Posts by Don

Quote from Nate

Do we think that the exclusion of the to be infinitive is evident of Epicurus' style? Or was it an ancient Greek convention to omit verbs that are otherwise implied?

My understanding is that it was quite common to omit the copula in ancient Greek.

Copula (linguistics) - Wikipedia

Quote from Don

TΟ ΔΙAΛΥΘEΝ that which is disintegrated, unwound, and scattered (Note: the definite article)

TΟ AΝAΙΣΘΗTΟΥΝ that which lacks perception

I want to point out that I prefer "that" here rather than "one who" or any similar words. Once one dies, the body is an "it" since it is officially an inanimate object.

My older attempt at a formal equivalence translation:

"The limit of the magnitude of pleasure (is) the whole of the removal of that which causes pain. Where that which gives pleasure exists, during the time it is present, there is neither pain nor that which causes pain in body or mind nor either of these together."

Quote from Nate

Quote from Don

am of the opinion that translations should, if at all possible, reflect the original texts' wordplay, eg, playing off the original here in PD17's:

δίκαιος vs ἄδικος

ἀταρακτότατος vs ταραχῆς

I agree. As far as KD17 goes, it should be "the greatest troubles."

Good call!

Ὁ δίκαιος ἀταρακτότατος, ὁ δ’ ἄδικος πλείστης ταραχῆς γέμων.

More literal (formal equivalence):

"The one who acts justly has a fully untroubled mind; but the one who acts unjustly is full of the greatest troubles."

More dynamic/functional equivalence:

"One who acts justly has the greatest peace of mind, free from trouble; but one who acts unjustly is full of troubles, and will be agitated, confused, and uncertain."

There is definitely a place for both formal and dynamic translation. I see Epicurus's wordplay using similar words or constructions often being lost in traditional or scholarly translations. What would be optimal, from my perspective, would be to be able to somehow convey that wordplay as well as to convey the various nuances and connotations the ancient Greek language has in a readable, colloquial English style. Doing both is NOT easy! Anybody who attempts translation, formal or functional, has my respect!

Dynamic and formal equivalence - Wikipedia

Edit:

In the past, I looked askance at dynamic/functional equivalence. My impression (especially of Bible translation) was that the translator was trying to read their own understanding into the text, to make it say something it wasn't actually saying. While that may be possible, I now think a strictly literal translation could do the same in that choosing one target word to convey one source word can also hide the deeper meaning of a text. Some balance of dynamic and formal equivalence is probably the best approach. And yes I'm trying to remind myself of this all the time

DigiVatLib

folio 403r

Notes:

Bailey, Epicurus The Extant Remains (Oxford 1926)

Epicurus The Extant Remains Bailey Oxford 1926 Optimized For Greek On Left : Cyril Bailey : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

Epicurus - The Extant Remains - Cyril Bailey - Optimized for Greek on Left Side for On-Line Viewing

archive.org

[ U339 ] via Attalus's site: http://www.attalus.org/translate/epicurus2.html#unknown

Gnomolgion from the Parisinus codex, 1168, f. 115r- (Maxims of Epicurus): It is possible to provide security against other afflictions, but as far as death is concerned, we men all live in a city without walls. {= Vatican Saying 31}

[Cf. Maximus the Abbot, Gnomologion, 36, [p.194 Turic.; t. II p. 827 Combef.]

Metrodori Epicurei Fragmenta collegit scriptoris incerti Epicurei Commentarium moralem, subiecit Alfredus Koerte (1890)

Metrodori Epicurei Fragmenta collegit scriptoris incerti Epicurei Commentarium moralem, subiecit Alfredus Koerte : Metrodorus, of Lampsacus, d. 277 B.C : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

26

archive.org

DigiVatLib

ἡ πενία μετρουμένη τῷ τῆς φύσεως τέλει μέγας ἐστὶ πλοῦτος· πλοῦτος δὲ μὴ ὁριζόμενος μεγάλη ἐστὶ πενία.

