Posts by Don

Quote from Godfrey

Now I understand where the table in post #30 comes from; it sometimes takes a few repetitions for an idea to sink in...perhaps more observable because you're smiling and laughing. That seems to me to be rather banal, not very useful

LOL... And that "observable" idea of my theory is blown out of the water anyway with the section from the letter to Menoikeus: "so that in old age you can be youthful by taking joy (kinetic pleasure) in the good things you remember" and Fragment 68 "To those who are able to reason it out, the highest and surest joy (kinetic pleasure) is found in the stable health of the body and a firm confidence in keeping it." See posts above.

Those two alone muddy the waters considerably!

It may be useful to dig into the the implications of the energeia aspect of those pleasures involved in motion. But I'm *almost* back at square one.

There still has to be a distinction that is of paramount importance here for Epicurus in defining the spectrum of pleasure he recognizes with the pleasures accepted by the Cyrenaics. On its surface, I still think the circumplex quadrants have something to speak to that with low and high arousal. ...hmmm .... Maybe *that* has some connection to energeia?? By Zeus! This is a minefield!!!

On enargeia and kinesis, check out the Wikipedia article here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Potential…ity?wprov=sfla1

I need to read these closer too:

https://cup.columbia.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Philosophies-of-Happiness-Appendix-6.pdf

https://cup.columbia.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Philosophies-of-Happiness-Appendix-8.pdf

There aren't a lot of opportunities, but I decided to try and replace single words with either katastematic or kinetic pleasure.

It should also be remembered that the phrase "kinetic pleasure" isn't *actually* what Epicurus says. What he says is (as literally as I can make it):

"Peace of mind (ataraxia) and freedom from pain (aponia) are condition/state pleasures; joy (khara) and delight (euphrosyne) are seen in relation to (κατὰ) motion (κίνησιν) by means of activity (ἐνεργείᾳ)."

ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀταραξία καὶ <ἡ> ἀπονία καταστηματικαί εἰσιν ἡδοναί. ἡ δὲ χαρὰ καὶ ἡ εὐφροσύνη κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργείᾳ βλέπονται (seen).

ἐνεργείᾳ is a dative case of ἐνέργεια which comes up in Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics: See https://sites.google.com/view/epicurean…n-ethics-book-1

Epicurus also uses the word in the Letter to Herodotus:

[37] "Hence, since such a course is of service to all who take up natural science, I, who devote to the subject my continuous **energy** (τὸ συνεχὲς **ἐνέργημα**) and **reap the calm enjoyment of a life** (ἐγγαληνίζων) like this, have prepared for you just such an epitome and manual of the doctrines as a whole.

Here are my replacments:

519. The greatest fruit of justice is a katastematic pleasure (serenity).

δικαιοσύνης καρπὸς μέγιστος ἀταραξία.

Letter to Menoikeus:

The steady contemplation of these facts enables you to understand everything that you accept or reject in terms of the health of the body and the katastematic pleasure (serenity) of the soul — since that is the goal of a completely happy life.

so that in old age you can be youthful by taking kinetic pleasure (joy) in the good things you remember

τῷ μὲν ὅπως γηράσκων νεάζῃ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς διὰ τὴν χάριν τῶν γεγονότων

(LOL! Well that blows my memories are katastematic pleasure out of the water!!)

Scholion to the Letter to Herodotus, DL.10.66

[He says elsewhere that the soul is composed of the smoothest and roundest of atoms, far superior in both respects to those of fire ; that part of it is irrational, this being scattered over the rest of the frame, while the rational part resides in the chest, as is manifest from our fears and our kinetic pleasure (joy)

(Interesting note here is that fear is contrasted with a kinetic pleasure. Not sure if there's any significance, but there you have it.)

I'm repeating myself a bit with this post but wanted to keep it for future reference in one spot...

Two key words:

καθίστημι "to make" in PD21 - "to bring into a certain state; bring; replace or restore; etc."

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, καθίστημι

κατάστημα "condition, state, not necessarily permanent: bodily or mental condition"

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, κατάστημα

I want to (once again) compile instances of the use of those words that I feel are pertinent. I am intentionally NOT including Cicero's materials because, honestly, I don't necessarily consider him a reliable source. I'm limiting my sources to Epicurus, Metrodorus, and Diogenes of Oenoanda for now. And, yes, I have to "trust" others for reporting the words of Epicurus and Metrodorus... but at least we have Diogenes' Wall.

