I'd like to see our format in the "Texts" section here at Epicureanfriends become more like that in the future
The Perseus Digital Library doesn't have interlinear texts, but their ability to click on every word to access the authoritative dictionaries is priceless.
PD19. Finite time and infinite time contain the same amount of joy, if its limits are measured out through reasoning.
To be clear, where Saint-Andre uses "joy" the Greek is hēdonē "pleasure." My take on that PD is that if the definition of the limit of pleasure is the removal of all pain (and after that it's just variety) it doesn't matter the amount of time, finite or infinite. If your pleasure glass is full, it's full.
But I always go back to this commentary from Diogenes Laertius when talking about Epicurus's take on eudaimonia:
[121] Two sorts of happiness (eudaimonia) can be conceived, the one the highest possible, such as the gods enjoy, which cannot be augmented, the other admitting addition and subtraction of pleasures.
It's always tricky when trying to compare what texts mean when different words are used: pleasure vs happiness. 121 doesn't say two kinds of pleasure but two kinds of well-being. I do NOT think we could substitute well-being for pleasure in PD19, but does verse 121 inform, in any way, our understanding of the PDs? Questions beget questions.
So to properly evaluate this hypothetical you need to get a sense of the uncertainties. We have Epicurus' letter describing his situation, but we don't know much about the shepherd. Do they love or hate their job? Are they allergic to grass? What's the breadth of their mental pleasure in this circumstance: does it align with their innermost desires? We therefore need to make up answers for all of these uncertainties, which of course is what makes this a hypothetical in the first place
It warms my heart to see someone else want more details on a hypothetical 
and these are ones I hadn't even thought of! Well done, Godfrey !!
I've often interpreted PD09 to mean that a pleasurable feeling is a pleasurable feeling. Condensing all or every pleasure implies that's possible... Or does it? That "if" could be doing the same work as in PD10. IF x was possible, then y. But IF x isn't possible, y isn't possible. Maybe PD09 is actually saying that all pleasures do differ from each other!
PD09, 10, and 11 all start out with ει "if..."
Those "if's..." imply to me that those IF's are counterfactual! Those if's are not actually possible. That sets to a whole different vibe for each of those 3 PDs.
Don't get "the height of pleasure" or "the highest pleasure" or "the greatest pleasure" mixed up with the "greatest good." The greatest good, summum bonum, telos *is* pleasure. But I don't want to derail this thread, but I want to stress that point.
Does that apply too to "the limit of quantity of pleasure" as referenced in PD03? If so, the PD03 is intended to mean the "limit of quantity of pleasure for YOU" or "for a particular person" is the absence of pain, rather than referring to a particular activity? And that therefore different people are going to be doing different things when they are at this limit referenced in PD03?
No.
The "limit" of pleasure is the removal of all pain, by definition. After that, it's all variation. For anyone. People are going to be doing different things to provide that variety.
So "pleasure" is itself contextual and there is absolutely no Platonic ideal or Aristotelian essence of "Pleasure"?
The feeling of pleasure is personal and subjective.
Choices are based on context.
So if I read you correctly, from your perspective, the "ability to share" seems to be perhaps the paramount consideration in fruitfulness and enjoyability.
Hmmm. That said, I can take pleasure in learning something new and I don't necessarily have to share everything I learn. The differences with this Epicurus week scenario is:
Would I know I know something that wasn't available to me or my Epicurean friends in modern time? Or am I simply transported into Epicurus's body with no prior knowledge of my previous existence? If the latter, I'm not worried about sharing. In the former, I'm dealing with having important knowledge that could be of use to my friends with the pain of not being able to share that knowledge with said friends.
PS. (Edit) Everything is contextual! The same pleasure in different contexts coming from different desires may lead to completely different decisions on whether one selects or flees from that pleasure.
In this case: Are all pleasures equally to be chosen? If so, how do we choose among them? If not, why not?
No.
Epicurus was concerned with our entire existence: the well-being of both our physical (σώματος) and mental (ψυχῆς) health. By contemplating and following his philosophy, we come to understand that all our decisions of which actions to choose and from which actions to flee are going to affect whether our physical, material health and well-being are to be maintained or not and whether our minds are to be troubled or not. That is the baseline for every decision and with "Ask this question of every desire: what will happen to me if the object of desire is achieved, and what if not?"
Another warmup question might be: "A former Torquatus put his son to death for violating a military rule, and our Torquatus justified that as a decision consistent in nature with an Epicurean perspective. This despite the other Epicurean rule that we sometimes die for a friend. Does that tell us anything about the Epicurean position for choosing among pleasures and pains?"
For the earlier Torquatus, he decided security and order in his troops was more important than the life of his son. That sounds horrific, but I'm also not an ancient Roman general commanding a legion. The fruits of his decision were strict discipline under his command. Was it worth it? Did it provide well-being? You'd have to ask Titus Manlius Imperiosus Torquatus
Now we're getting somewhere!