Poverty is great wealth if measured by the goals of nature, and wealth is abject poverty if not limited by the goals of nature. (Saint-Andre)

This saying (U477) is also attested in Seneca's Letters (4:10):

Quote from Seneca

10. But I must end my letter. Let me share with you the saying which pleased me to-day. It, too, is culled from another man's Garden:[3] "Poverty brought into conformity with the law of nature, is great wealth."' (magnae divitiae sunt lege naturae composita paupertas') Do you know what limits that law of nature ordains for us? Merely to avert hunger, thirst, and cold. In order to banish hunger and thirst, it is not necessary for you to pay court at the doors of the purse-proud, or to submit to the stern frown, or to the kindness that humiliates; nor is it necessary for you to scour the seas, or go campaigning; nature's needs are easily provided and ready to hand.

Bailey also cites Lucretius 5.1117-1119, as echoing this saying:

Yet were man to steer

His life by sounder reasoning, he'd own

Abounding riches, if with mind content

He lived by thrift; for never, as I guess,

Is there a lack of little in the world.

quod siquis vera vitam ratione gubernet,

divitiae grandes homini sunt vivere parce

aequo animo; neque enim est umquam penuria parvi.

parce < parcus

Charlton T. Lewis, Charles Short, A Latin Dictionary, parcus

πενία

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, πενία

If I remember correctly, Epicurus was not a fan of the Cynics who lived by begging in the streets. So, I don't think πενία should be interpreted as abject poverty or living on the edge of starvation and similar scenarios. Parcus has a connotation of frugality and thriftiness. I can see Epicurus hammering that home, that we don't need great wealth to find pleasure, to be happy. That is a common thread. Πενία and πλούτος are also opposites or antonyms, so that also plays into Epicurus's wordplay that he likes.

DigiVatLib

ἐνύπνια οὐκ ἔλαχε φύσιν θείαν οὐδὲ μαντικὴν δύναμιν, ἀλλὰ γίνεται κατὰ ἔμπτωσιν εἰδώλων.

Dreams have neither a divine nature nor a prophetic power; instead they come from the impact of images. (Saint-Andre)

NOTE that the word "images" in the translation, the transcription, and the actual manuscript is the word εἰδώλων, the name of the those film of "images" that impact our senses including our mind.

Vat. gr.1950...

https://digi.vatlib.it/view/MSS_Vat.gr.1950.pt.2/0256

Again, a big red Pi.

πᾶσα φιλία διʼ ἑαυτὴν ἀρετή· ἀρχὴν δὲ εἴληφεν ἀπὸ τῆς ὠφελείας.

Every friendship is an excellence in itself, even though it begins in mutual advantage.

ἀρετή aretē "excellence, virtue"

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, ἀρετή

Same as PD19 (supposedly)...

PD19 (Saint-Andre translation):

Finite time and infinite time contain the same amount of joy, if its limits are measured out through reasoning.

ὁ ἄπειρος χρόνος ἴσην ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ ὁ πεπερασμένος, ἐάν τις αὐτῆς τὰ πέρατα καταμετρήσῃ τῷ λογισμῷ.

VS22 from manuscript: https://digi.vatlib.it/view/MSS_Vat.gr.1950.pt.2/0256

(Big red capital omicron) ὁ ἄπειρος χρόνος καὶ ὁ πεπερασμένος ἴσην ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐάν τις ορθως αὐτῆς τὰ πέρατα καταμετρήσῃ τῷ λογισμῷ.

NOTE the slightly different word order between PD19 and VS22 and the addition of what looks like (to me) ορθως:

ὁ ἄπειρος χρόνος ἴσην ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ ὁ πεπερασμένος, ἐάν τις αὐτῆς τὰ πέρατα καταμετρήσῃ τῷ λογισμῷ.

ὁ ἄπειρος χρόνος καὶ ὁ πεπερασμένος ἴσην ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐάν τις ορθως αὐτῆς τὰ πέρατα καταμετρήσῃ τῷ λογισμῷ.

It's important in PD31 to go back to the original text to see what connotations those words in "neither harm nor be harmed" have.

Τὸ τῆς φύσεως δίκαιόν ἐστι σύμβολον τοῦ συμφέροντος εἰς τὸ μὴ βλάπτειν ἀλλήλους μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι.

"To neither 'harm' others nor be 'harmed' oneself."

The word used is βλάπτειν and βλάπτεσθαι from βλάπτω

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, βλάπτω

and

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon, βλάπτω

Note that at the second link above, βλάπτω: "after Hom. to damage, hurt, mar, opp. to wilful wrong (ἀδικεῖν)"

That inclusion of ἀδικεῖν is very interesting, especially since it is literally what we would translate as "unjust" ἀ + δικεῖν.

