Posts by Don

Quote from JJElbert

[not] fit to carry the Greeks' chisels.

That's some fine wordsmithing there! That should be turned into an idiom. "When it comes to philosophy, [name of modern philosopher you don't agree with] isn't fit to carry the Greeks' chisels."

https://collections.louvre.fr/en/recherche?q=Epicure

Just read that the Louvre posted their entire collection online, so of course I'm sharing my first search of their database. Enjoy!

Welcome!

Onto the next Key Doctrine (KD) concerning behavior that is δίκαιος:

KD 36: Κατὰ μὲν <τὸ> κοινὸν πᾶσι τὸ δίκαιον τὸ αὐτό, συμφέρον γάρ τι ἦν ἐν τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίᾳ· κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἴδιον χώρας καὶ ὅσων δή ποτε αἰτίων οὐ πᾶσι συνέπεται τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον εἶναι.

From LSJ: κατὰ κοινόν, opp. κατ᾽ ἰδίαν, jointly, in common (κατ᾽ ἰδίαν in private; also, separately, apart) **Spoiler alert: we're going to see κατ᾽ ἰδίαν soon!

I'm going to use "civilized conduct" and similar terms to try to get away from the baggage of "justice" and "righteousness." Granted, it's not a 1-1 correspondence, but it may help us break out of our preconceived notions.

(μὲν) κατὰ κοινὸν πᾶσι τὸ δίκαιον τὸ αὐτό

"On the one hand, 'civilized conduct' is the same (τὸ αὐτό) for all in common (κατὰ κοινὸν)..."

...συμφέρον γάρ τι ἦν ἐν τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίᾳ·

paraphrase: "for it was something useful in communities brought together for mutual benefit [to neither harm nor be harmed]..."

Next clause...

(δὲ) κατὰ τὸ ἴδιον χώρας καὶ ὅσων δή ποτε αἰτίων οὐ πᾶσι συνέπεται τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον εἶναι.

μὲν... δὲ... Remember that this combination of particles sets up a contrast between two phrases. The clunky but helpful "standard" is to think "On the one hand, X... On the other hand, Y..."

So:

(μὲν) κατὰ (τὸ) κοινὸν...

"On the one hand, jointly/in common...

(δὲ) κατὰ τὸ ἴδιον...

"On the other hand, in private or separately/apart; individually..."

Here ἴδιον (having to do with the private sphere; being set apart; individually) is contrasted with κοινόν (having to do with the public sphere; considered together in community) from the first phrase. This parallel writing style is reminiscent of Epicurus in his letter to Menoikeus.

This style can be seen also in...

πᾶσι τὸ δίκαιον τὸ αὐτό (clause 1)

"Civilized behavior is the same for all"

οὐ πᾶσι [συνέπεται] τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον εἶναι. (clause 2, οὐ πᾶσι "not all")

"Civilized behavior is not the same for all"

...which is lost of a translator decides to use "it is not.." or other paraphrases or pronouns.

κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἴδιον χώρας καὶ ὅσων δή ποτε αἰτίων οὐ πᾶσι συνέπεται τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον εἶναι.

"On the other hand, with respect to the particulars of a place or other causes, civilized behavior is not the same for all."

Looked at in this way, this KD is not that controversial. To judge an act as "civilized, well-ordered, conducive to mutual benefit, i.e., righteous", does it provide both parties with the benefit of not harming nor being harmed. That's what's common to all. How this is brought about can be different in time and place.

This is in keeping with Epicurus's philosophy of relativity and context. Note, this does NOT mean there is an ideal form of το δίκαιον. There is a contextual, mutually-beneficial series of actions that can be used as a guide to determining if an action or law meets certain criteria: two, in fact - (1) Are the parties protected from harm? (2) Are the parties prohibited from harming others? How these two criteria are achieved can be different in individual times and places, but the criteria stay the same since humans began gathering together in communities.

