Posts by Don

FYI

Ηδονή hēdonē

Woodhouse, S. C. (1910) English–Greek Dictionary: A Vocabulary of the Attic Language‎[1], London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Limited.

allurement idem, page 25.

amusement idem, page 28.

caprice idem, page 112.

cheer idem, page 128.

complacency idem, page 151.

dalliance idem, page 193.

delectation idem, page 207.

delight idem, page 208.

ecstasy idem, page 261.

elation idem, page 265.

enchantment idem, page 270.

enjoyment idem, page 275.

entrancement idem, page 278.

exhilaration idem, page 291.

fascination idem, page 308.

gaiety idem, page 351.

gladness idem, page 361.

glee idem, page 361.

gratification idem, page 370.

hilarity idem, page 400.

idiosyncrasy idem, page 413.

intoxication idem, page 454.

jollity idem, page 464.

joy idem, page 464.

light-heartedness idem, page 491.

merriment idem, page 526.

mirth idem, page 532.

pleasure idem, page 620.

rapture idem, page 672.

ravishment idem, page 674.

rejoicing idem, page 689.

satisfaction idem, page 734.

transport idem, page 889.

treat idem, page 892.

zest idem, page 997.

Quote from Cassius

I would say "floating" is going to evoke "mindlessness" or "total inaction" unless we are careful to exclude that. And that's where the kinetic language gets blurry, if for example savoring memories is kinetic.

I would lean into the "relaxation" aspect of floating, liked in an inner tube down a river, luxuriating in the sunshine, slow motion, float.

For memory:

Post

RE: Modern Neuroscience And The Katastematic / Kinetic Debate

There aren't a lot of opportunities, but I decided to try and replace single words with either katastematic or kinetic pleasure.

It should also be remembered that the phrase "kinetic pleasure" isn't *actually* what Epicurus says. What he says is (as literally as I can make it):

"Peace of mind (ataraxia) and freedom from pain (aponia) are condition/state pleasures; joy (khara) and delight (euphrosyne) are seen in relation to (κατὰ) motion (κίνησιν) by means of activity (ἐνεργείᾳ)."

ἡ μὲν…

Don

July 2, 2023 at 11:04 PM

...so that in old age you can be youthful by taking joy (explicitly a kinetic pleasure per Epicurus) in the good things you remember (letter to Menoikeus)

τῷ μὲν ὅπως γηράσκων νεάζῃ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς διὰ τὴν χάριν τῶν γεγονότων

Quote from Cassius

I don't think "motion" really captures the issue either. Almost like we are talking about "excited" atomic particles.

To me, it's action (kinetic) vs stability (katastematic).

There's also the distinction of pleasure coming from outside ourselves and pleasure coming from internal (mental) sources.

This is not the kinetic/katastematic distinction (I've been burned on making that assumption before!), but it's a distinction that gets discussed in Epicurus, Metrodorus, and Philodemus.

I know you're trying to get at the "pleasure when you're not 'doing' something 'pleasurable'" but there has to be a better way than "non-stimulating."

As an adjacent issue that's come up in this discussion, I wanted to see where "mental pain" came up the texts to see what's being conveyed in the texts and/or being obfuscated by translation. Here's a selection:

PD3

Ὅρος τοῦ μεγέθους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡ παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσις. ὅπου δ’ ἂν τὸ ἡδόμενον ἐνῇ, καθ’ ὃν ἂν χρόνον ᾖ, οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἀλγοῦν ἢ τὸ λυπούμενον ἢ τὸ συναμφότερον.

άλγος pain (of either mind or body), sorrow, trouble, grief, distress, woe; in Homer, mostly in pl., sufferings

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, ἄλγος

λυπούμενος from verb λυπεω

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, λυ_π-έω

[St-Andre note to PD3] The word ἡδονή is often translated solely as "pleasure"; however, depending on the context I also translate it as "joy", "delight", "enjoyment", or even "happiness" in the modern sense because the Greek word ἡδονή refers to any physical, emotional, or mental state that is filled with sweetness (ἡδύς), whereas the English word "pleasure" carries stronger connotations of a purely physical state (although compare phrases such as "the pleasures of philosophy"). Furthermore, although there is no hard and fast distinction between ἄλγος as bodily pain and λυπούμενος as mental distress, the former word tends to be used more in relation to the body and the latter more in relation to the mind or emotions; see also Principal Doctrine #10. For other texts that emphasize the concept of a natural limit to enjoyment, see Principal Doctrines #11, #15, #18, #19, #20, as well as Letter to Menoikos, Section 133, Vatican Saying #35, and Fragment #548.