ἀδικεῖν:

Greek Word Study Tool

That definition includes:

Quote

to be ἄδικος, do wrong (defined by Arist.Rh.1368b6 τὸ βλάπτειν ἑκόντα παρὰ τὸν νόμον, cf. ἀδίκημα）“, τῶν ἀδικησάντων τίσις ἔσσεται” those who have sinned, h.Cer.367; freq. in Hdt. and Att.; τἀδικεῖν wrong-doing, S.Ant.1059; τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν righteous dealing, A.Eu.85,749:— in legal phrase, do wrong in the eye of the law, the particular case being added in part., as “Σωκράτης ἀ. . . ποιῶν . . καὶ διδάσκων” Pl.Ap.19b, cf. X.Mem.1.1.1: c. acc. cogn., ἀδικίαν, ἀδικήματα, etc., Pl.R.344c, 409a, cf. Arist.Rh.1389b7; also “ἀ. οὐδὲν ἄξιον δεσμοῦ” Hdt.3.145; ἀ. πολλά, μεγάλα, etc., Pl.Smp.188a, al.; οὐδέν, μηδὲν ἀ. ib., al.:—“ἀ. περὶ τὰ μυστήρια” D.21.175, cf. IG2.811c154; ἀ. εἰς πόλιν, κτῆμα, Lib. Or.15.39, 31.7:—in games or contests, play foul, Ar.Nu.25, Arist. EN1123b32.

That section that is "defined by Arist.Rh.1368b6) refers to:

Quote from Aristotle, Rhetoric 1368b

after we have first defined acting unjustly.

Let injustice, then, be defined as voluntarily causing injury contrary to the law. Now, the law is particular or general. By particular, I mean the written law in accordance with which a state is administered; by general, the unwritten regulations which appear to be universally recognized. Men act voluntarily when they know what they do, and do not act under compulsion. What is done voluntarily is not always done with premeditation; but what is done with premeditation is always known to the agent, for no one is ignorant of what he does with a purpose. note The motives which lead men to do injury and commit wrong actions are depravity and incontinence. For if men have one or more vices, it is in that which makes him vicious that he shows himself unjust; for example, the illiberal in regard to money, the licentious in regard to bodily pleasures, the effeminate in regard to what makes for ease, note the coward in regard to dangers, for fright makes him desert his comrades in peril; the ambitious in his desire for honor, the irascible owing to anger, one who is eager to conquer in his desire for victory, the rancorous in his desire for vengeance; the foolish man from having mistaken ideas of right and wrong, the shameless from his contempt for the opinion of others. Similarly, each of the rest of mankind is unjust in regard to his special weakness.

So both Epicurus (or the Epicurean composer of the Kuriai Doxai, to hedge my bets) and Aristotle decided to use βλάπτω to define ἀδικεῖν!

"voluntarily causing injury (βλάπτω) contrary to the law. = τὸ βλάπτειν ἑκόντα παρὰ τὸν νόμον."

With both Aristotle and Epicurus using βλάπτω, they both recognize there is importance in the "voluntarily causing injury." Aristotle seems to ascribe more importance to the actions contrariness to the law, although he does state that there is also "unwritten regulations which appear to be universally recognized." Epicurus, on the other hand, seems to be more interested in the "contract" the συμφέροντος which is directly related to words that mean:

confer a benefit

be useful or profitable

useful, expedient, fitting, advantage

and so on...

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, συμφέρω

Epicurus seems more concerned with the usefulness or benefit of the agreement/contract/etc. than what the "letter of the law" is in a certain time and place.

I would *begin* to try to translate PD31 as:

The justice of nature (i.e., what is naturally just) is an agreement of mutual benefit between or among people to not voluntarily harm each other nor to not be harmed oneself deliberately by others actions.

This way, it rules out accidents and similar calamities. Epicurus wants to say that being harmed in a flood or killed by a wild animal cannot be claimed to be just or unjust. "To not be harmed" does not mean in any sense that you will never be injured or hurt. It all goes back to those voluntary actions for which we must take responsibility.

