from what manuscript are you working?
codex Laurentianus Plut.69.35 - written 1101-1200 CE (12 century CE)
http://mss.bmlonline.it/s.aspx?Id=AWOItZA2I1A4r7GxMME1&c=Laertius%20Diogenes#/oro/496
Principal Doctrines start on folio 243v, 10 lines from the bottom on the left side.
The oldest I could find.
And is there more than one which we can compare?
Oh, yeah. There are at least 3 more I want to look at that have no numbers. Plus there are the Latin translations. I've only just started!
This is what my notes look like.... Just beginning, but finding some interesting punctuation. Just made it on a first run up to PD17.
Probably have something very preliminary to share before next week. 
Okay, I've posted my Menoikeus update. So now it's off to Kyriai Doxai. I've printed out the appropriate pages of codex Laurentianus Plut.69.35 - written 1101-1200 CE (12 century CE) and I want to start going through and checking order, punctuation, etc. Fun!! 
(no sarcasm intended btw)
Piggybacking on Joshua's post:
https://www.apa.org/news/podcasts/speaking-of-psychology/why-kids-lie
So, the first time that a parent catches a child in a lie, it may come as an unpleasant surprise, but psychological research has found that lying is a normal part of childhood. In fact, it's a developmental milestone. It's only possible once children have developed some self-control and the ability to understand another person's mental state.
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/decept…ish%20to%20dogs.
Many animals carry out disinformation campaigns aimed at others, within and across species. They mislead, cheat and lie in rampant acts of deception.
Moral of that second article: Humans are not special
I wouldn't dispense with the list altogether, it's too historically ingrained. But a prose version in parallel is definitely worthwhile.
I actually like Cassius 's idea of using superscript "verse" numbers in a prose format. "Chapters " could be topics.
So, we'd have Principle Doctrines 3:2 for example
My primary reason for posting this little experiment is to simply elicit thoughts - using this admittedly brute force method at its most basic - on whether the idea that Kyriai Doxai could have been more prose than list deserves more attention.... Or have I been barking up the wrong tree this whole time!
If the feedback is generally that this prose theory seems to maybe have some merit, I'll maybe go off digging into the manuscripts etc (after I finish that menoikeus revision )
If the consensus is that the "prose" idea adds no real value overall to the "list", I'll dial back my enthusiasm for that idea.
Don are there any markings or other reasons for the paragraph divisions, or are those done solely by judgment as to topic change?
Oh, those are merely where I thought the topic changed!
As I mentioned, this is ONLY a VERY quick and dirty experiment at this point.
I merely copied and pasted Hicks' text, took out the numbers, went through and combined similar topics (to my briefly considered satisfaction), copied that, and pasted it here. No real scholarship or research of any kind!
That said, several of the sections hold together quite well even using this slapdash technique for the time being.
Okay, this is a "quick and dirty" experiment in "What if Kyriai Doxai was not written as a list?" I'm using the Hicks text available at Perseus Digital Library and simply taking the "list" of 40 "principal doctrines" and combining them into (somewhat) coherent sections with no breaks for line numbers. Just as an experiment... which on a number of levels seems to work. I find the sections hang together pretty well and the sections seem to me to elucidate the topics being covered. I also see call backs to other sections. Some of the "solitary" doctrines seem almost out of place, which makes me curious if the extant manuscripts all follow the same "order"... Memory serves me that they don't. Which further makes me wonder if the book got re-arranged somehow and then got ossified into the "order" we have now. MUCH more research has to be done, manuscripts need to be examined, etc.,.. but, here, for your enjoyment and consideration is a POSSIBLE version of Epicurus's work entitle Kyriai Doxai:
Kyriai Doxai of Epicurus
A blessed and eternal being has no trouble himself and brings no trouble upon any other being ; hence he is exempt from movements of anger and partiality, for every such movement implies weakness.*
Death is nothing to us; for the body, when it has been resolved into its elements, has no feeling, and that which has no feeling is nothing to us.
