Posts by Don

Quote from Cassius

In the spirit of keeping it coming, I think:

(1) The issue of being clear in our technical discussions about "ranking" and "divisions" and "types" of pleasure. Here we have a fascinating and important discussion that can be pursued with a wide variety of types of people (both inside and outside the Epicurean framework) without too much pressure from emotional issues.

But we also have :

(2) The issue of the apparent subjective/relativistic nature of pleasure, the acceptance of which is explosively rejected outside the Epicurean framework of Nature. In fact it is hard to even discuss personal attitudes toward pleasure without first coming to terms with the practical implications of concluding that people will disagree on how to pursue pleasure. That probably takes us off into the infrequently discussed issues such as the last ten PDs, and this issue (which might be the most important of which) has to be kept tightly tied to the Epicurean framework for us to make progress on dissecting it. Talking about this issue with people outside the basic Epicurean framework is hardly even possible because you run into immediate and emotional issues about what "should" be the best pleasures, and if you can't agree that that "objective" framework makes no sense then you can hardly even get off the ground.

This is good.Thanks for summarizing! Here are my thoughts.

1) I don't think we can "rank" or "divide" individual pleasures. What we can classify (for lack of a better word) are the *consequences* of pleasures. Do someone's present pleasures move them along the path to future pleasures? That's always been my argument for why we *can* censure the "pleasures of the profligate" (PD10). Their actions, while subjectively pleasurable for them in the present, do not assure them of future pleasures.

2) Again, yes, people will pursue pleasure in different ways, but: (a) are the present pleasures they experience assuring them of future pleasures? and (b) are they in keeping with natural justice: to not harm and to not be harmed? I think those are the criteria by which to "judge" pleasure (again, for lack of a better verb). There are no best pleasures, or right pleasures, or correct pleasures in and of themselves. You all here in the forum have begun to move me in that direction. I'm still wrestling with this myself because I can readily think of pleasures that people insist are pleasurable to them that I think are abhorrent. I'm also not convinced that these kinds of "pleasures" are actually pleasures and not activating some other center in the brain, but let's for arguments' sake say they are pleasurable for these people in the widest possible definition. Then we judge them by the criteria a and b above: assurance of future pleasures and accordance with natural justice. Epicurean Philosophy says that we should accept some pain for future pleasures. I'm thinking here of rehab for the profligate's drug addiction, for example.

That's my take (at least in this moment ... I could change my mind)

It seems to me we're all on the right track moving in the same direction, maybe just in different lanes.

I agree with Cassius that there is no objective standard to judge one pleasure more pleasurable than another. Pleasure by its very nature is subjective.

Both Godfrey and I have mentioned the "pursuit." According to Attalus's website, Fragment 68 is from the following:

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Plutarch, That Epicurus actually makes a pleasant life impossible, 4, p. 1089D: It is this, I believe, that has driven them, seeing for themselves the absurdities to which they were reduced, to take refuge in the "painlessness" and the "stable condition of the flesh," supposing that the pleasurable life is found in thinking of this state as about to occur in people or as being achieved; for the "stable and settled condition of the flesh," and the "trustworthy expectation" of this condition contain, they say, the highest and the most assured delight for men who are able to reflect. Now to begin with, observe their conduct here, how they keep decanting this "pleasure" or "painlessness" or "stable condition" of theirs back and forth, from body to mind and then once more from mind to body.

Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights, IX.5.2: Epicurus makes pleasure the highest good but defines it as sarkos eustathes katastema, or "a well-balanced condition of the body."

So, Plutarch says Epicureans say that the "pleasurable life is found in thinking of this state as about to occur in people or as being achieved." This again emphasizes the process. It also echoes what Epicurus said about how important it is to remember past pleasures and look forward to future pleasures. We cannot have guarantees or assurances of stable health, but we can make choices that moved us in that direction. We can look forward to those future pleasures of stable health. We can be assured that we ourselves will make choices to move ourselves forward toward stable health (aponia) and peace of mind (ataraxia). I'm not advocating a "tranquilist" perspective but just talking about a process and attributes growing out of that process when we're making choices about what gives us pleasure in the future and the present.