Your Menoikeus quote is an interesting one. I went back to see how I translated it:
Just as the most food is not chosen but that which brings the greatest pleasure; choose as well not the longest time but that in which one enjoys the fruits of that which bring the greatest pleasure (ἀλλὰ τὸν ἥδιστον καρπίζεται.).
The key word that gets skimmed over by a lot of translations is καρπίζεται (karpizetai) "enjoy the fruits (of that which brings the greatest pleasure (ἥδιστον hēdiston))" which is related to Latin carpo as in carpe diem "pluck/harvest the day". There's a literal sense of reaping the benefits, enjoying the fruits, of the most pleasurable experience, the sweetest choice.
By consciously choosing the hypothetical - for me! someone else's mileage may vary - that involves living in severe pain for a week then dying, whether or not I'm imbued with the knowledge of Epicurus or surrounded by his friends, doesn't sound "fruitful" to me, to riff on καρπίζεται. One, by definition of the hypothetical, couldn't "come back" and share that knowledge. But do I know I'm me living as Epicurus, or am I just Epicurus living his life with no memory of me?
This seems akin to the choice of "Would you choose to be given "god-like" knowledge for a day then die?" What good would it serve to know everything and not be able to share it?
Epicurus didn't choose to experience the severe pains of his final acute illness. That was a part of his life that wasn't up to him. How he dealt with it is admirable, maybe even inspirational. So I don't see the fruitfullness in choosing that final week. It's still the shepherd for me if I am required to choose.
If I may:
I'm trying to understand what long term pleasure I would be gaining if I chose to endure the pain of the last week of Epicurus's life. We know (or are told) he was writing letters up to his last day, or at least dictating them. But I've seen people go through kidney stones, and Epicurus's were evidently impacted and infected.
Plus do I die at the end of the week or come back to my present self? Do I get to retain all of Epicurus's knowledge? Do I get to come back and write books in Epicurus's name?
Epicureans can choose to undergo pain and hardship of it leads to long term pleasure in their lives. If I can somehow know what he knew, that's something to consider. But again, I remain skeptical of the value of these kinds of thought experiments.
For me that one is easier I think - I would want to be able to question Epicurus in his most mature and advanced stage of life, so I would say "being with Epicurus during the last week of his life" to ask him where he eventually came down on many of these same issues we are discussing.
And i would probably include the exact question we are discussing from post one of this thread.
Ah! But how readily available would he be available that last week? How open to questions? How bedridden and in pain would be be? How much wine was he drinking to dull the pain? I can come up with all kinds of complications! 
Personally, I think being a student of Epicurus for a week, even his last week, is more intriguing than "being" Epicurus himself.
Which leads me to ask if a more difficult question would be:
You can travel back in time for one week (and you're able to understand and read the language, have all the proper inoculations, etc.) for a specifically Epicurean excursion. When and where do you go?
Do you spend a week:
- sitting with Epicurus as a child, badgering his teachers about the origins of Chaos
- learning with Epicurus in Lampsacus at the beginning of his philosophical work
- traveling with Epicurus when he was getting kicked out of Mytilene
- being with Epicurus during the last week of his life
- in Athens meeting with Cicero and Atticus and visiting the Garden, Academy, etc.
- visiting the Villa of the Papyri, reading in the library, and attending a 20th with Philodemus and Piso
PS. I'm intentionally leaving out spending a week living in the Garden and house with Epicurus in his prime, in the mature school surrounded by students. That'd be the easy choice for me.
Personally, I think being a student of Epicurus for a week, even his last week, is more intriguing than "being" Epicurus himself.
I was assuming I wasn't dying at the end of the week as a shepherd.
Clear and Vivid episode on "spirituality" and transcendence from a material universe perspective.
"accident of accidents"
I know it sounds weird, but it's just an old definition of accident:
"Any property, fact, or relation that is the result of chance or is nonessential or nonsubstantive."
In a sense I see all bodies as being qualities, and bodies coming into larger bodies is the chain all the way up from molecules to mountains. So "qualities of qualities" might not be something unusual, but might actually be the normal expression.
I can't get behind that. Bodies have qualities. They can be defined by their qualities. Their qualities can be qualified by other qualities, like time. But bodies are not qualities.
For example:
An apple is a body.
A quality of the apple is its being red.
Red does not exist apart from red things.
When an apple is unripe, it has the quality green.
It is green until it ripens.
The quality green can be qualified by time in that "it has the quality green for x amount of time until it turns red"
Edit: see also https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accident_…%29?wprov=sfla1
Now, this being said, I think Cassius 's primary issue with "accident" as a translation being problematic is that it could be misunderstood by the casual reader to imply chance, luck, or fortune as in common parlance. I do think that could be an issue. It is a philosophical jargon word per that Wikipedia article.
I think void is a thing, or at least the absence of a thing. It is the "thing" through which atoms move. I don't see equating time with void. If anything, time is a descriptor of a descriptor. It is a way of talking about the duration of a quality, a quality of a quality.
I get the sense that time in Epicurus's system is a "quality of a quality," not a thing unto itself.
