not only pleasure, but the highest sort of pleasure. For whoever feels how he is affected must inevitably be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain. But Epicurus thinks that the highest pleasure consists in an absence of all pains; so that pleasure may afterwards be varied, and may be of different kinds, but cannot be increased or amplified.
From this, we can see:
If we examine this, we find a "state" (let's say "condition") which would be katastematic pleasure.
"That very state (condition)" is "free from every sort of pain." Every sort of pain? Would that be both freedom from mental pain (ataraxia?) and physical pain (aponia?)? That's how I could read it.
Pleasures that are varied then could be the kinetic pleasure which are of different kinds and varied, BUT the background condition of katastematic pleasure - the background pleasure - cannot be increased or amplified. Once erroneous view are eradicated, they can't grow back. Correct views once established cannot be increased or amplified.
it is inevitable that there must be in a man who is in this condition a firmness of mind which fears neither death nor pain
There's that "condition" with "firmness of mind"... sounds katastematic.
I'll leave it there for now, but there are ways to interpret Cicero's "Torquatus" material as this katastematic background/foundation ocean of pleasure punctuated by waves of kinetic pleasure without too many gymnastics.
Fascinating stuff!
πᾰ́θος–αίσθηση perhaps? Don?
I would probably say αἴσθησις since that has more of the sensation/perception connotation:
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, αἴσθ-ησις
It seems that it may have been Cicero who made such a complex and confusing issue of it. Imagine that!
LOL! Cicero? Obfuscating the issue? Unthinkable!
Which all makes sense since the Cyrenaics would not have accepted the "ocean" just the "waves" as pleasure.
I think you're onto something, TauPhi .
I'm curious how this relates to PD09:
If every pleasure were condensed in <location> and duration and distributed all over the structure or the dominant parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ from one another. Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers 115 (1987)
In scanning those articles and the info on energeia, I'm wondering now if PD9 can be interpreted as the difference in our soul-atoms distributed throughout our bodies that allow sensation and the soul-atoms specifically located in our chest that is the rational part of our psykhē.
I'm beginning to think (as of ... What time is it right now? I could change my mind by this afternoon ) the katastematic pleasure is the preferred background condition of being. Kinetic pleasure is the moment by moment awareness of individual pleasures. Katastematic pleasure is the calm ocean, kinetic pleasures are the waves.
That metaphor needs work, but.... Discuss.
PS. The ocean metaphor isn't mine btw. One of the papers used this. I like it.
Now I understand where the table in post #30 comes from; it sometimes takes a few repetitions for an idea to sink in...perhaps more observable because you're smiling and laughing. That seems to me to be rather banal, not very useful
LOL... And that "observable" idea of my theory is blown out of the water anyway with the section from the letter to Menoikeus: "so that in old age you can be youthful by taking joy (kinetic pleasure) in the good things you remember" and Fragment 68 "To those who are able to reason it out, the highest and surest joy (kinetic pleasure) is found in the stable health of the body and a firm confidence in keeping it." See posts above.
Those two alone muddy the waters considerably!
It may be useful to dig into the the implications of the energeia aspect of those pleasures involved in motion. But I'm *almost* back at square one.
There still has to be a distinction that is of paramount importance here for Epicurus in defining the spectrum of pleasure he recognizes with the pleasures accepted by the Cyrenaics. On its surface, I still think the circumplex quadrants have something to speak to that with low and high arousal. ...hmmm .... Maybe *that* has some connection to energeia?? By Zeus! This is a minefield!!!
On enargeia and kinesis, check out the Wikipedia article here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Potential…ity?wprov=sfla1
I need to read these closer too:
https://cup.columbia.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Philosophies-of-Happiness-Appendix-6.pdf
https://cup.columbia.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Philosophies-of-Happiness-Appendix-8.pdf
There aren't a lot of opportunities, but I decided to try and replace single words with either katastematic or kinetic pleasure.
It should also be remembered that the phrase "kinetic pleasure" isn't *actually* what Epicurus says. What he says is (as literally as I can make it):
"Peace of mind (ataraxia) and freedom from pain (aponia) are condition/state pleasures; joy (khara) and delight (euphrosyne) are seen in relation to (κατὰ) motion (κίνησιν) by means of activity (ἐνεργείᾳ)."
ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀταραξία καὶ <ἡ> ἀπονία καταστηματικαί εἰσιν ἡδοναί. ἡ δὲ χαρὰ καὶ ἡ εὐφροσύνη κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργείᾳ βλέπονται (seen).
ἐνεργείᾳ is a dative case of ἐνέργεια which comes up in Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics: See https://sites.google.com/view/epicurean…n-ethics-book-1
Epicurus also uses the word in the Letter to Herodotus:
[37] "Hence, since such a course is of service to all who take up natural science, I, who devote to the subject my continuous **energy** (τὸ συνεχὲς **ἐνέργημα**) and **reap the calm enjoyment of a life** (ἐγγαληνίζων) like this, have prepared for you just such an epitome and manual of the doctrines as a whole.
Here are my replacments:
519. The greatest fruit of justice is a katastematic pleasure (serenity).
δικαιοσύνης καρπὸς μέγιστος ἀταραξία.
Letter to Menoikeus:
The steady contemplation of these facts enables you to understand everything that you accept or reject in terms of the health of the body and the katastematic pleasure (serenity) of the soul — since that is the goal of a completely happy life.
so that in old age you can be youthful by taking kinetic pleasure (joy) in the good things you remember
τῷ μὲν ὅπως γηράσκων νεάζῃ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς διὰ τὴν χάριν τῶν γεγονότων
(LOL! Well that blows my memories are katastematic pleasure out of the water!!)
Scholion to the Letter to Herodotus, DL.10.66
[He says elsewhere that the soul is composed of the smoothest and roundest of atoms, far superior in both respects to those of fire ; that part of it is irrational, this being scattered over the rest of the frame, while the rational part resides in the chest, as is manifest from our fears and our kinetic pleasure (joy)
(Interesting note here is that fear is contrasted with a kinetic pleasure. Not sure if there's any significance, but there you have it.)
I'm repeating myself a bit with this post but wanted to keep it for future reference in one spot...
Two key words:
καθίστημι "to make" in PD21 - "to bring into a certain state; bring; replace or restore; etc."
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, καθίστημι
κατάστημα "condition, state, not necessarily permanent: bodily or mental condition"
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, κατάστημα
I want to (once again) compile instances of the use of those words that I feel are pertinent. I am intentionally NOT including Cicero's materials because, honestly, I don't necessarily consider him a reliable source. I'm limiting my sources to Epicurus, Metrodorus, and Diogenes of Oenoanda for now. And, yes, I have to "trust" others for reporting the words of Epicurus and Metrodorus... but at least we have Diogenes' Wall.
PD21 One who perceives the limits of life knows how easy it is to expel the pain produced by a lack of something and **to make one's entire life complete**; so that there is no need for the things that are achieved through struggle.
ὁ τὰ πέρατα τοῦ βίου κατειδὼς οἶδεν ὡς εὐπόριστόν ἐστι τὸ <τὸ> ἀλγοῦν κατʼ ἔνδειαν ἐξαιροῦν καὶ τὸ τὸν ὅλον βίον παντελῆ καθιστάν (< infinitive of καθίστημι)· ὥστε οὐδὲν προσδεῖται πραγμάτων ἀγῶνας κεκτημένων.
Fragment 2:
Lack of mental disturbance and lack of bodily pain are static pleasures, whereas revelry and rejoicing are active pleasures involving movement.
ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀταραξία καὶ <ἡ> ἀπονία **καταστηματικαί** εἰσιν ἡδοναί. ἡ δὲ χαρὰ καὶ ἡ εὐφροσύνη κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργείᾳ βλέπονται.
Fragment 68:
To those who are able to reason it out, the highest and surest joy is found in **the stable health of the body** and a firm confidence in keeping it.
**τὸ γὰρ εὐσταθὲς σαρκὸς κατάστημα** καὶ τὸ περὶ ταύτης πιστὸν ἔλπισμα τὴν ἀκροτάτην χαρὰν καὶ βεβαιοτάτην ἔχει τοῖς ἐπιλογίζεσθαι δυναμένοις.
