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"In Epicurus’ own words, “the same conviction that inspires confidence that no evil is eternal or even enduring, also makes us aware that in our limited conditions of life friendship affords us the most perfect security”.²⁴"
Tutrone's translation of PD28
"Roman readers seem to have discussed with fervor Cicero’s work On the Commonwealth (De Re Publica), which strongly advocated the importance of political commitment as an altruistic, law-abiding service and warned against the risks of contemplative isolation.² Cicero’s main target in the first polemical part of On the Commonwealth were the Epicureans, who – as Cicero himself says elsewhere – took Italy by storm and founded several communities of wisdom-practitioners in imitation of Epicurus’ Athenian garden."
I was unaware of this work by Cicero. Maybe worth finding, and it may be worth finding out if this was written pre- or post-de Finibus. So, Cicero really didn't like Epicureanism even with Epicurean friends.
Fabio Tutrone. A View from the Garden: Contemplative Isolation and Constructive Sociability in Lucretius and in the Epicurean Tradition
An interesting paper that lays out a thought-provoking perspective on a number of points. Haven't read it completely, but I liked the parts I've read so far including a nuanced view of "live unknown." The author talks about its contextual nature.
Just realized there are a lot of CAPITAL LETTERS in my post #94. I did not mean to yell that much 
Passions can get the best of you when you post later at night. I agree with everything I wrote... Just maybe need to dial back the expression of it.
So, this is a "listen to your feelings" concept I can get behind. This is the work of Dr. Lisa Feldman Barrett too:
We cross posted -- much of the answer to your question is in the "animality objection" in post 82 above.
I thought the "All pleasure is good" precluded the ranking of pleasure.
That would be correct if we considered all pleasure is good" to mean "all pleasure is THE highest good" but it is by no means clear (at least to me) that Epicurus was considering "good" here in that absolute sense, rather than in the relative sense in which there are many goods, some better than others. That's the reason for the SUMMUM in the "summum bonum" I think.
Okay, let me finally return to my "Oh, my"...
Pleasure is "THE highest good" not because it is the "Best Bestest Good Out Of All The Other Goods."
It is "The Good" because it is the good thing to which all other possible candidates for "The Good Thing" leads. It is The Good, the Tagathon, the Goal, the Telos at the End of every action or desire. It is NOT "good" relative to other goods. It is THE GOOD. There are no rivals.
Virtue cannot be The Good because ultimately we act virtuously because it is instrumental to pleasure.
Wisdom cannot be The Good because we act wisely ultimately because it is instrumental to feelings of pleasure.
Philosophy cannot be The Good because we follow a philosophy because it will lead us to pleasure.
EVERYTHING points to pleasure. Pleasure sits at the top of the heap of possible candidates for The Good BECAUSE it is the final destination, The Goal, the Telos, the End. That is why it's the SUMMUM bonum. It is at the summit of goods. All paths up the mountain pass virtue, wisdom, etc., along the way and what sits at the end of the path at the top... why do we do the things we do? ... To achieve pleasure! The SUMMUM denotes the top or the summit. It is literally the highest good. It is the good "at the utmost, at farthest." Every path, followed to its end, leads ultimately to pleasure. Pleasure is literally The End at the end of the path.
This is also an argument against viewing some pleasures being "higher" than others. PLEASURE writ large is the telos, the goal, the end, the highest good. We chase pleasure in all its myriad and varied forms.
Aristotle didn't accept pleasure as The Good because (according to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) "pleasure cannot be our ultimate target, because what counts as pleasant must be judged by some standard other than pleasure itself, namely the judgment of the virtuous person." That's circular reasoning it seems to me. Pleasure can't be the ultimate good because there needs to be a standard of pleasure judged by some virtuous person?? That's one reason why Epicurus said Pleasure IS The Standard for our choices. There is no other "authority" - no virtuous person - judging our actions except does this choice lead to pleasure.
Now, this didn't deter Epicurus from saying, "Yes, all pleasure is good, but that pleasure you're thinking about choosing... Experience has shown that leads ultimately to pain, not the most pleasant life. Okaaay, you do the drugs all night, drink til dawn if you choose to. BUT you're going to pay a hefty price tomorrow and even more if you keep it up. But I will not argue that you aren't feeling pleasure in the moment. I'll let the Cyrenaics know you'll be knocking at their door."
