Posts by Don

Quote from Cassius

I see that that specific phrase "Their god is the belly" is from Philippians and not directly tied to Epicureans, though it wouldn't be surprising if they were the intended target

Philippians 3:19

King James Bible
Whose end is destruction, whose God is their belly, and whose glory is in their shame, who mind earthly things.)

It's a difference without a distinction, but I found it interesting that Philipians uses κοιλιά (koilia) instead of γάστρα (gastra):

ὧν τὸ τέλος ἀπώλεια ὧν ὁ θεὸς ἡ κοιλία καὶ ἡ δόξα ἐν τῇ αἰσχύνῃ αὐτῶν οἱ τὰ ἐπίγεια φρονοῦντες

Quote from Cassius

I just don't see that in this case. In fact, when Epicurus speaks so strongly of a simple diet and also the pleasures of philosophy and study of nature as to his primary sources of happiness, it appears to me that those contradict any assertion that the physical pleasures of the stomach outweigh all others.

Additionally on this, you seem to be inferring that "the pleasures of the stomach" have to do with something more fancy than "a simple diet." That's not necessarily the case. It's about satisfying that natural feeling of hunger, listening to your body, tuning into your body's needs: hunger, thirst, cold. If you can satisfy those, THAT is the foundation and root of The Good. Yes, take advantage of all pleasures. All pleasures are part of The Good; but you must satisfy the root and foundation before you can experience all the other pleasures life has to offer. That's my take.

I'm in agreement with Bryan and Eikadistes in their posts above. Additionally...

Quote from Cassius

whether the alleged statement has analogs in the core texts

We have SO few extant core texts from card-carrying Epicureans that we have to rely on what's reported fragmentarily in other ancient authors. I want to take a look at the lineage of those fragments in U409:

• [Metrodorus - quoted letter by Plutarch - 330-278 BCE]
• Cicero - 106-43 BCE
• Plutarch - c.40-120s CE
• Hegesippus - 110-180 CE
• Athenaeus of Naucratis (Deipnosophistae) - c.170s-210s CE

The Hegesippus quote appears to be:

Quote

And Hegesippus, in his Philetairi, says—

That wisest Epicurus, when a man
Once ask'd him what was the most perfect good
Which men should constantly be seeking for,
Said pleasure is that good. Wisest and best
Of mortal men, full truly didst thou speak:
For there is nothing better than a dinner,
And every good consists in every pleasure.

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The "For there is nothing better than a dinner," is τοῦ γὰρ μασᾶσθαι κρεῖττον οὐκ ἔστ᾽ οὐδὲ ἓν ἀγαθόν: where the translation "dinner" corresponds to μασᾶσθαι which has the connotation "knead, press into a mould, esp. of barley-cakes which were subsequently moistened and eaten without baking." There's our barley-cakes again.

I will grant you every which way that we're dealing with hostile witnesses (and one's going for humor in the case of Atheneaus), but if they say they're actually quoting something we're almost obligated to believe they're at least quoting or paraphrasing something.

When Athenaeus writes that: And Epicurus says—“The origin and root of all good is the pleasure of the stomach; and all excessive efforts of wisdom have reference to the stomach.” ‘ἀρχὴ καὶ ῥίζα παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἡ τῆς γαστρὸς ἡδονή: καὶ τὰ σοφὰ <καὶ> τὰ περισσὰ ἐπὶ ταύτην ἔχει τὴν ἀναφοράν.' That sounds like Epicurus, especially with his use of ἀρχὴ καὶ ῥίζα echoing pleasure being the ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος. The pleasure of the stomach (ἡ τῆς γαστρὸς ἡδονή) is being called the ἀρχὴ καὶ ῥίζα "foundation/origin and root" just as pleasure writ large is the foundation/origin and end-goal.

Quote from Cassius

the physical pleasures of the stomach outweigh all others

I don't see Epicurus (siphoned through those later authors) saying that. It seems to me he's saying "You can rely on your stomach. Listen to your stomach. When you're hungry eat, not to excess but to relieve your REAL feelings of hunger." and so on like Bryan and Eikadistes wrote. Satisfying your stomach/hunger is listening to nature. I could also see this taken metaphorically. If your stomach is upset, if you're nervous and you have butterflies, listen to your stomach. This is the same idea as the mind per Diogenes Laertius being located in the thorax/chest (not necessary "the heart" like some write): the rational part resides in the chest (τὸ δὲ λογικὸν ἐν τῷ θώρακι): θώρακι = θώραξ = the abdominal cavity, chest, thorax; “κεφαλῆς καὶ θώρακος καὶ τῆς κάτω κοιλίας” taken as extending below the midriff.

