Posts by Don

Quick thought:

As animals, we have a desire to feel pleasure.

As humans, we have the capacity to choose which desires to feel pleasure we pursue.

Let's start with some definitions and we're going to focus on the word Epicurus uses not the translation for right now:

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, ἐπιθυ_μ-ία

I'm including the Blue Letter Bible entry to illustrate that the Christians took επιθυμία to be inherently bad. Mostly I think because any choice not sanctioned by the church was evil. Rememder that the Greek for choice is αίρεση hairesē whereby we get English heresy.

G1939 - epithymia - Strong's Greek Lexicon (kjv)

G1939 - ἐπιθυμία epithymía, ep-ee-thoo-mee'-ah; from ; a longing (especially for what is forbidden):—concupiscence, desire, lust (after).

www.blueletterbible.org

And finally, some translations for επιθυμία :

Woodhouse, S. C. (1910) English–Greek Dictionary: A Vocabulary of the Attic Language‎, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Limited.

appetite idem, page 35.

aspiration idem, page 45.

bent idem, page 74.

caprice idem, page 112.

concupiscence idem, page 156.

craving idem, page 182.

desire idem, page 215.

hunger idem, page 410.

inclination idem, page 428.

itch idem, page 461.

longing idem, page 498.

lust idem, page 505.

passion idem, page 597.

predilection idem, page 634.

proneness idem, page 653.

vagary idem, page 942.

want idem, page 961.

whim idem, page 976.

wish idem, page 983.

So you can decide to fulfill an επιθυμία or not. It is an opportunity for a volitional and/or a cognitive act. It could also be a sensory stimulation as in realizing you're hungry or thirsty.

You want something. You decide whether or not you pursue it, to fill that perceived need. So, sensation may be part of it.

The feeling you experience by fulfilling that want, desire, passion, hunger, longing is either pleasurable or painful.

Still thinking...

I think Godfrey 's point that desires (επιθυμία ) and pleasure (ηδονή ) are two different things is a very important one, and conflating the two is part of the trouble in discussing this topic.

In re-reading G&T I'm struck by their conclusion in 19.4.30:

Quote

It seems simplest just to suppose that when the organism is functioning harmoniously it is always having some form of perception; that since the operation is harmonious the perception is pleasant and without pain; and that is just what aponia is. Ataraxia is the condition when, because of correct views, our expectations are undisturbed by fear, our desires do not pursue empty objectives and our memories are pleasant: this leaves us to enjoy our pleasures unanxiously.

This seems in line with where I'm coming down, especially in light of Metrodorus 's fragment. G&T's "when the organism is functioning harmoniously it is always having some form of perception" seems to me to have parallels to the homeostasis and interoception of modern biology. Their "this leaves us to enjoy our pleasures unanxiously" seems again to bolster the points I was trying to make in post #92 above. Ataraxia and aponia become the condition (katastema) that is always available to us once we internalize Epicurus's teachings, freeing us to enjoy the pleasure that comes from our prudent choices of which desires will lead to a pleasurable life.

Quote from Cassius

I keep coming back in my mind to one of the biggest challenges here being the over-restrictive definition of pleasure that we live under today

Agreed. There's a linkage of "pleasure" with "profligacy" or "indulgence" in modern parlance... And it seems Ancient parlance, too.

Quote from Cassius

that if you feel ANYTHING at all (and we are constantly feeling lots of things as part of being alive) then those feelings are either (1) pleasure or (2) pain.

Agreed. I am coming around to feeling this and not just intellectually thinking it. I don't think there is a neutral state although I'm going to have to go back to Barrett and Lembke to think about this in light of their research. (Sent thoughts, Godfrey ?)

On a related note, it seems Dewitt was fully on board with katastematic and kinetic pleasures in Epicurus's philosophy.