PD21 One who perceives the limits of life knows how easy it is to expel the pain produced by a lack of something and **to make one's entire life complete**; so that there is no need for the things that are achieved through struggle.

ὁ τὰ πέρατα τοῦ βίου κατειδὼς οἶδεν ὡς εὐπόριστόν ἐστι τὸ <τὸ> ἀλγοῦν κατʼ ἔνδειαν ἐξαιροῦν καὶ τὸ τὸν ὅλον βίον παντελῆ καθιστάν (< infinitive of καθίστημι)· ὥστε οὐδὲν προσδεῖται πραγμάτων ἀγῶνας κεκτημένων.

Fragment 2:

Lack of mental disturbance and lack of bodily pain are static pleasures, whereas revelry and rejoicing are active pleasures involving movement.

ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀταραξία καὶ <ἡ> ἀπονία **καταστηματικαί** εἰσιν ἡδοναί. ἡ δὲ χαρὰ καὶ ἡ εὐφροσύνη κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργείᾳ βλέπονται.

Fragment 68:

To those who are able to reason it out, the highest and surest joy is found in **the stable health of the body** and a firm confidence in keeping it.

**τὸ γὰρ εὐσταθὲς σαρκὸς κατάστημα** καὶ τὸ περὶ ταύτης πιστὸν ἔλπισμα τὴν ἀκροτάτην χαρὰν καὶ βεβαιοτάτην ἔχει τοῖς ἐπιλογίζεσθαι δυναμένοις.

Metrodorus (Diogenes Laertius, 10.136):

Metrodorus in his Timocrates, whose actual words are : "Thus pleasure being conceived both as that species which consists in motion and that which is a state of rest."

Μητρόδωρος ἐν τῷ Τιμοκράτει λέγουσιν οὕτω: νοουμένης δὲ ἡδονῆς τῆς τε κατὰ κίνησιν καὶ τῆς καταστηματικῆς.

Metrodorus, Fragment 5: "Metrodorus, in his book On the Source of Happiness in Ourselves being greater than that which arises from Objects, says: 'What else is the good of the soul but **the sound state of the flesh (τὸ σαρκὸς εὐσταθὲς κατάστημα),** and the sure hope of its continuance?'"

Diogenes of Oenoanda:

Let us now [investigate] how life is to be made pleasant for us both in **states** and in actions (praxesin).

(εισαν τὰ φ̣ρόν[ιμα]. ἡμ[εῖς δὲ ζη]τ̣ῶ̣μεν ἤ̣δ̣η πῶς ὁ βίος ἡμεῖν ἡδὺς γένηται καὶ ἐν τοῖς **κατασ̣τήμασι** καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν.)

Let us first discuss states (περὶ δὲ τῶν καταστημάτων πρῶτον εἴπωμεν), keeping an eye on the point that, when the emotions which disturb the soul are removed, those which produce pleasure enter into it to take their place.

One thing that I find interesting is that only in Metrodorus (Fragment 5 & DL10.136) and Epicurus' Fragment 68 (i.e., DL10.136) do we find εὐσταθὲς modifying κατάστημα. That's " well based, standing firm, stable (relatively unchanging)." κατάστημα itself is simply "condition, state."

The other references only use κατάστημα and related words alone:

Epicurus: Fragment 2 (& Diogenes 10.136): καταστηματικαί

Metrodorus (DL 10.136): καταστηματικῆς

Diogenes of Oenoanda: κατασ̣τήμασι

So, the idea of a *stable/"relatively unchanging" condition is not necessarily conveyed by the second set of references, only the connotation of "state, condition." If that's the case, then we're talking about "state, condition" in contrast to kinesis "motion, opp. rest (στάσις)". Kinesis in LSJ includes opp. ἠρεμία (eremia) which is also a "quietude of the mind." So, this implies to me that we are, indeed, talking about pleasure "at rest (residing in a particular state or condition)" and pleasure "in motion."

PostScript...:

In thinking some more, I note that Fragment 68 doesn't mention pleasure in general **BUT** it does mention a KINETIC PLEASURE!

To those who are able to reason it out, the highest and surest joy is found in the stable health of the body and a firm confidence in keeping it.

τὸ γὰρ εὐσταθὲς σαρκὸς κατάστημα καὶ τὸ περὶ ταύτης πιστὸν ἔλπισμα τὴν ἀκροτάτην χαρὰν καὶ βεβαιοτάτην ἔχει τοῖς ἐπιλογίζεσθαι δυναμένοις.