My thoughts on transhumanism (e.g., uploading consciousness to a machine or transferring it to another brain) are directly akin to my thoughts on the "pleasure machine": WHO owns the hardware doing the storage or transfer? What are their motivations? Follow the money!

Quote from Martin

Full transhumanism by leaving the body/uploading something to machinery is a delusion.

I agree with Martin and Adrastus on this. From what I read, there is a lot more going on with consciousness than simply electrical patterns to be transposed to some hardware. I'm not talking about woo/supernatural goings-on. Gut bacteria seem to have a direct effect on mood/feeling for one thing. Mood/feeling are part of our consciousness. Anyone thinking we can "live forever" through technology is simply transposing the age-old idea of Heaven into a technological paradigm.

Quote from Cassius

I personally would not cite statements to the effect that "the root of all good is the pleasure of the stomach" as an authentic statement of correct Epicurean doctrine.

Well, according to the cites for U409, it seems rather well attested, including a quote from a letter by Metrodorus himself (via Plutarch )

Quote

And are not Metrodorus's words something like to these when he writes to his brother thus: It is none of our business to preserve the Greeks, or to get them to bestow garlands upon us for our wit, but to eat well and drink good wine, Timocrates, so as not to offend but pleasure our stomachs. And he saith again, in some other place in the same epistles: How gay and how assured was I, when I had once learned of Epicurus the true way of gratifying my stomach; for, believe me, philosopher Timocrates, our prime good lies at the stomach.

ἦ γὰρ οὐ τούτοις ἔοικε τὰ Μητροδώρου πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφὸν γράφοντος; οὐδὲν δεῖ σῴζειν τοὺς; Ἕλληνας οὐδ᾽ ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ στεφάνων παρ᾽ αὐτῶν τυγχάνειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν οἶνον, ὦ Τιμόκρατες, ἀβλαβῶς τῇ γαστρὶ καὶ κεχαρισμένως.’ καὶ πάλιν πού φησιν ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς γράμμασιν ὡς ‘καὶ ἐχάρην καὶ ἐθρασυνάμην, ὅτι ἔμαθον παρ᾽ Ἐπικούρου ὀρθῶς γαστρὶ χαρίζεσθαι.’ καὶ ‘περὶ γαστέρα γάρ, ὦ φυσιολόγε Τιμόκρατες, τἀγαθόν.’ ’

If we accept "direct" quotes from Cicero, should we not probably accept "direct" quotes from Plutarch?

The word used for "belly" is indeed γαστρὶ. From whence we get words like gastric, gastroenterology, etc. Cicero writes "when hunger and thirst are banished by food and drink, the mere fact of getting rid of those distresses brings pleasure as a result. So as a rule, the removal of pain causes pleasure to take its place." There's also VS33: The body cries out to not be hungry, not be thirsty, not be cold. Anyone who has these things, and who is confident of continuing to have them, can rival the gods for happiness. (NOTE: "body" σαρκὸς is used here instead of "belly" but the idea is the same as Metrodorus' letter) There's also U200 (emphasis added):

[ U200 ]

Porphyry, Letter to Marcella, 30, [p. 209, 7 Nauck]: Do not think it unnatural that when the flesh cries out for anything, the soul should cry out too. The cry of the flesh is, "Let me not hunger, or thirst, or shiver," and it’s hard for the soul to restrain these desires. And while it is difficult for the soul to prevent these things, it is dangerous to neglect nature which daily proclaims self-sufficiency to the soul via the flesh which is intimately bonded to it.

Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 4.10: Let me share with you a saying which pleased me today. It, too, is culled from another man’s Garden: "Poverty, brought into conformity with the law of nature, is great wealth." Do you know what limits that law of nature ordains for us? Merely to avert hunger, thirst, and cold.

Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies, II 21, p. 178.41: Epicurus, who held that happiness consists in not being hungry, nor thirsty, nor cold...

Cf. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, V.35.102: Time would fail me should I wish to carry on about the cause of poverty; for the matter is evident and nature herself teaches us daily how few and how small her needs are, and how cheaply satisfied.

So, the idea of "pleasure of the belly" seems to me to be fairly well-attested within the philosophy.

Quote from Cassius

Whenever we have this discussion I for one always need to remember U469 from the Strobeus anthology (which I gather is not citable back to where the fragment itself comes (?):

[ U469 ]
Johannes Stobaeus, Anthology, XVII.23: "Thanks be to blessed Nature because she has made what is necessary easy to supply, and what is not easy unnecessary."

Stobaeus attributes the quote to Epicurus in the section "On Self-Control"

John Stobaeus: Anthology (translated into English)

www.cameronhuff.com

(Sorry for the crappy reference. Working on a better one. This is the only Stobaeus I could find on the fly in English. This link explicitly said "Below is a text version of Anthology, as his book is now known, translated using Google Gemini Flash 2.5 in July of 2025." 🤢)

ABOUT SELF-CONTROL. Chapter 17.

23. From Epicurus.

Thanks to blessed nature, that it has made what is necessary easily available, but what is difficult to obtain, not necessary.

24. From the same.

If you wish to make someone rich, do not add to his money, but subtract from his desires.

Here at least they are in Greek:

https://hdl.handle.net/2027/njp.32101020151518?urlappend=%3Bseq=331%3Bownerid=27021597768766665-349

I find it interesting that "blessed nature" "makariai physei" uses the exact word in PD1 Τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον... (makarion ...)

I'm light of my last post, I'll propose:

Ἄφοβον ὁ θεός, - God causes no fear

ἀνύποπτον ὁ θάνατος - Death causes no worry

καὶ τἀγαθὸν μὲν εὔκτητον, - and so there's no effort neeed to acquire The Good (pleasure);

τὸ δὲ δεινὸν εὐεκκαρτέρητον - and The Terrible (pain) can be endured without struggle.

I'm getting the sense of, instead of "easy" which to me implies a level of dismissiveness, a better idea would be "without effort or struggle." To illustrate this point, here are some of the other words in the same area of the LSJ dictionary:

• εὐείσβολος , ον, easily invaded
• εὐέκ-βα^τος , ον, easy to get out of
• εὐεκ-κάθαρτος [κα^], ον, easily cleared up
• εὐεκ-καρτέρητος , ον, easy to endure
• εὐέκ-καυτος , ον, easily flaring up, Gal.11.405
• εὐέκ-κρι^τος , ον, of food, easy to excrete
• εὐέκ-νιπτος , ον, easy to wash out, of a colour
• εὐεκ-πλήρωτος , ον, easily fulfilled or realized
• εὐεκ-ποίητος , ον, easy to turn to account, i.e. assimilate, of food
• εὐεκ-πόρθητος , ον, easily sacked
• εὐεκ-πύρωτος [υ^], ον, easily heated (The soil is dry and easily reduced to powder - ἁλμυρίδων καὶ εὐεκπύρωτός ἐστι - Strabo, Geography)
• εὐέκ-ρυπτος , ον, easy to wash out

So, I don't necessarily like the "easy" or "easily" connotations in English, but I could easily (pun intended) see the εὐ- and εὐεκ- conveying whatever action is implied by the rest of the word, that it involved no effort, no struggle.

In relation to the tetrapharmakos:

Pleasure really is attainable without effort, it's always readily available if we look for it.

Pain is endurable without struggle in the sense of adding suffering on top of pain. Pain is inevitable but suffering, adding an additional layer to pain, is not necessary. ex. https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/medita…ing-is-optional

That's my take this morning.

FWIW, Emily Austin's translation:

Quote from Cassius

Don also what about the "easy" part -- do you agree with Wikipedia that "easy" is a fair translation, or would you modify that as well?

εὔκτητος , ον, honestly acquired, ex., “πλοῦτος” (wealth); easily gotten

εὐεκ-καρτέρητος , ον, easy to endure; written for εὐεγκ.

