Posts by Don

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I think Epicurus scored the winning goal on that playing field.

Yes I think you are right but this is our task - to explain the reasoning to the "hearts in darkness."

Tell them to turn on the light!

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All the to'ing and fro'ing befuddles me to no end.

What do you do with that priest in the video when he reaches the "uncaused cause" part of his chain of reasoning, and suggests to you that that is "God?"

I suspect that you have a good answer to that, but I also expect that 95% of the world does not.

Oh, that? I think he's deluded and indoctrinated and unwilling to honestly assess his preconceived notions. There's no need for an "uncaused cause." As Joshua pointed out in an historical antidote in the last episode of the podcast, there's no need for that notion in physics.

My point is that if you're trying to counter the unmoved mover claim, you've already ceded the argument to them.

I do not believe answering the summum bonum question in any way cedes the field to anyone. I think Epicurus scored the winning goal on that playing field.

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We have to be alive - we have to exist! - to feel pleasure or pain.

And that's exactly why I would say that it makes sense to emphasize the "life" aspect as part of the equation, so that no one gets the idea that pleasure or pain are themselves disembodied forces or god or of nature or ideals that exist apart from the living being.

None of this has any meaning for things that don't exist! Pleasure and pain are feelings *of living beings.*

I truly and sincerely don't understand the knots into which we tie ourselves in these discussions about the "greatest good," the summum bonum, the telos, etc. To me it's simple and clear as day:

All those terms simply mean "What motivates your actions when you keep asking why you do what you do?" Epicurus answered, correctly in my opinion, pleasure. Pleasure, both in the short term and the long term, motivates all our actions. Full stop. Stoics answered virtue. Epicurus could come back with, why do you act virtuously... Because it brings you pleasure!

All the to'ing and fro'ing befuddles me to no end.

Quote from Cassius

I doubt there is a way to be sure of this question but for example sitting at dinner for thanksgiving and looking forward to the meal might be something I would consider to be a type of hunger that is pleasure.

I'd say the anticipation of tucking into the feast is the pleasure, not the feeling of hunger itself.

Quote from Cassius

I think DeWitt is asking, however, whether that was not the direction that Epicurus was going, and once one "thinks like an Epicurean" in equating life in the absence of pain to be pleasure, then equating "being alive" with "pleasurable experience" is a natural association, and a good way to think.

I think DeWitt is just mistaken, especially in light of his "Latin doesn't have a definite article" hobbyhorse in his summum bonum paper. I do not think this was the direction Epicurus was going. It's not "life in the absence of pain = pleasure", it is simply "the absence of the feeling of pain = pleasure" and conversely "the absence of the feeling of pleasure = pain." Adding "life" to the equation doesn't add anything. We have to be alive - we have to exist! - to feel pleasure or pain.

Quote from Cassius

And I really don't know that I think that natural cycles of developing natural and ordinary degrees of hunger or thirst should be considered to be "pain.". Seems to me that these are aspects of normal functioning and only situations where abnormal hunger or thirst develops would really be considered "painful.". That goes along with our earlier discussions where some argue that not every unfulfilled desire is a matter of pain.

I'd say by definition that feeling hungry is pain because it's not pleasure to feel hungry... And the feelings are two. In modern neuroscience terms, you either feel positive (pleasure) or negative (pain) affect. It might not be very high arousal in the negative direction if you're just feeling "noshy" but it's negative/pain all the same.

I don't think you can answer "Why did you do that?" with "Because I'm alive" and have it have any real meaning.

By definition, if you're dead you don't exist; you can't perform any action if you don't exist.

If I say, "Because it gives pleasure" or "it gives me a pleasurable feeling," and you ask why; then I can say "Because of biology and natural selection, etc." but that's gilding the lily to my mind. But biology and natural selection can't be motivating factors. They are the scaffolding that makes my living possible, but they don't answer "why"... Maybe "how." We feel because we're alive. When we're alive, we feel. Our *feelings* answer the why, if we're honest with ourselves.

