Posts by Don

I was assuming I wasn't dying at the end of the week as a shepherd.

Alan Lightman: Can Science Explain Spirituality? | Clear+Vivid with Alan Alda

A physicist whose world has no room for spirits, but who has experienced many eerily transcendent moments – both in nature and in his work – sets out to…

clear-vivid-with-alan-alda.simplecast.com

Clear and Vivid episode on "spirituality" and transcendence from a material universe perspective.

Quote from Cassius

"accident of accidents"

I know it sounds weird, but it's just an old definition of accident:

"Any property, fact, or relation that is the result of chance or is nonessential or nonsubstantive."

Quote from Cassius

In a sense I see all bodies as being qualities, and bodies coming into larger bodies is the chain all the way up from molecules to mountains. So "qualities of qualities" might not be something unusual, but might actually be the normal expression.

I can't get behind that. Bodies have qualities. They can be defined by their qualities. Their qualities can be qualified by other qualities, like time. But bodies are not qualities.

For example:

An apple is a body.

A quality of the apple is its being red.

Red does not exist apart from red things.

When an apple is unripe, it has the quality green.

It is green until it ripens.

The quality green can be qualified by time in that "it has the quality green for x amount of time until it turns red"

Edit: see also https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accident_…%29?wprov=sfla1

Now, this being said, I think Cassius 's primary issue with "accident" as a translation being problematic is that it could be misunderstood by the casual reader to imply chance, luck, or fortune as in common parlance. I do think that could be an issue. It is a philosophical jargon word per that Wikipedia article.

I think void is a thing, or at least the absence of a thing. It is the "thing" through which atoms move. I don't see equating time with void. If anything, time is a descriptor of a descriptor. It is a way of talking about the duration of a quality, a quality of a quality.

I get the sense that time in Epicurus's system is a "quality of a quality," not a thing unto itself.

Got it:

Following up on Eikadistes 's find in On Piety, here's the commentary that goes along with that:

Quote

Lines 1885-6: here the fact that the gods exist in the first instance as conceptualized by humans is illustrated by comparison to the ontological status of time, which according to Epicurus is not even a per se entity {but rather an accident or attribute of other entities), yet is not in consequence any less real. Rather, it is in an epiphenomenon of our thinking about certain occurrences in relation to other events and objects. For the status of time as an accidental property of things see Epic. Ad Herod. 68-73; Demetrius of Laconia ap. Sext. Emp. Adv. math.10.219-27, where time is styled an "accident of accidents"; Lucr. I. 459-63.

We've been looking at the letter to Herodotus and Joshua is the one who noted the Lucretius quote cited there. I haven't put my finger on the Sextus citation yet.

That's a good find!

Quote from Nate

Philodemus seems to suggest that time is, among other things, a preconception: “For the All […] is thought of, just as Time [khrónos] is defined, as being a naturally formed generic conception [prólepsin]” (Philodemus, On Piety, Col. 66.3-6)

I thought time was one of the things specifically excluded from having a prolepsis.

[DL 10.72] "There is another thing which we must consider carefully. We must not investigate time as we do the other accidents which we investigate in a subject, namely, by referring them to the preconceptions (προλήψεις) envisaged in our minds

The way Epicurus describes it sounds like we bypass any "preconception": "we must take into account the plain fact itself... linking to it in intimate connexion this attribute of duration."

Note: Joshua's Lucretius excerpt echoes 3 above:

Lucretius:

We must concede that no one

has a sense of time in and of itself,

apart from things in motion or at rest.

Epicurus:

καὶ κινήσεσι καὶ στάσεσιν

"both things in motion and those at rest"

Quote from Cassius

Quote from Don

passiveness and impassibility, movement and repose, are equally comprised in time.

Don why would Epicurus not simply be talking about the movement of the atoms (either in isolation or in bodies, bodies being the big deal), with no reference to human feeling at that point. If the point of time is that the atoms are changing place, that might make sense (?)

Oh, I see no reason to think Epicurus is primarily talking about the motion of the atoms. He's talking about "the usual expressions" everyone uses about time. Right before the words in question, he's talking about night and day and their parts. I think he's talking about things on the macro level and not the micro level of atoms.