From

εὐ- had a wide semantic spectrum: easily but also honorably; well, thoroughly, competently;

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, ε , ἔτυ^μος , εὖ

εὐ- Woodhouse, S. C. (1910), English–Greek Dictionary: A Vocabulary of the Attic Language‎[1], London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Limited.

• ably idem, page 2.
• adroitly idem, page 13.
• advantageously idem, page 14.
• arrange idem, page 41.
• capably idem, page 111.
• capitally idem, page 112.
• commendably idem, page 147.
• commodiously idem, page 148.
• creditably idem, page 183.
• estimably idem, page 283.
• excellently idem, page 288.
• fairly idem, page 302.
• finely idem, page 321.
• flourish idem, page 329.
• fortunately idem, page 340.
• gallantly idem, page 352.
• handsomely idem, page 383.
• happily idem, page 384.
• hopefully idem, page 405.
• impress idem, page 423.
• keep idem, page 467.
• laudably idem, page 478.
• luckily idem, page 503.
• meritoriously idem, page 526.
• nicely idem, page 557.
• off idem, page 569.
• profitably idem, page 653.
• propitiously idem, page 653.
• prosper idem, page 653.
• prosperously idem, page 653.
• reconcile idem, page 680.
• reputably idem, page 699.
• richly idem, page 712.
• righteously idem, page 715.
• rightly idem, page 715.
• satisfactorily idem, page 734.
• settle idem, page 758.
• skilfully idem, page 780.
• successfully idem, page 834.
• thrive idem, page 870.
• virtuously idem, page 954.
• well idem, page 973.

PLUS

--ἐγκαρτερέω , persevere or persist in a thing, τινί v.l. in X.Mem.2.6.22; “ἐγκαρτερεῖν [τούτοις] ἃ ἔγνωτε” Th.2.61; “πρὸς δίψαν” Plu.2.987e: c. inf., “μὴ φιληθῆναι” Id.Ages.11.

2. c. acc., await stedfastly, “θάνατον” E.HF1351, Andr.262.

3. abs., hold out, remain firm under, c. dat., “ταῖς πληγαῖς” Plu.Pomp.79; “τοῖς δεινοῖς” Luc.Anach.38: abs., Plu.Lyc.18, PAmh.2.78 (ii A. D.).

So, it doesn't have to be "easily endured." That's the LSJ definition, but it's not a widely attested word, so I'm going to leave my jury out.

At risk of being a broken record, is important to remember that the first two lines are *not* commands. They're not in the imperative: "Don't do this." They are statements of fact:

God causes no fear.

Death causes no need for anxiety.

Austin herself admits the less than optimal choice of extravagant and corrosive. See (note 2)...

Corrosive desires are corrosive to one's well-being. Take away something corrosive, and one can begin to heal.

She herself admits she couldn't go through the book repeating natural and necessary, natural and unnecessary, not natural nor necessary over and over. I have no problem with her final compromise.

Welcome aboard!

Epicurus: Fragments - translation

See U67 for even more (copied here for convenience. These include Joshua's citations, too; just with additional context.)

[ U67 ]

Athenaeus, Deipnosophists, XII p. 546E: Not only Aristippus and his followers, but also Epicurus and his welcomed kinetic pleasure; I will mention what follows, to avoid speaking of the "storms" {of passion} and the "delicacies" which Epicurus often cites, and the "stimuli" which he mentions in his On the End-Goal. For he says "For I at least do not even know what I should conceive the good to be, if I eliminate the pleasures of taste, and eliminate the pleasures of sex, and eliminate the pleasures of listening, and eliminate the pleasant motions caused in our vision by a visible form."

Athenaeus, Deipnosophists, VII p. 280A: Again, in the work On the End-Goal, he says something like this: "As for myself, I cannot conceive of the good if exclude the pleasures derived from taste, or those derived from sexual intercourse, or those derived from entertainments to which we listen, or those derived from the motions of a figure delightful to the eye."

Athenaeus, Deipnosophists, VII p. 278F: For Epicurus does not speak with face muffled, but in a loud voice he declares: "As for myself, I cannot conceive of the good if exclude the pleasures derived from taste, or those derived from sexual intercourse."

Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Philosophers, X.6: It is observed too that in his treatise On the End-Goal, he writes in these terms: "I know not how to conceive the good, apart from the pleasures of taste, sexual pleasures, the pleasures of sound, and the pleasures of beautiful form."

Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, III.18.41: Why do we shirk the question, Epicurus, and why do we not confess that we mean by pleasure what you habitually say it is, when you have thrown off all sense of shame? Are these your words or not? For instance, in that book which embraces all your teaching (for I shall now play the part of translator, so no one may think I am inventing) you say this: "For my part I find no meaning which I can attach to what is termed good, if I take away from it the pleasures obtained by taste, if I take away the pleasures which come from listening to music, if I take away too the charm derived by the eyes from the sight of figures in movement, or other pleasures by any of the senses in the whole man. Nor indeed is it possible to make such a statement as this – that it is joy of the mind which is alone to be reckoned as a good; for I understand by a mind in a state of joy, that it is so, when it has the hope of all the pleasures I have named – that is to say the hope that nature will be free to enjoy them without any blending of pain." And this much he says in the words I have quoted, so that anyone you please may realize what Epicurus understands by pleasure.

Ibid., III.20.46: For he has not only used the term pleasure, but stated clearly what he meant by it. "Taste," he says, "and embraces and spectacles and music and the shapes of objects fitted to give a pleasant impression to the eyes,"

Cicero, On End-Goals, Good and Bad, II.3.7 (Torquatus to Cicero): "Does not Epicurus recognize pleasure in your sense?" (Cicero): "Not always," said I, "now and then, I admit, he recognizes it only too fully, for he solemnly avows that he cannot even understand what good there can be or where it can be found, apart form that which is derived from food and drink, the delight of the ears, and the grosser forms of gratification. Do I misrepresent his words?" Ibid., II.7.20: In a number of passages where he is commending that real pleasure which all of us call by the same name, he goes so far as to say that he cannot even imagine any Good that is not connected with pleasure of the kind intended by Aristippus. Such is the language that he uses in the lecture dealing solely with the topic of the Chief Good. II.8.23: Men of taste and refinement, with first-rate chefs... the accompaniment of dramatic performances and their usual sequel – these are pleasures without which Epicurus, as he loudly proclaims, does not know what Good is. II.10.29: But fancy his failing to see how strong a proof it is that the sort of pleasure, without which he declares he has no idea at all what Good means (and he defines it in detail as the pleasure of the palate, of the ears, and subjoins the other kinds of pleasure, which cannot be specified without an apology). I.10.30: the kinetic sort of pleasure ... he extols it so much that he tells us he is incapable even of imagining what other good there can be. II.20:64: ... Nor did he forgo those other indulgences in the absence of which Epicurus declares that he cannot understand what good is.

Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, I.40.111 (Cotta speaking): Your school recognizes no pleasure of the mind which does not have its beginning and end in the physical body. I take it that you, Velleius, are not like the rest of our Epicureans, who are ashamed of those sayings of Epicurus in which he states that he does not understand how there can be anything good except sensual and sexual pleasures. And he then goes on quite unashamed to enumerate these pleasures one by one.

Cicero, Against Lucius Calpurnius Piso, 28.69: {Piso} would have it that Epicurus was an eloquent fellow; and indeed he does, I believe, assert that he cannot conceive any good apart from bodily pleasure.

Talk of the hedonic treadmill reminded me of Dr. Anna Lembke's book Dopamine Nation: Finding Balance in the Age of Indulgence. Here's an interview with the author on NPR's Fresh Air:

https://www.npr.org/transcripts/1030930259

She brings up overindulgence, homeostasis, addiction. I brought up the book several years ago, so I'm sure if you search the title there's a thread on the forum.

And LAST one, promise, Epicurus Ancient:

Ancient - The Ancient color palette is meant to simulate older plant dyes, which would generally come out lighter in color. In the tartan cloth, the following colors (as defined in the tartans' thread count) have the following shades: Red turns to orange; Blue turns to a light sky blue; Green is a grassy green; Yellow is a pale yellow

Okay, now I'm obsessed so I decided to try some variation on the "Epicurus Tartan." Here is the tartan in a Weathered (or "Reproduction") Palette. You'll note that the sett is the same (the thread count and order) but the specific colors themselves have been swapped out for "weathered" versions:

Weathered (aka reproduction) - The Weathered color palette (also known as "Reproduction" by one mill) is meant to look like the tartan has been recovered from a bog and affected by the weather. It uses lots of browns and grays to drive that look home.