Quote from Cassius

Thanks for that link. This reminds me too of what is maybe a similar word "duty" and the Latin variant "officiis." I remember I spend a lot of time with Cicero's "De Officiis" when I first came across it. But I totally agree with this: "Using the word justice has sooo much cultural baggage in English."

Here's the officium entry (officiis is just the dative/ablative plural) from Lewis and Short:

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…:entry=officium

Before I dive into the last KDs on justice, I wanted to take a moment to review what is actually the connotation of the ancient Greek word translated as justice, right, etc: δίκαιος dikaios

Here the LSJ dictionary entry:

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…:entry=di/kaios

Note that the basic meaning has to do with observing custom or rule, being well-ordered, abiding by the social rule, being civilized.

Speaking for myself, I have a cultural bias to think of justice - or better capital J Justice - or being Righteous had an abstract existence, some canonical measurements. This is less just than this because ABC parameters of the ultimate yardstick of justice are not met. Epicurus blows that idea out of the water. Using the word justice has sooo much cultural baggage in English.

Granted, the word took on similar connotations in Epicurus's day which is probably why he took so much of KDs to dispel that notion.

Please feel free to check out the LSJ entry and share any thoughts on what context we're dealing with using the English justice (and variants) to translate δίκαιος.

To repeat and expand on michelepinto 's and others' proposals:

• The four sides = The four lines of the Tetrapharmakos
• The dot = the atom (or whatever basic building block of matter you want in modern terms)
  • The space around the dot represents the void.
• The points at the top (a triangle pointing up) and bottom (a triangle pointing down) of the diamond shape represent pain and pleasure.
  • Additionally, the points represent the choices we make based on pain and pleasure. Which way will we decide to go? It's up to us!
• The symbol is an abstract eye to represent the motto SIc fac omnia tamquam spectet Epicurus. You could even include the letters SFOTSE in some arrangements around or inside the diamond.
• The diamond shape with dot is an abstract representation of a walled Garden with a group of people inside.
  • For those Epicureans who want to emphasize lathe biosas it can represent that but doesn't need to.
• The two sides of the diamond represent two people facing each other with outstretched arms < > joining hands in friendship.
• The diamond itself represents the most durable natural physical substance which stands for the unshakable enduring trust in the Canon and the physical nature of the Cosmos with no supernatural intervention.

I'm blue-skying here but just wanted to provide in how many directions you can go with a simple figure. I agree with Cassius that the most traditional "symbol" was the bust of Epicurus but that's hard to capture graphically (unless someone is up for a challenge).

Quote from Cassius

Michelle --- Along the same lines as your post I see this post on Facebook today:

That's a beautiful piece of artwork and maybe "represents" the philosophy but it is completely impractical as a symbol or logo. We need something more in line with the Nike swoosh, Christian cross, Islamic crescent, Atheist A, Apple apple, ... You get the idea. Something bold, graphic, and that you could hang from a necklace.

Quote from Bryan

I find it helpful to keep the Macedonians/Diadochoi in mind. From one perspective, they were a constant source of abhorrent behavior and destruction. Many people found living underneath them to be humiliating and intolerable. There is no evidence that Epikouros ever even complained, as Metrodoros says "ΟΥΔΕΝ ΔΕΙ ΣΩΙΖΕΙΝ ΤΟΥΣ ΕΛΛΗΝΑΣ it is not our responsibility to save the country (Plutarch, Non Posse 1098 C)" Kolotes even dedicated his work to the Ptolemy family.

Thanks for posting this! I tend to forget about Plutarch. Looks like I need to go do some more reading!!

This seems to be a reminder to be aware of your limitations and not to be overwhelmed by trying to "save the country" unless this truly gives you pleasure, of course.

Oops, I missed that too! It looks like it's in both Non posse and Adv. Col.

Mea culpa!