I've watched Alex O'Connor's work on YouTube for awhile and came across this episode of his podcast. Y'all are welcome to react to the episode as a whole of you wish, but the Catholic bishop talks about the summum bonum at around 14 or 15 minute mark. His explanation is exactly how I understand the term: keep asking "why?" and the answer at the end is your summum bonum. I can see the answer being "it brings me pleasure" Her didn't, of course. But I thought this was a good explanation of the term summum bonum. Which is why I balk at Dewitt's "life is the greatest good" because it seems a tautology to answer why I do something as "because I'm alive."

Anyway, it's an interesting conversation.

Even though JRR Tolkien fully embraced a Catholic worldview, I found this post on Instagram interesting. Even he can't get away from the fact that he created his world of Middle-earth because he found the creation process pleasurable.

@tolkien.worldwide on Instagram: "J.R.R. Tolkien passionately conveyed that the act of creating his world brought him immeasurable pleasure and joy. The crucial lesson we should all learn is that striving for perfection should never be driven by the…

421 likes, 6 comments - @tolkien.worldwide on Instagram: "J.R.R. Tolkien passionately conveyed that the act of creating his world brought him immeasurable ..."

www.instagram.com

Quote from Cassius

Philodemus in "On Signs / On Methods of Inference"

Maybe there's a podcast episode or two in the future?

Quote from Cassius

So to avoid drawing any improper conclusions from the "absence" of divisions, it would be necessary to know of some ancient texts where divisions *were* used. If everything in ancient Latin and Greek was in fact run together without much break then not much can be inferred.

Personally, I think the fact that there were lists of 44 and 40 PDs floating around shows there was no "standard" list. I'm also curious to look at the Latin translations to see if they offered any gaps in the text for topics or paragraphs.

Again, for my notes as much as anything (but happy to share!):

Principal Doctrines begins in manuscript Grec 1758

(Publication date : 1401-1500) on folio 206 (left side), 12 lines up from the bottom, right side of the text:

Grec 1758

Grec 1758 -- 1401-1500 -- manuscrits

gallica.bnf.fr

As an example of what does bring me joy : ΚΥΡΙΑΙ ΔΟΞΧΑΙ starts in the middle of the third line from the bottom on folio 247b in this manuscript, Publication date : 1075-1150:

Diogène Laërce

Diogène Laërce -- 1075-1150 -- manuscrits

gallica.bnf.fr

Okay... but procrastination brings pain, so NOW I'm off to trim the hedges

Okay, so here's my next project in my "copious" free time I want to look at the "best" Greek manuscripts transcribing Diogenes Laertius and go through them, looking for natural breaks in the text - not topical necessarily but literally in the written texts. Then to "reconstruct" the book listed as Κύριαι δόξαι by Diogenes in Epicurus's bibliography. Note that that title doesn't have a definite article. It's NOT 'Αι κύριαι δόξαι "THE Principal Doctrines" but Κύριαι δόξαι "Principal Doctrines" as in maybe these are not EVERY Principal Doctrine of Epicurus but a good solid exposition of the important teachings Epicureans should pay attention to.

From my letter to Menoikeus introduction, I found that the six manuscripts listed by Bailey as the most significant and "representing a careful copying" are:

codex Borbonicus Neapolitanus gr. iii B. 29 (12th c) known as B

codex Parisinus gr. 1759 (14th c.) known as P

https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b8470453h/f497.item (the letter begins four lines from the bottom of folio 243r)

codex Parisinus gr. 1758 (14th or 15th c.) known as Q

https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b107231783/f203.item (letter starts 16 lines down on left folio on page number 148)

codex Constantinopolitanus Veteris Serail. (14th or 15th c.) known as Co

codex Laurentianus LXIX. 35 (14th c.) known as H

http://mss.bmlonline.it/Catalogo.aspx?Shelfmark=Plut.69.35

Plut.69.35 is listed in the online catalog as coming from the 12th century, so I am unsure if it is H or something else. However, it's inclusion in the Laurentian Library and its shelfmark 69.35 (i.e., LXIX. 35) leads me to believe it is. I'm not sure why Bailey gives it a date of 14th century.

codex Vaticanus gr. 140 (14th c.) known as W

https://digi.vatlib.it/view/MSS_Vat.gr.140 (letter begins 13 lines down on right folio 177)

PS. This project will be *after* revising my Menoikeus commentary to include the discussion on απολαυσεις in 131 etc. Just saying.