To me, this is making more and more sense (in light especially of Metrodorus's book reference). We can be more sure of internal freedom from pain in the body and internal freedom from disturbances in the mind than we can of external sources of pleasure... Even if necessary pleasures are easy to come by. The katastematic pleasures of ataraxia and aponia are "states or conditions of being" generated from within ourselves. We free our minds from trouble and fear by internalizing Epicurus's principles on the gods, death, the nature of the universe, etc. - by mulling them over and accepting or rejecting their validity and veracity. We free our bodies from pain by healthy habits and prudent choices. *Ataraxia & aponia* allow for continuing pleasure regardless of external circumstances. If we have them, we have well-being (eudaimonia). Kinetic pleasures or pleasures of sight, sounds, touch, etc. vary the pleasure and we enjoy luxuries if and when they become available.

Not an entirely thought out position, but this is where I'm heading.

Quote from Cassius

I took that as a statement that pleasure is not always ever-present in one form or ano

ther, meaning that pleasure might not always be available as a guide.

Ah! Got it. Mea culpa.

I wasn't saying pleasure isn't or can't be present.

But, by definition (I think), if we're making a choice about an action, the pleasure we will get as a result of that action is in the future. We have not felt *that* pleasure yet but are using past and present pleasure to extrapolate into the future that *choice* A will bring X amount of pleasure in the future; choice B will bring Y amount of pleasure and Z amount of pain. If predicted X is greater than Y pleasure, I should go with choice A for that pleasure. (I'm excluding pain in the equation for ease of argument, but that would factor in if I were to choose C pain for greater future pleasure).

We're always weighing present pleasure being felt now or was in there past against future pleasure that will be felt then.

That's what I mean by the present guide and the future goal.

Quote from Cassius

I am kind of surprised that you take that position

Just so we're clear and I can verify that I'm making the point I thought I was:

What position do you think I'm taking?

Quote from Cassius

Pleasure can be thought of as a feeling which serves as a guide because it is ever-present in one form or another.

But pleasure isn't always being felt when making choices and rejections. True, we're either feeling pleasure or pain, but we're often extrapolating to future pleasure when making choices of actions.

Quote from Cassius

As for what the "goal" is - is not the "goal" something more conceptual that is not presently with us and may never be reached?

So, in light of my comment above, the pleasure we're aiming for as our goal is "not presently with us" which makes that pleasure the/a goal.

I see pleasure as both the guide and the goal.

We aim toward the goal of a pleasurable life. That's the "greatest good (thing)" to my understanding.

We use the goal of pleasure as the guide in making our choices and rejections.

Cassius , I like your phrasing better than Dewitt's and yours doesn't rely on "Latin doesn't have a definite article."

Quote from Cassius

I think the motivation of the "Wikipedians" is to reduce the types of pleasure to only those which are "approved" and that makes way for Platonic / Aristotelian categorization into "better or worse" pleasures.

I'm going to again stress that we're not dealing with a monolithic authoritarian editorial board of "Wikipedians." Each and every one of us has the ability to sign up for a free account and add content. Whether that's just External Links to pertinent papers on JSTOR or Academia or books, or actually adding prose edits in articles ***and backing them up with citations***, we can all do it. There's no barrier. I would have done it myself today but I was under the weather and took a sick day. My plan is to include some additional material directly in the katastematic article. It could use some bulking up.

What we're really dealing with here are people - the hoi polloi to use Epicurus's term - working under the influence of popular acculturation and academic indoctrination. They have not set sail in their own little boat, free from all indoctrination. The hoi polloi are not aware there's even a controversy. Although, I will admit there *may* be some Stoic or Platonic sympathizers selectively editing Wikipedia. Yet another reason to get an account, get on, and at least start providing some *referenced* counterpoints.

Quote from Cassius

"I've told you that "Pleasure" is the goal of life

I agree 100% with you. Why then, I ask, does Dewitt not want to just stop at saying this? Dewitt's whole "Epicurus didn't say pleasure was the greatest good. Life is the greatest good" is, in my opinion, an unnecessary obfuscation. When he writes in that paper Cassius posted today:

Quote

Pleasure Not the Greatest Good

IN SPITE of this teaching it was not the doctrine of Epicurus that pleasure was the greatest good. To his thinking the greatest good was life itself. This was a logical deduction from the denial of immortality. Without the afterlife this present life becomes the concentration of all values. Pleasure, or happiness, has its place as the end, goal or fulfilment of living.