Another way of stating the question is that if he had been consistent, as soon as Epicurus formulated his philosophy he should have retired to his cave and lived a subsistence existence totally apart from the crowd. But he did not -- he lived a life of relative material luxury and devoted much of his time to philosophical controversy. Why - one naturally would ask? And I think the answer has to be in part that he valued the pleasures that he chose to pursue more highly - much more highly - than the pleasures he would have achieved had he retired to the cave on bread and water.
I'm not sure what you're getting at here. Epicurus talked the talk and walked the walk. He aimed to live the most pleasant life. Living an ascetic life in a cave open to the elements, alone, away from friends, on the edge of starvation, would not be pleasant. He knew that obviously. He set up shop right outside the walls of the city on the road to the Academy in relative affluence for the day. It has nothing to do with "higher" or "lower" pleasures. The life he led was the most pleasant for him and he chose that.
And I would say that what seems like the obvious answer to me is that he chose the pleasures derived from the life of philosophical study and writing and controversy as much more pleasant to him than the life of "grazing in the grass."
Epicurus chose "the pleasures derived from the life of philosophical study and writing" precisely because he found it pleasurable. He obviously enjoyed teaching, writing diatribes against rival schools, welcoming friends into the Garden. I don't think he weighed living like a cow or a pig AGAINST a life of teaching and writing. He knew what would bring him pleasure and pursued that.
Moooooooo
PS. On second thought...Oink
LOL! Okay, it's my turn to say, "Oh, my! 
"
Off to work now, but I'll try to post tonight.
The next step though is significantly harder, which is the analysis of "ranking" pleasures
Please don't take this as some kind of ad hominem, because it's not meant that way...
But why?
Why do you want or need to rank pleasures?
I thought the "All pleasure is good" precluded the ranking of pleasure.
Maybe ranking desires for specific pleasures is possible (Epicurus did do that after a fashion with necessary, natural, etc.), but by definition pleasure is good.
I might even amend my post above to say the pleasure of breathing, eating, are both natural and necessary. The desire to eat shrimp instead of bread is natural but not necessary.
Cassius is right and we need to return to Kalosyni 's original list that started this thread and what is meant when an Epicurean talks about pleasure. Godfrey 's mention of Maslow's hierarchy above reminded me of a post I wrote last year. Here's the applicable excerpt:
I was listening to a TED Radio Hour today about Abraham Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs… and realized it seemed VERY Epicurean: KD 29: Among desires, some are natural and necessary, some are natural and unnecessary, and some are unnatural and unnecessary (arising instead from groundless opinion). The necessary desires are at the bottom. To not be hungry, etc. The need for security is the social contract Epicurus talks about. Love and friendship is next. It gets a little more fuzzy with self-esteem and self-actualization but I think the similarities remain and are worth exploring!
I wanted to emphasize again - at the risk of derailing the thread immediately - that those categories pertain to desires not pleasure. We *need* air, food, water, shelter. We can gain pleasure from those "necessary needs", but it is a necessary desire to seek air, food, water, shelter. Without wanting, seeking, and procuring adequate air, we die. Without adequate food, we die. Etc.There is an agency to making sure we have those necessary desires filled. Fulfilling those desires also gives us pleasure and removes pain. Think of swimming underwater. We can decide to stay under as long as possible, but at some point we're going to "desire" to breathe. Our heads splash through the surface and we take in a big breath of air. Ahhhhhhh!! Yeah, baby! That's the pleasure. So, my contention is that a desire need not be grand. It need not be capital-D Desire. Just like pleasure doesn't need to be capital-P Pleasure. There are things that we desire because they're necessary for living, and only the living can experience pleasure. Then pleasures can be varied. We can desire different foods, clothing, shelter, etc. A desire for those varieties are "unnecessary" in the sense that any food would do if we were starving, but there's nothing "wrong" or "bad" about deriving pleasure from fulfilling a desire for shrimp rather than bread when it comes to the "necessary" desire for food as long as it's not an undue struggle or painful process of fulfilling that variety.