Quote from Cassius

Good idea. We really need to pin this down. It's logical to have a way to keep track of the sentences, but the artificial division introduces an overlay of meaning that needs to be kept in the background - by "force" if necessary.

It's a similar situation to the Bible in that there were no "verses" in the original texts. Scholars started dividing the New Testament into verses in the 1400-1500s. Maybe the artificial divisions are an outgrowth of that tendency.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chapters_and_verses_of_the_Bible#%3A%7E%3Atext%3DMost_attribute_these_to_Rabbi%2Csystem_was_never_widely_adopted.?wprov=sfla1

Quote from Cassius

Plus I don't think we should lose sight of the "celestial book" references

I'm sorry, can you refresh my memory on the "celestial book" reference? Oops, never mind. I found the discussion:

Post

RE: Toward a New Interlinear Gloss of De Rerum Natura

Any way you can use one of the text versions posted to Internet Archive? It would probably require some editing but might include more options?

I was considering doing an interlinear of the Principal Doctrines or the Letter to Menoikeus until I remembered the Epicurus Wiki did a good job on both: http://wiki.epicurism.info/Main_Page/ I'll keep working on my in-depth analysis of the Letter and possibly integrate some interlinear text there.

Don

June 1, 2021 at 11:08 PM

Quote from Cassius

If Epicurus or the later school leaders had thought separation and numbering were important or helpful, then presumably they could easily have numbered them themselves - and if they did not, that is significant.

It certainly appears to me that they did not number the PDs.

Okay, this was VERY interesting. I used the 1739 Greek with Latin translation to compare with the text at Perseus Digital Library:

1739: https://hdl.handle.net/2027/nnc1.0021…7768674761-1400

Perseus Greek (DL, Book 10): http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…0%3Achapter%3D1

Perseus English (DL, Book 10): http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…0%3Achapter%3D1

I used the Greek text to compare with each other since 1739 had 44 Principal Doctrines and Perseus (i.e., Hicks, 1972) had the "normal" 40! I wanted to see what was different. And were there differences!! Starting at 44, I had to go all the way back to PD18 to get the lists to coincide!! Some Hicks were divided by the 1739, a couple 1739's were combinations of Hicks, and so on. To follow the numbers, capital Roman numerals are the 1739. Hicks uses a modified Roman numeral system with ϝ being V (5). So, where 1739 uses XXVI for 26; Hicks would use χχϝι for 26. I'm also, in part, placing this here to serve as notes for myself and anyone else who wants to dive in to this.

Principle Doctrine Comparison: 1739 edition vs Hicks 1972 (Perseus Digital Library)

[139] [ι.] Τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον οὔτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχει οὔτε ἄλλῳ παρέχει, ὥστε οὔτε ὀργαῖς οὔτε χάρισι συνέχεται: ἐν ἀσθενεῖ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον. [ἐν ἄλλοις δέ φησι τοὺς θεοὺς λόγῳ θεωρητούς, οὓς μὲν κατ᾽ ἀριθμὸν ὑφεστῶτας, οὓς δὲ καθ᾽ ὁμοείδειαν ἐκ τῆς συνεχοῦς ἐπιρρύσεως τῶν ὁμοίων εἰδώλων ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀποτετελεσμένωι ἀνθρωποειδῶς.]

[ιι.] Ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς: τὸ γὰρ διαλυθὲν ἀναισθητεῖ: τὸ δ᾽ ἀναισθητοῦν οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς.

[ιιι.] Ὅρος τοῦ μεγέθους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡ παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσις. ὅπου δ᾽ ἂν τὸ ἡδόμενον ἐνῇ, καθ᾽ ὃν ἂν χρόνον ᾖ, οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἀλγοῦν ἢ τὸ λυπούμενον ἢ τὸ συναμφότερον.

211 [140] [ιϝ.] Οὐ χρονίζει τὸ ἀλγοῦν συνεχῶς ἐν τῇ σαρκί, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἄκρον τὸν ἐλάχιστον χρόνον πάρεστι, τὸ δὲ μόνον ὑπερτεῖνον τὸ ἡδόμενον κατὰ σάρκα οὐ πολλὰς ἡμέρας συμμένει.212 αἱ δὲ πολυχρόνιοι τῶν ἀρρωστιῶν πλεονάζον ἔχουσι τὸ ἡδόμενον ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ ἤ περ τὸ ἀλγοῦν.