The magnitude of pleasure reaches its limit in the removal of all pain. When pleasure is present, so long as it is uninterrupted, there is no pain either of body or of mind or of both together. 4. Continuous pain does not last long in the flesh ; on the contrary, pain, if extreme, is present a very short time, and even that degree of pain which barely outweighs pleasure in the flesh does not last for many days together. Illnesses of long duration even permit of an excess of pleasure over pain in the flesh.
It is impossible to live a pleasant life without living wisely and well and justly, and it is impossible to live wisely and well and justly without living pleasantly. Whenever any one of these is lacking, when, for instance, the man is not able to live wisely, though he lives well and justly, it is impossible for him to live a pleasant life.
In order to obtain security from other men any means whatsoever of procuring this was a natural good. Some men have sought to become famous and renowned, thinking that thus they would make themselves secure against their fellow-men. If, then, the life of such persons really was secure, they attained natural good ; if, however, it was insecure, they have not attained the end which by nature's own prompting they originally sought.
No pleasure is in itself evil, but the things which produce certain pleasures entail annoyances many times greater than the pleasures themselves. If all pleasure had been capable of accumulation,--if this had gone on not only by recurrence in time, but all over the frame or, at any rate, over the principal parts of man's nature, there would never have been any difference between one pleasure and another, as in fact there is. If the objects which are productive of pleasures to profligate persons really freed them from fears of the mind,--the fears, I mean, inspired by celestial and atmospheric phenomena, the fear of death, the fear of pain ; if, further, they taught them to limit their desires, we should never have any fault to find with such persons, for they would then be filled with pleasures to overflowing on all sides and would be exempt from all pain, whether of body or mind, that is, from all evil. If we had never been molested by alarms at celestial and atmospheric phenomena, nor by the misgiving that death somehow affects us, nor by neglect of the proper limits of pains and desires, we should have had no need to study natural science. It would be impossible to banish fear on matters of the highest importance, if a man did not know the nature of the whole universe, but lived in dread of what the legends tell us. Hence without the study of nature there was no enjoyment of unmixed pleasures. There would be no advantage in providing security against our fellow-men, so long as we were alarmed by occurrences over our heads or beneath the earth or in general by whatever happens in the boundless universe. When tolerable security against our fellow-men is attained, then on a basis of power sufficient to afford support140and of material prosperity arises in most genuine form the security of a quiet private life withdrawn from the multitude.
Nature's wealth at once has its bounds and is easy to procure ; but the wealth of vain fancies recedes to an infinite distance.
Fortune but seldom interferes with the wise man ; his greatest and highest interests have been, are, and will be, directed by reason throughout the course of his life.
The just man enjoys the greatest peace of mind, while the unjust is full of the utmost disquietude.
Pleasure in the flesh admits no increase when once the pain of want has been removed ; after that it only admits of variation. The limit of pleasure in the mind, however, is reached when we reflect on the things themselves and their congeners which cause the mind the greatest alarms. Unlimited time and limited time afford an equal amount of pleasure, if we measure the limits of that pleasure by reason. The flesh receives as unlimited the limits of pleasure ; and to provide it requires unlimited time. But the mind, grasping in thought what the end and limit of the flesh is, and banishing the terrors of futurity, procures a complete and perfect life, and has no longer any need of unlimited time. Nevertheless it does not shun pleasure, and even in the hour of death, when ushered out of existence by circumstances, the mind does not lack enjoyment of the best life. He who understands the limits of life knows how easy it is to procure enough to remove the pain of want and make the whole of life complete and perfect. Hence he has no longer any need of things which are not to be won save by labour and conflict.