Again, this was all very stream of consciousness so I'm hoping Kalosyni is at least getting pleasure from reading these digressions.
I'm going to duplicate my post from above on that phrase "most pleasant" so it doesn't get lost. Eikadistes 's excellent compilation of PD translations might prove helpful in this analysis as well.
The larger context of that phrase is:
...the wise seek to enjoy the time which is most pleasant and not merely that which is longest.
So, he's specifically talking about enjoying the most pleasant time. Not a specific pleasure. The phrase is in the context of talking about the span of one's life. A life doesn't have to be long to be the "most pleasant." What makes the most pleasant life? I go back to Cicero's Torquatus:
Let us imagine a man living in the continuous enjoyment of numerous and vivid pleasures alike of body and of mind, undisturbed either by the presence or the prospect of pain: what possible state of existence could we describe as being more excellent or more desirable?
Good post, Godfrey . Pulling out a couple more sentences for emphasis from the WP article:
I wouldn't limit a desire to a mental concept, it could also be a physical or psychological craving.
Trying to wrap my head around your statement here. Are you referring to things like addiction? A "desire" that is more of an involuntary craving? I would categorize addiction or craving as different from a desire. A desire - in my mind - has to be voluntarily brought to mind. You have to have agency to decide to fulfill the desire or not. Yes, I'm picking up on agency from Wikipedia. A craving for an addiction takes the agency out of the picture. But.. hmm.. what about a strong desire to possess something or to be with someone? Still working all this out.
The sense I was trying to get across with the "a desire is a mental concept" is that a desire is something you can think about. In fact, the thought "I want X" (and its many permutations) is itself the desire. On the other hand, pleasure and pain are something that happens to you. You can think about the feelings of pleasure and pain after they occur.. or before they occur if you have a desire for something. Pleasure and pain are, after all, what we attempt to experience or avoid, respectively. But, in the moment, pleasure or pain just happens. You can desire lunch with a friend. You can schedule lunch with a friend. But during the lunch with a friend you experience the feeling of pleasure welling up. You can't think "Now, I will experience pleasure." That's like that beer commercial from a number of years ago where the person says, "Commence relaxation NOW!"
The commercials ... make fun of a certain Teutonic obsession with control, using various scenarios whose humor would come through whether it was a beer ad or a late-night comedy skit. In one, a blond actor struggles to get comfortable on a couch for a relaxation session. He is wearing a stiff white shirt and tie and is listening to a compact disk titled "Das Kalm." "Commence relaxation now," an offscreen voice commands. It does not work out well. "Germans don't do laid back," the announcer intones in an unmistakable German accent. "They do beer."
(PS... with apologies to Martin btw)
It's that idea of willing something that needs to be allowed to arise naturally that I'm trying to get at. Pleasure and pain can't be willed. They can be nurtured and chosen but you can't say "Commence feeling pleasure NOW!". You can say, "I desire this experience that will result in pleasure."
it is clear too that we also feel pleasure or pain independently of any desire
Absolutely! The literal definition of πάθη pathē is "what is done or what happens to a person." See my #71 above that you reacted to. That's why desires and pleasure (& pain) are two very different things. We can choose our desires. Pleasure and pain will happen to us irregardless of whether we choose one over the other or not. What Epicurus's philosophy does is give us a goal toward which to direct what choices we make about which desires to pursue and which to reject at any given time depending on our context and circumstances.
I would also add we can consciously desire something. We can think about wanting something. We don't get a choice but to experience pain or pleasure when it's happening. We react. If I hit my thumb with a hammer, I feel pain! I don't get to decide if it's painful, it just is.
Now, I can "will" myself to endure the pain... like the experiments that have subjects hold their hand in ice water. Those who swear can more readily withstand the cold longer than those who are not allowed to swear. They are both experiencing pain but one group experiences it as less painful. Same stimulus, different reactions.
I would say that may be too broad. Can't we desire to feel pain in order to experience more pleasure later?
We choose to experience pain for a larger pleasure. We don't desire to experience pain.
On the other hand, while we are feeling pain or pleasure we are feeling it without thinking why - we just feel it.
Right. We feel pleasure and pain resulting from a specific desire being fulfilled.
