Posts by Don

I've been giving this ocean metaphor more thought, and I'd like to share a refinement that Godfrey offered this evening at our happy hour. I hope he doesn't mind my posting. I think it's a brilliant modification.

So, my issue of seeing katastematic pleasures as the ocean and kinetic pleasure as the waves was the idea of seeing waves as disturbances. There is a tradition of comparing ataraxia (a quintessential katastematic pleasure) to sailing on calm seas. Waves, to me, signified disturbance, turbulence, etc. Not something to take pleasure in.

Enter Godfrey ...He offered that if the ocean is katastematic pleasure, think of the waves as surfers do. Surfers seek out waves, large and small. They can ride them for a long time, sometimes they wipe out. To me, even the wipe outs are a valuable metaphor. Maybe those are the pleasures that aren't necessarily choiceworthy by everyone?? But, in any case, waves CAN be pleasurable. Thanks, Godfrey !!

So, I'm trying to not become completely enamored of the ocean/wave metaphor...but I'm liking this. As you've seen, I've left out Cicero's "Torquatus" material so far. I'm still not convinced Cicero is a reliable narrator, but supposedly Cicero requested Atticus to get Phaedrus's Epicurean text "On the Gods" when Cicero was writing his "On the Nature of the Gods." But what happens if we take this ocean/waves metaphor and look at what "Torquatus" has to say. I'm not going to be exhaustive, but let's take a look...

Quote from Cicero, On Ends, 1.11

And therefore Epicurus would not admit that there was any intermediate state between pleasure and pain; for he insisted that that very state which seems to some people the intermediate one, when a man is free from every sort of pain, is not only pleasure, but the highest sort of pleasure. For whoever feels how he is affected must inevitably be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain. But Epicurus thinks that the highest pleasure consists in an absence of all pains; so that pleasure may afterwards be varied, and may be of different kinds, but cannot be increased or amplified.

From this, we can see:

• Epicurus would not admit that there was any intermediate state between pleasure and pain
• he insisted that that very state... when a man is free from every sort of pain, is not only pleasure, but the highest sort of pleasure.
• the highest pleasure consists in an absence of all pains
• pleasure may afterwards be varied
  • may be of different kinds, but cannot be increased or amplified.

If we examine this, we find a "state" (let's say "condition") which would be katastematic pleasure.

"That very state (condition)" is "free from every sort of pain." Every sort of pain? Would that be both freedom from mental pain (ataraxia?) and physical pain (aponia?)? That's how I could read it.

Pleasures that are varied then could be the kinetic pleasure which are of different kinds and varied, BUT the background condition of katastematic pleasure - the background pleasure - cannot be increased or amplified. Once erroneous view are eradicated, they can't grow back. Correct views once established cannot be increased or amplified.

Quote

it is inevitable that there must be in a man who is in this condition a firmness of mind which fears neither death nor pain

There's that "condition" with "firmness of mind"... sounds katastematic.

I'll leave it there for now, but there are ways to interpret Cicero's "Torquatus" material as this katastematic background/foundation ocean of pleasure punctuated by waves of kinetic pleasure without too many gymnastics.

Fascinating stuff!

Quote from Pacatus

πᾰ́θος–αίσθηση perhaps? Don?

I would probably say αἴσθησις since that has more of the sensation/perception connotation:

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, αἴσθ-ησις

Quote from Godfrey

It seems that it may have been Cicero who made such a complex and confusing issue of it. Imagine that!

LOL! Cicero? Obfuscating the issue? Unthinkable!

Which all makes sense since the Cyrenaics would not have accepted the "ocean" just the "waves" as pleasure.

I think you're onto something, TauPhi .

Quote from Godfrey

I'm curious how this relates to PD09:

If every pleasure were condensed in <location> and duration and distributed all over the structure or the dominant parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ from one another. Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers 115 (1987)

In scanning those articles and the info on energeia, I'm wondering now if PD9 can be interpreted as the difference in our soul-atoms distributed throughout our bodies that allow sensation and the soul-atoms specifically located in our chest that is the rational part of our psykhē.

I'm beginning to think (as of ... What time is it right now? I could change my mind by this afternoon ) the katastematic pleasure is the preferred background condition of being. Kinetic pleasure is the moment by moment awareness of individual pleasures. Katastematic pleasure is the calm ocean, kinetic pleasures are the waves.

That metaphor needs work, but.... Discuss.