Take Plutarch again:

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the good is a thing that arises out of your very escape from evil and from your memory and reflection and gratitude that this has happened to you.

From my perspective, one key word is "arises." This again implies a process.

I think there's a difference between talking about maximizing pleasure in our lives over time in the present and the future and talking about maximum pleasure of any one pleasurable event. The latter can't be measured by definition because we're talking about subjective phenomena.

This conversation is both very pleasurable for me as well as enlightening. Keep it coming!

I think you may be on to something here, Godfrey . If I hear you right, the pursuit of pleasure (Jefferson's pursuit of happiness) is the important part. As long as we are making choices that point us in the direction of our (subjective) pleasure, we're doing it right in the moment even if we're experiencing pain in that moment.

I found Fragment 68 to be applicable:

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68. To those who are able to reason it out, the highest and surest joy is found in the stable health of the body and a firm confidence in keeping it.

According to this then, from my interpretation, the "highest... joy (pleasure)" is defined as stable health and the confidence in maintaining it. We make choices to achieve this.

This is a fascinating thread and full of new information. Thanks for posting, Cassius !

I realize everyone here is already aware of all this, but I have to state that I find Lucretius's exposition of Epicurus's thinking on evolution (since I've read that Lucretius was arguably using Epicurus's multi-volume masterwork On Nature as his guide) amazingly -- shockingly -- prescient. I have a hard time wrapping my brain around the fact that Epicurus was formulating his ideas almost two-thousand years before Darwin: Evolution isn't aiming that's any goal. Tongues and arms evolve and, if they're useful for something, they continue to evolve.

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...nothing at all was born in the body that we might be able to use it, but what is born creates its own use. Nor did sight exist before the light of the eyes was born, nor pleading in words before the tongue was created, but rather the birth of the tongue came long before discourse, and the ears were created much before sound was heard, and in short all the limbs, I trow, existed before their use came about: they cannot then have grown for the purpose of using them.

I find that someone so long before Darwin was writing like this absolutely awe-inspiring in the best sense.

I found a great illustration of the gradual, incremental, almost-imperceptible pace of evolution in a video of the evolution of the face. Paleoartist John Gurche charts his "direct ancestors" through human evolution ending with the artist's own face.

Here are some visual aids of what I understand to be the difference between "longest duration" pleasure and "long-term" pleasure:

Present >>>>Future

"Longest duration" refers to pleasurable experience over a single contiguous span of time leading to pain; pleasure clung to in the present with no consideration of consequences.

(ex., eating at the buffet as long as possible leading to indigestion and nausea in the future)

Present>>>>>Future

"Long-term" refers to pleasures over time punctuated by pains endured for the sake of the continued existence of the pleasure; or painful experience undergone in the present to have pleasure in the future.

(ex., Diet and exercise undergone for health and fitness)

Quote from Cassius

(As usual I want to note that i see this is a very fun and very useful discussion!)

Agreed!!

Quote from Cassius

But I do think that we still have a lot to do on the clear meaning of terms like "sage" and "fullness of pleasure." So that when Epicurus uses the term in the letter to menoeceus I would strongly presume that he is using it in a generic way and not as a term of art as in the comic book "Epicurus The Sage" for example.

I think I would agree with that if I understand what you're saying.

In the interest of making sure I'm being clear: I do NOT think that the Epicurean sage is akin to a buddha, bodhisattva, messiah, etc. The Epicurean sage is not a type of being, an official title, or an unattainable condition that only serves to make humans feel inadequate. It's more descriptive than anything else, a shorthand. A wise one is simply one who has learned to apply the philosophy in every aspect of their lives, who has internalized the doctrines and can readily pull them up in their mind to confront any situation when trying to make choices on courses of action to reject and accept.