We must take into account as the end all that really exists and all clear evidence of sense to which we refer our opinions ; for otherwise everything will be full of uncertainty and confusion. If you fight against all your sensations, you will have no standard to which to refer, and thus no means of judging even those judgements which you pronounce false. If you reject absolutely any single sensation without stopping to discriminate with respect to that which awaits confirmation between matter of opinion and that which is already present, whether in sensation or in feelings or in any presentative perception of the mind, you will throw into confusion even the rest of your sensations by your groundless belief and so you will be rejecting the standard of truth altogether. If in your ideas based upon opinion you hastily affirm as true all that awaits confirmation as well as that which does not, you will not escape error, as you will be maintaining complete ambiguity whenever it is a case of judging between right and wrong opinion. If you do not on every separate occasion refer each of your actions to the end prescribed by nature, but instead of this in the act of choice or avoidance swerve aside to some other end, your acts will not be consistent with your theories.
All such desires as lead to no pain when they remain ungratified are unnecessary, and the longing is easily got rid of, when the thing desired is difficult to procure or when the desires seem likely to produce harm.
Of all the means which are procured by wisdom to ensure happiness throughout the whole of life, by far the most important is the acquisition of friends. The same conviction which inspires confidence that nothing we have to fear is eternal or even of long duration, also enables us to see that even in our limited conditions of life nothing enhances our security so much as friendship.
Of our desires some are natural and necessary ; others are natural, but not necessary ; others, again, are neither natural nor necessary, but are due to illusory opinion.** Those natural desires which entail no pain when not gratified, though their objects are vehemently pursued, are also due to illusory opinion ; and when they are not got rid of, it is not because of their own nature, but because of the man's illusory opinion.
Natural justice is a symbol or expression of expediency, to prevent one man from harming or being harmed by another. Those animals which are incapable of making covenants with one another, to the end that they may neither inflict nor suffer harm, are without either justice or injustice. And those tribes which either could not or would not form mutual covenants to the same end are in like case. There never was an absolute justice, but only an agreement made in reciprocal intercourse in whatever localities now and again from time to time, providing against the infliction or suffering of harm. Injustice is not in itself an evil, but only in its consequence, viz. the terror which is excited by apprehension that those appointed to punish such offences will discover the injustice. It is impossible for the man who secretly violates any article of the social compact to feel confident that he will remain undiscovered, even if he has already escaped ten thousand times ; for right on to the end of his life he is never sure he will not be detected. Taken generally, justice is the same for all, to wit, something found expedient in mutual intercourse ; but in its application to particular cases of locality or conditions of whatever kind, it varies under different circumstances. Among the things accounted just by conventional law, whatever in the needs of mutual intercourse is attested to be expedient, is thereby stamped as just, whether or not it be the same for all ; and in case any law is made and does not prove suitable to the expediencies of mutual intercourse, then this is no longer just. And should the expediency which is expressed by the law vary and only for a time correspond with the prior conception, nevertheless for the time being it was just, so long as we do not trouble ourselves about empty words, but look simply at the facts. Where without any change in circumstances the conventional laws, when judged by their consequences, were seen not to correspond with the notion of justice, such laws were not really just ; but wherever the laws have ceased to be expedient in consequence of a change in circumstances, in that case the laws were for the time being just when they were expedient for the mutual intercourse of the citizens, and subsequently ceased to be just when they ceased to be expedient.
He who best knew how to meet fear of external foes made into one family all the creatures he could ; and those he could not, he at any rate did not treat as aliens ; and where he found even this impossible, he avoided all intercourse, and, so far as was expedient, kept them at a distance. Those who were best able to provide themselves with the means of security against their neighbours, being thus in possession of the surest guarantee, passed the most agreeable life in each other's society ; and their enjoyment of the fullest intimacy was such that, if one of them died before his time, the survivors did not lament his death as if it called for commiseration.
* Elsewhere he says that the gods are discernible by reason alone, some being numerically distinct, while others result uniformly from the continuous influx of similar images directed to the same spot and in human form.--Schol.
**Epicurus regards as natural and necessary desires which bring relief from pain, as e.g. drink when we are thirsty ; while by natural and not necessary he means those which merely diversify the pleasure without removing the pain, as e.g. costly viands ; by the neither natural nor necessary he means desires for crowns and the erection of statues in one's honour.--Schol.