[ϝ.] Οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδέως ζῆν ἄνευ τοῦ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως, <οὐδὲ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως> ἄνευ τοῦ ἡδέως. ὅτῳ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ ὑπάρχει ἐξ οὗ ζῆν φρονίμως, καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ὑπάρχει, οὐκ ἔστι τοῦτον ἡδέως ζῆν.

213 [141] [ϝι.] Ἕνεκα τοῦ θαρρεῖν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, ἦν κατὰ φύσιν [ἀρχῆς καὶ βασιλείας] ἀγαθόν, ἐξ ὧν ἄν ποτε τοῦθ᾽ οἷός τ᾽ ᾖ παρασκευάζεσθαι.

[ϝιι.] Ἔνδοξοι καὶ περίβλεπτοί τινες ἐβουλήθησαν γενέσθαι, τὴν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἀσφάλειαν οὕτω νομίζοντες περιποιήσεσθαι. ὥστ᾽ εἰ μὲν ἀσφαλὴς ὁ τῶν τοιούτων βίος, ἀπέλαβον τὸ τῆς φύσεως ἀγαθόν: εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀσφαλής, οὐκ ἔχουσιν οὗ ἕνεκα ἐξ ἀρχῆς κατὰ τὸ τῆς φύσεως οἰκεῖον ὠρέχθησαν.

[ϝιιι.] Οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸ κακόν: ἀλλὰ τὰ τινῶν ἡδονῶν ποιητικὰ πολλαπλασίους ἐπιφέρει τὰς ὀχλήσεις τῶν ἡδονῶν.

214 [142] [ιχ.] Εἰ κατεπυκνοῦτο πᾶσα ἡδονή, καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ περὶ ὅλον τὸ ἄθροισμα ὑπῆρχεν ἢ τὰ κυριώτατα μέρη τῆς φύσεως, οὐκ ἄν ποτε διέφερον ἀλλήλων αἱ ἡδοναί.

[χ.] Εἰ τὰ ποιητικὰ τῶν περὶ τοὺς ἀσώτους ἡδονῶν ἔλυε τοὺς φόβους τῆς διανοίας τούς τε περὶ μετεώρων καὶ θανάτου καὶ ἀλγηδόνων, ἔτι τε τὸ πέρας τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐδίδασκεν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε εἴχομεν ὅ τι ἐμεμψάμεθα αὐτοῖς, πανταχόθεν εἰσπληρουμένοις τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ οὐδαμόθεν οὔτε τὸ ἀλγοῦν οὔτε τὸ λυπούμενον ἔχουσιν, ὅ περ ἐστὶ τὸ κακόν.

[χι.] Εἰ μηθὲν ἡμᾶς αἱ τῶν μετεώρων ὑποψίαι ἠνώχλουν καὶ αἱ περὶ θανάτου, μή ποτε πρὸς ἡμᾶς ᾖ τι, ἔτι τε τὸ μὴ κατανοεῖν τοὺς ὅρους τῶν ἀλγηδόνων καὶ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, οὐκ ἂν προσεδεόμεθα φυσιολογίας.

215 [143] [χιι.] Οὐκ ἦν τὸ φοβούμενον λύειν ὑπὲρ τῶν κυριωτάτων μὴ κατειδότα τίς ἡ τοῦ σύμπαντος φύσις, ἀλλ᾽ ὑποπτευόμενόν τι τῶν κατὰ τοὺς μύθους: ὥστε οὐκ ἦν ἄνευ φυσιολογίας ἀκεραίους τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀπολαμβάνειν.

[χιιι.] Οὐθὲν ὄφελος ἦν τὴν κατ᾽ ἀνθρώπους ἀσφάλειαν κατασκευάζεσθαι τῶν ἄνωθεν ὑπόπτων καθεστώτων καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ ἁπλῶς τῶν ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ.

[χιϝ.] Τῆς ἀσφαλείας τῆς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γενομένης μέχρι τινὸς δυνάμει τε ἐξερειστικὴ216 καὶ εὐπορίᾳ εἰλικρινεστάτη γίνεται ἡ ἐκ τῆς ἡσυχίας καὶ ἐκχωρήσεως τῶν πολλῶν ἀσφάλεια.