Metrodorus (Diogenes Laertius, 10.136):
Metrodorus in his Timocrates, whose actual words are : "Thus pleasure being conceived both as that species which consists in motion and that which is a state of rest."
Μητρόδωρος ἐν τῷ Τιμοκράτει λέγουσιν οὕτω: νοουμένης δὲ ἡδονῆς τῆς τε κατὰ κίνησιν καὶ τῆς καταστηματικῆς.
Metrodorus, Fragment 5: "Metrodorus, in his book On the Source of Happiness in Ourselves being greater than that which arises from Objects, says: 'What else is the good of the soul but **the sound state of the flesh (τὸ σαρκὸς εὐσταθὲς κατάστημα),** and the sure hope of its continuance?'"
Diogenes of Oenoanda:
Let us now [investigate] how life is to be made pleasant for us both in **states** and in actions (praxesin).
(εισαν τὰ φ̣ρόν[ιμα]. ἡμ[εῖς δὲ ζη]τ̣ῶ̣μεν ἤ̣δ̣η πῶς ὁ βίος ἡμεῖν ἡδὺς γένηται καὶ ἐν τοῖς **κατασ̣τήμασι** καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν.)
Let us first discuss states (περὶ δὲ τῶν καταστημάτων πρῶτον εἴπωμεν), keeping an eye on the point that, when the emotions which disturb the soul are removed, those which produce pleasure enter into it to take their place.
One thing that I find interesting is that only in Metrodorus (Fragment 5 & DL10.136) and Epicurus' Fragment 68 (i.e., DL10.136) do we find εὐσταθὲς modifying κατάστημα. That's " well based, standing firm, stable (relatively unchanging)." κατάστημα itself is simply "condition, state."
The other references only use κατάστημα and related words alone:
Epicurus: Fragment 2 (& Diogenes 10.136): καταστηματικαί
Metrodorus (DL 10.136): καταστηματικῆς
Diogenes of Oenoanda: κατασ̣τήμασι
So, the idea of a *stable/"relatively unchanging" condition is not necessarily conveyed by the second set of references, only the connotation of "state, condition." If that's the case, then we're talking about "state, condition" in contrast to kinesis "motion, opp. rest (στάσις)". Kinesis in LSJ includes opp. ἠρεμία (eremia) which is also a "quietude of the mind." So, this implies to me that we are, indeed, talking about pleasure "at rest (residing in a particular state or condition)" and pleasure "in motion."
PostScript...:
In thinking some more, I note that Fragment 68 doesn't mention pleasure in general **BUT** it does mention a KINETIC PLEASURE!
To those who are able to reason it out, the highest and surest joy is found in the stable health of the body and a firm confidence in keeping it.
τὸ γὰρ εὐσταθὲς σαρκὸς κατάστημα καὶ τὸ περὶ ταύτης πιστὸν ἔλπισμα τὴν ἀκροτάτην χαρὰν καὶ βεβαιοτάτην ἔχει τοῖς ἐπιλογίζεσθαι δυναμένοις.
χαρὰν is simply the accusative of χαρά (khara).... Where do we see χαρά? RIGHT THERE in Epicurus's category of kinetic pleasures: ἡ δὲ χαρὰ καὶ ἡ εὐφροσύνη κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργείᾳ βλέπονται.
SO... That means that we could substitute kinetic pleasure in Fragment 68!
- To those who are able to reason it out, the highest and surest kinetic pleasure is found in the stable health of the body and a firm confidence in keeping it.
Question, of course, is HOW can the "stable health of the body and a firm confidence in keeping it" be a KINETIC PLEASURE!!??
Curiouser and curiouser!
That quote in the definition in post 40 is from
Fragment 68:
To those who are able to reason it out, the highest and surest joy is found in the stable health of the body and a firm confidence in keeping it.
τὸ γὰρ εὐσταθὲς σαρκὸς κατάστημα καὶ τὸ περὶ ταύτης πιστὸν ἔλπισμα τὴν ἀκροτάτην χαρὰν καὶ βεβαιοτάτην ἔχει τοῖς ἐπιλογίζεσθαι δυναμένοις.
The εὐσταθὲς (eustathes) there is "well based, standing firm, stable (relatively unchanging)." The κατάστημα (katastēma) is the "condition, state."