I am of the opinion that translations should, if at all possible, reflect the original texts' wordplay, eg, playing off the original here in PD17's:

δίκαιος vs ἄδικος

ἀταρακτότατος vs ταραχῆς

I'm going to shamelessly self-promote this thread from March 2020, my early days on the forum. I edited slightly, but am pleased that the post still stands up.

Usual rendering:

οὐ βιαστέον τὴν φύσιν ἀλλὰ πειστέον· πείσομεν δὲ τὰς ἀναγκαίας ἐπιθυμίας ἐκπληροῦντες, τάς τε φυσικὰς ἂν μὴ βλάπτωσι, τὰς δὲ βλαβερὰς πικρῶς ἐλέγχοντες.Nature must be persuaded, not forced. And we will persuade nature by fulfilling the necessary desires, and the natural desires too if they cause no harm, but sharply rejecting the harmful desires.

Welcome aboard!

Quote from Joshua

"Natural philosophy", at least in the English of the 19th century, did not contain just physics but also botany (Joseph Banks), biology (Charles Darwin), geology (Charles Lyell), astronomy (Edwin Hubble), anatomy and physiology (Henry Gray), and so on.

Here's an idea of the all-encompassing connotation of φύσις

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, φύσις

Here's Hicks on DL 10.30:

The usual arrangement, however, is to conjoin canonic with physics, and the former they call the science which deals with the standard and the first principle, or the elementary part of philosophy, while physics proper, they say, deals with becoming and perishing and with nature ; ethics, on the other hand, deals with things to be sought and avoided, with human life and with the end-in-chief.

And the text:

εἰώθασι μέντοι τὸ κανονικὸν ὁμοῦ τῷ φυσικῷ τάττειν: καλοῦσι δ᾽ αὐτὸ περὶ κριτηρίου καὶ ἀρχῆς, καὶ στοιχειωτικόν: τὸ δὲ φυσικὸν περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς, καὶ περὶ φύσεως: τὸ δὲ ἠθικὸν περὶ αἱρετῶν καὶ φευκτῶν καὶ περὶ βίων καὶ τέλους.

[134] Because of this, it is better to follow the stories of the gods than to be enslaved by the deterministic decrees of the old natural philosophers,...

One way to keep it more in line with the text is to use "Physical Science" but that's clunky.

Ο ΘAΝATΟΣ ΟΥΔEΝ ΠΡΟΣ ΗΜAΣ·

TΟ ΓAΡ ΔΙAΛΥΘEΝ AΝAΙΣΘΗTEΙ TΟ Δ' AΝAΙΣΘΗTΟΥΝ ΟΥΔEΝ ΠΡΟΣ ΗΜAΣ.

A strictly very literal translation would be something like:

Death (is) nothing to us,

Because "that which is disintegrated, unwound, and scattered" lacks perception, and that which lacks perception is nothing to us.

TΟ ΔΙAΛΥΘEΝ that which is disintegrated, unwound, and scattered (Note: the definite article)

TΟ AΝAΙΣΘΗTΟΥΝ that which lacks perception

Note that the preposition ΠΡΟΣ used with the accusative case broadly expresses motion or direction towards an object. Here is can be thought of answering what impact does Death have in relation to us: Nothing! Death cannot have any impact or we cannot have any regard for Death after we die. We do not exist. If something cannot perceive or sense the world, it is not alive... it does not exist. To speak of something that does not exist is the same as speaking of nothing.

First, may I say that I find Cassius initial efforts at a simple vote extremely endearing. Cassius: You are the eternal optimist. However, it has elicited an excellent discussion.

Now, instead of nitpicking others' valiant attempts at translation, I'll simply offer my own for consideration... and, yes, it's late and I got lazy at the end and just copied Hicks. He'll do as a start, and it's in the scholion anyway. And I don't expect this translation to be The Chosen One, of course. This is primarily to simply illustrate some points.

Original Text: Τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον οὔτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχει οὔτε ἄλλῳ παρέχει, ὥστε οὔτε ὀργαῖς οὔτε χάρισι συνέχεται: ἐν ἀσθενεῖ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον.