PS. The ocean metaphor isn't mine btw. One of the papers used this. I like it.

Quote from Godfrey

Now I understand where the table in post #30 comes from; it sometimes takes a few repetitions for an idea to sink in...perhaps more observable because you're smiling and laughing. That seems to me to be rather banal, not very useful

LOL... And that "observable" idea of my theory is blown out of the water anyway with the section from the letter to Menoikeus: "so that in old age you can be youthful by taking joy (kinetic pleasure) in the good things you remember" and Fragment 68 "To those who are able to reason it out, the highest and surest joy (kinetic pleasure) is found in the stable health of the body and a firm confidence in keeping it." See posts above.

Those two alone muddy the waters considerably!

It may be useful to dig into the the implications of the energeia aspect of those pleasures involved in motion. But I'm *almost* back at square one.

There still has to be a distinction that is of paramount importance here for Epicurus in defining the spectrum of pleasure he recognizes with the pleasures accepted by the Cyrenaics. On its surface, I still think the circumplex quadrants have something to speak to that with low and high arousal. ...hmmm .... Maybe *that* has some connection to energeia?? By Zeus! This is a minefield!!!

On enargeia and kinesis, check out the Wikipedia article here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Potential…ity?wprov=sfla1

I need to read these closer too:

https://cup.columbia.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Philosophies-of-Happiness-Appendix-6.pdf

https://cup.columbia.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Philosophies-of-Happiness-Appendix-8.pdf

There aren't a lot of opportunities, but I decided to try and replace single words with either katastematic or kinetic pleasure.

It should also be remembered that the phrase "kinetic pleasure" isn't *actually* what Epicurus says. What he says is (as literally as I can make it):

"Peace of mind (ataraxia) and freedom from pain (aponia) are condition/state pleasures; joy (khara) and delight (euphrosyne) are seen in relation to (κατὰ) motion (κίνησιν) by means of activity (ἐνεργείᾳ)."

ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀταραξία καὶ <ἡ> ἀπονία καταστηματικαί εἰσιν ἡδοναί. ἡ δὲ χαρὰ καὶ ἡ εὐφροσύνη κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργείᾳ βλέπονται (seen).

ἐνεργείᾳ is a dative case of ἐνέργεια which comes up in Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics: See https://sites.google.com/view/epicurean…n-ethics-book-1

Epicurus also uses the word in the Letter to Herodotus:

[37] "Hence, since such a course is of service to all who take up natural science, I, who devote to the subject my continuous **energy** (τὸ συνεχὲς **ἐνέργημα**) and **reap the calm enjoyment of a life** (ἐγγαληνίζων) like this, have prepared for you just such an epitome and manual of the doctrines as a whole.

Here are my replacments:

519. The greatest fruit of justice is a katastematic pleasure (serenity).

δικαιοσύνης καρπὸς μέγιστος ἀταραξία.

Letter to Menoikeus:

The steady contemplation of these facts enables you to understand everything that you accept or reject in terms of the health of the body and the katastematic pleasure (serenity) of the soul — since that is the goal of a completely happy life.

so that in old age you can be youthful by taking kinetic pleasure (joy) in the good things you remember

τῷ μὲν ὅπως γηράσκων νεάζῃ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς διὰ τὴν χάριν τῶν γεγονότων

(LOL! Well that blows my memories are katastematic pleasure out of the water!!)

Scholion to the Letter to Herodotus, DL.10.66

[He says elsewhere that the soul is composed of the smoothest and roundest of atoms, far superior in both respects to those of fire ; that part of it is irrational, this being scattered over the rest of the frame, while the rational part resides in the chest, as is manifest from our fears and our kinetic pleasure (joy)

(Interesting note here is that fear is contrasted with a kinetic pleasure. Not sure if there's any significance, but there you have it.)

I'm repeating myself a bit with this post but wanted to keep it for future reference in one spot...

Two key words:

καθίστημι "to make" in PD21 - "to bring into a certain state; bring; replace or restore; etc."

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, καθίστημι

κατάστημα "condition, state, not necessarily permanent: bodily or mental condition"

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, κατάστημα

I want to (once again) compile instances of the use of those words that I feel are pertinent. I am intentionally NOT including Cicero's materials because, honestly, I don't necessarily consider him a reliable source. I'm limiting my sources to Epicurus, Metrodorus, and Diogenes of Oenoanda for now. And, yes, I have to "trust" others for reporting the words of Epicurus and Metrodorus... but at least we have Diogenes' Wall.