Red turns to a "salmon" red; Blue turns to bluish grey; Green becomes brown; Yellow turns to pale gold

PS: I just realized I didn't put the right thread count on the "atoms and void" stripes. My bad.

This post grew in the writing, so apologies for the length...

Quote from DaveT

There is nothing to fear from gods or natural phenomenon, yes.

There is no afterlife of which to be suspicious, yes.

Yes, completely agree.

Quote from DaveT

And Pleasure is easy to obtain, yes, but it's hard to measure.

I'm not sure what you mean by "hard to measure." I've taken this line to mean - at least in part - that pleasure is obtainable if we're open to it, if we're honest with ourselves. It's important to remember that that specific line is (taking the conjunction and connecting particle μὲν):

τἀγαθὸν εὔκτητον (tagathon eukteton) The Highest Good is easy to get.

It's not just day-to-day pleasures that the Tetrapharmakos is referring to. It's The Good, The Highest Good, the Goal. And The Good is what we're shooting for IF we're open to it and honest with ourselves. It's the final reason - the end point - for all we do all.

Quote from DaveT

while Pain can be easily endured, no, I'm not willing to acknowledge that this is a universal truth.

I have problems with this line as well. One part of me interprets it in light of the historical period in which it was written. If you have severe pain, chances are you were not being cured and it would be a (relatively) short time until you died. But I will grant that even Cicero disputes that interpretation.

This line, too, is: τὸ δεινὸν εὐεκκαρτέρητον (to deinon euekkartereton) The Terrible is easily endured.

I would posit that here, too, we're talking about Pain as The Bad in a theoretical philosophical concept, not day to day pains, as The Good (tagathon < to + agathon) in the previous line. The podcast has been talking about Cicero does not want to concede that pain is an evil.

But that doesn't alleviate my own concerns for people with chronic pain from fibromyalgia, severe arthritis, chronic migraines, etc. I don't want to read Epicurus as being flippant or dismissive, so this line takes some sitting with. PD4 is problematic in the same way: 4. Continuous pain does not last long in the flesh ; on the contrary, pain, if extreme, is present a very short time, and even that degree of pain which barely outweighs pleasure in the flesh does not last for many days together. Illnesses of long duration even permit of an excess of pleasure over pain in the flesh.

Do people with chronic pain have some pleasures in their life? Can they enjoy some things? Maybe. I am not going to speak for them. So, yes, I can understand your concerns with Tetrapharmakos line 4, PD4, etc..

Quote from DaveT

With respect, your reference to PD 31 doesn't address my question.

This question? (italics)

Quote from DaveT

I start to remember that when we do act for our own good, whether judged by pleasure, or by adhering to Virtues, there sometimes are unintended bad or evil consequences for others. And that leaves me wondering how to reconcile both Stoic and Epicurean real world consequences of individual as well as communal actions.

Maybe I don't understand what you're asking. Apologies. I take it that you're asking "How do we reconcile Epicurean real world consequences of individual as well as communal actions?"

Let me come at this by responding to post 13 where you wrote:

Quote from DaveT

for example: Divorce may be a good for each party, yet it just as easily can be a disaster for the other one. That is either an intended or unintended consequence.

If one person is acting unilaterally for their own self-interest without respect to the consequences to the other person that could come back to harm their own self-interest, that doesn't strike me as an Epicurean way of making a decision. Others may disagree, but I would think an Epicurean is going to take all those consequences into consideration. I would also think the Epicurean is going to take into consideration those consequences of actions that may lead to a divorce in the first place and avoid them. Not everyone making decisions is making decisions within an Epicurean paradigm so I don't think all consequences are the result of Epicurean or Stoic decision-making. Not everyone is using prudence in their decisions; in fact, lots of decisions are taken in the heat of the moment, the exact opposite of any philosophical framework. How the decision is made, prudently or otherwise, is directly related to the kind of consequences that could very well ensue.

Quote from DaveT

Could it be that a weakness in Epicurus' teaching is that it can't apply to any community larger than the Garden?