Plutarch, Against Colotes, 1125. I believe it's supposed to be from Metrodorus's Letter to Timocrates.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…%3Asection%3D31

Quote from Cassius

Quote from Don

If you're weighing the choice of whether or not you're going to commit an act contrary to the laws of the community in which you live, you're free to do that. BUT be aware that if you're not caught right away, that doesn't mean your home free... Until the day you die. You want to live your life that way?

I think you're correct. Of course the big picture includes the possibility of revolting (Cassius Longinus model) or leaving (which Epicurus did from Mytilene and Lampsacus, right?)

That even makes sense in the context of the KDs here: if you feel you can't abide by the contract of your community, you have the choice to oppose it (Does the pain of that makes it choice-worthy?) or find a new community and a new contract

Quote from Don

Saint-Andre translation: It is impossible to be confident that you will escape detection when secretly doing something contrary to an agreement to not harm one another or be harmed, even if currently you do so countless times; for until your death you will be uncertain that you have escaped detection

Okay, reading this in the light of day, I can see how it is consistent with the philosophy. It seems (now) to be reinforcing the personal responsibility inherent in Epicurus's writings. I.e.,..

If you're weighing the choice of whether or not you're going to commit an act contrary to the laws of the community in which you live, you're free to do that. BUT be aware that if you're not caught right away, that doesn't mean your home free... Until the day you die. You want to live your life that way?

Maybe these two are The Tell-tale Heart Key Doctrines.

This all still so far doesn't address the "injustice" of the biggies (e.g., atrocities, genocide, mass murder, etc.), but I think we're getting there and, rest assured, I'mma gonna circle back around to all that before we're done with this thread.

For now, I like where my head is ending up for 34 & 35... Until I start thinking again. We'll see.

Quote from Cassius

Well, you could call it "implying" or maybe even "stating clearly"

LOL

Actually, let me expand on that LOL.

I think I was getting hung up on the idea that someone had to commit the act *then* be afraid of getting caught.

Instead, the whole intent is to weigh the pain or pleasure stemming from your commission of an act counter to the law before you commit it. Your children are starving and you decide to steal food. You may get caught but your children eat. You can live with the fear of getting caught because the pleasure of fed children outweighs the pain of the fear of retribution.

Yes?

Or am I imposing my own desired meaning on the text instead of reading what's there?

It doesn't look that on the literal front, but then again...

Ahhh! It's too late in the day for textual criticism.

Quote from Cassius

So in the it is one of those dangerous aspects of life that some people have no conscience and are killers, just like wolves and lions. We in civil society will organize force to deal with them and if done rationally can hope to be successful most of the time

Okay, I can get behind this part. We agree to contracts among members of a society to neither harm nor be harmed. Some people decide to not abide by that contract - like wild animals with whom we have no contract. There are people in the society to enforce the contract for the security of those who have agreed to abide by it. That all hangs together, and it's part of the next two KDs, too, if I remember.

But KD 34 & 35 rely on someone being afraid of consequences of their actions to not go against the contract?

Wait... ....

Actually, the way I just stated that right there makes more sense to me, especially from an Epicurean perspective. If I commit an unjust act - defined as an act in opposition to the social contract - my life will be more unpleasant if I'm caught. Therefore, I do my best to not commit unjust acts. I act prudently and justly with regard to my fellow citizens. This leads to a more pleasant life.

Is this what Epicurus is implying here in 34 & 35????

FYI: I'm going to start using KD (Key Doctrines) instead of PD (Principal Doctrines) to maintain the same KD initials for English and Greek (Kyriai Doxai). Call me pedantic. I can take it.

KD 34: Ἡ ἀδικία οὐ καθ’ ἑαυτὴν κακόν, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ κατὰ τὴν ὑποψίαν φόβῳ, εἰ μὴ λήσει τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν τοιούτων ἐφεστηκότας κολαστάς.

Saint-Andre translation: Injustice is not bad in itself, but only because of the fear caused by a suspicion that you will not avoid those who are appointed to punish wrongdoing.