PD21 One who perceives the limits of life knows how easy it is to expel the pain produced by a lack of something and **to make one's entire life complete**; so that there is no need for the things that are achieved through struggle.

ὁ τὰ πέρατα τοῦ βίου κατειδὼς οἶδεν ὡς εὐπόριστόν ἐστι τὸ <τὸ> ἀλγοῦν κατʼ ἔνδειαν ἐξαιροῦν καὶ τὸ τὸν ὅλον βίον παντελῆ καθιστάν (< infinitive of καθίστημι)· ὥστε οὐδὲν προσδεῖται πραγμάτων ἀγῶνας κεκτημένων.

Fragment 2:

Lack of mental disturbance and lack of bodily pain are static pleasures, whereas revelry and rejoicing are active pleasures involving movement.

ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀταραξία καὶ <ἡ> ἀπονία **καταστηματικαί** εἰσιν ἡδοναί. ἡ δὲ χαρὰ καὶ ἡ εὐφροσύνη κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργείᾳ βλέπονται.

Fragment 68:

To those who are able to reason it out, the highest and surest joy is found in **the stable health of the body** and a firm confidence in keeping it.

**τὸ γὰρ εὐσταθὲς σαρκὸς κατάστημα** καὶ τὸ περὶ ταύτης πιστὸν ἔλπισμα τὴν ἀκροτάτην χαρὰν καὶ βεβαιοτάτην ἔχει τοῖς ἐπιλογίζεσθαι δυναμένοις.

Metrodorus (Diogenes Laertius, 10.136):

Metrodorus in his Timocrates, whose actual words are : "Thus pleasure being conceived both as that species which consists in motion and that which is a state of rest."

Μητρόδωρος ἐν τῷ Τιμοκράτει λέγουσιν οὕτω: νοουμένης δὲ ἡδονῆς τῆς τε κατὰ κίνησιν καὶ τῆς καταστηματικῆς.

Metrodorus, Fragment 5: "Metrodorus, in his book On the Source of Happiness in Ourselves being greater than that which arises from Objects, says: 'What else is the good of the soul but **the sound state of the flesh (τὸ σαρκὸς εὐσταθὲς κατάστημα),** and the sure hope of its continuance?'"

Diogenes of Oenoanda:

Let us now [investigate] how life is to be made pleasant for us both in **states** and in actions (praxesin).

(εισαν τὰ φ̣ρόν[ιμα]. ἡμ[εῖς δὲ ζη]τ̣ῶ̣μεν ἤ̣δ̣η πῶς ὁ βίος ἡμεῖν ἡδὺς γένηται καὶ ἐν τοῖς **κατασ̣τήμασι** καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν.)

Let us first discuss states (περὶ δὲ τῶν καταστημάτων πρῶτον εἴπωμεν), keeping an eye on the point that, when the emotions which disturb the soul are removed, those which produce pleasure enter into it to take their place.

One thing that I find interesting is that only in Metrodorus (Fragment 5 & DL10.136) and Epicurus' Fragment 68 (i.e., DL10.136) do we find εὐσταθὲς modifying κατάστημα. That's " well based, standing firm, stable (relatively unchanging)." κατάστημα itself is simply "condition, state."

The other references only use κατάστημα and related words alone:

Epicurus: Fragment 2 (& Diogenes 10.136): καταστηματικαί

Metrodorus (DL 10.136): καταστηματικῆς

Diogenes of Oenoanda: κατασ̣τήμασι

So, the idea of a *stable/"relatively unchanging" condition is not necessarily conveyed by the second set of references, only the connotation of "state, condition." If that's the case, then we're talking about "state, condition" in contrast to kinesis "motion, opp. rest (στάσις)". Kinesis in LSJ includes opp. ἠρεμία (eremia) which is also a "quietude of the mind." So, this implies to me that we are, indeed, talking about pleasure "at rest (residing in a particular state or condition)" and pleasure "in motion."

PostScript...:

In thinking some more, I note that Fragment 68 doesn't mention pleasure in general **BUT** it does mention a KINETIC PLEASURE!

To those who are able to reason it out, the highest and surest joy is found in the stable health of the body and a firm confidence in keeping it.