I think any community of any size would benefit from its citizens/residents applying Epicurean principles to their lives. Epicurean philosophy is applied by the individual to their own lives. Epicurus has something to say about the social contract, about justice (hence my bringing up PD31 and the other latter ones for that matter), and about how to live in a wider society, but the philosophy is lived by individuals.

Your characterization of "everyone out for themselves" doesn't, from my perspective, describe an Epicurean way of living. In many ways, we can only be responsible for ourselves and our own actions. I feel Epicurean philosophy is a philosophy of personal responsibility, taking into account the facts of life that sometimes things do happen by chance. Again, I don't think a stereotypical Epicurean is going to cheat on their taxes or lie for lying's sake because the Epicurean is going to have that nagging doubt about getting caught. Psychopaths, sociopaths, narcissists are going to always exist and to try to get away with what they can. They don't consider the consequences or don't care about them. That has no reflection on Epicurean philosophy.

I may very well be missing your point, but the fact that some decisions have negative consequences doesn't seem to me to impact the overall living of a life based on trying to apply Epicurean philosophy.

I was playing around with the Tartan Designer at the USAKilts.com website and decided to see if I could come up with anything relating to Epicurus. I grant you that it's not a great design, but I was curious how much symbolism I could incorporate. To that end:

1. The red and black lines signify atoms (red) in the void (black).
2. The total number of green threads add up to 109 for Epicurus being born in the 109th Olympiad.
3. The green was used to symbolize the plants and trees within the Garden.
4. The three yellow lines are for both the 3rd year within the 109th Olympiad as well as the three legs of the Canon.
5. The blue lines stand for the 20th, Epicurus birthday (in the 7th month of Gamelion (the white) and the monthly 20th.
6. The blue and white are meant to bring to mind the blue and white cross on the modern Greek flag, representing Epicurus' birthplace.
7. The red guard lines on the blue are meant to represent the continuing living legacy of Epicureanism down through the ages.

I encourage others to try out the Tartan Designer and come up with a better design . There is ZERO chance this design will EVER be woven or worn, but this was a fun exercise to see what's possible in this art form.

Quote from DaveT

My take away from the selections is kind of like: Epicurus: What's good for me is good and what's bad for me is bad with proportions of each depending on prudence. And if everyone does it that way; "what a wonderful world it would be." (to borrow a phrase from a popular tune.)...

And then, I start to remember that when we do act for our own good, whether judged by pleasure, or by adhering to Virtues, there sometimes are unintended bad or evil consequences for others. And that leaves me wondering how to reconcile both Stoic and Epicurean real world consequences of individual as well as communal actions.

Choices are always made within a larger context which affects the consequences that have to be taken into account. "Good" decisions will sometimes have painful consequences that, in the long run, have positive consequences for the individual(s). Consider the choice to end a marriage or to have major surgery with an extended recovery time. The ending of the marriage may be the best, most prudent decision for both parties individually but that doesn't mean it's pleasurable at the time of the divorce. Having a major surgery will indeed be painful for the individual (and their family and friends) and recovery may be long and painful; but, as a choice, that's "what's good for me" based on prudence. Conversely, if it's a terminal diagnosis and the surgery and recovery will likely make the last months of one's life unbearable, NOT having surgery (if one is relatively able to go about their day up until the last few weeks or days of one's life) may be what's best for one's life.

For Epicurus, context is everything and individual circumstances are of paramount importance.

As far as communal actions, these can also be seen as individual actions that have broader consequences. As PD31 says, "31. Natural justice is a symbol or expression of expediency, to prevent one man from harming or being harmed by another." I don't want to be harmed and, therefore, it's in my best interest for having a pleasurable happy existence to not harm others and to encourage that behavior in others. Individuals choosing "what's best for me" in the moment may decide what's best for them is to steal money or food. This decision could be based on simple greed or it could be based on the need to feed yourself or your children. A decision to lie is also not a virtuous/vicious choice in and of itself. If someone is coming to beat up another person and that intended victim has taken shelter in your house, you don't truthfully at all costs tell the potential assailant that the person in in your house when they come knocking on the door. Absolute adherence to some truth-telling virtue in this case does more harm than good. There is no virtue in handing a victim over to their assailant in honor of "I always tell the truth."