Wouldn't the summit be the summit of pleasure/removal of pain and the bottom the "summit" of pain? At least that's how I read it from Eikadistes 's translation above.
Maybe the bottom could relate to katastematic pleasure.... But that might invite going down another rabbit hole, as it were.
Epicurus explicitly refers to the "greatest extent of pain" as a "mountain peak" in KD4, so I'm deferring to him
Trivia: That peak that Nate referred to is άκρον akron which is also the name of a city in Ohio named because it was the highest point in the surrounding landscape.
"The city was founded by Simon Perkins and Paul Williams in 1825 along the Little Cuyahoga River at the summit of the developing Ohio and Erie Canal. The name is derived from the Ancient Greek word ἄκρον : ákron signifying a summit or high point." (Wikipedia)
Consider the difference the below makes in contrast to how these are normally read (note: this is just quick and dirty using Hicks' translation from Perseus!):
The magnitude of pleasure reaches its limit in the removal of all pain. When pleasure is present, so long as it is uninterrupted, there is no pain either of body or of mind or of both together. Continuous pain does not last long in the flesh ; on the contrary, pain, if extreme, is present a very short time, and even that degree of pain which barely outweighs pleasure in the flesh does not last for many days together. Illnesses of long duration even permit of an excess of pleasure over pain in the flesh.
Or this:
If the objects which are productive of pleasures to profligate persons really freed them from fears of the mind,--the fears, I mean, inspired by celestial and atmospheric phenomena, the fear of death, the fear of pain ; if, further, they taught them to limit their desires, we should never have any fault to find with such persons, for they would then be filled with pleasures to overflowing on all sides and would be exempt from all pain, whether of body or mind, that is, from all evil.
If we had never been molested by alarms at celestial and atmospheric phenomena, nor by the misgiving that death somehow affects us, nor by neglect of the proper limits of pains and desires, we should have had no need to study natural science. It would be impossible to banish fear on matters of the highest importance, if a man did not know the nature of the whole universe, but lived in dread of what the legends tell us. Hence without the study of nature there was no enjoyment of unmixed pleasures. There would be no advantage in providing security against our fellow-men, so long as we were alarmed by occurrences over our heads or beneath the earth or in general by whatever happens in the boundless universe. When tolerable security against our fellow-men is attained, then on a basis of power sufficient to afford support and of material prosperity arises in most genuine form the security of a quiet private life withdrawn from the multitude.
Edit: Note that in that last section, we have:
And so on. The text of Kuriai Doxai builds on itself, continuously refers back to previous passages, sets up arguments for later passages. Reading it as isolated sayings, as if it was a list or compilation like "the Vatican Sayings"or, evidently more properly, Epicurus's Manner of Speaking, robs it of its structure and the power of its arguments. The book is not The Principal Doctrines. There's no definite article. I'd suggest something more like Sovereign Axioms or Sovereign Opinions or... Just something to shift our paradigm in seeing the text as discrete PDs! I like the Sovereign because it plays off of κυρίαι kyriai's meanings of both adjective principal/ruling/authorized and noun lord/ruler. (Note the Christian "mantra" Kyrie eleison! Lord, have mercy!)
And a mountain could be a metaphorical boundary marker, too.
That's a great point: that imagery might even convey the idea of a summit, which might be interesting if we consider the bottom of the mountain to be the summit of pleasure and the top of the mountain to be the peak of pain.
I'll keep that in mind and keep an eye out for "summit" or "some extent of a mountain" elsewhere.
Epicurus explicitly refers to the "greatest extent of pain" as a "mountain peak" in KD4, so I'm deferring to him
And this is *exactly* why I advocate for not reading the Principal Doctrines as discrete "sayings." They have to be read as a coherent text, or at least in sections. These metaphors and such that Eikadistes is finding or pointing out are/were completely lost if you read 1, 2, then 3 then 4. We have to read them as a text just like the letters.
And a mountain could be a metaphorical boundary marker, too.