***

Letter to Menoikeus 128

τούτων γὰρ ἀπλανὴς θεωρία πᾶσαν αἵρεσιν καὶ φυγὴν ἐπανάγειν οἶδεν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὑγίειαν καὶ τὴν <τῆς ψυχῆς> ἀταραξίαν, ἐπεὶ τοῦτο τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν ἐστι τέλος. τούτου γὰρ χάριν πάντα πράττομεν, ὅπως μήτε ἀλγῶμεν μήτε ταρβῶμεν. ὅταν δ᾽ ἅπαξ τοῦτο περὶ ἡμᾶς γένηται, λύεται πᾶς ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς χειμών, οὐκ ἔχοντος τοῦ ζῴου βαδίζειν ὡς πρὸς ἐνδέον τι καὶ ζητεῖν ἕτερον ᾧ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀγαθὸν συμπληρωθήσεται. τότε γὰρ ἡδονῆς χρείαν ἔχομεν, ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ παρεῖναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀλγῶμεν· <ὅταν δὲ μὴ ἀλγῶμεν>, οὐκέτι τῆς ἡδονῆς δεόμεθα. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος λέγομεν εἶναι τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν.

[128] The steady contemplation of these things equips one to know how to decide all choice and rejection for the health of the body and for the tranquility of the mind, that is for our physical and our mental existence, since this is the goal of a blessed life. For the sake of this, we do everything in order to neither be in bodily or mental pain nor to be in fear or dread; and so, when once this has come into being around us, it sets free all of the calamity, distress, and suffering of the mind, seeing that the living being has no need to go in search of something that is lacking for the good of our mental and physical existence. For it is then that we need pleasure, if we were to be in pain from the pleasure not being present; but if we were to not be in pain, we no longer desire or beg for pleasure. And this is why we say pleasure is the foundation and fulfillment of the blessed life.

Vocabulary

ἀλγῶμεν (first person plural subjunctive) "if we were to feel bodily pain, to suffer hardship, to feel pain of mind"

ταρβῶμεν (first person plural subjunctive) "if we were to be afraid, to dread" (note: related to the opposite of ataraxia)

"they set free all (πᾶς) the calamity, distress, suffering (χειμών) of the soul/mind (ψυχῆς),..."

χειμών has the connotation of cold and stormy winter weather. This word then takes on the metaphorical sense of calamity, distress, etc. When you read this word, imagine freezing blizzards, blinding snowfall, and howling wind!

128f. τότε γὰρ ἡδονῆς χρείαν ἔχομεν, ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ παρεῖναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀλγῶμεν·

τότε "then, at that time"

χρείαν (accusative) "need, want, necessity"

"for then we have need of pleasure,"

μὴ παρεῖναι "to not be by, to not be present"

As in 128b. ἀλγῶμεν (first person plural subjunctive) "if we were to feel bodily pain, to suffer hardship, to feel pain of mind"

"Because it is then that we need pleasure, if we were to be in pain from the pleasure not being present…"

128g. <ὅταν δὲ μὴ ἀλγῶμεν>, οὐκέτι τῆς ἡδονῆς δεόμεθα. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος λέγομεν εἶναι τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν.

ὅταν δὲ μὴ ἀλγῶμεν,

"but if we were to not be in pain,"

οὐκέτι "no more, no longer"

δεόμεθα, here means "desire, beg for, ask for"; shows up in New Testament to convey "implore, pray for, etc."

"we no longer desire/beg for/ask for pleasure (τῆς ἡδονῆς)."

So, it's not that we "don't need" pleasure, it's that we don't desire it or beg for it like we do when it's not present. Why? Because when we are not in pain, we are full of pleasure. There is no need to seek or beg for pleasure when you have a full measure of pleasure.

λέγομεν "we say"

"and that is why we say pleasure is the foundation and fulfillment, the beginning and end (ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος) of the blessed life."

***

Fragment 2.

ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀταραξία καὶ <ἡ> ἀπονία καταστηματικαί εἰσιν ἡδοναί. ἡ δὲ χαρὰ καὶ ἡ εὐφροσύνη κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργείᾳ βλέπονται.

Epicurus: Lack of mental disturbance and lack of bodily pain are static pleasures, whereas revelry and rejoicing are active pleasures involving movement.

Lack of mental disturbance (ie, mental pain) = ataraxia

lack of bodily pain = aponia (note: I'm not enamoured of that translation, but it'll do for now)

I would agree with your points with an important caveat for me.

Quote from Cassius

But until it is accepted that pleasure includes both stimulating and non-stimulating pleasures, it's not possible to stand up against the argument of Cicero and others that Epicurus is using the term "pleasure" in a non-standard way.