Although now that I'm writing this, I need to be careful in steering clear of elevating the wisdom to make the decisions with the pleasure arising from those decisions. Although again... No, okay... The decision is just the means to the pleasurable end. Just as acting virtuously is a means to achieving pleasure. Okay, I think I pulled myself out of the nose dive.

Quote from Cassius

Another way of stating my concern is to observe that I think it is pretty clear that the goal and the guide in Epicurean terms is "pleasure." That means that the goal of life cannot be "to be a sage" and the guide of life cannot be "a sage" or "to follow a sage," and those terms strike me as particularly hazardous if we consider "sage" to be synonymous with "a wise man" and if we consider how important it is not to embrace "wisdom" as the goal or the guide of life.

Is it possible that all this discussion of "sage" is overlay by Diogenes Laertius using his non-Epicurean philosophical categories?

Epicurus himself uses the term σοφός as "sage" or "wise man" in the Letter to Menoikos:

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[126] The wise man does not deprecate life nor does he fear the cessation of life.

[126] ὁ δὲ σοφὸς οὔτε παραιτεῖται τὸ ζῆν> οὔτε φοβεῖται τὸ μὴ ζῆν:

So if we are to accept the Letter as being from Epicurus's own hand, he referred to "the wise man"

I wouldn't say the goal of life is to be sage but that becoming wise is a natural result of following the Epicurean path. Wisdom/prudence makes the pleasant life possible along with being just and acting rightly (PD 5). One becomes wise in applying the philosophy and these characteristics ....uh, characterize (sorry) what behaviors one will exhibit by being adept at knowing how to apply the philosophy of pleasure in one's life. For those not fully proficient in the application of Epicurean philosophy, these characteristics can be a list of "fake it til you make it" behaviors. The more you practice the behaviors of a "sage" the more you'll see their usefulness if know how to make your choices.

Oh, but I think "longest period" and "long-term" are two different things.

Longest period = blissed out all the time, eating at the delicious buffet of delicacies for hours and hours; making pleasure last for the longest period isn't tenable or advisable.

Long-term = "I will eat enough of this delicious food on the buffet to fully satiate myself but I'm not going to gorge myself "for the longest period I can" because I know later (i.e., long term) that will cause me pain." Long-term involves making choices and rejections with an eye to what will cause you more pleasure later or maintain your fullness of pleasure (I have not read DeWitt's section on that yet... but I do remember seeing your graphic).

He was in pain, but there's no way to avoid physical pain if one is in a material body. We get sick. We get injured. But remember what Epicurus wrote:

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"On this blissful day, which is also the last of my life, I write this to you. My continual sufferings from strangury and dysentery are so great that nothing could augment them ; but over against them all I set gladness of mind at the remembrance of our past conversations."

So even in the midst of severe physical pain, Epicurus was able to apply his philosophy and experience pleasure. He remained a sage even to the last.

From my perspective, experiencing the fullness of pleasure doesn't mean one is blissed out all the time. That's what I meant about having mastery over your choices and rejections to maximize long-term pleasure. You may be experiencing pain right now, but the sage can - so to speak - keep their eyes on the prize of long-term pleasure. They have an expansive view of their life and aren't bogged down in their present suffering... even though it might be severe (e.g., the response to "torture" characteristics). The sage keeps in mind that severe pain is short, chronic pain has moments of pleasure (at least according to the Principal Doctrines).

In response to Cassius 's asking

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what is a "sage"? Do we limit "sagehood" to "teachers" or "leaders of schools"?

I'd say that the sage, ὁ σοφός, the wise one, is anyone - from a classical Epicurean perspective - who has achieved a level of mastery over their choices and rejections that allows them to continually experience the fullness of pleasure in their life. By virtue of this, one would hope that these are the teachers and leaders of Epicurean communities but it could theoretically be anyone on the Epicurean path.