217 [144] [χϝ.] Ὁ τῆς φύσεως πλοῦτος καὶ ὥρισται καὶ εὐπόριστός ἐστιν: ὁ δὲ τῶν κενῶν δοξῶν εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκπίπτει.

[χϝι.] Βραχέα σοφῷ τύχη παρεμπίπτει, τὰ δὲ μέγιστα καὶ κυριώτατα ὁ λογισμὸς διῴκηκε καὶ κατὰ τὸν συνεχῆ χρόνον τοῦ βίου διοικεῖ καὶ διοικήσει.

[χϝιι.] Ὁ δίκαιος ἀταρακτότατος, ὁ δ᾽ ἄδικος πλείστης ταραχῆς γέμων.

[χϝιιι.] Οὐκ ἐπαύξεται ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ ἡ ἡδονή, ἐπειδὰν ἅπαξ τὸ κατ᾽ ἔνδειαν ἀλγοῦν ἐξαιρεθῇ, ἀλλὰ μόνον ποικίλλεται. (XIX) τῆς δὲ διανοίας τὸ πέρας τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀπεγέννησεν ἥ τε τούτων αὐτῶν ἐκλόγησις καὶ τῶν ὁμογενῶν τούτοις, ὅσα τοὺς μεγίστους φόβους παρεσκεύαζε τῇ διανοίᾳ.

XX 218 [145] [χιχ.] Ὁ ἄπειρος χρόνος ἴσην ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ ὁ πεπερασμένος, ἐάν τις αὐτῆς τὰ πέρατα καταμετρήσῃ τῷ λογισμῷ.

ΧΧΙ [χχ.] Ἡ(1739: Εἰ) μὲν (1739: η) σὰρξ ἀπέλαβε τὰ πέρατα τῆς ἡδονῆς ἄπειρα, καὶ ἄπειρος αὐτὴν χρόνος παρεσκεύασεν. (ΧΧΙΙ) ἡ (1739: Εἰ) δὲ διάνοια τοῦ τῆς σαρκὸς τέλους καὶ πέρατος λαβοῦσα τὸν ἐπιλογισμὸν καὶ τοὺς ὑπὲρ τοῦ αἰῶνος φόβους ἐκλύσασα τὸν παντελῆ βίον παρεσκεύασεν, καὶ οὐθὲν ἔτι τοῦ ἀπείρου χρόνου προσεδεήθη: <οὐ> μὴν ἀλλ᾽ οὔτε ἔφυγε τὴν ἡδονήν, οὐθ᾽ ἡνίκα τὴν ἐξαγωγὴν ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν τὰ πράγματα παρεσκεύαζεν, ὡς ἐλλείπουσά τι τοῦ ἀρίστου βίου κατέστρεφεν. (NOTE: The two ει's "IF" AT THE BEGINNING OF 1739'S XXI AND XXII AND HOW THEY SPLIT #20 IN PERSEUS)

ΧΧΙΙΙ 219 [146] [χχι.] Ὁ τὰ πέρατα τοῦ βίου κατειδὼς οἶδεν, ὡς εὐπόριστόν ἐστι τὸ <τὸ> ἀλγοῦν κατ᾽ ἔνδειαν ἐξαιροῦν καὶ τὸ τὸν ὅλον βίον παντελῆ καθιστάν: ὥστ᾽ οὐδὲν προσδεῖται πραγμάτων ἀγῶνας κεκτημένων.

XXIV [χχιι.] Τὸ ὑφεστηκὸς δεῖ τέλος ἐπιλογίζεσθαι καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν ἐνάργειαν, ἐφ᾽ ἣν τὰ δοξαζόμενα ἀνάγομεν: εἰ δὲ μή, πάντα ἀκρισίας καὶ ταραχῆς ἔσται μεστά. (1739 HAS SOME SPELLING DIFFERENCES: ὑφεστηκὸς < ὑφεςηκὸς; μεστά < μεςα

XXV [χχιιι.] Εἰ μάχῃ πάσαις ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν, οὐχ ἕξεις οὐδ᾽ ἃς ἂν φῇς αὐτῶν διεψεῦσθαι πρὸς τί ποιούμενος τὴν ἀναγωγὴν κρίνῃς.