It was the Stoics and Cicero who concocted and publicized the false report that Epicurus counted pleasure as the greatest good. This is mistakenly asserted in all our handbooks.

I see nowhere in any of Epicurus's writings or any early adherents of the Garden to substantiate a phrase like "Life is the greatest good." At least Dewitt does say "pleasure is the end, goal or fulfilment of living." But that's what the "greatest good" is although he tries to jump through some hoops to say otherwise. (Dewitt tries to use VS42)

This wording bothered me in DeWitt's book and it bothers me here. It seems a milquetoast concession to an uneasiness to just saying "Pleasure is the Greatest Good. It is the thing to which all things point."

Even if someone wants to say Epicurus was using the philosophical terminology of the other schools in saying "the greatest good" (I think this was not the case and that Epicurus was genuinely saying 'pleasure is the greatest good') "Life" can't be the "greatest good" because our lives can't point to life. That's a tautology. Maybe "Living is a pleasure."? Ok, but yeah.

I'm sorry to bring up the rabbit hole again, but it bothers me. To my understanding, pleasure is the greatest "thing" to which we can aspire in our lives because everything we do ends with "Should I do this?" And we answer the question in the end "is it pleasurable or painful?" If you ask"is it virtuous?" you have to answer a whole set of other questions that finally boil down to "will this provide me with pleasure or pain?"

I find Dewitt's formulation of "Life is the greatest good" a tad nonsensical. Of course, life - living - is great and a good thing but it's great because it's the only thing we have! We exist now. After we exist, we do not exist. Non Fui, Fui, Non Sum, Non Curo. Yes PD2 says "Death is nothing to us; for what has disintegrated lacks awareness, and what lacks awareness is nothing to us." Before we "disintegrate" we're alive, we're living, we're making choices and rejections, and that's great. That's a pleasurable thing to experience. But I'm not persuaded by his "no definite article in Latin" idea, not his saying the Stoics and Cicero are the ones responsible for "Pleasure is the greatest good" from what I've seen.

And I know this has been written and cited before by Cassius, so in the interest of fairness and to work on my citation habits:

File

Epicurus: The Summum Bonum Fallacy

The aim of this article is to show how the lack of a definite article in Latin obliterated the doctrine of Epicurus that life itself and not pleasure is the greatest good.

Cassius

February 13, 2022 at 4:00 PM

Common Fallacies About Epicurus (#2): Epicurus maintained that Pleasure is the “Greatest Good” – NewEpicurean

Oh, and btw, I am feeling a little better after sleeping much of today away. From miserable to uncomfortable. The terrible can be endured...

Quote from Kalosyni

I would add that your label of the "Wikipedia-Epicureans" would refer to the "tranquility-as-the-goal-Epicureans".

Exactly. Wikipedia editors (of which I am one and anyone else can be, too!) are, for the most part, entering third-party information that should be sourced. There is nothing - except time - stopping any of us or anyone else from entering information, citations, and references to Nikolsky, G&T, Wenham, DeWitt, Sedley, the sun-size paper author I forget their name, et al. to Epicurus-related articles on Wikipedia.

(Unless someone would like to share an experience that didn't go well in the past? Even so, the opportunity still exists.)

Quote from Godfrey

My thinking is that pleasure is typically a result. Desires are something that we can tangibly work with. Epicurus' concern is with describing practice, with things anybody can do to achieve pleasure. He doesn't care what type of pleasure you achieve, he's concerned with how you go about achieving pleasure. And to him, you do this by working with your desires and with your pains. If you understand your desires, you will be more effective at achieving pleasure. As you minimize your various pains, these will by definition be replaced with pleasure. But you must always remember that your guide and goal is pleasure. Understanding desires and removing pains are only tools for pursuing pleasure. We can also pursue various pleasures for pure enjoyment, but for an effective practice to achieve lasting pleasure he focused on working with desires and on things which cause pain.

Brilliant!