χαρὰν is simply the accusative of χαρά (khara).... Where do we see χαρά? RIGHT THERE in Epicurus's category of kinetic pleasures: ἡ δὲ χαρὰ καὶ ἡ εὐφροσύνη κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργείᾳ βλέπονται.

SO... That means that we could substitute kinetic pleasure in Fragment 68!

- To those who are able to reason it out, the highest and surest kinetic pleasure is found in the stable health of the body and a firm confidence in keeping it.

Question, of course, is HOW can the "stable health of the body and a firm confidence in keeping it" be a KINETIC PLEASURE!!??

Curiouser and curiouser!

That quote in the definition in post 40 is from

Fragment 68:

To those who are able to reason it out, the highest and surest joy is found in the stable health of the body and a firm confidence in keeping it.

τὸ γὰρ εὐσταθὲς σαρκὸς κατάστημα καὶ τὸ περὶ ταύτης πιστὸν ἔλπισμα τὴν ἀκροτάτην χαρὰν καὶ βεβαιοτάτην ἔχει τοῖς ἐπιλογίζεσθαι δυναμένοις.

The εὐσταθὲς (eustathes) there is "well based, standing firm, stable (relatively unchanging)." The κατάστημα (katastēma) is the "condition, state."

I like TauPhi 's post above (No. 39) because it gets at again how we co-exist with two very real perspectives: At our most basic, we exist as atoms and void. There's no getting around that. That is true.

However, we don't experience our existence *as atoms and void* (or as interactions of chemicals). We experience our lives at the level of feelings and sensations. That is ALSO true.

Both can be true at the same time and neither need override the other.

I hope I've characterized TauPhi's points correctly!

Quote from Godfrey

Upon further percolating

I like that! From now on, I will no longer cogitate or "meditate on these things," I'm going to "percolate on these things."

Quote from Godfrey

Would it be that kinetic pleasure is a condition of a change of state and katastematic pleasure is a condition of being in a state? This actually seems like the simplest and most accurate definition.

Yes, I agree with the following addenda: I think this line gets to the heart of Epicurus's recognizing these two categories of pleasure... and his and others saying we can have more confidence in the katastematic pleaasure. There's not only the "state" of feeling katastematic it is also the "stability" of katastematic pleasure. We can have confidence in the availability of katastematic pleasure because it is a "stable condition" of the mind or a "background or foundational" condition of the mind. This, to me, is also connected to the characteristic of the sage in that "once the sage has become wise, they will no longer fall back into ignorance." Once incorrect ideas are rooted out, they can't grow back. This is where ataraxia comes from: The mind being in a stable condition of not being worried about death, the gods, etc. Once the incorrect views are rooted out, we achieve a stable tranquil condition of the mind that is no longer troubled by these views.

I don't think the "motion of the atoms" has anything to with Epicurus's categorization of pleasure into katastematic or kinetic. As Godfrey points out, the atoms are moving all the time. I don't see any way to have the atomic motions be concerned with the kinetic/katastematic distinction.

Quote from Godfrey

Is there anything in the Greek that would support the idea that Epicurus was referring to change, not motion, if/when he used the terms kinetic and katastematic?

I'll use that as a jumping off point to look at the Greek and Latin (I rarely need much provocation to return to dictionaries and etymologies ) κατάστημα literally means "condition, state, not necessarily permanent: bodily or mental condition, “τὸ εὐσταθὲς σαρκὸς κ.” Epicur.Fr.68, Metrod.Fr.5, cf. Diog.Oen.29" Check out the post above where I shared those references to Epicurus, Metrodorus, and Diogenes Oenoanda.

I found this interesting article online: https://cup.columbia.edu/wp-content/upl…-Appendix-6.pdf

and this one: https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/14932622.pdf

There' also Hiram's article: https://societyofepicurus.com/on-the-standar…tatic-pleasure/

I admit I have not read these yet but was intrigued by the abstracts. I'll try to read them soon-ish but if anyone beats me to it, please share thoughts!

Quote from Cassius

Quote from Don responding to Godfrey

If I understand you correctly, you're saying katastematic pleasure has a longer "shelf life" whereas kinetic pleasures are of (relatively) shorter duration?