Quote from Cassius

"pleasure" includes two types of pleasures which we can understand in words that mean something to us ( 1 - exciting / stimulating pleasures vs 2 - pleasures of normal living in which we are not stimulated / excited).

I can't quite put my finger on it, but "non-stimulating" and "not stimulated" sounds like falling into a Cyrenaic trap. "Non-stimulating" and "not stimulated" sounds like there's no sensation at all. That's not what you want to convey. Those terms sound like a Cyrenaic argument just waiting in that if it's not pleasure, then you're asleep or dead or, if not in pain, in some third neutral state.

Those what you term non-stimulating pleasures are taking pleasure, consciously, in the stable (NOT STATIC) well-functioning of the body and the tranquility of an undisturbed mind. The pleasure of floating on a calm sea and the assurance of its continuance. As mortal humans, we aren't guaranteed this pleasure forever, if it can be achieved, but we can expect moments IF we accept the fact that we have access to this AS pleasure, as a pleasurable feeling. That was Epicurus's genius in pointing this out.

Quote from Cassius

I think the designation of A1 as kinetic and A2 as katastematic would not be helpful. Regardless of different readings of the texts, as I understand the situation the k/k terminology is not nearly as well establishable in the core Epicurus and Lucretius texts as is the discussion of the difference between "stimulation" vs "absence of pain / normal experience of life."

Actually, from my reading of the texts, that is exactly the description of kinetic and katastematic. There seems to be no strict, formal "mental" or "physical" pleasure categorization because all pleasure at heart is "physical" and material. Epicurus identified kinetic and katastematic pleasure to define his broad spectrum of pleasure available to us, rather than the narrow band accepted by the Cyrenaics or later but Cicero.

Pain on the hand can be (broadly) defined adequately as of the mind or of the body.

I also think we need to acknowledge that there is a difference between pain and suffering. Acknowledging and dealing with pain is one thing. Dwelling on, focusing on, wallowing in pain increases suffering, not the pain itself. This, if I remember correctly, is corroborated by psychological research, including the work of Jon Kabat-Zinn. Suffering can be self-inflicted. It doesn't make it any less real, but I think this idea of suffering vs pain is directly related to Epicurus's situation in his dying days.

Quote from Pacatus

Question: Can B1 and B2 also have katastematic qualities? For example, chronic physical pain or clinical depression?

I would say no. Epicurus identified katastematic and kinetic as categories of pleasure specifically. Pain seems specifically to be divided into those of body and those of mind. Pleasure appears to have a more nuanced division.

I see where you're going, but let me provide the following possible revision or at least offer this to get your math didn't in my mind.

To recap:

A = pleasure (pleasurable sensation/positive affect)

B = pain (painful sensation/negative affect)

A1 = "Any experience of agreeable "stimulation"" (ie, kinetic pleasure)

A2 = "normal and healthy experience of life" (ie, katastematic pleasure)

A = (A1 + A2)

C the totality of experience in one's life.

HP is defined as "most pleasure possible in life is when 100% of life ("C") is composed totally of pleasure, which means 100% A (pleasure, either A1 or A2 or both) and 0% B (pain)"

Let's even give B the benefit of the doubt and say B1 is pain in the body and B2 is pain in the mind...

C = (A1 + A2) + (B1 + B2)

The height/fullness of pleasure would then be:

C - (B1 + B2) = (A1 + A2)

Or using HP as 100% pleasure in C...

HP = C - (B1 + B2) = (A1 + A2)

or

HP = (A1 + A2) height/fullness of pleasure is just 100% pleasure

HP = C - (B1 + B2) height/fullness of pleasure is the totality of life without any pain of body or mind

Since we're not gods, we can't achieve HP all the time, but we can experience moments of it. Even Epicurus admitted he felt the pain of his final illness, he just valued his positive memories more highly than the pain and took comfort in a life well-lived. Maybe I'd arithmeticize his experience as:

A1 + A2 + B2 > B1

Hmmm.... But pain in the body B1 is the absence of pleasure in the body but neither A1 nor A2 map neatly onto mind and body since memories can be a kinetic pleasure. The Pleasure Math is an imperfect science but for now I'll stop with

A1 + A2 + B2 > B1

Agreed, Pacatus. The definite article was used much more often than it is in, say, English. And a generic wider use in Colossians 2:8 is a definite possibility.

Fascinating stuff, both from a scientific and an Epicurean perspective!

I just hope if this technology takes off, the texts actually make it out into the wild.

Quote from Titus

Maybe he is refering to different groups at the same time. As you did say, we would need more information about the background of the recipients.