τὸ γὰρ εὐσταθὲς σαρκὸς κατάστημα καὶ τὸ περὶ ταύτης πιστὸν ἔλπισμα τὴν ἀκροτάτην χαρὰν καὶ βεβαιοτάτην ἔχει τοῖς ἐπιλογίζεσθαι δυναμένοις.

χαρὰν is simply the accusative of χαρά (khara).... Where do we see χαρά? RIGHT THERE in Epicurus's category of kinetic pleasures: ἡ δὲ χαρὰ καὶ ἡ εὐφροσύνη κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργείᾳ βλέπονται.

SO... That means that we could substitute kinetic pleasure in Fragment 68!

- To those who are able to reason it out, the highest and surest kinetic pleasure is found in the stable health of the body and a firm confidence in keeping it.

Question, of course, is HOW can the "stable health of the body and a firm confidence in keeping it" be a KINETIC PLEASURE!!??

Curiouser and curiouser!

That quote in the definition in post 40 is from

Fragment 68:

To those who are able to reason it out, the highest and surest joy is found in the stable health of the body and a firm confidence in keeping it.

τὸ γὰρ εὐσταθὲς σαρκὸς κατάστημα καὶ τὸ περὶ ταύτης πιστὸν ἔλπισμα τὴν ἀκροτάτην χαρὰν καὶ βεβαιοτάτην ἔχει τοῖς ἐπιλογίζεσθαι δυναμένοις.

The εὐσταθὲς (eustathes) there is "well based, standing firm, stable (relatively unchanging)." The κατάστημα (katastēma) is the "condition, state."

I like TauPhi 's post above (No. 39) because it gets at again how we co-exist with two very real perspectives: At our most basic, we exist as atoms and void. There's no getting around that. That is true.

However, we don't experience our existence *as atoms and void* (or as interactions of chemicals). We experience our lives at the level of feelings and sensations. That is ALSO true.

Both can be true at the same time and neither need override the other.

I hope I've characterized TauPhi's points correctly!

Quote from Godfrey

Upon further percolating

I like that! From now on, I will no longer cogitate or "meditate on these things," I'm going to "percolate on these things."

Quote from Godfrey

Would it be that kinetic pleasure is a condition of a change of state and katastematic pleasure is a condition of being in a state? This actually seems like the simplest and most accurate definition.

Yes, I agree with the following addenda: I think this line gets to the heart of Epicurus's recognizing these two categories of pleasure... and his and others saying we can have more confidence in the katastematic pleaasure. There's not only the "state" of feeling katastematic it is also the "stability" of katastematic pleasure. We can have confidence in the availability of katastematic pleasure because it is a "stable condition" of the mind or a "background or foundational" condition of the mind. This, to me, is also connected to the characteristic of the sage in that "once the sage has become wise, they will no longer fall back into ignorance." Once incorrect ideas are rooted out, they can't grow back. This is where ataraxia comes from: The mind being in a stable condition of not being worried about death, the gods, etc. Once the incorrect views are rooted out, we achieve a stable tranquil condition of the mind that is no longer troubled by these views.

I don't think the "motion of the atoms" has anything to with Epicurus's categorization of pleasure into katastematic or kinetic. As Godfrey points out, the atoms are moving all the time. I don't see any way to have the atomic motions be concerned with the kinetic/katastematic distinction.

Quote from Godfrey

Is there anything in the Greek that would support the idea that Epicurus was referring to change, not motion, if/when he used the terms kinetic and katastematic?

I'll use that as a jumping off point to look at the Greek and Latin (I rarely need much provocation to return to dictionaries and etymologies ) κατάστημα literally means "condition, state, not necessarily permanent: bodily or mental condition, “τὸ εὐσταθὲς σαρκὸς κ.” Epicur.Fr.68, Metrod.Fr.5, cf. Diog.Oen.29" Check out the post above where I shared those references to Epicurus, Metrodorus, and Diogenes Oenoanda.

I found this interesting article online: https://cup.columbia.edu/wp-content/upl…-Appendix-6.pdf

and this one: https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/14932622.pdf

There' also Hiram's article: https://societyofepicurus.com/on-the-standar…tatic-pleasure/

I admit I have not read these yet but was intrigued by the abstracts. I'll try to read them soon-ish but if anyone beats me to it, please share thoughts!

Quote from Cassius

Quote from Don responding to Godfrey

If I understand you correctly, you're saying katastematic pleasure has a longer "shelf life" whereas kinetic pleasures are of (relatively) shorter duration?