XXVI 220 [147] [χχιϝ.] Εἴ τιν᾽ ἐκβαλεῖς ἁπλῶς αἴσθησιν καὶ μὴ διαιρήσεις τὸ δοξαζόμενον κατὰ τὸ προσμένον καὶ τὸ παρὸν ἤδη κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ πᾶσαν φανταστικὴν ἐπιβολὴν τῆς διανοίας, συνταράξεις καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς αἰσθήσεις τῇ ματαίῳ δόξῃ, ὥστε τὸ κριτήριον ἅπαν ἐκβαλεῖς. (XXVII) εἰ δὲ βεβαιώσεις καὶ τὸ προσμένον ἅπαν ἐν ταῖς δοξαστικαῖς ἐννοίαις καὶ τὸ μὴ τὴν ἐπιμαρτύρησιν, οὐκ ἐκλείψεις τὸ διεψευσμένον: ὡς τετηρηκὼς ἔσῃ πᾶσαν ἀμφισβήτησιν κατὰ πᾶσαν κρίσιν τοῦ ὀρθῶς ἢ μὴ ὀρθῶς.

XXVIII. 221 [148] [χχϝ.] Εἰ μὴ παρὰ πάντα καιρὸν ἐπανοίσεις ἕκαστον τῶν πραττομένων ἐπὶ τὸ τέλος τῆς φύσεως, ἀλλὰ προκαταστρέψεις εἴ τε φυγὴν εἴ τε δίωξιν ποιούμενος εἰς ἄλλο τι, οὐκ ἔσονταί σοι τοῖς λόγοις αἱ πράξεις ἀκόλουθοι.

(APPEARS "OUT OF ORDER" AS ALTERNATIVE TEXT for 32 BELOW) [χχϝι.] Τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ὅσαι μὴ ἐπ᾽ ἀλγοῦν ἐπανάγουσιν ἐὰν μὴ συμπληρωθῶσιν, οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀναγκαῖαι ἀλλ᾽ εὐδιάχυτον τὴν ὄρεξιν ἔχουσιν, ὅταν δυσπόριστοι ἢ βλάβης ἀπεργαστικαὶ δόξωσιν εἶναι.

(NOT APPEARING AS THIS IN 1739 EDITION, see below: [χχϝιι.] Ὧν ἡ σοφία παρασκευάζεται εἰς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου βίου μακαριότητα, πολὺ μέγιστόν ἐστιν ἡ τῆς φιλίας κτῆσις.)

(NOT APPEARING AS THIS IN 1739 EDITION, see below: [χχϝιιι.] Ἡ αὐτὴ γνώμη θαρρεῖν τε ἐποίησεν ὑπὲρ τοῦ μηθὲν αἰώνιον εἶναι δεινὸν μηδὲ πολυχρόνιον, καὶ τὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὡρισμένοις ἀσφάλειαν φιλίαις222 μάλιστα κατεῖδε συντελουμένην.)

(ALTERNATE TEXT for 29, combines text from χχϝιι. and χχϝιιι. from Perseus: Ὧν ἡ σοφία παρασκευάζεται εἰς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου βίου μακαριότητα, πολὺ μέγισόν ἐσιν ἡ τῆς φιλίας κτῆσις. καὶ τὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὡρισμένοις ἀσφάλειαν φιλίαις μάλισα κτησει δει νομιζειιν συντελουμένην. XXIX. Ex iis, quae ad totius vitae beatitudinem sapientia comparat, longe maxima est amicitiae possessio. Et in mediocribus opibus securitatem, amicitiae possessione maxime perfici putandum est. Google Translate: Of those which wisdom brings to the happiness of the whole life, the possession of friendship is by far the greatest. And in moderate wealth security is to be thought best accomplished by the possession of friendship.)

(ALTERNATE TEXT for 30: λ'. Ἡ αυτη γνωμη θαρρειν τε εποιησεν ὑπερ του μηθεν αιωνιον ειναι δεινον, μηδε πολυχρονιον. XXX. Eadem sententia confidentiam parit, quod nullum sit aeternum malum, neque diurturnum. Google Translate: The same sentence gives birth to confidence that there is no eternal evil, nor long-lasting.)