Someone will ask: If duration is the difference between katastematic and kinetic, what is the exact dividing line between the two and how is that line philosophically established? Would the time frame be a second, minute, hour, day, or what?

That's exactly the reason I'm not ready to embrace that suggestion just yet.

Godfrey , I can always rely on you for insightful responses and thoughtful posts! Great appreciated!

Let me think about a few of your points.

Just for my own putting things in order...

Quote from Godfrey

the difference between katastematic and kinetic is a factor of time

Hmmm.... I'm going to have to think about that. If I understand you correctly, you're saying katastematic pleasure has a longer "shelf life" whereas kinetic pleasures are of (relatively) shorter duration? To break down some of your examples:

Quote from Godfrey (edited, with notes from Don)

• I can be hungry (Don: pain or absence of pleasure)
  
• and get pleasure from relieving that hunger (Don: I would characterize that as kinetic pleasure while eating; gaining pleasure from remembering the meal - from my perspective - would be katastematic)
• I can be a little bit hungry (low arousal, negative valence)
  
  • or really hungry (high arousal, negative valence).
• What makes the pleasure from eating kinetic is that it changes my temporary state from hunger (pain) to pleasure (absence of pain = negative pleasure) (Don: Negative pleasure?? I'd accept negation of or opposite of pleasure but not the term "negative pleasure." Or maybe I'm just reading too much into that.)
• But before long I'll be hungry again, either way. (Don: Okay, fleeting/temporary pleasure is being characterized as kinetic, right? ... because it changes?)

And then you discussed katastematic pleasure...

Quote from Godfrey (with notes from Don)

The katastematic pleasure of:

• a correct worldview
• or of knowing that my needs are cared for for the foreseeable future...
  
  • could last years, not hours or minutes, and becomes a sort of "background" state of pleasure.

Okay, so you are including the long-term ("background") characteristic as (one) defining feature of katastematic pleasure. With short-term pleasure being a feature of kinetic pleasure... and its "kinetic" aspect is this exact fleeting feature it has?

Quote from Godfrey

I don't think that observability is relevant to either kinetic or katastematic pleasure.

So, it doesn't matter - from your perspective - what kind of activity is involved in causing the pleasure. I'll have to dig into that. Not saying I disagree or agree... Have to consider. Thank You for some food for thought!!!

Quote from Cassius

Quote from Don

(I realize this thread has strayed waaaaay off the original topic but this is a good conversation, so I'll let Cassius decide if it needs to be branched off or not)

Do you have a suggestion on where it started branching and how to describe the topic? Are you thinking it's a modern psychology heading?

Maybe back at post 100??

It seems to me we're diving into katastematic and kinetic and modern neuroscience??

Okay, further thoughts...

Epicurus likes his parallel constructions (ex., his "never too old... never too young..." sections in Menoikeus), so how would those (conveniently) four feelings of pleasure line up ... extrapolating from my thoughts above in post 128:

What I'm proposing here is that Ataraxia is the parallel to Khara; Aponia is the parallel to Euphrosyne.

Khara is "joy, delight" in being a spectator or member of audience. You experience pleasure from the experience. You can still be observed (it's a kinetic pleasure) engaging in the activity, but the pleasure is felt primarily as an internal feeling. It's still an external stimuli, but your "body" isn't as involved. LSJ definition includes "joy in or at a thing." Think watching a dancing or singing performance. The corresponding katatematic pleasure example is ataraxia.

Euphrosyne is "mirth, merriment, esp. of a banquet, good cheer, festivity." Euphrosyne is the pleasure you feel when actually involved yourself - with your body - in an activity. The oorresponding katastematic pleasure example is aponia.

(I realize this thread has strayed waaaaay off the original topic but this is a good conversation, so I'll let Cassius decide if it needs to be branched off or not)

In thinking about this a little more...

We always have to remember not to confuse desires with feelings. I don't think we're doing that here, but just putting that notice up again.

It also seems to me that ataraxia ((tranquility), aponia* (see footnote), chara, (joy) and euphrosyne (delight) could be described as *emotions* that is how we *experience* pleasure in our body and mind. Pleasure and pain are the two valents available to us to describe our affect with level of arousal the other axis. I go back to the circumplex model of affect:

Euphrosyne and xhara would be positive (pleasant) valence with high arousal (in the Happy Quadrant); ataraxia and aponia would be high positive valence and low arousal (in the Content(ment) Quadrant).