For ease of access, I'm going to copy that section about time from the Herodotus here again:

Quote from Epicurus from his letter to Herodotus

[72] "There is another thing which we must consider carefully. We must not investigate time as we do the other accidents which we investigate in a subject, namely, by referring them to the preconceptions envisaged in our minds ; but we must take into account the plain fact itself, in virtue of which we speak of time as long or short, linking to it in intimate connexion this attribute of duration.106We need not adopt any fresh terms as preferable, but should employ the usual expressions about it. Nor need we predicate anything else of time, as if this something else contained the same essence as is contained in the proper meaning of the word `time' (for this also is done by some). We must chiefly reflect upon that to which we attach this peculiar character of time, and by which we measure it. [73] No further proof is required : we have only to reflect that we attach the attribute of time to days and nights and their parts, and likewise to feelings of pleasure and pain and to neutral states, to states of movement and states of rest, conceiving a peculiar accident of these to be this very characteristic which we express by the word `time.'

Nowhere in that section does he bring up atoms or atomic motion. He's talking about our experience of time in the real world and our "intimate connexion" to it as a duration, long or short. At the end he goes over three things to which "we attach the attribute of time"

1. to days and nights and their parts
   1. ταῖς ἡμέραις καὶ ταῖς νυξὶ συμπλέκομεν καὶ τοῖς τούτων μέρεσιν
2. to "feelings of pleasure and pain" and to "neutral states" (Hicks inadequate translation)
   1. καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς ἀπαθείαις
3. to states of movement and states of rest (again, Hicks inadequate translation)
   1. καὶ κινήσεσι καὶ στάσεσιν

As for 2, I see no problem *somehow* having it refer to feelings like anger, etc. "I was angry for a short time."

I also maintain that 3's καὶ κινήσεσι καὶ στάσεσιν refers to kinetic and katastematic pleasure. He doesn't necessarily *need* to be referring to them (rather simply motion and rest in a general sense), but the similiarities are enough for me to bring it up.

The 1691/92 Greek/Latin edition translated that phrase as:

Similiter et perturbationinus ac tranquillitatibus,...

Charlton T. Lewis, Charles Short, A Latin Dictionary, perturbātĭo

Charlton T. Lewis, Charles Short, A Latin Dictionary, tranquillĭtas

So, maybe the import for Epicurus is to hammer home the dichotomy, not of pleasure/pain vs some neutral state (which would be opposed to his philosophy) but rather the active emotions vs tranquility? Which is echoed in the next couplet with motion and states?

Yonge:

It is, in fact, evident, that we speak of time as composed of days and nights, and parts of days and nights; passiveness and impassibility, movement and repose, are equally comprised in time.

That's not very helpful

So:

ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς ἀπαθείαις,...

"And likewise (applied) to both the πάθεσι and to the ἀπαθείαις"

but note the dative plural definite articles so it seems he's talking about those which... or the (plural things) to which the duration of time is applied in common speech using "the usual expressions."

τοῖς πάθεσι is the neuter dative plural of πάθος "that which happens" (ie, how we experience things)

ταῖς ἀπαθείαις is the feminine dative plural of ἀπάθεια "no feeling"

ἀπάθεια was/is the ideal of the Stoics, the control over ones passions. But I see no reason to think Epicurus would have been using ταῖς ἀπαθείαις in that Stoic sense.

He's using those as examples of things to which we apply the "usual expressions" of the duration of time.

So, I do NOT agree with Hicks translation implying Epicurus was using this phrase to talk about pleasure, pain and a "neutral" state, but I'm still puzzling through what Epicurus was meaning.

PS. Edit: Technically, I suppose it could refer to those experiencing/feeling things and those not experiencing/feeling things (those who are dead), but that seems a little far fetched. It could also mean those experiences/feelings themselves and those things not consciously experienced, but that too send stretching it.

Would that we had Book 10 of On Nature! It obviously was a long treatment on the study of time, and the fragments are tantalizing. For example:

DCLP/Trismegistos 59744 = LDAB 848

Col.2

... given that, far from even being able to conceive that time could never exist, one sees quite the contrary immediately that it necessarily conceives time as something [like this]...

(4 (37-13)... going into..., we distinguish the short time and the long time [by reasoning] which is not different, but all that...