XXXI 223 [149] [χχιχ.] Τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μέν εἰσι φυσικαὶ <καὶ ἀναγκαῖαι: αἱ δὲ φυσικαὶ> καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖαι: αἱ δὲ οὔτε φυσικαὶ οὔτ᾽ ἀναγκαῖαι ἀλλὰ παρὰ κενὴν δόξαν γινόμεναι. [φυσικὰς καὶ ἀναγκαίας ἡγεῖται ὁ Ἐπίκουρος τὰς ἀλγηδόνος ἀπολυούσας, ὡς ποτὸν ἐπὶ δίψους: φυσικὰς δὲ οὐκ ἀναγκαίας δὲ τὰς ποικιλλούσας μόνον τὴν ἡδονήν, μὴ ὑπεξαιρουμένας δὲ τὸ ἄλγημα, ὡς πολυτελῆ σιτία: οὔτε δὲ φυσικὰς οὔτ᾽ ἀναγκαίας, ὡς στεφάνους καὶ ἀνδριάντων ἀναθέσεις.]

(ALTERNATIVE TEXT for 32: λβ'. Των επιθυμιων ὁσαι μη επ' αλγουν επαναγουσιν εαν μη συμπληρωθωσιν ουκ εισιν αναγκαιαι, αλλ' εθδιαχυτον την ὀρεξιν εχουσιν, ὁταν δυςτοριζοι, η βλαβης απργαζικαι, δοξωσιν ειναι. XXXII. Cupiditates illae; quae dolorem non inducunt, si consummatae non fuerint, non sunt necessariae: sed adpetitum habent, qui facile dissipetur, quoties paratu difficiles, aut detrimenti effectrices esse videantur. Google translate: Those desires; which do not cause pain, if they have not been completed, they are not necessary: but they have an appetite, which is easily dissipated, whenever they appear to be difficult in preparation, or productive of harm.)

XXXIII [χχχ.] Ἐν αἷς τῶν φυσικῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, μὴ ἐπ᾽ ἀλγοῦν δὲ ἐπαναγουσῶν ἐὰν μὴ συντελεσθῶσιν, ὑπάρχει ἡ σπουδὴ σύντονος, παρὰ κενὴν δόξαν αὗται γίνονται καὶ οὐ παρὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν φύσιν οὐ διαχέονται ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κενοδοξίαν.

XXXIV 224 [150] [χχχι.] Τὸ τῆς φύσεως δίκαιόν ἐστι σύμβολον τοῦ συμφέροντος εἰς τὸ μὴ βλάπτειν ἀλλήλους μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι.

XXXV [χχχιι.] Ὅσα τῶν ζῴων μὴ ἠδύνατο συνθήκας ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν ἄλλα μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι, πρὸς ταῦτα οὐθὲν ἦν δίκαιον οὐδὲ ἄδικον. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐθνῶν ὅσα μὴ ἠδύνατο ἢ μὴ ἐβούλετο τὰς συνθήκας ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι.

XXXVI [χχχιιι.] Οὐκ ἦν τι καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸ δικαιοσύνη, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ταῖς μετ᾽ ἀλλήλων συστροφαῖς καθ᾽ ὁπηλίκους δή ποτε ἀεὶ τόπους συνθήκη τις ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι.

XXXVII 225 [151] [χχχιϝ.] Ἡ ἀδικία οὐ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὴν κακόν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῷ κατὰ τὴν ὑποψίαν φόβῳ, εἰ μὴ λήσει τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν τοιούτων ἐφεστηκότας κολαστάς.

XXXVIII [χχχϝ.] Οὐκ ἔστι τὸν λάθρᾳ τι κινοῦντα ὧν συνέθεντο πρὸς ἀλλήλους εἰς τὸ μὴ βλάπτειν μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι, πιστεύειν ὅτι λήσει, κἂν μυριάκις ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος λανθάνῃ. μέχρι γὰρ καταστροφῆς ἄδηλον εἰ καὶ λήσει.