Maybe katastematic and kinetic were simply Epicurus way to describe the quadrants on the right (NOTE: Knowing fully well he didn't have a circumplex model of affect!! This is just a modern way of diagramming affect). Cyrenaics ONLY accepted the upper right quadrant as "Pleasure"; Epicurus accepted everything to the RIGHT of the vertical axis. I've stated this before (I think on one of the podcast threads, so sorry if this is duplicating what you've already read there.)

I have no trouble accepting that some people, ancient and modern, would only use PLEASURE to describe active pleasures one engages in with their body. I'd still call those kinetic pleasures... a pleasurable feeling *caused* by a external circumstances in which one engages. To describe it another way, people can SEE you engaging in activities from which you derive kinetic pleasures. Katastematic pleasures are those engaged in INSIDE your head (or in your chest if we're using the "your mind is in your chest/abdomen" paradigm of Epicurus). People can't SEE you engaged in those activities although they can be very powerfully felt by you.

Again, running the risk of thinking out loud but trying to add fuel to the fire for further conversation... or maybe that's fire to the minefield to paraphrase Little Rocker .

*aponia - I don't see - and don't think it's interpreted correctly - aponia as "being free from pain" in the sense of just "not feeling any pain." The word is "a + ponia (ponos)". Ponos includes:

πόνος (pónos)

• work, especially hard work; toil
• bodily exertion, exercise
• work, task, business
• the consequence of toil, distress, trouble, suffering
• anything produced by work, a work

It seems to me that aponia is to the body as ataraxia is to the mind. Ataraxia is a tranquil, well-functioning, calm mind. Aponia is the sense of your body working perfectly, the sense/feeling that athletes (And I wouldn't know this from first-hand experience ) get when they're in the flow and their bodies are just acting effortlessly. That's my sense of aponia.

Quote from Godfrey

I agree that a basic understanding of neurochemistry can aid in the pursuit of pleasure and well-being.

Agreed!

Quote from Godfrey

pleasure remains the way that we experience our neurochemical functioning

Agreed!! And well put, Godfrey.

Quote from Godfrey

I think, [pleasure] remains the highest good/the goal/the guide. Neurochemistry is the mechanism of pleasure but, to my way of thinking, doesn't supercede pleasure. For it to do so we would need equipment that would instantaneously monitor our levels of the various chemicals. The equipment that we have for that is our faculty of Feelings.

Again, well put. If I may add, our brains are what we have to "monitor our levels of the various chemicals." Our feelings and sensations (including interoception) are how we experience that monitoring. And as Dr. Lisa Feldman Barrett points out, that monitoring and prediction function is the main job of our brains... that whole reasoning thing comes along for the ride later on as I understand it.

I think TauPhi is onto something here with this line of thinking. My suggestion would just be to expand beyond dopamine when we consider the parallels between ancient katastematic/kinetic categories and modern neuroscience, and I do believe there are parallels. Maybe not one to one correspondence since Epicurus had no access to the research we have, but I feel his observations and intuition were ahead of their time.

Interesting articles/papers. The NLM ones are waaay into the weeds and I haven't read past the abstract, but sharing for possible future reference. The Psychology Today and other ones are a little more accessible.

The Neurochemicals of Happiness

Seven brain molecules that make you feel great.

www.psychologytoday.com

Happiness & Health: The Biological Factors- Systematic Review Article

Happiness underlying factors are considerable from two dimensions: endogenic factors (biological, cognitive, personality and ethical sub-factors) and exogenic…

www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov

Pleasure systems in the brain

Pleasure is mediated by well-developed mesocorticolimbic circuitry, and serves adaptive functions. In affective disorders anhedonia (lack of pleasure) or…

www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov

UConn Researcher: Dopamine Not About Pleasure (Anymore) - UConn Today

Contrary to a long-held scientific idea, psychologist John Salamone says an increasing number of studies show that the neurotransmitter has to do not with…

today.uconn.edu

How Brain Chemicals Influence Mood | UPMC HealthBeat

Learn more about common brain chemicals, or neurotransmitters, and how they affect your thinking and overall health.

share.upmc.com

I return to this section of Diogenes Laertius (10.136) over and over again when this topic comes up:

(Quote)

[136] He (Epicurus) differs from the Cyrenaics with regard to pleasure (περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς). They do not include under the term the pleasure which is a state of rest (τὴν καταστηματικὴν - tes katastematiken), but only that which consists in motion (ἐν κινήσει - en kinesei). Epicurus admits both (i.e., katastematiken and en kinesei); also pleasure of mind as well as of body (ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος),

as he (Epicurus) states:

1. in his work On Choice and Avoidance
2. and in that On the Ethical End
3. and in the first book of his work On Human Life
4. and in the epistle to his philosopher friends in Mytilene
5. So also Diogenes in the seventeenth book of his Epilecta
6. and Metrodorus in his Timocrates, whose actual words are : "Thus pleasure being conceived both as that species which consists in motion (τε κατὰ κίνησιν (kinesin)) and that which is a state of rest (καταστηματικῆς (katastematikes))."
   1. "νοουμένης δὲ ἡδονῆς τῆς τε κατὰ κίνησιν (kinesin) καὶ τῆς καταστηματικῆς (katastematikes)."

The words of Epicurus in his work On Choice (and Avoidance) are: "Peace of mind (ἀταραξία - ataraxia) and freedom from pain (ἀπονία - aponia) are pleasures which imply a state of rest (καταστηματικαί - katastematikai); joy (χαρὰ khara) and delight (εὐφροσύνη euphrosyne) are seen to consist in motion and activity (κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργείᾳ - kata kinesin energeia)."

(End Quote)

According to this report, Epicurus mentions katastematic and kinetic (and mental and bodily) pleasures in at least four books, and the Epicureans Diogenes of Tarsus and Metrodorus each mention it in their books.

I'm still not entirely convinced that the best translation of katastematic is "state *of rest*". I think stable pleasure would be good, but is it stable because it's reliable - or 100% available at all times to paraphrase Little Rocker. καταστημα is defined by LSJ as "condition, state, not necessarily permanent: 1. bodily or mental condition, “τὸ εὐσταθὲς σαρκὸς κ.” Epicur.Fr.68, Metrod.Fr.5, cf. Diog.Oen.29" (3 Epicurean sources cited)

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, Κκ , κατάσσυ^τος , κατάστημα

[ U68 ] Plutarch, That Epicurus actually makes a pleasant life impossible, 4, p. 1089D: It is this, I believe, that has driven them, seeing for themselves the absurdities to which they were reduced, to take refuge in the "painlessness" and the "stable condition of the flesh," supposing that the pleasurable life is found in thinking of this state as about to occur in people or as being achieved; for the "stable and settled condition of the flesh," and the "trustworthy expectation" of this condition contain, they say, the highest and the most assured delight for men who are able to reflect. Now to begin with, observe their conduct here, how they keep decanting this "pleasure" or "painlessness" or "stable condition" of theirs back and forth, from body to mind and then once more from mind to body.

Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights, IX.5.2: Epicurus makes pleasure the highest good but defines it as sarkos eustathes katastema, or "a well-balanced condition of the body."

> Metrodorus, Fragment 5: "Metrodorus, in his book On the Source of Happiness in Ourselves being greater than that which arises from Objects, says: 'What else is the good of the soul but the sound state of the flesh, and the sure hope of its continuance?'" (Source: Metrodori Epicurei Fragmenta collegit scriptoris incerti Epicurei Commentarium moralem, subiecit Alfredus Koerte)

> Diogenes of Oenoanda:

Let us now [investigate] how life is to be made pleasant for us both in states (katastēmasi) and in actions (praxesin).**

(εισαν τὰ φ̣ρόν[ιμα]. ἡμ[εῖς δὲ ζη]τ̣ῶ̣μεν ἤ̣δ̣η πῶς ὁ βίος ἡμεῖν ἡδὺς γένηται καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατασ̣τήμασι καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν.)

Let us first discuss states (περὶ δὲ τῶν καταστημάτων πρῶτον εἴπωμεν), keeping an eye on the point that, when the emotions which disturb the soul are removed, those which produce pleasure enter into it to take their place.

Well, what are the disturbing emotions? [They are] fears —of the gods, of death, and of [pains]— and, besides [these], desires that [outrun] the limits fixed by nature. These are the roots of all evils, and, [unless] we cut them off, [a multitude] of evils will grow [upon] us.

**in actions (praxesin) < πράξεσιν dative plural of πραξις "act, action, activity, deed, doing"

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, πρᾶξις

Quote from Godfrey

Don do you see homeostasis as being a helpful idea in sorting out this conundrum?