Quote from Cassius

Sorry we just crossposted and I elaborated on my earlier post....

But I think your comment emphasizes my question. "Can't"? What does "can't" mean with a human nature possessing agency, and absence of fate?

Diogenes Laertius was compiling from who knows how many sources. Was this characteristic referring to Epicurus himself as written by one of his admiring students ("The Founder *can't* fall back into...")? Was it hyperbole ("Sages of *our* school *can't* fall back....")? The original original source could shed light on the issue you're bringing up... and, of course, we can't know that.

Your question made me go back and take another look at the text:

ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν ἅπαξ γενόμενον σοφὸν μηκέτι τὴν ἐναντίαν λαμβάνειν διάθεσιν μηδὲ πλάττειν ἑκόντα:

Those words are fairly adamant that it's a one-and-done (at least according to whatever source DL was using):

• ἅπαξ once, once only, once for all
• μηκέτι no more, no longer, no further
• μηδέ and not

That's a lot of "no, nay, never, no more" as far as falling back to the opposite disposition (opposite to being a sage).

I would also say that once you know something, you can't unknow it. Once you know the truth of the "true philosophy" you can't un-know it. It's part of your knowledge. So, while someone may behave as if they were ignorant or choose to act in ways contrary to their well-being or contrary to the truth, they can't do it (or say they're doing it) from a place of ignorance.

My take is that once there sage roots out the causes of ignorance and fear and comes to realize the veracity of the "true philosophy", they can't go back to being ignorant.

Quote from Cassius

Thanks and yes t hat looks much better. For the benefit of anyone else reading, it's not necessary to go into the code view if you just block select the text that is hard-coded, then select the Font Size, Font Family, or Font Color option in the editor menu. Click on that button and the last option at the bottom of each is "Remove....." and that lets you remove the hard-coding using the GUI. But either method works fine.

Sorry, just to let you know: I did eventually use the "Remove..." but I couldn't figure out what was wrong (since the font was already "black"... just hard-coded). When I went into the html I could see the tags and had the "eureka" moment of realizing what was going on. That GUI with the "Remove..." feature for font family, size, and color is *very* helpful! Thanks again!

Quote from Cassius

Yes great work Don! Also, would you mind editing your post by blocking it all and selecting "remove color" from the menu? Pasting it from Google brought over hard-coded dark text which is hard to see using a dark forum style. Might be good to "remove font" too so that it looks best on all forum styles. I could do it myself but once you see how that works you ll know for the future.

Thanks, Cassius, for that hint! I do see <span style...> tags for the color in the html now that you mentioned it and removed them. Nope, no need to do it yourself! This was a good learning exercise!

Quote from Martin

The numbering appears to be a bit odd.

Other than that, I noticed only one bug: I guess that

"..., the wise one will not let the passions hinder progress towards wisdom once they’ve become wise"

should be

"..., the wise one will not let the passions hinder progress towards wisdom once he has become wise".

It seems at every corner, we encounter wrong translations or significant differences between translations. Thanks for exposing some more.

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Thank you, Martin and Joshua , for the comments.

Martin , I fully agree about the numbering system on this outline ended up odd. I'm not sure what happened in my pasting from Google. The forum didn't like it and honestly it was late when I posted so I did what I could and called it "good enough" That'll definitely be fixed in any final version.

Regarding "they", 3rd person singular "they" in that sentence.I was actually using the 3rd person singular "they" in that sentence.

Characteristics of an Epicurean Sage

The following is a comparison of two translations of Diogenes Laertius’s exposition of “the views of Epicurus himself and his school concerning the wise man.” There are not a lot of male pronouns in the text and many of the verbs are 3rd-person-plural (“They” do this or that…), but “the sage” or “the wise one” is the translation of ὁ σοφός, a male noun. Many of the characteristics are also aimed at men. However, gender neutral language will be used when possible in the notes, because, in light of the inclusion of women in the Garden and writing philosophical treatises, being a σοφός should (theoretically) be open to both men and women.