Quote from Godfrey

Correct me if I'm missing something, but I've never found a connection between pleasure and natural and necessary in any of the writings of Epicurus. The connection that he consistently makes, in all cases (at least in translation) is between natural and necessary and desires. In the PDs it's between desires and pains. But never pleasures.

You are correct. The word used is επιθυμία (epithymia "desire, yearning, longing; passion") not ηδονή (hedone)

Quote from Cassius

And I grant you it takes effort to get through the lengthy and detailed discussions in Gosling and Taylor and Nikolsky but they WILL help on this issue.

Before I dig into them again:

A) Do they accept that Epicurus used the terms katastematic and kinetic, but those terms have been given undue importance by ancient and modern commentators?

B) Do they assert that Epicurus never used the words?

If B, I have strong objections to that argument.

In fact, let me copy the relevant passage from DLX.136 (emphasis added

Quote

He differs from the Cyrenaics with regard to pleasure. They do not include under the term the pleasure which is a state of rest (καταστηματικὴν), but only that which consists in motion (κινήσει). Epicurus admits both ; also pleasure of mind as well as of body, as he states in his work On Choice and Avoidance and in that On the Ethical End, and in the first book of his work On Human Life and in the epistle to his philosopher friends in Mytilene. So also Diogenes in the seventeenth book of his Epilecta, and Metrodorus in his Timocrates, whose actual words are : "Thus pleasure being conceived both as that species which consists in motion and that which is a state of rest." The words of Epicurus in his work On Choice (and Avoidance) are : "Peace of mind and freedom from pain are pleasures which imply a state of rest ; joy and delight are seen to consist in motion and activity."

So, what is DL "asserting" here?

• Cyrenaics only include kinetic pleasures under their definition of pleasure.
• Epicurus includes BOTH kinetic and katastematic in his definition.
• Where does Epicurus say BOTH pleasures are included? In the following works:
  • On Choice and Avoidance
  • On the Ethical End
  • the first book of his work On Human Life
  • the epistle to his philosopher friends in Mytilene
• Plus Metrodorus says both kinetic and katastematic pleasures are included in the Epicurean definition of Pleasure in Timocrates.
• Plus Diogenes (of Tarsus) says this in the seventeenth book of his Epilecta

There's no hierarchy asserted here. And the passage goes out of its way to say BOTH kinetic and katastematic pleasures are *included* in the Epicurean definition of pleasure in contrast to the Cyrenaics. And it cites *six* works that specifically make this point.

That's the kind of thing that needs to be accounted for: What's actually stated in the text.

PS. I should have also added that in addition to katastematic and kinetic pleasures, DL writes that Epicurus includes BOTH "pleasure of mind as well as of body." The Cyrenaics only included physical pleasure. So, those textual citations that DL cites appear to emphasize Epicurus included ALL pleasures: katastematic and kinetic, mental and physical, etc.

PPS. I'm wondering if Epicurus equated katastematic with mental and kinetic with physical? I'm not advocating that (yet), just raising the question.

Quote from Cassius

Unfortunately i cannot agree even with this statement.

It sincerely confuses me as to how you or anyone can say that. It's not Diogenes Laertius (DL) "asserting" this or even paraphrasing it. He's quoting Epicurus's On Choices and Metrodorus's Timocrates. I'll go back and read Gosling and Taylor and Nikolsky, of course, to refresh my memory of their arguments, but the ancient booktitles are there, and I think *that* has to be accounted for. If we start saying, "Oh, Epicurus didn't really write that in a book with that title!" we're on a Skeptical slippery slope as to what few ancient texts we have. The flip side of this is Cicero and his whole creation of the characters Villeius and Torquatus and being able to take creative liberties with their dialogue. Yes, we can be a little more skeptical and critical of his work. But DL makes a point of basically saying, "I'm not making this up. Here are their exact words from these books."

Quote from Cassius

Whatever Epicurus may have thought about K/K, those thoughts were not significant enough to make it into those key documents.