XXXIX [χχχϝι.] Κατὰ μὲν <τὸ> κοινὸν πᾶσι τὸ δίκαιον τὸ αὐτό, συμφέρον γάρ τι ἦν ἐν τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίᾳ: κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἴδιον χώρας καὶ ὅσων δή ποτε αἰτιῶν οὐ πᾶσι συνέπεται τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον εἶναι.

XL 226 [152] [χχχϝιι.] Τὸ μὲν ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον ὅτι συμφέρει ἐν ταῖς χρείαις τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίας τῶν νομισθέντων εἶναι δικαίων, ἔχει τὸν τοῦ δικαίου χαρακτῆρα, ἐάν τε τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσι γένηται ἐάν τε μὴ τὸ αὐτό. (XLI) ἐάν δὲ νόμον θῆταί τις, μὴ ἀποβαίνῃ δὲ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίας, οὐκέτι τοῦτο τὴν τοῦ δικαίου φύσινἔχει. κἂν μεταπίπτῃ τὸ κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον συμφέρον, χρόνον δέ τινα εἰς τὴν πρόληψιν ἐναρμόττῃ, οὐδὲν ἧττον ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ἦν δίκαιον τοῖς μὴ φωναῖς κεναῖς ἑαυτοὺς συνταράττουσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἁπλῶς εἰς τὰ πράγματα βλέπουσιν.

XLII 227 [153] [χχχϝιιι.] Ἔνθα μὴ καινῶν γενομένων τῶν περιεστώτων πραγμάτων ἀνεφάνη μὴ ἁρμόττοντα εἰς τὴν πρόληψιν τὰ νομισθέντα δίκαια ἐπ᾽ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων, οὐκ ἦν ταῦτα δίκαια. ἔνθα δὲ καινῶν γενομένων τῶν πραγμάτων οὐκ ἔτι συνέφερε τὰ αὐτὰ δίκαια κείμενα, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τότε μὲν ἦν δίκαια, ὅτε συνέφερεν εἰς τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίαν τῶν συμπολιτευομένων: ὕστερον δ᾽ οὐκ ἦν ἔτι δίκαια, ὅτε μὴ συνέφερεν.

XLIII 228 [154] [χχχιχ.] Ὁ τὸ μὴ θαρροῦν ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν ἄριστα συστησάμενος οὗτος τὰ μὲν δυνατὰ ὁμόφυλα κατεσκευάσατο: τὰ δὲ μὴ δυνατὰ οὐκ ἀλλόφυλά γε: ὅσα δὲ μηδὲ τοῦτο δυνατὸς ἦν, ἀνεπίμεικτος ἐγένετο, καὶ ἐξωρίσαθ᾽229 ὅσα τούτων λυσιτελῆ πράττειν.

XLIV [χλ.] Ὅσοι τὴν δύναμιν ἔσχον τοῦ τὸ θαρρεῖν μάλιστα ἐκ τῶν ὁμορούντων παρασκευάσασθαι, οὕτω καὶ ἐβίωσαν μετ᾽ ἀλλήλων ἥδιστα τὸ βεβαιότατον πίστωμα ἔχοντες, καὶ πληρεστάτην οἰκειότητα ἀπολαβόντες οὐκ ὠδύραντο ὡς πρὸς ἔλεον τὴν τοῦ τελευτήσαντος προκαταστροφήν.

Sorry, I'll stop soon...

Diogenis Laertii de vitis, dogmatibus et apophthegmatibus clarorum philosophorum libri X. : Graece et Latine / ad fidem optimorum librorum quam correctissime ...

Here's a Greek/Latin edition from Curiae Regnitianae : Apud G. J. Püttnerum, 1739. That includes 44 Principal Doctrines again. Interestingly, the Greek is not subdivided. Oh, mistaken! The Greek text does have Greek numbers in the PDs!! Now I'll have to go and verify those weren't there...I don't believe they were, but can't hurt to check!... Yeah, the books from the 1500s definitely do not have numbered PDs in Latin or Greek.

Quote from Joshua

Danish scholar Marcus Meibomius

So, Marcus divided the books into paragraphs; what I called verses in my Menoikeus translation.

Usener's Epicurea was published in 1887; but we have above the 1758 French translation with enumerated PDs. Curiouser and curiouser.

I'm wondering if Martin is able to determine where the 44 comes from in the German translation.