I undertook this to see what characteristics of someone considered a sage in Epicurean philosophy would be “outdated” and which ones could apply to our time.

The two translation under consideration are the Hicks (1925) translation as provided by Wikisource https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Lives_of_…osophers/Book_X and the Yonge (1895) translation available at Project Gutenberg: http://www.gutenberg.org/files/57342/57…-h.htm#Page_424 of Diogenes Laertius, Lives, Book X:117-121 with notes on the original text. For the original text, I am using the Greek version on the Perseus Digital Library: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3atext%3a1999.01.0257.

I have found that Yonge may have been using a different Greek text than the Hicks version on Perseus. This may account for some of the discrepancies. Also consulted was the digitized Oxford-held manuscript of DL online at http://www.bl.uk/manuscripts/Vi…l_ms_531_fs001r (page f171v) This is the page where section 117 begins.

I will also be referring from time to time to the 2018 translation by Pamela Mensch from OUP.

Format: Hicks translation is first, followed (indented) by Yonge. Article author’s notes come last in each bullet point.
(Working on transferring the outline format from Google Docs to forum format)

• There are three motives to injurious acts among men – hatred, envy, and contempt; and these the wise man overcomes by reason.

1. He said that injuries existed among men, either in consequence of hatred, or of envy, or of contempt, all which the wise man overcomes by reason.
   1. NOTE: The three motives in the original (accusative case) are:
      1. Μῖσος: hate, hatred, grudge (LSJ)
         1. Trivia: origin of the mis- in misanthrope
      2. Φθόνον: ill-will or malice, esp. envy or jealousy of the good fortune of others (LSJ)
      3. Καταφρόνησιν: contempt, disdain (LSJ)

Moreover, he who has once become wise never more assumes the opposite habit, not even in semblance, if he can help it.

1. Also, that a man who has once been wise can never receive the contrary disposition, nor can he of his own accord invent such a state of things as that he should be subjected to the dominion of the passions; nor can he hinder himself in his progress towards wisdom.

He will be more susceptible of emotion than other men: that will be no hindrance to his wisdom.

1. NOTE: Yonge seems to include the emotions and their non-hindrance with the above. i.e., the wise one will not let the passions hinder progress towards wisdom once they’ve become wise.
2. NOTE: The original text (per Perseus) is: ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν ἅπαξ γενόμενον σοφὸν μηκέτι τὴν ἐναντίαν λαμβάνειν διάθεσιν μηδὲ πλάττειν ἑκόντα: πάθεσι μᾶλλον συσχεθήσεσθαι: οὐκ ἂν ἐμποδίσαι πρὸς τὴν σοφίαν. Which is composed of three clauses:
   1. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν ἅπαξ γενόμενον σοφὸν μηκέτι τὴν ἐναντίαν λαμβάνειν διάθεσιν μηδὲ πλάττειν ἑκόντα:
      1. Literally: Also, the once-arisen sage will no longer fall back to the opposite disposition nor be put into that mold wittingly (on purpose).
   2. πάθεσι μᾶλλον συσχεθήσεσθαι:
      1. Literally: By the pathē they will exceedingly be affected...
   3. οὐκ ἂν ἐμποδίσαι πρὸς τὴν σοφίαν.
      1. Literally: This will not be a hindrance on the path to wisdom.
3. NOTE: However, the digitized manuscript appears to have, (with punctuation as interpreted by me):
   1. αλλὰ καὶ τὸν ἅπαξ γενόμενον σοφὸν, μηκέτι τὴν ἐναντίαν λαμβάνειν διάθεσιν· μηδὲ πλάττειν ἑκόντα πάθεσι μᾶλλον συσχεθήσεσθαι· οὐκ ἂν ἐμποδίσαι πρὸς τὴν σοφίαν.
   2. The manuscript then gives five different clauses or phrase:
   3. αλλὰ καὶ τὸν ἅπαξ γενόμενον σοφὸν,
      1. Literally: Once one has become wise… (the once-arisen sage)
   4. μηκέτι τὴν ἐναντίαν λαμβάνειν διάθεσιν·
      1. Literally: ... will no longer fall back to the opposite disposition...
   5. μηδὲ πλάττειν ἑκόντα πάθεσι μᾶλλον συσχεθήσεσθαι·
      1. Literally: .. nor (μηδέ) be put into (that) mold readily/wittingly by the πάθη exceedingly to be affected…
         1. Συσχεθήσεσθαι: future infinitive “to be constrained, distressed, afflicted, and, generally, to be affected by anything whether in mind or body”
   6. οὐκ ἂν ἐμποδίσαι πρὸς τὴν σοφίαν.
      1. Literally: .. This would not impede/hamper/fetter (their way) toward wisdom.
   7. NOTE: This section appears to mean that the sage will not be exceedingly affected by the passions, emotions, etc., that they won't be overcome with emotion and this is not an impediment on the way to wisdom.
4. NOTE: I am more inclined to take Hicks's interpretation as the text being two separate ideas. This appears to flow better:
   1. The sage, once wise, won't fall back into ignorance, nor will they willingly do this on purpose.
   2. Sages are greatly affected by the pathē (i.e., more so than other people) but this doesn't hinder their progress to wisdom.
5. Trivia: ἐμποδίσαι literally means to have one's feet bound, to be put in fetters.