I do think "homeostatis" is helpful, but... I've come to understand that the concept of "homeostasis" has been somewhat replaced by "allostasis." Ex.: "Clarifying the Roles of Homeostasis and Allostasis in Physiological Regulation" (2014)

BUT when I talk (colloquially) about "homeostasis," I'm going to say that I mean an awareness of the well functioning of the body and mind accompanied by a state of satisfaction and contentment.

*That* I think is helpful, and what I believe I would call "ataraxia."

One thing I want to emphasize, too, is that I do not think there are only two katastematic pleasures, e.g., ataraxia and aponia; just like I don't think there are only two kinetic pleasures, e.g., khara and euphrosyne. Those are the four pleasures that Epicurus provides as his examples... but there is no way that those are the only four pleasures that Epicurus believed existed.

Little Rocker's point about katastematic pleasures being always there, always available to perception is exactly right (in my opinion). Ataraxia is always available to be sensed (IF you're body and mind are working right with correct attitudes toward the gods and death etc.) BUT, from my perspective, we also always have access to our memories, to our anticipations (in the colloquial sense not the Epicurean canonic sense). That availability to access and/or generate a particular mental state is what I think katastematic pleasures are. They are not dependent on outside circumstances or chance or fortune.

Quote from Little Rocker

This is a minefield

LOL! Well, that hasn't stopped us before!

Pleasure appears to be a "feeling," since it is canonically defined as one of the two feelings of the canon.

Is "feeling" a sensation? I would have to say yes, in the sense that every feeling is a sensation in the sense of PD2, but interestingly, Saint-Andre doesn't use sensation but awareness there:

Death is nothing to us; for what has disintegrated lacks awareness, and what lacks awareness is nothing to us.

We are *aware* when we are *feeling* pleasure...therefore, it seems to be that feelings = sensations.

Or we may just be splitting hairs to no purpose:

αἴσθησῐς (aísthēsis)

• Perception from the senses, feeling, hearing, seeing
• Perception by the intellect as well as the senses
• That which is perceived: scent
• Ability to perceive: discernment
• Cognition or discernment of moral discernment in ethical matters

Quote from Little Rocker

So for what it's worth, I'm inclined to think the difference is that katestematic pleasure is always there, always available to perception. I can call it to mind and experience it wherever I am. 'Kinetic' pleasure comes and goes.

Now, *THAT* I agree 100%! To continue on my soapbox/hobby horse: That's why we can be more confident in katastematic pleasures: They are always available to us. We can enjoy kinetic pleasures, but they are dependent on circumstances external to ourselves.

I realize I still need to again read G&T (Why do I read that "gin & tonic"??) but then I think... do I? I need to back and read Epicurus and what's left of the Epicureans first, I think.

FWIW...

Post

RE: Do Pigs Value Katastematic Pleasure? ( Summer 2022 K / K Discussion)

I will continue to soapbox the fact that katastematic and kinetic come directly from Epicurus in On Choices and Avoidances:

[…]

I will continue to soapbox that Metrodorus stated there were pleasures of activity and those of "rest/states/stability":

[…]

This, to me, points to the "source" - "the sound state of the flesh" (to sarkos eustathes *katastema*) - being a more confident source -- according to Metrodorus himself -- of pleasure than "objects" (kinetic pleasure) outside of ourselves. It does…

Don

October 19, 2022 at 9:19 PM

Quote from Cassius

If in fact Farrington's position reduces to "generated from within" vs "generated from without" that would at least have the virtue of being clear and understandable, whether it's agreeable or not.

there's something to be said for "clear and understandable"

Good questions, Cassius. I'll have to dig into Farrington... But, in all honesty, I agree with him because he agrees with my interpretation not the other way around.

I've never been overly enamored of G&T's interpretation anyway IF I remember it correctly.

As a further explanation of my perspective:

Katastematic is derived from καθιστημι (kathistēmi) which, among its many definitions, is "bring into a certain state; come into a certain state, become" LSJ references PD13 specifically.

It is useless to be safe from other people while retaining suspicions about what is above and below the earth and in general about the infinite unknown.

οὐθὲν ὄφελος ἦν τὴν κατὰ ἀνθρώπους ἀσφάλειαν παρασκευάζεσθαι τῶν ἄνωθεν ὑπόπτων καθεστώτων καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ ἁπλῶς τῶν ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ.

I believe the word there is talking about bringing into the state of viewing something with suspicion

καθίστημι - Wiktionary