Is not a desire somehow more "willed" while pleasure and pain are simply reactions?
Desires are conscious thoughts - "longings" - for something.
Pleasure and pain are the feelings we experience which help us choose which desires to fulfill and which to reject.
That gets back to pathe right? A desire is not a pathe is it?
A desire is an επιθυμια epithymia; pain and pleasure are παθη pathe. Yes, two different words. Two different "things."
(1) What is the relationship between desire and pleasure?
We desire to experience pleasure.
We desire to avoid pain.
The larger context of that phrase is:
...the wise seek to enjoy the time which is most pleasant and not merely that which is longest.
So, he's specifically talking about enjoying the most pleasant time. Not a specific pleasure. The phrase is in the context of talking about the span of one's life. A life doesn't have to be long to be the "most pleasant." What makes the pleasant life? I go back to Cicero's Torquatus:
Let us imagine a man living in the continuous enjoyment of numerous and vivid pleasures alike of body and of mind, undisturbed either by the presence or the prospect of pain: what possible state of existence could we describe as being more excellent or more desirable?
There is no consideration necessary of the duration, intensity, etc. of the specific *pleasure* itself of drinking wine. What will be the result of this desire if it is fulfilled? If not? The decision to pursue one's desire to experience the pleasure derived from drinking wine is completely contingent on personal factors and subjective feelings of what pain and pleasure will result from whether this desire is fulfilled or not.
See in that first sentence i would say that it is impossible and illogical to evaluate the result without considering each of the factors (duration intensity etc) that we are discussing. The result IS largely those resulting factors, is it not?
I wouldn't say the *result* is the duration/intensity. The result is what happens *after* the desire is filled or experienced; After you've experienced the duration/intensity. The decision of whether or not to fulfill a specific desire is contingent on what happens if it's fulfilled or what happens if it's not, after the experience. How much pleasure ensues from fulfilling this desire balanced against how much pain ensues from fulfilling that desire. I desire/decide to undergo the pain of exercise because the *result* I desire is a healthier life. I sense a lack of exercise is detrimental and I desire to fill that lack. The result I wish to achieve is a healthier life.
Admittedly, this is very stream of consciousness. I reserve the right to revise and extend my remarks.
I agree with this, but probably more is needed to define what desire really is.
The word Epicurus uses when talking about natural, necessary, etc is επιθυμία epithymia:
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, ἐπιθυ_μ-ία
I'll admit I have only the barest knowledge of Nietzsche's philosophy.
Using Epicurus's method of using what the generally-accepted definition of a word is, I'd offer that a "desire" is a mental concept sensing a need for some thing one does not currently have or for an experience one is not currently undergoing. One senses a lack or void that one feels needs to be filled. Whether one fills that sensed need is the crux of making choices and rejections.
After having read the above exchange, I don't know whether we're farther along or not. I'm going to summarize my thoughts. Take from this what you will.
Pleasure can be experienced from ... Let's say, drinking wine.
Some people desire the pleasure of drinking wine. This is a natural but unnecessary desire. One could satisfy one's thirst simply by drinking water. Maybe this person wants to vary their pleasure The person who desires the pleasure experienced by drinking wine weighs the pain in procuring the wine (minimal), any resulting pain (enjoy in moderation, minimal pain), commits to not acting foolish (maintain reputation, no pain). The desire to experience the pleasure of intoxicating beverages in this context can be experienced with minimal pain. Go ahead.
Another person who struggles with alcoholism weighs the desire for the pleasure of intoxicating beverages much differently.
The *pleasure* of drinking wine stays the same. Two people drinking wine will expressive pleasure. They may decide to pursue their desires for wine drinking for very different reasons
The desire to experience the pleasure of drinking wine is completely contextual and subjective.
The decision to indulge the desire to experience this specific pleasure is completely personal, subjective, and contextual.
There is no consideration necessary of the duration, intensity, etc. of the specific *pleasure* itself of drinking wine. What will be the result of this desire if it is fulfilled? If not? The decision to pursue one's desire to experience the pleasure derived from drinking wine is completely contingent on personal factors and subjective feelings of what pain and pleasure will result from whether this desire is fulfilled or not.