However, not every bodily constitution nor every nationality would permit a man to become wise.

1. That the wise man, however, cannot exist in every state of body, nor in every nation.
2. Οὐδὲ μὴν ἐκ πάσης σώματος ἕξεως σοφὸν γενέσθαι· ἂν οὐδ᾽ ἐν παντὶ ἔθνει.
3. NOTE: The key phrases here are:
   1. ἐκ πάσης σώματος: (neither) from every body
      1. σώματος "a body, one's life in the physical world"
   2. ἐν παντὶ ἔθνει: (nor) in every έθνος (tribe, nation; later referring to "barbarian" nation (non-Hellenic); class of people)
      1. Is this saying that a sage can't be found in every nation or is it saying not in certain classes? The meaning of έθνος is broad.
   3. ἕξεως "of a state, habit, condition (of a body)"
4. NOTE: What does this mean? How does this connect with the evangelical nature of the philosophy? We know women were a part of the Garden and wrote treatises, so the "state of body" can't exclude women. And Epicurean communities were in "barbarian" lands. How to interpret this? Is this where DeWitt is getting that Epicurus said non-Greeks couldn't achieve wisdom? I can certainly see that if someone is incapable of studying and applying the philosophy due to mental illness, brain injury, or other condition. I can also see some "nations" not being conducive to allowing or encouraging study and application because of repression, culture, exposure to the philosophy, etc. I would be reluctant to say (for modern applications) anything akin to "women can't be sages" or "Russians can't be sages."

Even on the rack the wise man is happy.

1. That even if the wise man were to be put to the torture, he would still be happy.
2. NOTE: It's important to remember that the original says εὐδαίμονα not "happy." There's a difference!
3. Trivia: στρεβλωθῇ literally means "stretch on the wheel or rack, to rack, torture, applied to slaves for the purpose of extracting evidence" (LSJ)

He alone will feel gratitude towards friends, present and absent alike, and show it by word and deed.

1. That the wise man will only feel gratitude to his friends, but to them equally whether they are present or absent.
2. NOTE: Is it Hicks's "he alone will feel" or Yonge's "only feel gratitude towards friends"?
3. NOTE: I find it odd that this clause is sandwiched between two mentions of torture. Is this a scribal error? Does this one about friends reference something about the sage being tortured? The Perseus original text is identical to the digitized Oxford manuscript.

When on the rack, however, he will give vent to cries and groans.