Someone will ask: If duration is the difference between katastematic and kinetic, what is the exact dividing line between the two and how is that line philosophically established? Would the time frame be a second, minute, hour, day, or what?

That's exactly the reason I'm not ready to embrace that suggestion just yet.

Godfrey , I can always rely on you for insightful responses and thoughtful posts! Great appreciated!

Let me think about a few of your points.

Just for my own putting things in order...

Quote from Godfrey

the difference between katastematic and kinetic is a factor of time

Hmmm.... I'm going to have to think about that. If I understand you correctly, you're saying katastematic pleasure has a longer "shelf life" whereas kinetic pleasures are of (relatively) shorter duration? To break down some of your examples:

Quote from Godfrey (edited, with notes from Don)

• I can be hungry (Don: pain or absence of pleasure)
  
• and get pleasure from relieving that hunger (Don: I would characterize that as kinetic pleasure while eating; gaining pleasure from remembering the meal - from my perspective - would be katastematic)
• I can be a little bit hungry (low arousal, negative valence)
  
  • or really hungry (high arousal, negative valence).
• What makes the pleasure from eating kinetic is that it changes my temporary state from hunger (pain) to pleasure (absence of pain = negative pleasure) (Don: Negative pleasure?? I'd accept negation of or opposite of pleasure but not the term "negative pleasure." Or maybe I'm just reading too much into that.)
• But before long I'll be hungry again, either way. (Don: Okay, fleeting/temporary pleasure is being characterized as kinetic, right? ... because it changes?)

And then you discussed katastematic pleasure...

Quote from Godfrey (with notes from Don)

The katastematic pleasure of:

• a correct worldview
• or of knowing that my needs are cared for for the foreseeable future...
  
  • could last years, not hours or minutes, and becomes a sort of "background" state of pleasure.

Okay, so you are including the long-term ("background") characteristic as (one) defining feature of katastematic pleasure. With short-term pleasure being a feature of kinetic pleasure... and its "kinetic" aspect is this exact fleeting feature it has?

Quote from Godfrey

I don't think that observability is relevant to either kinetic or katastematic pleasure.

So, it doesn't matter - from your perspective - what kind of activity is involved in causing the pleasure. I'll have to dig into that. Not saying I disagree or agree... Have to consider. Thank You for some food for thought!!!

Quote from Cassius

Quote from Don

(I realize this thread has strayed waaaaay off the original topic but this is a good conversation, so I'll let Cassius decide if it needs to be branched off or not)

Do you have a suggestion on where it started branching and how to describe the topic? Are you thinking it's a modern psychology heading?

Maybe back at post 100??

It seems to me we're diving into katastematic and kinetic and modern neuroscience??

Okay, further thoughts...

Epicurus likes his parallel constructions (ex., his "never too old... never too young..." sections in Menoikeus), so how would those (conveniently) four feelings of pleasure line up ... extrapolating from my thoughts above in post 128:

What I'm proposing here is that Ataraxia is the parallel to Khara; Aponia is the parallel to Euphrosyne.

Khara is "joy, delight" in being a spectator or member of audience. You experience pleasure from the experience. You can still be observed (it's a kinetic pleasure) engaging in the activity, but the pleasure is felt primarily as an internal feeling. It's still an external stimuli, but your "body" isn't as involved. LSJ definition includes "joy in or at a thing." Think watching a dancing or singing performance. The corresponding katatematic pleasure example is ataraxia.

Euphrosyne is "mirth, merriment, esp. of a banquet, good cheer, festivity." Euphrosyne is the pleasure you feel when actually involved yourself - with your body - in an activity. The oorresponding katastematic pleasure example is aponia.

(I realize this thread has strayed waaaaay off the original topic but this is a good conversation, so I'll let Cassius decide if it needs to be branched off or not)

In thinking about this a little more...

We always have to remember not to confuse desires with feelings. I don't think we're doing that here, but just putting that notice up again.

It also seems to me that ataraxia ((tranquility), aponia* (see footnote), chara, (joy) and euphrosyne (delight) could be described as *emotions* that is how we *experience* pleasure in our body and mind. Pleasure and pain are the two valents available to us to describe our affect with level of arousal the other axis. I go back to the circumplex model of affect:

Euphrosyne and xhara would be positive (pleasant) valence with high arousal (in the Happy Quadrant); ataraxia and aponia would be high positive valence and low arousal (in the Content(ment) Quadrant).