[VS. 3, fig. 3, 1: (37.17)] ... we [have unceasingly] the representation of the days and the nights which makes us conceive, with regard to them, a length by which to measure each movement. [In fact,] we do not consent to time itself being measured by these precisely, as (if it were made up) of days and nights

[Frg. 9, 1: (37.31)] ... and time is a representation capable of measuring all movement, and which is measured in magnitude [by means of] movement] the most common ... (4 (37-34 ))...they use [such ways of expressing themselves. But what is certain is that never again have the public executors at least, who are blind from birth, bringing time to this succession of days and nights...

Col. 4. : ...and never [prior] observations will inevitably imply that it [fails me. And] yet, [we have seen it, whenever the study bears on time, it is to these that it [refers]; and it is in them, it seems to me, that the emotions] and the representations coming from the totality [are distinctly grasped], to stick to these ways of expressing oneself [about nature...

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Quote

and likewise to feelings of pleasure and pain and to neutral states

This line caught me by surprise! Is Epicurus endorsing the idea of "neutral states" in addition to pleasure and pain?! As always, back to the books!

The phrase here is:

ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς ἀπαθείαις.

So πάθεσι (pathesi) and ἀπαθείαις (apatheiais). We're all familiar with the pathē, they are two: pleasure and pain. But what about the second word?

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, ἀπάθ-εια

My initial take is that he's using it as the opposite of pathē, but I'm holding off on the significance. I do not think he's advocating for three states because that goes against everything in the canonics. The most basic definition is "want of sensation" literally "no feeling" so maybe he's using it as a synonym for ἀναισθητεῖ (see PD02)?

As an aside, the next phrase is καὶ κινήσεσι (kinēsesi) καὶ στάσεσιν (stasesin) which dovetails nicely with kinetic and katastematic pleasures.

Physics by Aristotle

I just came across this mention of Aristotle's ideas on time in Physics 4:10-14 and thought I saw some parallels with Epicurus and Lucretius. Or, if not parallels, Aristotle providing a jumping off point for an Epicurean rebuttal.

For example, Epicurus in the Herodotus:

Quote

[72] "There is another thing which we must consider carefully. We must not investigate time as we do the other accidents which we investigate in a subject, namely, by referring them to the preconceptions envisaged in our minds ; but we must take into account the plain fact itself, in virtue of which we speak of time as long or short, linking to it in intimate connexion this attribute of duration.106We need not adopt any fresh terms as preferable, but should employ the usual expressions about it. Nor need we predicate anything else of time, as if this something else contained the same essence as is contained in the proper meaning of the word `time' (for this also is done by some). We must chiefly reflect upon that to which we attach this peculiar character of time, and by which we measure it. [73] No further proof is required : we have only to reflect that we attach the attribute of time to days and nights and their parts, and likewise to feelings of pleasure and pain and to neutral states, to states of movement and states of rest, conceiving a peculiar accident of these to be this very characteristic which we express by the word `time.' [He says this both in the second book "On Nature" and in the Larger Epitome.]

Both Epicurus and Aristotle talk about time in relation to motion.

Do I remember that Lucretius discussed time somewhere?

Anyway, food for thought.

For the ancient Greek, I stick with Hellenion:

Calendar – Hellenion

AUC and Olympiad does a nice job hitting both the Roman and Greek calendars.

Quote from Cassius

I wonder as a Latin exam where the reference back comes in.

dici ab illo

"be told by him (ie, Epicurus)"

Don't get hung up on Bailey's "occupation."

The word is ἐπιτηδευμάτων.

It seems to me to be more general. Yes, it can be a job or occupation, but Woodhouse gives the range of meanings:

Woodhouse, S. C. (1910) English–Greek Dictionary: A Vocabulary of the Attic Language‎[1], London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Limited.

avocation idem, page 55.

business idem, page 106.

calling idem, page 109.

career idem, page 113.

custom idem, page 191.

employment idem, page 269.

habit idem, page 380.

hobby idem, page 402.

institution idem, page 447.

occupation idem, page 568.

practice idem, page 631.

profession idem, page 653.

pursuit idem, page 659.

routine idem, page 723.

study idem, page 829.

trade idem, page 885.

vocation idem, page 955.

work idem, page 988.

Basically, it seems it's anything that can occupy one's time.

ea facere ipsa per se laetitiam.

id est voluptatem.

doing them is a joy in itself.

that is pleasure

laetitia

Derived from laet(us) (“happy”, “glad”)

joy, gladness, happiness, pleasure, delight