1. Nor will he groan and howl when he is put to the torture.
2. NOTE: Will the σοφός groan or not? The original text runs ὅτε μέντοι στρεβλοῦται, ἔνθα καὶ μύζει καὶ οἰμώζει. There doesn't appear to be a "nor" here:
   1. ὅτε when
   2. μέντοι indeed, however, to be sure
   3. ἔνθα when
   4. μύζει I. (he) murmurs with closed lips, mutters, moans.
   5. (και) οἰμώζει
      1. (and) wails aloud, laments
3. NOTE: So, Hicks seems to have the upper hand here. This also makes sense in the light of the sage being more affected by the emotions (#3) but also remaining content under torture (#5).

As regards women, he will submit to the restrictions imposed by the law, as Diogenes says in his epitome of Epicurus' ethical doctrines.

1. Nor will he marry a wife whom the laws forbid, as Diogenes says, in his epitome of the Ethical Maxims of Epicurus.
2. Mensch's translation has: The wise man will not consort with women in any manner proscribed by law, as Diogenes says in his Epitome of Epicurus' Ethical Doctrines.
3. NOTE: Does the original text talk about marriage? Sexual relations? Consorting? γυναικί τ᾽ οὐ μιγήσεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν ᾗ οἱ νόμοι ἀπαγορεύουσιν…
   1. Interestingly, γυναικί is the singular dative case "of, by, for (a) woman"
   2. (οὐ) μιγήσεσθαι - one definition is "to (not) have intercourse with, to be united to, of men and women" but another if simply "to (not) mingle with."
   3. οἱ νόμοι ἀπαγορεύουσιν "the laws/customs forbid"
4. NOTE: For a modern application, consider what laws or customs dictate how men and women should behave in establishing a consensual, sexual relationship. This may be the best way to interpret this characteristic.

Nor will he punish his servants; rather he will pity them and make allowance on occasion for those who are of good character.

1. He will punish his servants, but also pity them, and show indulgence to any that are virtuous.
2. Will the σοφός punish their servants or not? The original begins with ουδέ, a mark of negation, so it appears Hicks again has the upper hand here.
3. Trivia: οἰκέτας = "household slaves". Neither translator wants to use the word "slave." Servants aren't the same as slaves.
4. NOTE: It appears the Epicurean will be benevolent to "servants" and will be sure to encourage "good" ones by rewarding them.

Only the first 9 and much revision to go. As a final product, it may end up being my own translation of the list of characteristics with something like the above as endnotes.

Feel free to take a read through and provide comments.

This is great, Joshua ! Thanks for posting the step by step. I'll look forward to seeing your progress. If your design is like the tree ring, could you technically use the ring to impress into wax seals eventually? Ευπραττειν! May you do well!

Thank you, Martin , for these detailed comments on Dimitriadis's book. I'll admit I have only just started it, but your comments on the science that he cites certainly gives me pause. My own radar went up when he mentions the "strip of gray matter in the prefontal cortex" and seems to equate this to the seat of consciousness. That section of the book is open to interpretation, but things like the expansion on the universe being due to black holes, the improper use of the phrase "Planck time", and the heliocentric universe can be checked with a quick Google or Wikipedia search.

It's these kinds of incorrect small details that give me pause to an entire work. This was my first reaction to DeWitt and his "Epicureanism is hiding behind every Christian corner" habits. Now, I'm glad I'm giving DeWitt another chance and I'll continue to read Dimitriadis's book.

I do not in any way question Dimitriadis's sincerity and passion for Epicurus, but those errors and misrepresentations *really* need to be corrected if his book as a whole is to be taken seriously.

Quote from Cassius

But don't let it sidetrack you too long from DeWitt

LOL I have actually been reading and highlighting DeWitt. I just haven't had a chance to post my thoughts on the book here yet... And I keep getting sidetracked by his excellent articles!

Thanks for reminding us of Dimitriadis's book. It fell off my radar. Having your positive review of his work has sparked my curiosity!