Maybe katastematic and kinetic were simply Epicurus way to describe the quadrants on the right (NOTE: Knowing fully well he didn't have a circumplex model of affect!! This is just a modern way of diagramming affect). Cyrenaics ONLY accepted the upper right quadrant as "Pleasure"; Epicurus accepted everything to the RIGHT of the vertical axis. I've stated this before (I think on one of the podcast threads, so sorry if this is duplicating what you've already read there.)

I have no trouble accepting that some people, ancient and modern, would only use PLEASURE to describe active pleasures one engages in with their body. I'd still call those kinetic pleasures... a pleasurable feeling *caused* by a external circumstances in which one engages. To describe it another way, people can SEE you engaging in activities from which you derive kinetic pleasures. Katastematic pleasures are those engaged in INSIDE your head (or in your chest if we're using the "your mind is in your chest/abdomen" paradigm of Epicurus). People can't SEE you engaged in those activities although they can be very powerfully felt by you.

Again, running the risk of thinking out loud but trying to add fuel to the fire for further conversation... or maybe that's fire to the minefield to paraphrase Little Rocker .

*aponia - I don't see - and don't think it's interpreted correctly - aponia as "being free from pain" in the sense of just "not feeling any pain." The word is "a + ponia (ponos)". Ponos includes:

πόνος (pónos)

• work, especially hard work; toil
• bodily exertion, exercise
• work, task, business
• the consequence of toil, distress, trouble, suffering
• anything produced by work, a work

It seems to me that aponia is to the body as ataraxia is to the mind. Ataraxia is a tranquil, well-functioning, calm mind. Aponia is the sense of your body working perfectly, the sense/feeling that athletes (And I wouldn't know this from first-hand experience ) get when they're in the flow and their bodies are just acting effortlessly. That's my sense of aponia.

Quote from Godfrey

I agree that a basic understanding of neurochemistry can aid in the pursuit of pleasure and well-being.

Agreed!

Quote from Godfrey

pleasure remains the way that we experience our neurochemical functioning

Agreed!! And well put, Godfrey.

Quote from Godfrey

I think, [pleasure] remains the highest good/the goal/the guide. Neurochemistry is the mechanism of pleasure but, to my way of thinking, doesn't supercede pleasure. For it to do so we would need equipment that would instantaneously monitor our levels of the various chemicals. The equipment that we have for that is our faculty of Feelings.

Again, well put. If I may add, our brains are what we have to "monitor our levels of the various chemicals." Our feelings and sensations (including interoception) are how we experience that monitoring. And as Dr. Lisa Feldman Barrett points out, that monitoring and prediction function is the main job of our brains... that whole reasoning thing comes along for the ride later on as I understand it.

I think TauPhi is onto something here with this line of thinking. My suggestion would just be to expand beyond dopamine when we consider the parallels between ancient katastematic/kinetic categories and modern neuroscience, and I do believe there are parallels. Maybe not one to one correspondence since Epicurus had no access to the research we have, but I feel his observations and intuition were ahead of their time.

Interesting articles/papers. The NLM ones are waaay into the weeds and I haven't read past the abstract, but sharing for possible future reference. The Psychology Today and other ones are a little more accessible.

The Neurochemicals of Happiness

Seven brain molecules that make you feel great.

www.psychologytoday.com

Happiness & Health: The Biological Factors- Systematic Review Article

Happiness underlying factors are considerable from two dimensions: endogenic factors (biological, cognitive, personality and ethical sub-factors) and exogenic…

www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov

Pleasure systems in the brain

Pleasure is mediated by well-developed mesocorticolimbic circuitry, and serves adaptive functions. In affective disorders anhedonia (lack of pleasure) or…

www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov

UConn Researcher: Dopamine Not About Pleasure (Anymore) - UConn Today

Contrary to a long-held scientific idea, psychologist John Salamone says an increasing number of studies show that the neurotransmitter has to do not with…

today.uconn.edu

How Brain Chemicals Influence Mood | UPMC HealthBeat

Learn more about common brain chemicals, or neurotransmitters, and how they affect your thinking and overall health.

share.upmc.com

I return to this section of Diogenes Laertius (10.136) over and over again when this topic comes up:

(Quote)