So, there's really no such thing as an unjust act or injustice itself it seems, just like righteousness doesn't exist in and of itself. Okay, that's at least consistent. Wrong-doing (another translation of ἀδικία) isn't "bad in and of itself" ("οὐ καθ’ ἑαυτὴν").

What I'm reading here is that breaking the law - transgressing that mutual contract - isn't bad in and of itself. It's only bad because of the fear you as the criminal experience from the anxiety that you might get caught.

Frankly, this is where Epicurus begins to lose me. This KD, along with the next one (KD 35) which we'll look at below, clearly seems to say that the only unjust act, according to Epicurus, is one that will make you fear you might get caught breaking a law. What if you have no conscience? What if you don't fear punishment? Granted, punishment was much harsher in ancient Greece and Rome than it is currently in modern culture. Consider the prisons in ancient Rome. They were terrible places! Check out this article from the Center for Hellenic Studies on "Punishment in Ancient Athens". Some punishments listed include "imposed fines, imprisonment, a set time of public humiliation in the stocks, limited loss of political rights, total disfranchisement, exile from the city ..., and death...." It could also include torture and what the article calls "bloodless crucifixion" that sounds horrible and was for citizens. The article goes on to say even convicted murderers were expected to try and break out of prison and go into exile, ridding the polis of their poisonous influence and giving the criminal a new possible life elsewhere. So, even the justice system of Ancient Athens had loopholes! Epicurus's conscience deterrent seems woefully lacking and without real teeth. It *almost* seems - dare I say - idealistic, and expects humans all to be subject to the same fear.

In KD 34, Epicurus does decide to finally use ἀδικία "injustice" ἀ "not" + δικία "just" http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…:entry=a)diki/a

This KD is going to be better parsed by bringing along the next one, KD 35. As Cassius has pointed out, there are no numbers in the original manuscripts. This one also stars with another Οὐκ ἔστι "it is not" like 33 and 34:

KD 35: Οὐκ ἔστι τὸν λάθρα τι κινοῦντα ὧν συνέθεντο πρὸς ἀλλήλους εἰς τὸ μὴ βλάπτειν μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι, πιστεύειν ὅτι λήσει, κἂν μυριάκις ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος λανθάνῃ. μέχρι γὰρ καταστροφῆς ἄδηλον εἰ καὶ λήσει.

Saint-Andre translation: It is impossible to be confident that you will escape detection when secretly doing something contrary to an agreement to not harm one another or be harmed, even if currently you do so countless times; for until your death you will be uncertain that you have escaped detection.

...ὧν συνέθεντο πρὸς ἀλλήλους εἰς τὸ μὴ βλάπτειν μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι,...

...contrary to an agreement to not harm one another or be harmed,...

(Note our old friend βλάπτειν again!)

Here again, the emphasis is on the uncertainty of escaping detection. Was Epicurus relying on someone's fear of being tortured or of being removed or exiled from the city to maintain security and peace! It appears so. I find that a weak argument on several fronts. It also seems an odd way of defining injustice.

Thoughts?

Quote from JJElbert

To illustrate Don's point, a little thought experiment; how many male names could I produce from the ancient world off the top of my head? Easily a hundred. How many women? Thinking now, I start to struggle after five or six. And how many of those are duly famous in their own right? Sappho...Hypatia...Cleopatra...

And how many names would be actual women and how many would be mythological or legendary?

Okay, moving on to PD 33, it appears pretty straightforward:

33 Οὐκ ἦν τι καθ’ ἑαυτὸ δικαιοσύνη, ἀλλ’ ἐν ταῖς μετ’ ἀλλήλων συστροφαῖς καθ’ ὁπηλίκους δή ποτε ἀεὶ τόπους συνθήκη τις ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν ἢ βλάπτεσθαι.

