Posts by Don

In case you're interested:

Here's Diogenes Laertius on Carneades

Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, BOOK IV, Chapter 9. CARNEADES (c. 213-129 B C.)

Could it be:

Paterculus' grandfather Gaius Velleius had been prefect of the military engineers (praefectus fabrum) in the army Pompey the Great, and later in that of Marcus Brutus, the man who had killed Julius Caesar in 44 BCE and tried to restore the Roman republic. At Philippi in Macedonia, in 42, this army was defeated by Mark Antony and Octavian, the new leaders of the Caesarian party. Velleius was probably present, and he now sided with his powerful personal friend Tiberius Claudius Nero. During the next year, Nero got involved in the war waged between Octavian and Nero's friend Lucius Antonius (a brother of Mark Antony). Velleius was unable to help his protector, and may have seen his position in the Campania threatened, so he committed suicide.note

Octavian defeated Lucius Antonius, but was clement towards Claudius Nero. Perhaps he had already fallen in love with the Nero's wife Livia. In 38, she remarried, and Octavian adopted her sons Drusus and Tiberius. The latter was to play a very important role in the life of Velleius Paterculus.

Velleius Paterculus - Livius

Lo and behold, there's a book on this very topic:

The First Fossil Hunters

The fascinating story of how the fossils of dinosaurs, mammoths, and other extinct animals influenced some of the most spectacular creatures of classical…

press.princeton.edu

Quote from Nate

Until, then, Happy Eikas!

Now, THAT'S indeed a gift for the Twentieth!

Quote from Godfrey

Could it be that, early on, Epicurus had not yet settled on the idea of no neutral state? If so, could this give a rough idea of the approximate date the letter? (Just a thought for another thread.)

That's a possibility. If I knew that was there, I had forgotten about it. I'll have to dig in a little more on that "neutral state" (apatheia, a + patheia = "no feeling") comment... unless someone else can chime in! Please do!

Quote from Godfrey

Some pleasures do involve various pains

I can't endorse that. The feeling of pleasure is pleasure and feeling of pain is pain.

If you're saying "Some overall pleasurable activities involve various pains," then, yes, I can endorse that. Riding on a roller coast for some is partly exhilarating and partly terrifying, but the "terror in a controlled environment" is part of the pleasure.

And we know that we have to undergo some pain (ex., exercise) for future pleasure (ex., better health, longer life hopefully). I have no problem with that scenario.

What I'm objecting to (and objecting is probably too strong of a word here) is that the feeling of pleasure itself is not mixed with pain. We can experience some pleasure and some pain in different parts of our body (or maybe even different parts of our mind?) but there is no such thing as pleasure/pain in one feeling.

That's what I meant by "simply."

Quote from Godfrey

If Lucretius was deciding between spending a life as a shepherd or spending it writing didactic poetry, how would intensity, duration and duration apply? I tend to think of this breakdown in terms of maximizing overall pleasure. In this case:

In thinking more about your intensity, duration, and location schema, it seems Epicurus himself endorses your idea of applying time/duration to pleasure and how we make our choices:

Quote from Letter to Herodotus

We must chiefly reflect upon that to which ***we attach this peculiar character of time***, and by which we measure it. [73] No further proof is required : we have only to reflect that we attach the attribute of time to days and nights and their parts, and likewise to feelings of pleasure and pain and to neutral states, to states of movement and states of rest, conceiving a peculiar accident of these to be this very characteristic which we express by the word `time.' [He says this both in the second book "On Nature" and in the Larger Epitome.]

So, Epicurus states that we DO apply the characteristic of "time" to the feelings of pleasure and pain and to neutral states, to states of movement and states of rest (δὲ καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς ἀπαθείαις, καὶ κινήσεσι καὶ στάσεσιν). Now, I'm not sure what we are to glean from the translation referring to a "neutral state" ἀπαθείαις (apatheiais) because that's not one of the two feelings of pleasure: κινήσεσι and στάσεσιν. But that might have to wait for another thread. What I wanted to point out that your duration criteria does appear to have a precedent from Epicurus himself.

Quote from Cassius

the question is "Does Epicurean philosophy leave the door wide open to *whatever* interpretation of pleasure one desires to make?"

For Epicurus, pleasure is simply that feeling which is not painful derived from actions or states which do not result in struggle, distress, anxiety, pain, etc. Additionally, Pleasure comes in two "flavors" - that which is felt in a state of rest ; that which consists in motion and activity.