μέγεθος • (mégethos) n (genitive μεγέθους or μεγέθεος); third declension
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, μέγεθος
The "limit" is that word that Epicurus uses to denote limits elsewhere and is the same word as that "boundary stone" that we've encountered before.
So it could be even something like "the limit of the amount of pleasure"
I voted for Bailey, but also like the Hicks version. Which brings up the question: which is the best word choice, "quantity" or "magnitude"?
Also, I prefer the versions that begin with pleasure rather than removal of pain. Just seems that this arrangement emphasizes pleasure rather than absence of pain.
Ὅρος limit, rule, standard. A boundary or marker stone Masc. 2nd declension.
μεγέθος of degree, greatness, magnitude.
Pleasure ΗΔΟΝΩΝ comes first in the text.
a dying soul that disperses from the body like a fart dissipating into the air,
I don't know if I'd come up with that metaphor, but, yeah, like that.
Do we think that the exclusion of the to be infinitive is evident of Epicurus' style? Or was it an ancient Greek convention to omit verbs that are otherwise implied?
My understanding is that it was quite common to omit the copula in ancient Greek.
TΟ ΔΙAΛΥΘEΝ that which is disintegrated, unwound, and scattered (Note: the definite article)
TΟ AΝAΙΣΘΗTΟΥΝ that which lacks perception
I want to point out that I prefer "that" here rather than "one who" or any similar words. Once one dies, the body is an "it" since it is officially an inanimate object.
My older attempt at a formal equivalence translation:
"The limit of the magnitude of pleasure (is) the whole of the removal of that which causes pain. Where that which gives pleasure exists, during the time it is present, there is neither pain nor that which causes pain in body or mind nor either of these together."
am of the opinion that translations should, if at all possible, reflect the original texts' wordplay, eg, playing off the original here in PD17's:
δίκαιος vs ἄδικος
ἀταρακτότατος vs ταραχῆς
I agree. As far as KD17 goes, it should be "the greatest troubles."
Good call!
Ὁ δίκαιος ἀταρακτότατος, ὁ δ’ ἄδικος πλείστης ταραχῆς γέμων.
More literal (formal equivalence):
"The one who acts justly has a fully untroubled mind; but the one who acts unjustly is full of the greatest troubles."
More dynamic/functional equivalence:
"One who acts justly has the greatest peace of mind, free from trouble; but one who acts unjustly is full of troubles, and will be agitated, confused, and uncertain."
There is definitely a place for both formal and dynamic translation. I see Epicurus's wordplay using similar words or constructions often being lost in traditional or scholarly translations. What would be optimal, from my perspective, would be to be able to somehow convey that wordplay as well as to convey the various nuances and connotations the ancient Greek language has in a readable, colloquial English style. Doing both is NOT easy! Anybody who attempts translation, formal or functional, has my respect!
Dynamic and formal equivalence - Wikipedia
Edit:
In the past, I looked askance at dynamic/functional equivalence. My impression (especially of Bible translation) was that the translator was trying to read their own understanding into the text, to make it say something it wasn't actually saying. While that may be possible, I now think a strictly literal translation could do the same in that choosing one target word to convey one source word can also hide the deeper meaning of a text. Some balance of dynamic and formal equivalence is probably the best approach. And yes I'm trying to remind myself of this all the time
folio 403r
Notes:
Bailey, Epicurus The Extant Remains (Oxford 1926)
[ U339 ] via Attalus's site: http://www.attalus.org/translate/epicurus2.html#unknown
Gnomolgion from the Parisinus codex, 1168, f. 115r- (Maxims of Epicurus): It is possible to provide security against other afflictions, but as far as death is concerned, we men all live in a city without walls. {= Vatican Saying 31}
[Cf. Maximus the Abbot, Gnomologion, 36, [p.194 Turic.; t. II p. 827 Combef.]
Metrodori Epicurei Fragmenta collegit scriptoris incerti Epicurei Commentarium moralem, subiecit Alfredus Koerte (1890)