[136] He (Epicurus) differs from the Cyrenaics with regard to pleasure (περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς). They do not include under the term the pleasure which is a state of rest (τὴν καταστηματικὴν - tes katastematiken), but only that which consists in motion (ἐν κινήσει - en kinesei). Epicurus admits both (i.e., katastematiken and en kinesei); also pleasure of mind as well as of body (ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος),

as he (Epicurus) states:

1. in his work On Choice and Avoidance
2. and in that On the Ethical End
3. and in the first book of his work On Human Life
4. and in the epistle to his philosopher friends in Mytilene
5. So also Diogenes in the seventeenth book of his Epilecta
6. and Metrodorus in his Timocrates, whose actual words are : "Thus pleasure being conceived both as that species which consists in motion (τε κατὰ κίνησιν (kinesin)) and that which is a state of rest (καταστηματικῆς (katastematikes))."
   1. "νοουμένης δὲ ἡδονῆς τῆς τε κατὰ κίνησιν (kinesin) καὶ τῆς καταστηματικῆς (katastematikes)."

The words of Epicurus in his work On Choice (and Avoidance) are: "Peace of mind (ἀταραξία - ataraxia) and freedom from pain (ἀπονία - aponia) are pleasures which imply a state of rest (καταστηματικαί - katastematikai); joy (χαρὰ khara) and delight (εὐφροσύνη euphrosyne) are seen to consist in motion and activity (κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργείᾳ - kata kinesin energeia)."

(End Quote)

According to this report, Epicurus mentions katastematic and kinetic (and mental and bodily) pleasures in at least four books, and the Epicureans Diogenes of Tarsus and Metrodorus each mention it in their books.

I'm still not entirely convinced that the best translation of katastematic is "state *of rest*". I think stable pleasure would be good, but is it stable because it's reliable - or 100% available at all times to paraphrase Little Rocker. καταστημα is defined by LSJ as "condition, state, not necessarily permanent: 1. bodily or mental condition, “τὸ εὐσταθὲς σαρκὸς κ.” Epicur.Fr.68, Metrod.Fr.5, cf. Diog.Oen.29" (3 Epicurean sources cited)

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, Κκ , κατάσσυ^τος , κατάστημα

[ U68 ] Plutarch, That Epicurus actually makes a pleasant life impossible, 4, p. 1089D: It is this, I believe, that has driven them, seeing for themselves the absurdities to which they were reduced, to take refuge in the "painlessness" and the "stable condition of the flesh," supposing that the pleasurable life is found in thinking of this state as about to occur in people or as being achieved; for the "stable and settled condition of the flesh," and the "trustworthy expectation" of this condition contain, they say, the highest and the most assured delight for men who are able to reflect. Now to begin with, observe their conduct here, how they keep decanting this "pleasure" or "painlessness" or "stable condition" of theirs back and forth, from body to mind and then once more from mind to body.

Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights, IX.5.2: Epicurus makes pleasure the highest good but defines it as sarkos eustathes katastema, or "a well-balanced condition of the body."

> Metrodorus, Fragment 5: "Metrodorus, in his book On the Source of Happiness in Ourselves being greater than that which arises from Objects, says: 'What else is the good of the soul but the sound state of the flesh, and the sure hope of its continuance?'" (Source: Metrodori Epicurei Fragmenta collegit scriptoris incerti Epicurei Commentarium moralem, subiecit Alfredus Koerte)

> Diogenes of Oenoanda:

Let us now [investigate] how life is to be made pleasant for us both in states (katastēmasi) and in actions (praxesin).**

(εισαν τὰ φ̣ρόν[ιμα]. ἡμ[εῖς δὲ ζη]τ̣ῶ̣μεν ἤ̣δ̣η πῶς ὁ βίος ἡμεῖν ἡδὺς γένηται καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατασ̣τήμασι καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν.)

Let us first discuss states (περὶ δὲ τῶν καταστημάτων πρῶτον εἴπωμεν), keeping an eye on the point that, when the emotions which disturb the soul are removed, those which produce pleasure enter into it to take their place.

Well, what are the disturbing emotions? [They are] fears —of the gods, of death, and of [pains]— and, besides [these], desires that [outrun] the limits fixed by nature. These are the roots of all evils, and, [unless] we cut them off, [a multitude] of evils will grow [upon] us.

**in actions (praxesin) < πράξεσιν dative plural of πραξις "act, action, activity, deed, doing"

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, πρᾶξις