What seems to get interpreted is the activity leading to pleasure and the consequences flowing from pleasure. I think that's also why the pleasure from states is so important because it's source is a state of existence and not an action (something kinetic) and there are really no consequences other than continued pleasure in the state. Plus, we always have access to the pleasure deriving from a state of existence if we only will experience it.

I'm going to quote the letter to Menoikeus with some emphasis:

Quote

[128] The steady contemplation of these things equips one to know how to decide all choice and rejection for the health of the body and for the tranquility of the mind, that is for our physical and our mental existence, since this is the goal of a blessed life. For the sake of this, we do everything in order to neither be in bodily or mental pain nor to be in fear or dread; and so, when once this has come into being around us, it sets free all of the calamity, distress, and suffering of the mind, seeing that the living being has no need to go in search of something that is lacking for the good of our mental and physical existence. For it is then that we need pleasure, if we were to be in pain from the pleasure not being present; but if we were to not be in pain, we no longer desire or beg for pleasure. And this is why we say pleasure is the foundation and fulfillment of the blessed life. [129] Because we perceived pleasure as a fundamental good and common to our nature, and so, as a result of this, we begin every choice and rejection against this, judging every good thing by the standard of how that pleasure affects us or how we react to considering experiencing that pleasure. And because pleasure is the fundamental and inborn good, this is why not every pleasure is seized and we pass by many pleasures when greater unpleasant things were to result for us as a result: and we think many pains better than pleasures whenever greater pleasure were to follow for a longer time by patiently abiding the pain. [130] So, all pleasure, through its nature, belongs to us as a good; however, not all are elected; and just as all pains are entirely evil by their nature, so not all are always to be shunned.It is proper when judging these things to consider what is advantageous and what is not advantageous for you; in other words (i.e., what the consequences will be). We consult the consequences of our actions; because, on the one hand, pleasure over time can lead to pain; and on the other hand, pain can lead to pleasure.

It seems to me that Epicurus is a consequentialist. The "correct" choice to make is based on the consequences of that choice.

Or did you have something entirely different in mind when you used "interpretation"? I suppose should have asked before I went off half-cocked.

Quote from Cassius

But within "pleasurable" and "painful" are there not obviously degrees or pleasurable or painful? And are we not going to choose those pleasures which we find to be more pleasurable than others?

In thinking about this, if we're making a choice about something we've never done before, there is no way for us to know which choice we would find more pleasurable. We can predict which choice we *think* would bring us more pleasure, but what are we basing this one. Previous experience - both our own personal experience and that knowledge that we've gleaned from seeing or reading about others' experiencess - is really the only criteria we can use.

I'm not sure what this implies, but I find it interesting when we (we all) say things like "We make choices that will bring us more pleasure." It seems we should probably say "We make choices that we believe will bring us more pleasure in the long run or the short term."

Quote from Pacatus

Does any of that change how I think of pleasurable alternatives, or variety in choice? No. But variety can be thought of (thinking "out loud" again) as simply loosening the choice constraints. And that offers more options for pleasure. (Though I still think that sometimes the activity of choosing itself -- which entails having alternatives -- can be pleasurable in itself.)

I can concur with that.

Quote from Pacatus

But that seems still a form of complex determinism -- just with branching chains of causation. No choices are made sans some environmental conditions (why economists -- my background -- talk about "constrained choice").

I think that, in broad strokes, is how life works. We may literally have infinite choices in each moment, but the choices we are most likely going to make in any given moment probably are constrained but our character, our philosophy of life, our social context, etc. Do I have the capacity to abandon my family and move to the woods? Sure. Will I choose to do that? Do I want to do that? No.

Quote from Pacatus

So you are suggesting that my choices are always determined

Oh, I'm not saying that. However, many other previous choices provide the choices you are offered. I don't think the choices you make "in the moment" are determined. There may be a higher probability of predicting what you'll based on your past behavior, current emotional state, previous choices, etc. But once a decision is made, those other branches are pruned, leading down a path to other decisions. The environment within which those other decisions are made is made by the choices you make now and in the future.

PS. I could chart decisions over years that brought me to be here, typing this response to you, right now. But I don't think those previous decisions were predetermined... Or at least I don't *feel* they were predetermined.

Excellent practical application of the question, Pacatus !

My initial reaction to your post/question is "Not all choices are created equal." That may be a bit flippant, so I apologize if it comes off that way... but it's not far from what I want to get across.

You're going to have a feeling after making every choice you make. There's no getting around that. You're alive. You're feeling every tiny millisecond of your existence. Those feelings are going to be either pleasurable or painful (positive or negative). Plus there are innumerable other choices that led to your chicken/fish choice. Did you have chicken recently? Did you see something about a fish dish on TV just now that makes you slightly prefer that choice? Is it harder to heat up the chicken than the fish? ALL that goes into the choice.