To that, I'd say "Bingo!" According to On Choices and other quoted material, Epicurus used the words katastematic and kinetic. Yes, I will continue to "assert" that. But *maybe* they weren't central to his philosophy because THEY'RE BOTH PLEASURES. He didn't see the need to belabor the point. He didn't put them in a hierarchy. He recognized that, sure, there are different kinds of pleasure. In fact, there are two general "species." But his philosophy stood on the assertion that PLEASURE is the Good to which everything else points. He then needed to demonstrate *how* to live pleasurably by making choices and rejections, etc. My take on the On Choices quote from Epicurus is (and I'll go ciceronian and put dialogue in his mouth):

Epicurus: "Sure, I'll agree with the general idea that there are katastematic and kinetic pleasures, but the important thing is that they're *both* pleasurable! You also have two hands. Do you lift heavy stones with only one hand? Of course not! In the same way, to have a pleasurable life you need to consider all pleasures as available to you, and choose among all pleasures prudently, making choices and rejections among them. There is a time for stillness, there is a time for dancing."

It's not Epicurus saying katastematic pleasures are the *only* Good or the *only* Telos, it's the ancient and modern commentators trying to paint him into a Platonic or Aristotlean corner. I'm seeing this through a Princess Bride lens with Epicurus saying to his critics and the academics on the word "katastematic": "I don't think it means what you think it means."

Quote from Cassius

what is hardly more than a footnote in DL assumes significance out of all proportion to anything else, and comes to be seized on so as to take the place of the core original point about pleasure in the first place.

Oh my, look at that. I think we might actually agree on that point.

Quote from Godfrey

I would say that it's a different quality of pleasure: quieter, more subtle

ἡσυχία (hēsykhia) "Stillness, rest, quiet" (see my other post where Epicurus uses this exact word).

Trivia: Hesychia was also "In Greek mythology, either the daemon personification of silence, a handmaiden of the god of sleep, Hypnos; or a mortal daughter of Thespius."

I knew I'd hit a nerve with Cassius on this whole katastematic/kinetic topic. I'm still digging through all the posts from today, and I'll have to go back and read Nikolsky, G&T (not gin and tonic, unfortunately), et al. I'll have more to say over the next few days. Plus I'm digging into the original texts as well. *That's* the most important task in my opinion.

For the record, however, there is no doubt that Epicurus divided up pleasures into at least 2 different but related kinds. No matter what, we have to account for:

DL X.136. ὁ δ᾽ Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ Περὶ αἱρέσεων οὕτω λέγει: "ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀταραξία καὶ ἀπονία καταστηματικαί εἰσιν ἡδοναί: ἡ δὲ χαρὰ καὶ ἡ εὐφροσύνη κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργείᾳ βλέπονται."

And Epicurus, in his On Choices, says this, "For freedom from disturbance ("ataraxia") and freedom from suffering ("aponia") are katastematic pleasures, and joy and delight are viewed as kinetic and active." (trans. Inwood & Gerson)

Epicurus is quoted, directly dividing pleasures into at least 2 katastematic ones and at least 2 kinetic/active ones. He made the distinction. He used the terms. Note, however, that he is NOT quoted as putting them in a hierarchy that I can see, but the words are there.

Plus this is the passage directly before Epicurus's On Choices quote:

Metrodorus in his Timocrates, whose actual words are : "Thus pleasure being conceived both as that species which consists in motion and that which is a state of rest."

Metrodorus's quote is:

νοουμένης δὲ ἡδονῆς τῆς τε κατὰ κίνησιν καὶ τῆς καταστηματικῆς.

Right there, again, is κίνησιν (kinēsin) and

καταστηματικῆς (katastēmatikēs).

Metrodorus is also quoted as saying (I'm paraphrasing, don't have it in front of me) that we can be more confident of the pleasures arising from states than from those of objects or activities outside of ourselves. To me, this points directly to the katastematic/kinetic debate plus seems to point to the importance of autarkeia/self-reliance.

So, even if by some chance Epicurus and Metrodorus were responding to criticism from another philosopher (and I don't think they were, but for the sake of conjecture), the two katastematic quotes show both Epicurus and Metrodorus accepted the terms and the categories as useful. We have to understand why, taking into account:

- All pleasure is good.

- The feelings are two: pleasure and pain.