Saint-Andre translation: 33 Justice does not exist in itself; instead, it is always a compact to not harm one another or be harmed, which is agreed upon by those who gather together at some time and place. [St-Andre note: The word συνθήκη, translated here as "compact", means essentially the same as the word σύμβολον from Principal Doctrine 31.*]

Here, it's important to note that there's not a word meaning absolute although the intent is the same. Epicurus specifically says:

Οὐκ ἦν τι καθ’ ἑαυτὸ δικαιοσύνη...

"Righteousness does not exist in and of itself"

δικαιοσύνη is an abstract noun formed from δῐ́καιος (díkaios, “just”) +‎ -σῠ́νη (-súnē, "forms abstract nouns from adjectives or nouns"). So, δικαιοσύνη = righteousness, justice (as an abstract concept); fulfillment of the law. http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…try=dikaiosu/nh

Epicurus states unequivocally that there is no such entity as δικαιοσύνη that exists independent of context. There is no Platonic Form of righteousness in the Cosmos.

... but/instead... ἀλλ’...

it is always a compact

...ἀεὶ ... συνθήκη...

...ἐν ταῖς μετ’ ἀλλήλων συστροφαῖς καθ’ ὁπηλίκους δή ποτε ... τόπους ... τις...

agreed upon by those who gather together at some time and place.

ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτειν ἢ βλάπτεσθαι.

to not harm one another or be harmed

(Note our old friend βλάπτειν from the previous PDs)

Some important words:

ἀλλήλων expresses an action done in two directions: of one another, to one another, one another, each other, mutually, reciprocally. So, the compact/agreement has to be reciprocal and mutually agreed upon.

συστροφαῖς is a mass or gathering of people. This is the dative plural form of συστροφή. The -στοφη -strophē is akin to strophe in English as in a poem's twisting lines or the word apostrophe. I imagine a coming together of people, swirling in from disparate locations, to form a bustling community.

ὁπηλίκους refers to the idea of no matter how big or how small. The size of the gathering doesn't matter when it comes to making an agreement. This is potentially important for our discussions.

I'm also putting βλάπτειν back in here http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…7:entry=bla/ptw and its opposite αδικέω which notably Epicurus chooses NOT to use: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/morph?l…=captus#lexicon That may also continue to be important as this discussion moves doing.

Let the games continue...

The more I think about this, the more I wonder if we can include slaves in the ethnos έθνος mentioned in the Principle Doctrine. Slaves, although powerless, are still bound by the laws put in place by the slaveholding state. However, such law is not for the mutual benefit or pleasure of both parties.

Now, I can see the ruling class of such a state using a rationalization that the enslaved need to be "civilized," that they can't take care of themselves "by their nature", etc. which is not based on observation but prejudices.

As such, it seems to me that such a law would have to be unjust. It does not meet the fundamental quality or prolepsis of justice in providing an agreement to neither harm nor be harmed. One party is obviously harming the other. As such, any law sanctioning slavery is unjust whether ancient or modern. Whether or not Philodemus encourages using slaves or treating them kindly.

Now, an enslaved person who rises up against the one who oppresses her is not necessarily engaged in a just act. That's still harming another. However, if it was in self-defense or in direct reaction to being harmed by the unjust law of slavery, maybe it could be determined to be just.

On the other hand, if two parties sign a contract of indentured service and the servant rises up against the other party, that is unjust. In that case, even though one party has more power than the other, each agreed to the contract.

The whole idea of agreements, mutual benefit, security from harm, seems the only way to determine if justice or injustice is present. Maybe in some situations, it simply doesn't exist. For example, there is no justice or injustice if a tiger kills and eats a human. There was never any agreement. If another human kills and eats a human, that is an injustice because there are laws against that. By living in a society with those laws, citizens "agree" to abide by those laws.

I'm still trying to work out the identity of the ethnos who do not have power or who decide to not enter into agreements. This gets much more complex when dealing with humans than the animal scenarios. How and when are agreements made? Is the international community one society under some laws?

Obviously, I'm still thinking out loud. Maybe spend some time in JSTOR or Long & Sedley's Hellenistic Philosophers.

I may pause this one and continue to delve into parsing the remaining PDs.