If you choose the chicken, and, oops, it's gone bad... OH! I should have had the fish! You eat the chicken and "I'm still hungry. That wasn't as much as I thought it was." OR even "Wow, That was really good heated up! That exceeded my expectations."

Or the pain/pleasure feeling may be so miniscule you don't even think about it. You eat, and get on with your day.

Where are they getting that "Epicurean response"? That doesn't look textual, merely commentary from the author's perspective.

Quote from Cassius

"Pursue first and foremost those pleasures which are easiest to access" and that would be fairly interpretable, standing alone, as "live in a cave on bread and water."

Regardless of the possible bread and water interpretation, I think this *is* what Epicurus taught. Know - at a gut level - what you absolutely need to live a self-sufficient, pleasurable life of well-being. Then you *know* if everything else was tragically taken from you, IF all other sources of (kinetic) pleasure were removed from you, you would still be able to lead a life of pleasure without pain on that. BUT he also taught to ENJOY the varieties of pleasure available to us here and now.

Just reading down through and saw:

Quote from Cassius

The question might be better stated as "Does the choice between pleasures hang only on whether choosing one pleasure might produce one unit of pain, while another pleasure might produce zero units of pain?"

Oh, no, no. Once your start down pain and pleasure "units" - dolors and hedons - you've left Epicurean philosophy and are talking Utilitarian philosophy. Which is one reason I'm reluctant to wholeheartedly endorse Godfrey 's location, intensity, duration formulation.

Quote from Pomona website

For Bentham, the value of pleasure and pain can be given by two quantitative measurements: intensity (how strong is the feeling?) and duration (how long does it last?) (see Bentham [1789] 1993, ch. 4).

For Mill, there is a qualitative dimension to pleasure that Bentham did not recognize. According to Mill, some pleasures are more valuable than others because they are higher quality pleasures. Take two pleasures of similar quantities, that is, of the same intensity and duration. If one is higher quality than the other, it will be better, even though the quantities of pleasure are the same. In fact, a smaller quantity of a higher quality pleasure will be more valuable than a larger quantity of a lower quality pleasure.

Quote from Cassius

Death is nothing to us.

For example:

"English": ΔΕΑΘ ΙΣ ΝΟΘΙΝΓ ΤΟ ΥΣ.

"English" upper and lower: Δεαθ ις νοθινγ το υς.

Greek: Ο θάνατος ουδέν προς ημάς.

Literal: The death nothing to us [is].

Quote from Cassius

Now we need to go back and integrate whether all pleasures are identical, or some are to be chosen over others, and how. Does the choice between pleasures hang only on whether a pleasure might bring some disturbance, or can one pleasure be so much more pleasing than another that it is worth choosing, even if choosing that greater pleasure brings some degree of disturbance?

Here's my quick take:

• Pleasure feels good. That's what makes it pleasure and not pain.
• Choiceworthiness is determined by consequences, both to oneself and how one is perceived by one's community and friends.
• "Does the choice between pleasures hang only on whether a pleasure might bring some disturbance." Yes.
• "Can one pleasure be so much more pleasing than another that it is worth choosing?" That's just another way of asking "What are the consequences of this pleasure vs that pleasure?"
• I continue to soapbox that we can have more confidence in accessing some pleasures than others (the infamous katastematic vs "kinetic" discussion).

Quote from Cassius

That seems like a VERY good idea. Take a passage you know by heart and express it in Greek lettering.

And one can do this by writing longhand or typing. I'll try to provide a brief guide to the various keyboards and fonts out there soon for those who want to be able to type in polytonic Greek. Anybody want to share their work? Post it here if you want to challenge other beginners to "decipher" it. I suggest writing as English words sound and not as they're spelled sometimes: υεν "when"; δισπλαι "display", etc. You can also puzzle through names to start acclimating to the alphabet: Επίκουρος, Μετροδορος, Αχιλλεύς, Σόκρατες, Πλατό, Οδυσσέας, Αθήνα, Αφροδίτη,...

Quote from Cassius

What about word order in Greek? Do we have the same issues of order and use of inflection that we have in Latin? Did the Greeks write long sentences and intentionally make you wait to the end of the sentence to find out what it is about like the Romans did?

Of course Greek is an inflected language, but this is a feature and not a bug. The genius of this is that a word can be placed first in the sentence for emphasis regardless of whether it's a direct object, subject, etc. I highly recommend the short book The Ingenious Language: Nine Epic Reasons to Love Greek by Andrea Marcolongo.