(ἐν ἄλλοις δέ φησι τοὺς θεοὺς λόγῳ θεωρητούς, οὓς μὲν κατ᾽ ἀριθμὸν ὑφεστῶτας, οὓς δὲ καθ᾽ ὁμοείδειαν ἐκ τῆς συνεχοῦς ἐπιρρύσεως τῶν ὁμοίων εἰδώλων ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀποτετελεσμένωι ἀνθρωποειδῶς.)

Translation: The one who (That which) is blessed and indestructible (or imperishable) neither has troubles oneself nor causes troubles for others, that one is neither annoyed by anything nor troubles others; therefore such a one is constrained by neither anger nor gratitude; for (if that were the case) such a one is lacking in strength.

(Also, in other works he says by means of reason are the gods apprehended through contemplation, "some being numerically distinct, while others result uniformly from the continuous influx of similar images directed to the same spot and in human form.")

We all agree PD1 is describing the blessed/blissful existence of a god. And I use singular "god" deliberately since the words are singular at the beginning. See below for more on that.

Greek regularly turned adjectives into nouns using a definite article: Τὸ μακάριον and (Τὸ) ἄφθαρτον. English typically has to add words; however, we know what we mean if we say something like "The Brave and the Bold." We can also say things like "The Funny One." Here, it's not as easy saying it in English but "The Blessed and the imperishable" gets close. My perspective is that we have to use a "the" or "that which" here, even if it's a circumlocution like "The one who is blissful and imperishable" or "That which is blissful and imperishable."

The juxtaposition of "neither anger nor gratitude" (οὔτε ὀργαῖς οὔτε χάρισι) is interesting, because Philodemus does the same pairing of words in his works when speaking of anger and its opposite, gratitude. He sees these as mirror images or counterparts to each other. Epicurus also pairs these in the letter to Herodotus (DL 10.76-77, gratitude to Bryan for pointing this out!): "...any being who at the same time enjoys perfect bliss (μακαριότητα) along with immortality (ἀφθαρσίας lit., "no-corruption (unable to experience deterioration)"). [77] For troubles and anxieties and feelings of anger (ὀργαὶ) and partiality (χάριτες) do not accord with bliss (μακαριότητι), but always imply weakness (ἀσθενείᾳ) and fear (φόβῳ) and dependence upon one's neighbours. (῾οὐ γὰρ συμφωνοῦσιν πραγματεῖαι καὶ φροντίδες καὶ ὀργαὶ καὶ χάριτες μακαριότητι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ καὶ φόβῳ καὶ προσδεήσει τῶν πλησίον ταῦτα γίγνεταἰ)."

Many of these words in the Greek text are the same or close to the same as in PD1. So, that pairing evidently goes back to Epicurus himself.

ἀσθενείᾳ: Definition: weakness, frailty; Usage: want of strength, weakness, illness, suffering, calamity, frailty. negating the root sthenos, "strength."

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, σθένος

As some may know on this forum, I am in favor of the "idealist" position on the gods. The singular use in "That which is blissful and imperishable," to me, could describe an individual's conception of what the god is or should be. We each construct our image of the god in our mind by continually imagining the highest blissful state embodied in human form, imperishable because it has no existence other than our conception, formed of appropriate images. That conception in our mind is also not subject to fear or partiality nor does it trouble anyone.

Okay, that might be pushing it, I admit. That said, Epicurus's explanation within the Letter to Herodotus shows us exactly what the second half of PD1 means. I find it very interesting that troubles, anxieties, and feelings of anger and partiality are plural. The phrase is "feelings of anger and partiality." Keeping that "feelings" in mind is important. The god is not troubled by "feelings of anger and partiality." The primary - maybe only - feeling it has is the highest bliss, and it is unable to experience deterioration.

Lucretius also tells us that such a being does not exist in our world, in our cosmos. They can/could only exist "between worlds," between the pockets of order within the larger universe, within The All (the universe).

I also find the scholion interesting in its use of θεωρητούς which is related to the word used in the "characteristics of the sage": "ἐν ταῖς θεωρίαις" which I have interpreted as "(They shall enjoy themselves more) in contemplation." Yonge is the only one to take this route: "he will find more pleasure than other men in speculations." But if one can contemplate a being that is completely blissful and imperishable, why wouldn't the Epicurean sage enjoy contemplation more than the average member of the hoi polloi. Here is my reasoning for this interpretation:

That's all for now. I may head over the new PD2 thread now!