I think that is a good possibility. The Greek διὰ τῆς φιλοσοφίας καὶ κενῆς ἀπάτης uses singular terms (literally, "through the philosophy and empty deceitfulness") but that construction can be used generically to refer to a class of things, so "through philosophy, in general." 2:16 Μὴ οὖν τις ὑμᾶς κρινέτω is also singular, "Therefore, let no one judge..." But there's really no way around doing that.

So, yes, there could have been more than one philosophy at play in this letter.

Quote from Cassius

the 100% / 0% goal is a "whole organism" perspective, and not an inflexible rule that says at every moment that your "prime directive" is to make sure you never experience a moment of pain.

That sounds to me like an echo of the Stoic "if you're not 100% virtuous all the time, you're crap." I seem to remember they say you can still drown an inch below the surface of the water. Maybe people are mapping a Stoic perspective on an Epicurean idea?

Quote from Cassius

just trying to focus on whether it might be important to get a better fix on "variety." Is "variety" in pleasure the reason we find it is desirable to get out of bed tomorrow?

Technically, and to be purely pedantic and nit-picky, PD9 doesn't say anything about the desirability of a variety of pleasures. It merely states the fact that pleasures do differ from each other.

I think it's important to realize then that PD9 is followed by PD10 which talks about the "pleasures of the profligate." It seem to me the juxtaposition is saying something like "Yes, pleasures do differ from each other. You can't just lump all pleasures together - even though all pleasures feel good to us. Look at the pleasures of the profligate. They are experiencing pleasure, but are those pleasures washing away the mind's fears about astronomical phenomena and death and suffering, and furthermore teaching us the limits of our pains and desires? They are not. This is why some pleasures - even though good - are not choiceworthy because they lead to more pain. etc." The variety is another reason pleasures can be choiceworthy or not. We can decide among pleasures because they do differ from each other in their source, their effect, their consequences.

That's my take on PD9, 10, and 11.

When I have these thoughts about getting up in the morning, I sometimes think that I have the decision to stay in bed. Would this ultimately lead to more pleasure and pain? I would lose my job. My marriage would suffer. I wouldn't have any money to do the things I desire to do.

So, the decision to get up is a classic choice/rejection decision to me. I have the personal responsiblity to get out of bed or not. I make the decision to get up the vast majority of days, unless I'm sick or the basement's flooded or some other responsibility that can't be ignored. Again, do I leave the house and ignore the problem. That would be indeed lead to more pain in the long run!

So, as stated in post 3, I got excited about some words and phrases that *could* be interpreted as Epicurean. In fact, Clement of Alexandria (c.150 – c.215) thought the author of Colossians was referring to Epicureans (but also brings in Stoics) in verse 2:8:

Quote from Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis

(50)(6)He does not mean all philosophy, but the Epicurean variety (which Paul mentions in the Acts of the Apostles [Acts 17.18], criticizing it for rejecting Providence and making a god of pleasure) and any other form which honors the elements without a scientific knowledge of their creative cause, and without any notion of the creator.

51(1) The Stoics, too, of whom he also speaks say wrongly that God is corporeal and moves through matter of the most disreputable kind. (2) "Human tradition" is his term for this intellectual nonsense. ...

That's the opinion of Clement of Alexandria writing in around 200 CE. I will admit I got excited about the "Epicurean" possibilities from the text of Colossians and that Clement had the opinion the author was referring to Epicureans.

Then I looked closer at the list of characteristics of these philosophers the letter's author was warning about in 2:16 and 18:

• Therefore, do not let anyone condemn you in matters of food and/or drink
• or of observing festivals, new moons, or Sabbaths.
• 18 Do not let anyone disqualify you, insisting on self-abasement
• and worship of angels,
• initiatory visions,[i] puffed up without cause by a human way of thinking,[j]
• 19 and not holding fast to the head, from whom the whole body, nourished and held together by its ligaments and tendons, grows with a growth that is from God.

Maybe I could rationalize the "matters of food and/or drink" or "observing festivals" (The 20th, anyone?)... but then the letter's author goes into new moons or Sabaths. In fact, "matters of food and drink" sound like this "philosophy" being discussed has some dietary rules or forbidden foods that the Christians are eating. It's hard to say without any context. I'm sure the Colossians knew what he was referring to!