Also for the record, I don't accept, as some academic commentators appear to, that ataraxia and aponia are "negative" or "not sensed". That makes no sense to me just because there's an a- "un-" prefix on the words. One can take pleasure in being in a state one can describe as being "undisturbed" or in a state one can describe as "pain-free." I simply don't accept that ataraxia and aponia are not "sensed."

[ U416 ]

Olympiodorus the Younger, Commentary on Plato’s "Philebus," [p. 274 Stallb.]: Epicurus, referring to natural pleasure, says that it is katastematic.

Philo of Alexandria, Allegory of the Law, III.54, t. I [p. 118 Mang.]: ... to those who say that pleasure is katastematic.

Quote from Kalosyni

The closest think that comes to me regarding "homeostasis" is Vatican Saying 11 - "For most people, to be quiet is to be numb and to be active is to be frenzied." And so this is pointing at something which is neither.

Here's some of my own commentary on VS11.

VS11 For most people, to be quiet is to be numb and to be active is to be frenzied.

τῶν πλείστων ἀνθρώπων τὸ μὲν ἡσυχάζον ναρκᾷ, τὸ δὲ κινούμενον λυττᾷ.

• τῶν πλείστων ἀνθρώπων (gen) the greatest number of people (i.e., the majority of people)
• ἡσυχάζω (hesykhazo) I. to be still, keep quiet, be at rest, Aesch.; ἡ ἀπορία τοῦ μὴ ἡσυχάζειν the difficulty of finding rest, Thuc.:—often in part., ἡσυχάζων προσμένω Soph.; ἡσυχάσασα by resting from war, Thuc.
• νάρκη I. numbness, deadness, Lat. torpor, Ar.
• κῑνέω (κινούμενον middle/passive participle?)
  • to set in motion, move, remove
  • (grammar) to inflect
  • to meddle
  • to change, innovate
  • to begin, cause
  • to urge on, stir on
  • to arouse, exasperate, anger, taunt, abuse
  • (passive) to be moved, to stir, to move
• λύσσα I. rage, fury, esp. martial rage, Il. 2. after Hom. raging madness, raving, frenzy, Trag. II. canine madness, rabies, Xen. λύσσα, αττιξ λύττα, ἡ

So an alternative translation by Don: For the majority of people, to be at rest is to be bored stiff; but to be active is to be raving like a rabid dog.

To me it seems to be saying there needs to be a balance or that stillness is important and that most people don't recognize this. Plus they're just running around to appear important or just simply to do something, they can't be alone with their own thoughts… they're not self-reliant.

Additional note: In light of the current discussion over multiple threads on katastematic and kinetic pleasures, I find the words ἡσυχάζον (hēsykhazōn) and κινούμενον (kinoumenon) VERY indicative of the senses of katastematic and kinetic (in fact, kinoumenon is directly related to that word in Greek). I find their juxtaposition here very interesting.

I also see his "for most people" directly implying "but not for us (Epicureans)". He is setting up a contrast with the masses against the Epicureans, and, from my reading here, the Epicureans *value* ἡσυχάζον and κινούμενον and the Epicureans do NOT see them as numbness and "raving like a rabid dog," respectively.

In fact, hesykhias shows up in a PD14.

PD14 . “Although security on a human level is achieved up to a point by a power to resist and by prosperity, the security afforded by inner peace and withdrawing from the crowd is the purest.” White (2021)

Τῆς ἀσφαλείας τῆς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γενομένης μέχρι τινὸς δυνάμει τινὶ ἐξερειστικῇ καὶ εὐπορίᾳ εἰλικρινεστάτη γίνεται ἡ ἐκ τῆς ἡσυχίας καὶ ἐκχωρήσεως τῶν πολλῶν ἀσφάλεια.

+ ἡσυχίας (hesykhias) "peace; silence, stillness"

+ + ἐκχορεύω (ekkhoreuo) "to break out (ἐκ-) of the chorus (χορεύω)"

I find reading the ἡσυχάζον in VS11 in light of the ἡσυχίας in PD14 , and vice versa, to be intriguing.