The "insisting on self-abasement"? KJV translates that as "Let no man beguile you of your reward in a voluntary humility" with the Greek being θέλων ταπεινοφροσύνῃ. Some dictionaries translate that as "lowliness/humility of mind." That doesn't sound like Epicureans, but the voluntary humility? Could that be the voluntary "confession" characteristic of parrhesia (frank criticism)? That seems to be a stretch. The word ταπεινοφροσύνῃ shows up 7 times in the New Testament and can refer to serving the Lord "with all humility of mind" (Acts 20:19). It's also used in Ephesians 4:2 ("with all lowliness and meekness"); Philippians 2:3 ("Let nothing be done through strife or vainglory; but in lowliness of mind"); Colossians again in 3:12; 1 Peter 3:8 and 5:5.

The other characteristics that are brought up seem even less Epicurean: Worship of angels? Initiatory visions?? The latter sounds like a mystery cult.

In the end, there are just TOO many loose ends. If *some* of these lines were the only thing in the text, it would be easier to make a solid case that the author was talking about Epicureans. As it is, however, it's a roller coaster - yes, no, could be, no way - leading ultimately to frustration in trying to solve a puzzle with 1/2 the pieces missing forever. I don't think we can accept that the "philosophers" being referred to are Epicureans. Too many things don't add up in the final analysis.

Quote from Nate

Christian heresy has always really fascinated me.

Incidentally, I have been reading a lot about Marcion recently and the development of Biblical Canon. It is interesting to view Christianity at a time before orthodoxy developed, and explore how we view those figures from history.

If you haven't read Bart Ehrman's books yet, I highly recommend them. His Jesus Before The Gospels is fascinating and looks at how the oral traditions shaped the stories in the gospels.

PS. If you're a podcast listener, he also has a weekly podcast with Megan Lewis called Misquoting Jesus.

I will admit that I got a little excited when I read Colossians 2:8 in the New Revised Standard Version (Updated) (emphasis added) and checked the Greek:

2:8 Watch out that no one takes you captive through philosophy and empty deceit, according to human tradition, according to the elemental principles[b] of the world, and not according to Christ.

I mentioned the word philosophy above.

I thought the use of "empty" κενός might be the author's dig at Epicurus's use of that term.

Traditions of men τὴν παράδοσιν τῶν ἀνθρώπων sounded like anything that could be applied to pagan traditions, ie not of God.

And we're back to the τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου we saw in that other verse, but this time in a different context.

What could it do mean?!

Join us next post to delve into more .... Epicurean Mysteries! (Insert appropriate theme music here )

Quote from Godfrey

Paraphrase: "The most pleasure that one can experience is the removal of all pain, throughout one's body and mind, for the duration of their life. This maximal pleasure comprises pleasures which occur in various parts of one's body and mind and at various times, to such an extent that they fill the entirety of the person's body and mind for the duration of their life." PD03

Is this a correct paraphrase of PD03? If so, why? If not, why not?

As the start to a response, here's my clunky literal translation:

"The limit of the magnitude of pleasure (is) the whole of the removal of that which causes pain. Where that which gives pleasure exists, during the time it is present, there is neither pain nor that which causes pain in body or mind nor either of these together."

You included "for the duration of their life." I don't think that's implied in the PD. I think it's more important to focus on "during the time it is present." We can have the kind of pleasure outlined in PD3 momentarily or longer, but we're not guaranteed to have it, a mortal beings, "for the duration" of our lives. Even Epicurus didn't have that kind of pleasure "for the duration" off his life. Diogenes Laertius's commentary comes to mind: "Two sorts of happiness can be conceived, the one the highest possible, such as the gods enjoy, which cannot be augmented, the other admitting addition and subtraction of pleasures."

Quote from Cassius

Quote

PD09. If every pleasure could be intensified so that it lasted, and influenced the whole organism or the most essential parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ from one another"

Is it possible that one inference to take from this is that variety in pleasures IS desirable, and that we should not seek to let any of the three factors take over exclusively, even though variety does not take the amount of pleasure past its theoretical limit?

Εἰ κατεπυκνοῦτο πᾶσα ἡδονὴ, καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ περὶ ὅλον τὸ ἄθροισμα ὑπῆρχεν ἢ τὰ κυριώτατα μέρη τῆς φύσεως, οὐκ ἄν ποτε διέφερον ἀλλήλων αἱ ἡδοναί.

Yes, I would say variety is desirable. At the very least, we can say that pleasures (αἱ ἡδοναί is plural) do differ from each other.

Quote from Cassius

With the final unstated clause not being "but they do" but being instead "and you should not want them to or try to make them."

I'm not sure I'm onboard with your addition to the "unstated" clause. The unstated clause is very helpful in getting across the grammatical construction that conveys the counterfactual. Yours actually adds new content. I'm not quite sure what you're getting at with "and you should not want them to or try to make them." Is that commentary directed at those who elevate tranquility?